Faith, Reason, and Self-evident truths

[Jester]

This is currently being discussed in the Holy Huddle room, but for those non-Christians who wish to participate, I'm adding the topic here.

Is there proof, reasonable evidence, some evidence, etc for the existence of reality?

Or:

Must we accept some things on a non-rational basis?

Or:

Do you have some response not mentioned above?

[Jester]

Okay, Thought Criminal (and anyone else who's interested, I guess) here's my post from the Holy Huddle room. Feel free to comment as you please.

I'm glad we finally got this one open. I'll start with a summary of my personal position.

I find that, ironically, it was largely my skepticism that let me to faith. (For those who didn't see the original topic, we were debating whether there was a logical reason to believe in the physical universe, or if that was the sort of thing that needed to be taken on faith.)

In any case, I've adopted the position that, while we shouldn't contradict ourselves or any evidence that we see, a few things just have to be taken on faith. The idea actually bothers me, but being bothered isn't disproof, so there we are.

I'm inclined to think the same for the spiritual world in general. I know so little about it, but what information I do have leads me to feel that it is there.

Well, those are my initial thoughts. Any responses/additions?

[Thought Criminal]

I find that, ironically, it was largely my skepticism that let me to faith. (For those who didn't see the original topic, we were debating whether there was a logical reason to believe in the physical universe, or if that was the sort of thing that needed to be taken on faith.)

Faith is defined as irrational belief, which is to say belief that is not supported by evidence and analysis.

Given this, in what sense is your belief in the existence of things outside of your mind an act of faith? Or, to put it more pointedly, in what way are our independently verifiable perceptions of such things somehow less than evidence?

I'm inclined to think the same for the spiritual world in general. I know so little about it, but what information I do have leads me to feel that it is there.

This is actually related to the error above. The denial of an external, physical world is called idealism. Since the term has some other meanings, as well, let me specify the definition I intend:

any system or theory that maintains that the real is of the nature of thought or that the object of external perception consists of ideas.

Idealism in its pure form leads to idealistic monism, which says that only the mental exists. Physicalist monism, in contrast, says that only the physical exists. As a physicalist, I would say that the mental exists but only in terms of the physical, not independently. So, for example, given the physical state of my body (and, in particular, my brain), there can only be one set of contents in my mind. An alternative is to give up on monism entirely and embrace an ontology with two types of existence: dualism. In particular, Cartesian dualism says that the mental exists in one way while the physical exists in another.

I'm going to bet that when you talk about the spiritual, you are implicitly accepting something very much like Cartesian dualism. Would I be correct?

TC

[Jester]

Faith is defined as irrational belief, which is to say belief that is not supported by evidence and analysis.

Fair enough.

Given this, in what sense is your belief in the existence of things outside of your mind an act of faith? Or, to put it more pointedly, in what way are our independently verifiable perceptions of such things somehow less than evidence?

They are not independently verifiable.
All of these rest on the assumption that the information received by my mind is coming from a basically trustworthy source, as well as the idea that my mind is interpreting them essentially accurately. It is this pair of assumptions that are currently being questioned.

I'm inclined to think the same for the spiritual world in general. I know so little about it, but what information I do have leads me to feel that it is there.

This is actually related to the error above. The denial of an external, physical world is called idealism. Since the term has some other meanings, as well, let me specify the definition I intend:

The definition seems acceptable. I’ll stick to it. And yes, I agree that it would be accurate to apply it to the denial of an external world. I would only stipulate that I do not deny the external world, but merely deny that it has been evidenced.

Idealism in its pure form leads to idealistic monism, which says that only the mental exists. Physicalist monism, in contrast, says that only the physical exists. As a physicalist, I would say that the mental exists but only in terms of the physical, not independently. So, for example, given the physical state of my body (and, in particular, my brain), there can only be one set of contents in my mind. An alternative is to give up on monism entirely and embrace an ontology with two types of existence: dualism. In particular, Cartesian dualism says that the mental exists in one way while the physical exists in another.

I'm going to bet that when you talk about the spiritual, you are implicitly accepting something very much like Cartesian dualism. Would I be correct?

Something similar, yes.
With regard to the particular issue of the relationship between the brain and the mind, however, my position is essentially that we know far less than we think, and while I see a connection between the two, I don’t think we can reasonably make a conclusion that one can fully account for the other.

[cnorman18]

TC,

Just out of curiosity, what, in your view, is the problem with Cartesian dualism?

It seems all but self-evident to me. The stuff in my head is clearly not part of the physical world; it is unverifiable, and in fact directly inaccessible to anyone other than myself; that it even exists is unprovable except on my word. And yet it clearly does exist.

If we define "thought" as "electrochemical activity in the brain," that pretty clearly doesn't get us where we need to go. The fact of thought, that is, its content, is not accessible by that route, and it is the content of thought that matters. As I said on another thread, defining the reality of thought as brain activity makes no more sense than defining the reality of a Leonardo as the chemical composition of the paint. It's true in a trivial sense, but not the essential, the "real" one.

Seems to me there are only two ways out of defining thought as another order of existence; (1) defining it as "brain activity," as above, which is both trivial and beside the point; or (2) denying that anyone's thoughts are real, including my own, since they can neither be verified nor proven to exist. That also seems--unsatisfying.

So what's the problem?

[Thought Criminal]

They are not independently verifiable.
All of these rest on the assumption that the information received by my mind is coming from a basically trustworthy source, as well as the idea that my mind is interpreting them essentially accurately. It is this pair of assumptions that are currently being questioned.

How do you account for even the appearance of basic trustworthiness? For example, it does seem as though there is a keyboard in front of me, and that I can manipulate it in some ways but not in others. I can life it or press the keys but I can't seem to pass my hand through it, nor can I twist the whole thing into a pretzel. If it were purely a product of my mind, I don't see why I should have such unreasonable limitations.

I might suggest that the very act of perception carries with it an element of interpretation, so now you have to explain why it is that you are already interpreting your perceptions this way. The "assumption" is in fact a given, not something in addition to what we start with.

Something similar, yes.
With regard to the particular issue of the relationship between the brain and the mind, however, my position is essentially that we know far less than we think, and while I see a connection between the two, I don’t think we can reasonably make a conclusion that one can fully account for the other.

Why not?

TC

[Thought Criminal]

TC,

Just out of curiosity, what, in your view, is the problem with Cartesian dualism?

It seems all but self-evident to me. The stuff in my head is clearly not part of the physical world; it is unverifiable, and in fact directly inaccessible to anyone other than myself; that it even exists is unprovable except on my word. And yet it clearly does exist.

If we define "thought" as "electrochemical activity in the brain," that pretty clearly doesn't get us where we need to go. The fact of thought, that is, its content, is not accessible by that route, and it is the content of thought that matters. As I said on another thread, defining the reality of thought as brain activity makes no more sense than defining the reality of a Leonardo as the chemical composition of the paint. It's true in a trivial sense, but not the essential, the "real" one.

Seems to me there are only two ways out of defining thought as another order of existence; (1) defining it as "brain activity," as above, which is both trivial and beside the point; or (2) denying that anyone's thoughts are real, including my own, since they can neither be verified nor proven to exist. That also seems--unsatisfying.

So what's the problem?

If you bump your toe, you feel pain. If you bump your head, you feel dizzy. If we stimulate specific parts of your brain, you feel thirsty or hungry or horny. We can make you see lights, hear sounds, even experience emotions.

How do you explain this close link between the brain and the mind except to say that the mind exists in terms of the brain?

TC

[Zzyzx]

.

With regard to the particular issue of the relationship between the brain and the mind, however, my position is essentially that we know far less than we think, and while I see a connection between the two, I don’t think we can reasonably make a conclusion that one can fully account for the other.

I may have missed this earlier -- what is the distinction being made between brain and mind?

Merriam Webster defines mind as "a: the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons b : the conscious mental events and capabilities in an organism c : the organized conscious and unconscious adaptive mental activity of an organism".

Mental is defined as "a : of or relating to the mind; specifically : of or relating to the total emotional and intellectual response of an individual to external reality *mental health* b : of or relating to intellectual as contrasted with emotional activity c : of, relating to, or being intellectual as contrasted with overt physical activity"

And Brain is defined as: "1 a : the portion of the vertebrate central nervous system that constitutes the organ of thought and neural coordination, includes all the higher nervous centers receiving stimuli from the sense organs and interpreting and correlating them to formulate the motor impulses, is made up of neurons and supporting and nutritive structures, is enclosed within the skull, and is continuous with the spinal cord through the foramen magnum b : a nervous center in invertebrates comparable in position and function to the vertebrate brain
2 a (1) : INTELLECT, MIND (2) : intellectual endowment : INTELLIGENCE"

If the brain "includes all the higher nervous centers receiving stimuli from the sense organs and interpreting and correlating them to formulate the motor impulses".

And if mind is "the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons".

It would appear as though the two were inseparable AND as though the "mind" is simply a function of the brain.

[cnorman18]

TC,

Just out of curiosity, what, in your view, is the problem with Cartesian dualism?

It seems all but self-evident to me. The stuff in my head is clearly not part of the physical world; it is unverifiable, and in fact directly inaccessible to anyone other than myself; that it even exists is unprovable except on my word. And yet it clearly does exist.

If we define "thought" as "electrochemical activity in the brain," that pretty clearly doesn't get us where we need to go. The fact of thought, that is, its content, is not accessible by that route, and it is the content of thought that matters. As I said on another thread, defining the reality of thought as brain activity makes no more sense than defining the reality of a Leonardo as the chemical composition of the paint. It's true in a trivial sense, but not the essential, the "real" one.

Seems to me there are only two ways out of defining thought as another order of existence; (1) defining it as "brain activity," as above, which is both trivial and beside the point; or (2) denying that anyone's thoughts are real, including my own, since they can neither be verified nor proven to exist. That also seems--unsatisfying.

So what's the problem?

If you bump your toe, you feel pain. If you bump your head, you feel dizzy. If we stimulate specific parts of your brain, you feel thirsty or hungry or horny. We can make you see lights, hear sounds, even experience emotions.

How do you explain this close link between the brain and the mind except to say that the mind exists in terms of the brain?

TC

You misunderstand; I don't say that mind and brain are separate things. That thought depends on and is carried, so to speak, by the brain can much more conveniently and quickly be demonstrated with a bullet than with electrodes. No brain, no thoughts.

My point, really, is this; what is the nature of the reality of an idea?

The existence of electrical activity in the brain can be proven; the existence of a specific thought or idea cannot. That a particular thought or sensation can be stimulated by applying electrodes is irrelevant; that is going in the other direction. I can make you taste chocolate either by applying electrodes to the "taste" area of your brain--or by feeding you a Hershey bar. So far, so good. That's real.

But can you determine what I am thinking by analyzing my brain activity? Put my brain under a microscope or EEG or whatever and tell me to think of a person; can you tell me who I'm thinking of? Can you objectively prove that I'm thinking of Harry and not Tom?

Is that thought objectively real if the only way you can access it is through my subjective report? Why or why not?

You have said that subjective experience cannot be evidence even for myself if it's not demonstrable and provable to anyone else. How, then, am I to take the subjective experience of my own thoughts seriously? I can't prove to you that they even exist!

[Thought Criminal]

You misunderstand; I don't say that mind and brain are separate things. That thought depends on and is carried, so to speak, by the brain can much more conveniently and quickly be demonstrated with a bullet than with electrodes. No brain, no thoughts.

My point, really, is this; what is the nature of the reality of an idea?

The existence of electrical activity in the brain can be proven; the existence of a specific thought or idea cannot. That a particular thought or sensation can be stimulated by applying electrodes is irrelevant; that is going in the other direction. I can make you taste chocolate either by applying electrodes to the "taste" area of your brain--or by feeding you a Hershey bar. So far, so good. That's real.

But can you determine what I am thinking by analyzing my brain activity? Put my brain under a microscope or EEG or whatever and tell me to think of a person; can you tell me who I'm thinking of? Can you objectively prove that I'm thinking of Harry and not Tom?

Is that thought objectively real if the only way you can access it is through my subjective report? Why or why not?

You have said that subjective experience cannot be evidence even for myself if it's not demonstrable and provable to anyone else. How, then, am I to take the subjective experience of my own thoughts seriously? I can't prove to you that they even exist!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heterophenomenology

TC