Divine Insight wrote:
AgnosticBoy wrote:
If mental imagery is entirely physical, then scientists should absolutely be able to explain how physical processes in the brain lead to mental imagery. They absolutely should be able to directly observe what we're experiencing just like we can know about all of the visual content in a
computer!!!
And your problem with this is what exactly? That science isn't moving along at the speed that you would like for it to move?
Science is in the process of explaining these various things. Your impatience for the precise explanations does not equate to a failure of science.
Moreover, you claims that no explanation can be had are extremely premature. Why should anyone waste their time arguing with you when you have absolutely nothing to offer but complaints that science isn't moving as fast as you would like?
Clearly science is making progress and they haven't even remotely suggested that they are up against any brick walls preventing them from moving forward.
So where do you get off acting like as if they are up against a brick wall when there is absolutely no indication that this is the case?
Your arguments are no different from the "God of Gaps" types of arguments. You are simply arguing that just because science hasn't ironed out all the details yet that this suggests there must be some other non-scientific and non-physical answer.
It's way too premature to be trying to make that argument.
Your objections to science are unwarranted. It's that simple. Especially when you don't even have an alternative answer to offer. Claiming that there must be some non-physical images somewhere in an unseen invisible world that the brain is accessing when we visualize an image in our minds is, quite frankly, absurd.
Not only is there no need to make such a wild speculation, but until you have actually explained how that could work it's nothing but empty hot air.
Face it, you have nothing to offer but a disgruntled attitude toward science.
My approach on this thread is being a skeptic. I've asked materialist to justify their claim that all mental phenomena is physical, like 'mental imagery'. That does not require that I present any evidence but rather that materialists present evidence and so far they've failed. There is no scientific verifiable evidence that points to causation nor to the actual form or structure of mental images. The same big gap exists for consciousness. So what I'm left with here is agnosticism.
You go on to presume scientists will eventually discover the answer. You also accuse me of being impatient. I assume you know that potential future evidence does not justify CURRENT claims. I go by
available evidence and not evidence that is hoped for. I'm just as unsatisfied as an atheist that goes to a Christian website and leaves with little to no solid answers - just the typical apologetic points. There are other reasons that I view materialism as being inadequate for this issue. I believe that there are good reasons to support other positions like emergent dualism. Besides the lack of evidence from materialism, other reasons are:
- We don't perceive mental images the same way we perceive real-world objects, which shows the two are not the same
- Mental images/consciousness lack physical characteristics, which of course goes with why they're objectively unobserved.
- Computers have shown that consciousness is not needed to perform many of our cognitive tasks. Hek, some of the behaviors performed while sleepwalking shows that, as well. So WHY does it exist?
- The trend in science is also moving away from explaining consciousness in a reductionistic way. Reductionism gives materialism explanatory power. Without it you have consciousness as emergent phenomena or as a fundamental property.
I'll let leading neuroscientist Dr. Christof Koch elaborate on the last point.
Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist (MIT Press) by Dr. Christof Koch:
Pg. 113
What became increasingly clear to me was that no matter what the critical neuronal circuits are, their identification will raise a fundamental problem that I first encountered in 1992
Pg. 114
After one such seminar, the late neurologist Volker Henn in Zürich asked a simple question: Suppose that all of Crick’s and your ideas pan out and that layer 5 cortical neurons in the visual cortex that fire rhythmically and that send their output to the front of the brain are the critical neural correlates of consciousness. What is it about these cells that gives rise to awareness? How, in principle, is your hypothesis different from Descartes’ proposal that the pineal gland is the seat of the soul? Stating that neurons firing in a rhythmic manner generate the sensation of seeing red is no less mysterious than assuming that agitations of animal spirits in the pineal gland give rise to the passions of the soul. Your language is more mechanistic than Descartes’—after all, three and a half centuries have passed—but the basic dilemma remains as acute as ever.In both cases, we have to accept as an article of faith that some type of physical activity is capable of generating phenomenal feeling.
I responded to Henn with a promissory note: that in the fullness of time science would answer this question, but for now, neuroscience should just press on, looking for the correlates of consciousness. Otherwise, the exploration of the root causes of consciousness would be needlessly delayed.[/color]
Yet Henn’s challenge must be answered. The endpoint of my quest must be a theory that explains how and why the physical world is capable of generating phenomenal experience. Such a theory can’t just be vague, airy-fairy, but must be concrete, quantifiable, and testable.
Pg. 119
There is a clear alternative to emergence and reductionism, compelling to a covert Platonist such as myself. Leibniz spelled it out in the early eighteenth century in the opening statements of his Monadology:
1. The MONAD, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites—simple, that is, without parts.
2. And there must be simple substances, since there are composites; for the composite is nothing more than a collection, or aggregate, of simples.
This point of view does come with a metaphysical cost many are unwilling to pay—the admission that experience, the interior perspective of a functioning brain, is something fundamentally different from the material thing causing it and that it can never be fully reduced to physical properties of the brain.
I believe that consciousness is a fundamental, an elementary, property of living matter. It can’t be derived from anything else; it is a simple substance, in Leibniz’s words.
Pg. 120
And so it is with consciousness. Consciousness comes with organized chunks of matter. It is immanent in the organization of the system. It is a property of complex entities and cannot be further reduced to the action of more elementary properties. We’ve arrived at the ground floor of reductionism (that is why the reductionist of the subtitle of this book is tempered by the romantic).
Dr. David Chalmers believes consciousness is fundamental property of the universe and not just of a system like Dr. Koch believes.