Subjective Morality

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The Tanager
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Re: Subjective Morality

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Bust Nak wrote: Mon Sep 14, 2020 1:42 pmEarlier you said there are two issues: (1) what you think about an issue and (2) whether you think that issue has an objectively right/wrong answer. It's seems quite explicit that the (2) is referring specifically to the latter question by the phrase "that issue" (i.e. teaching of flat Earth) instead of any old related issues (e.g. whether the Earth is flat or not.)

Perhaps more to the point, you also said that this wasn't about me changing my answer to (1) based on whether we are looking at a subjective matter or an objective one, but here you are talking about changing my answer to (1) based on whether (2) has an objective answer or not. Why?

But, okay, whatever it takes to help you to understand my stance: some (2) kind of answers can affect some (1) kind of statements.
We have tried to come at this from many different angles. Context matters. If you think I'm changing up what I've been saying, then you are not understanding the different contexts of the various things I've said.

Here is another way of categorization:

All preferences can be covered by what I've called Simple Subjectivism. What do I prefer/believe about X? What do you prefer/believe about X? Do these preferences/beliefs differ? This includes the ice cream flavors one subjectively prefers because that is just their nature and one's belief about the objective truth of Flat Earth theory.

As far as our conversation goes there are at least three kinds of reasons to believe what we believe about X.

A. We believe X is Y because there is an objective truth about X.
B. We believe X is Y because there is no objective truth about X.
C. We believe X is Y because there is some other reason than (A) or (B).

To me (C) ignores the objectivism/non-objectivism issue, whether it's that we just follow our instincts, emotions, or whatever. You seem to fall under (C) when you talk about morality, even though you also claim there is no objective truth. That's been confusing.
Bust Nak wrote: Mon Sep 14, 2020 1:42 pm
To me, if subjectivism is addressing the issue objectivism does, then the subjective kind of (2) should also affect one's (1) kind of statement.
If some ice-cream favor is objectively more tasty than some other favor, would that change which ice-cream favor you personally prefer?
Yes, if by prefer you mean what my preferred opinion is on the question: "is chocolate more tasty?" If you mean some other preference, then which question are you asking for my preference on?
Bust Nak wrote: Mon Sep 14, 2020 1:42 pmThere is no reflection possible, I keep telling you, child abuse invoke raw emotions, I simply don't like children getting abused.
The following are exploring questions not accusations. It has nothing to do with them being damaged? You don't care about the damage they undergo (or don't think they are being damaged)?
Bust Nak wrote: Mon Sep 14, 2020 1:42 pmA reminder: Instincts and feelings are not based on rationality. Instead they contribute to the body of presumes for one to use reason on to come to a conclusion. You were supposed to be questioning the rationality of the bits that come after my preferences, and not question the rationality of my preferences themselves.
My instinct is to objectify women and my feelings try to lead me to do so. However, on my best days, I listen to what reason has told me and prefer women to not be objectified, including by myself.

If, for some reason, child abuse no longer invoked raw emotions for you, would you then think it good (or at least, meh, and then the joy the abuser would feel would tip you towards being okay with child abuse just like you talked about with ice cream tastes)? Considering the damage children would undergo would play no role in your moral preference there?

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Re: Subjective Morality

Post #532

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The Tanager wrote: Mon Sep 14, 2020 3:06 pm We have tried to come at this from many different angles. Context matters. If you think I'm changing up what I've been saying, then you are not understanding the different contexts of the various things I've said.
You've had plenty of answers from me qualified with the phrase "in this sense" or "in another sense." I think changing angles frequently is rather counter-productive. For example, earlier we were talking about A-type statements and C-type statements, you got that impression that I thought my suggested C is identical to A because I was speaking in a particular sense, trying to come at it from your angle; yet it has seemingly confused the issue because they are not identical to me at all.
All preferences can be covered by what I've called Simple Subjectivism. What do I prefer/believe about X? What do you prefer/believe about X? Do these preferences/beliefs differ? This includes the ice cream flavors one subjectively prefers because that is just their nature and one's belief about the objective truth of Flat Earth theory.

As far as our conversation goes there are at least three kinds of reasons to believe what we believe about X.

A. We believe X is Y because there is an objective truth about X.
B. We believe X is Y because there is no objective truth about X.
C. We believe X is Y because there is some other reason than (A) or (B).

To me (C) ignores the objectivism/non-objectivism issue, whether it's that we just follow our instincts, emotions, or whatever. You seem to fall under (C) when you talk about morality, even though you also claim there is no objective truth. That's been confusing.
The B here doesn't make much sense. Try this instead:

A. We believe X is Y because there is an objective truth about X.
B. We believe X is subjective because there is no objective truth about X.
C. We believe X is Y because there is some other reason than (A) or (B). Where "X is Y" is anything other than "X is subjective" as set out in (B).

For all subjective matters, from ice-cream taste to morality, I hold both (B) and (C). They are complimentary beliefs. (B) shows that my belief on whether the situation has an objective answer or not, changes something about what I think about the situation. (C) shows that my preferences doesn't change depending on whether the situation has an objective answer or not.
Yes, if by prefer you mean what my preferred opinion is on the question: "is chocolate more tasty?" If you mean some other preference, then which question are you asking for my preference on?
I am asking if you like the sensation of chocolate on your tongue more than that of vanilla. Presumably your taste buds would not report different signals based up on whether chocolate is objectively tastier than vanilla or not.
It has nothing to do with them being damaged? You don't care about the damage they undergo (or don't think they are being damaged)?
No, these are post hoc justifications. Raw emotional answers has no justifications.
My instinct is to objectify women and my feelings try to lead me to do so. However, on my best days, I listen to what reason has told me and prefer women to not be objectified, including by myself.
How do you tell the difference between what you said here and two conflicting instinct of you wanting to objectify women, and the instinct to be nice to women? The two scenarios has the exact same outwards appearance, no?
If, for some reason, child abuse no longer invoked raw emotions for you, would you then think it good (or at least, meh, and then the joy the abuser would feel would tip you towards being okay with child abuse just like you talked about with ice cream tastes)? Considering the damage children would undergo would play no role in your moral preference there?
If child abuse stop invoking raw emotions from me then I would start analysing the issue further and see what the implications are, and figure out how I feel about it by appealing to my raw emotional responses to said implications. If and when child abuse stop being such an open and shut case, then the damage cause would start to play a role.

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Re: Subjective Morality

Post #533

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Bust Nak wrote: Tue Sep 15, 2020 7:24 amYou've had plenty of answers from me qualified with the phrase "in this sense" or "in another sense." I think changing angles frequently is rather counter-productive.
Staying with the same angle and not getting one's point understood is unproductive. I'll risk the possible counter-production.
Bust Nak wrote: Tue Sep 15, 2020 7:24 amThe B here doesn't make much sense. Try this instead:

A. We believe X is Y because there is an objective truth about X.
B. We believe X is subjective because there is no objective truth about X.
C. We believe X is Y because there is some other reason than (A) or (B). Where "X is Y" is anything other than "X is subjective" as set out in (B).
I don't think this makes sense. The question my categorization is trying to answer is: what are the different reasons someone may believe such-and-such. Your correction does not maintain that. (B) is about believing one thing, while (C) is about believing a different thing.

Why does one think it is okay if Flat Earth theory is believed/taught?

A. Because one believes the shape of the Earth is objectively flat.

B. Because one believes the shape of the Earth is not objectively one shape and everyone should be allowed to believe whatever they want about the shape of the Earth.

C. Because one has raw emotions of pleasure invoked at such a thought.
Bust Nak wrote: Tue Sep 15, 2020 7:24 amI am asking if you like the sensation of chocolate on your tongue more than that of vanilla. Presumably your taste buds would not report different signals based up on whether chocolate is objectively tastier than vanilla or not.
If chocolate was objectively tastier, then it would be tastier to my tongue as well or my tongue would have a defect. The Earth is spherical to everyone, even if their mind gets different signals for whatever reason.
Bust Nak wrote: Tue Sep 15, 2020 7:24 am
It has nothing to do with them being damaged? You don't care about the damage they undergo (or don't think they are being damaged)?
No, these are post hoc justifications. Raw emotional answers has no justifications.
Such considerations can be a part of our emotional responses. If I see Susan crying out in pain at the hands of Johnny and I think damage is being done, then I'll have an emotional response. The reason I have that response is because of the damage I intellectually perceive being done. If I perceive that Johnny was popping Susan's separated shoulder back into place, then I will have a different emotional response, even though the actions in both situations are look the same.
Bust Nak wrote: Tue Sep 15, 2020 7:24 amHow do you tell the difference between what you said here and two conflicting instinct of you wanting to objectify women, and the instinct to be nice to women? The two scenarios has the exact same outwards appearance, no?
I think that is another way to put it. I have competing instincts. I would say the first instinct is the stronger one for me. I think I also have a moral sense telling me to make the second instinct stronger than it is. Then my reason is trying to figure out why I have these instincts, if my moral sense is simply cultural, can I find a way to justify following the stronger instinct, should I accept that justification, etc.

At this point, what I think of your moral view is that it is like one who has a dream/hallucination [you have certain beliefs and preferences], knows it is a dream/hallucination [believes there is no objective truth on the matter, that it was just a subjective experience they have of reality], but keeps acting as though the dream/hallucination is reality.

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Re: Subjective Morality

Post #534

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The Tanager wrote: Tue Sep 15, 2020 2:14 pm I don't think this makes sense. The question my categorization is trying to answer is: what are the different reasons someone may believe such-and-such. Your correction does not maintain that. (B) is about believing one thing, while (C) is about believing a different thing.
If "such-and-such" has to be that thing itself rather than all things about it, then the (A) and (C) alone would suffice:
A. We believe X is Y because there is an objective truth about X.
C. We believe X is Y because there is some other reason whether it's that we just follow our instincts, emotions, or whatever. (Or as I would put it, subjective feelings.)

(B) can be ruled out because makes no sense. No objective truth implies we are left to follow our subjective feelings, but it doesn't inform what those views are. We don't say "I like vanilla because there is no objective truth," instead we say "I like vanilla because it's sweet smelling, or whatever." I fall under (C) when I talk about morality, as I do with any other subjective matter such as food taste because both (A) and (B) are ruled out. (C) does ignore the objectivism/non-objectivism issue, objectivism/non-objectivism just determine whether (A) is in play or not. What's so confusing about that?
B. Because one believes the shape of the Earth is not objectively one shape and everyone should be allowed to believe whatever they want about the shape of the Earth.
This is the equivalent of "I like chocolate because there is no objective truth." Why would the fact that there is no objective truth, inform how you feel about an issue itself? You can't give me an explanation because you don't have one - you take this for granted as definitionally true.
If chocolate was objectively tastier, then it would be tastier to my tongue as well or my tongue would have a defect. The Earth is spherical to everyone, even if their mind gets different signals for whatever reason.
Well, I am asking you about mind signals, I spoke of sensation on the tongue. Sounds to me like you agree that the signals (incorrect as they are from a defective tongue) don't change depending on whether the question has an objective answer or not. So if the feeling of taste itself (as opposed to its correctness) doesn't change, why would it change for morality? And if it doesn't change depending on whether there is an objective answer or not, then it is not the case that you like chocolate because there is no objective truth.
Such considerations can be a part of our emotional responses. If I see Susan crying out in pain at the hands of Johnny and I think damage is being done, then I'll have an emotional response. The reason I have that response is because of the damage I intellectually perceive being done. If I perceive that Johnny was popping Susan's separated shoulder back into place, then I will have a different emotional response, even though the actions in both situations are look the same.
Sure, it can be. But you were talking about child abuse - you've already ruled out the equivalent of popping a shoulder back into place.
I think that is another way to put it. I have competing instincts. I would say the first instinct is the stronger one for me. I think I also have a moral sense telling me to make the second instinct stronger than it is. Then my reason is trying to figure out why I have these instincts, if my moral sense is simply cultural, can I find a way to justify following the stronger instinct, should I accept that justification, etc.
Okay how can you tell the different from one instinct (objectifying women) being stronger than the instinct (be nice to women) yet losing out due to some moral sense; and one instinct (objectifying women) being weaker than the instinct (be nice to women)?
At this point, what I think of your moral view is that it is like one who has a dream/hallucination [you have certain beliefs and preferences], knows it is a dream/hallucination [believes there is no objective truth on the matter, that it was just a subjective experience they have of reality], but keeps acting as though the dream/hallucination is reality.
Do you accept that you think of your ice-cream taste is like one who has a dream/hallucination [you like chocolate], knows it is a dream/hallucination [believes there is no objective truth on which ice-cream tastes best, that it was just a subjective experience they have of reality], but keeps acting as though the dream/hallucination is reality [picks chocolate ice-cream]?

I don't. The words dream/hallucination implies there is an mismatch between reality and the subjective experience. There is no mismatch because the nature of taste/morality is in actuality purely subjective. Having said that, I accept that I think of my moral view in exactly the same way as I threat ice-cream taste, and that it is as much (or rather as little) a dream/hallucination as each other.

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Re: Subjective Morality

Post #535

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Bust Nak wrote: Wed Sep 16, 2020 6:48 amIf "such-and-such" has to be that thing itself rather than all things about it, then the (A) and (C) alone would suffice:
A. We believe X is Y because there is an objective truth about X.
C. We believe X is Y because there is some other reason whether it's that we just follow our instincts, emotions, or whatever. (Or as I would put it, subjective feelings.)
(A) and (C) would not suffice. (B) is not believing something based on a subjective feeling one has, but a belief about a feature of reality outside of one's self being subjective.
Bust Nak wrote: Wed Sep 16, 2020 6:48 am(B) can be ruled out because makes no sense. No objective truth implies we are left to follow our subjective feelings, but it doesn't inform what those views are.
Why is that the necessary implication? One could follow their own subjective feelings or follow the thought that this is a subjective feature of reality (which has nothing to do with the content of their subjective feelings on the matter).
Bust Nak wrote: Wed Sep 16, 2020 6:48 amWe don't say "I like vanilla because there is no objective truth," instead we say "I like vanilla because it's sweet smelling, or whatever."
I agree. That's giving a (C) type of reason for the belief. When the belief is "I like allowing people freedom in ice cream choices," then we could also give a (C) type of reason or we could give a (B) type of reason. The (C) reason-giving person is not addressing the issue of objectivism; the (B) reason-giving person is addressing the same issue an objectivist, or an (A) reason-giving person, would.
Bust Nak wrote: Wed Sep 16, 2020 6:48 amThis is the equivalent of "I like chocolate because there is no objective truth." Why would the fact that there is no objective truth, inform how you feel about an issue itself? You can't give me an explanation because you don't have one - you take this for granted as definitionally true.
Above I've phrased things to not judge that one way or the other. I used a wrong definition before and your definition is also wrong. Let's use a neutral definition.

One could (and I know of people who do) say that the reason they like allowing personal freedom in taste is because they see taste as a non-objective feature of reality. Their belief is not based on any subjective feeling they experience, but on their intellectual belief that people's subjective feelings are like personal "hallucinations" that should not come into one's judgments of others.
Bust Nak wrote: Wed Sep 16, 2020 6:48 amWell, I am asking you about mind signals, I spoke of sensation on the tongue. Sounds to me like you agree that the signals (incorrect as they are from a defective tongue) don't change depending on whether the question has an objective answer or not. So if the feeling of taste itself (as opposed to its correctness) doesn't change, why would it change for morality? And if it doesn't change depending on whether there is an objective answer or not, then it is not the case that you like chocolate because there is no objective truth.
The feeling of what is moral would not necessarily change, but it could change. If taste was more than sensation, say, if reason was a part of taste, then change could happen. Reason is a part of morality for some people. Reason is not a part of taste for anyone that I know.
Bust Nak wrote: Wed Sep 16, 2020 6:48 amSure, it can be. But you were talking about child abuse - you've already ruled out the equivalent of popping a shoulder back into place.
But that equivalence is ruled out because of an intellectual perception. The emotional response of what's left is there because of the prior intellectual perception. Thus, it's not necessarily purely an emotional response.
Bust Nak wrote: Wed Sep 16, 2020 6:48 amOkay how can you tell the different from one instinct (objectifying women) being stronger than the instinct (be nice to women) yet losing out due to some moral sense; and one instinct (objectifying women) being weaker than the instinct (be nice to women)?
It seems to me that if it was purely instinctual, then the same instinct (the stronger one) would always win out. If the weaker instinct wins out, then this would be because of a different factor: moral guilt, a reasoning process, etc.
Bust Nak wrote: Wed Sep 16, 2020 6:48 amDo you accept that you think of your ice-cream taste is like one who has a dream/hallucination [you like chocolate], knows it is a dream/hallucination [believes there is no objective truth on which ice-cream tastes best, that it was just a subjective experience they have of reality], but keeps acting as though the dream/hallucination is reality [picks chocolate ice-cream]?

I don't. The words dream/hallucination implies there is an mismatch between reality and the subjective experience. There is no mismatch because the nature of taste/morality is in actuality purely subjective. Having said that, I accept that I think of my moral view in exactly the same way as I threat ice-cream taste, and that it is as much (or rather as little) a dream/hallucination as each other.
Using dream/hallucination is not intended to denote that kind of mismatch (if I understood you correctly). It is meant to contrast against how, for example, we all experience the shape of the Earth as the same (even if one thinks they experience it differently).

In my language here, I'm not talking about just my choice to eat ice cream, I'm talking about my judgment on other people's choices as well.

My experience of the shape of the Earth is that it is spherical. I believe the shape of the Earth is an objective truth of reality [i.e., that the Earth being spherical is not a dream/hallucination]. I'm going to act like my experience about the shape of the Earth is reality. I believe that those who believe Flat Earth theory is true should not believe so or act on that belief.

My experience of chocolate ice cream is that it tastes good. I believe that ice cream taste is a subjective truth of reality [i.e., that chocolate ice cream being good is a "dream"/"hallucination" and Johnny has a different experience that is also a real "dream"/"hallucination" he has]. I'm not going to act like my experience of chocolate ice cream is reality. I will not say something like: "I believe that those who dislike chocolate ice cream should eat chocolate ice cream." You seem to act the same way with ice cream.

Your experience of child abuse is that it is bad. You believe that moral issues are a subjective truth of reality [i.e., that child abuse being bad is a "dream"/"hallucination" and that Johnny has a different "hallucination" regarding child abuse.] Yet, you act like your experience of child abuse is reality and hold all others to your experience, claiming that Johnny should not abuse the child.

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Re: Subjective Morality

Post #536

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The Tanager wrote: Wed Sep 16, 2020 4:21 pm (A) and (C) would not suffice. (B) is not believing something based on a subjective feeling one has, but a belief about a feature of reality outside of one's self being subjective.
How is "a feature of reality outside of one's self being subjective" different from an objective truth as covered by (A)?
Why is that the necessary implication? One could follow their own subjective feelings or follow the thought that this is a subjective feature of reality (which has nothing to do with the content of their subjective feelings on the matter).
Presumably this "subjective feature of reality" is different from "a feature of reality outside of one's self being subjective" mentioned above, but how is it different from the content of one's subjective feelings on the matter as covered by (C)?
One could (and I know of people who do) say that the reason they like allowing personal freedom in taste is because they see taste as a non-objective feature of reality. Their belief is not based on any subjective feeling they experience, but on their intellectual belief that people's subjective feelings are like personal "hallucinations" that should not come into one's judgments of others.
You seem to be suggesting that this "intellectual belief that people's subjective feelings should not come into one's judgments of others" is something that is distinct from an objective truth and one's own subjective feelings on the matter. To me it's clearly an example of one's own subjective feeling on the matter.
The feeling of what is moral would not necessarily change, but it could change. If taste was more than sensation...
I was asking about sensation, I spoke of signals on the tongue, it sounds to me like you accept that the sensation does not change based on whether the issue of "chocolate vs vanilla" has an objective answer or not. If the sensation on the tongue doesn't change, then why would the feeling of what is moral change? To be doubly clear, I am asking about the feeling of what is moral, as opposed to what is moral. Is taste not the equivalent of morality; and the sensation of the tongue the equivalent of the feeling of what is moral?
Reason is a part of morality for some people. Reason is not a part of taste for anyone that I know.
It could be though, if you are not immediately sure about the taste of something, breaking down the food into texture or smell and see how you like each factor, much like how if you are not sure about the morality of Johnny causing pain to Susan. You can even use reason to figure out the likelihood of you like something without tasting it first.
But that equivalence is ruled out because of an intellectual perception. The emotional response of what's left is there because of the prior intellectual perception. Thus, it's not necessarily purely an emotional response.
Sure, but I don't see how that changes what I said. You asked me about a situation that was already filtered by intellectual perception, it's ready for pure emotional response.
It seems to me that if it was purely instinctual, then the same instinct (the stronger one) would always win out. If the weaker instinct wins out, then this would be because of a different factor: moral guilt, a reasoning process, etc.
Not exactly what I am getting at, I was suggesting that this moral guilt might simply be the other side of the same coin as the instinct of being nice to women. How can you tell if it is or isn't?
Using dream/hallucination is not intended to denote that kind of mismatch (if I understood you correctly). It is meant to contrast against how, for example, we all experience the shape of the Earth as the same (even if one thinks they experience it differently).
Then the last part of my earlier answer would suffice: I think of my moral view as much a dream/hallucination as I do my ice-cream taste. I knows there is no objective truth on the matter, that it was just a subjective experience I have of reality, and keeps acting as though the dream/hallucination is reality, as much as I am acting as though dream/hallucination is reality by eating ice-cream.
In my language here, I'm not talking about just my choice to eat ice cream, I'm talking about my judgment on other people's choices as well.
That's fine, me too, it's also included.
My experience of chocolate ice cream is that it tastes good. I believe that ice cream taste is a subjective truth of reality [i.e., that chocolate ice cream being good is a "dream"/"hallucination" and Johnny has a different experience that is also a real "dream"/"hallucination" he has]. I'm not going to act like my experience of chocolate ice cream is reality. I will not say something like: "I believe that those who dislike chocolate ice cream should eat chocolate ice cream." You seem to act the same way with ice cream.
Why doesn't this count acting like one's experience is reality when the following does count?
Your experience of child abuse is that it is bad. You believe that moral issues are a subjective truth of reality [i.e., that child abuse being bad is a "dream"/"hallucination" and that Johnny has a different "hallucination" regarding child abuse.] Yet, you act like your experience of child abuse is reality and hold all others to your experience, claiming that Johnny should not abuse the child.
Both of the above are equivalent to eating ice cream. If eating chocolate ice-cream over strawberry counts as acting like one's experience is reality, then both of the above are also be acting like experience is reality; if eating chocolate over strawberry does not count, then neither of the above are would be examples of acting like experience is reality.

Why would whether Johnny should or shouldn't do as I want change that, if not that inexplicable definitional truth of yours?

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Re: Subjective Morality

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Bust Nak wrote: Thu Sep 17, 2020 10:21 amHow is "a feature of reality outside of one's self being subjective" different from an objective truth as covered by (A)?
In (C), one is only considering their own subjective experience of reality. (A) and (B) are both based on looking at reality outside of one's self, but in different ways. In (A), one believes the X being looked at is objectively true, where everyone should have the same answer. The Earth is the same shape for everyone. In (B), one believes the X being looked at is not objectively true, where different people should have different answers. That chocolate ice cream tastes good is true for some people and false for others.
Bust Nak wrote: Thu Sep 17, 2020 10:21 am
Why is that the necessary implication? One could follow their own subjective feelings or follow the thought that this is a subjective feature of reality (which has nothing to do with the content of their subjective feelings on the matter).
Presumably this "subjective feature of reality" is different from "a feature of reality outside of one's self being subjective" mentioned above, but how is it different from the content of one's subjective feelings on the matter as covered by (C)?
No, I meant the same thing by both phrasings. The difference? My subjective feelings on chocolate ice cream is that it tastes good. But in believing ice cream taste to be a subjective feature of reality, I believe chocolate ice cream tastes good to some and not to others.

Why am I okay with people eating pistachio ice cream even though I hate it? Is it because of a different subjective feeling I have (like that I experience joy when allowing freedom in ice cream consumption to others) or is it because I look outside of myself and believe that ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality, regardless of the warm fuzzies I get? I'm not passing judgment on one over the other, just noting that there are different things going on.
Bust Nak wrote: Thu Sep 17, 2020 10:21 am
One could (and I know of people who do) say that the reason they like allowing personal freedom in taste is because they see taste as a non-objective feature of reality. Their belief is not based on any subjective feeling they experience, but on their intellectual belief that people's subjective feelings are like personal "hallucinations" that should not come into one's judgments of others.
You seem to be suggesting that this "intellectual belief that people's subjective feelings should not come into one's judgments of others" is something that is distinct from an objective truth and one's own subjective feelings on the matter. To me it's clearly an example of one's own subjective feeling on the matter.
1. I like chocolate ice cream.
2. I am fine with Johnny eating pistachio ice cream.

While I think these two statements can be meant as identical kinds of statements (presenting one's feelings/opinions on an issue), I don't think that is necessarily the case; they can be distinct kinds of statements. (1) gives my subjective experience of ice cream and (2) comes from my view that good ice cream is different for different people (ignoring my own subjective experience of ice cream flavors).

It seems to me that you think they are identical kinds of statements where (2) is just telling of a different feeling/opinion one has about another issue (freedom in ice cream taste versus personal ice cream taste). But, if you do, then "I believe the Earth is flat" would also be an identical kind of statement, just a different feeling/opinion one has about another issue. And, at that level, we aren't touching what the objectivism/non-objectivism issue is about.
Bust Nak wrote: Thu Sep 17, 2020 10:21 amI was asking about sensation, I spoke of signals on the tongue, it sounds to me like you accept that the sensation does not change based on whether the issue of "chocolate vs vanilla" has an objective answer or not.

If the sensation on the tongue doesn't change, then why would the feeling of what is moral change? To be doubly clear, I am asking about the feeling of what is moral, as opposed to what is moral. Is taste not the equivalent of morality; and the sensation of the tongue the equivalent of the feeling of what is moral?
Looking at the sensation of taste, a defective tongue would not change based on the objective answer, but a non-defective tongue would change. The non-defective tongue's sensation would be based on what the objective answer was. If chocolate is objectively good, then the non-defective tongue's sensation of chocolate would be that it was good. If vanilla, then vanilla. The same for morality.
Bust Nak wrote: Thu Sep 17, 2020 10:21 amSure, but I don't see how that changes what I said. You asked me about a situation that was already filtered by intellectual perception, it's ready for pure emotional response.
You said you were against child abuse because of the emotions it invokes in you, not because of a consideration of the damage being done. You said such a justification was a post hoc justification. Filtering the situation by an intellectual perception that damage is being done and responding emotionally because of that filter sounds pre-hoc not post-hoc.
Bust Nak wrote: Thu Sep 17, 2020 10:21 amNot exactly what I am getting at, I was suggesting that this moral guilt might simply be the other side of the same coin as the instinct of being nice to women. How can you tell if it is or isn't?
Whether I subjectively feel guilt or guiltless pleasure when seeing a beautiful woman, it doesn't matter. My point is that my belief about the goodness of objectifying women is separate from either subjective feeling. I base that belief on what I believe about humans being created in the image of God.
Bust Nak wrote: Thu Sep 17, 2020 10:21 amThen the last part of my earlier answer would suffice: I think of my moral view as much a dream/hallucination as I do my ice-cream taste. I knows there is no objective truth on the matter, that it was just a subjective experience I have of reality, and keeps acting as though the dream/hallucination is reality, as much as I am acting as though dream/hallucination is reality by eating ice-cream.
You are misunderstanding the analogy. I'm not talking about eating the ice cream you do...that's your dream/hallucination. I'm talking about applying your dream/hallucination to everyone else. I'm talking about applying your specific subjective experience of reality to other people in your judgments of them. With morality you apply your subjective experience of reality (child abuse is "yuck!") to others when judging their actions, while you do not do the same with food taste.

Now, you will probably think that we are switching issues and the different subjective experiences you are applying to their actions are:

1. personal freedom in morality is "yuck!"
2. personal freedom in food taste is "yeah!"

That's fine, but it doesn't address the objectivism/non-objectivism issue because you are only basing it on your own subjective experience of reality, regardless of the truth outside of your subjective experience. That's why I still think you are stuck (non-perjorative use here) in simple subjectivism.
Bust Nak wrote: Thu Sep 17, 2020 10:21 am
My experience of chocolate ice cream is that it tastes good. I believe that ice cream taste is a subjective truth of reality [i.e., that chocolate ice cream being good is a "dream"/"hallucination" and Johnny has a different experience that is also a real "dream"/"hallucination" he has]. I'm not going to act like my experience of chocolate ice cream is reality. I will not say something like: "I believe that those who dislike chocolate ice cream should eat chocolate ice cream." You seem to act the same way with ice cream.
Why doesn't this count acting like one's experience is reality when the following does count?
Your experience of child abuse is that it is bad. You believe that moral issues are a subjective truth of reality [i.e., that child abuse being bad is a "dream"/"hallucination" and that Johnny has a different "hallucination" regarding child abuse.] Yet, you act like your experience of child abuse is reality and hold all others to your experience, claiming that Johnny should not abuse the child.
In the former my experience is that "chocolate ice cream tastes good," while my action towards others is being okay with them eating other flavors of ice cream. I am okay with other people doing things that contradict my dream/hallucination.

In the latter your experience is "child abuse is bad," while your action towards others is not being okay with them acting in a different 'flavor'. You are not okay with other people doing things that contradict your dream/hallucination in moral issues, but you are in aesthetic issues.

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Re: Subjective Morality

Post #538

Post by Bust Nak »

The Tanager wrote: Fri Sep 18, 2020 8:56 am In (C), one is only considering their own subjective experience of reality. (A) and (B) are both based on looking at reality outside of one's self, but in different ways. In (A), one believes the X being looked at is objectively true, where everyone should have the same answer. The Earth is the same shape for everyone. In (B), one believes the X being looked at is not objectively true, where different people should have different answers. That chocolate ice cream tastes good is true for some people and false for others.
Okay, then I think my original response answers that, with a little rephrasing...
No, I meant the same thing by both phrasings. The difference? My subjective feelings on chocolate ice cream is that it tastes good. But in believing ice cream taste to be a subjective feature of reality, I believe chocolate ice cream tastes good to some and not to others.
That's what I said in my original response when I said we believe X is subjective because there is no objective truth about X. Let me try again.

Yes, I agree there are three kinds of reasoning and I use all three for different kind of claims.

A. We believe X is Y because there is an objective truth about X.
B. We believe X is Y because there is no objective truth about X.
C. We believe X is Y because there is some other reason than (A) or (B).

I hold this claim "the Earth is not flat" because there is an objective truth about the Earth, that it is not flat.
I hold this claim "morality is subjective" because there is no objective truth about morality.
I hold this claim "child abuse is wrong" because there is some other reason than (A) or (B), namely my subjective feelings.

(C) ignores the objectivism/non-objectivism issue as that it is a statement of my preference.

But I am not ignoring the objectivism/non-objectivism issue when I fall under (C) while talking about morality. Because I believe in non-objectivism, I conclude that "child abuse is wrong" is not distinct from, but identical to contents of my subjective feeling on child abuse, as such: I can rule out (A) "child abuse is wrong because there is an objective truth about child abuse" as trivially contradictory. I can rule out (B) "child abuse is wrong because there is no objective truth about child abuse" as nonsensical as that cannot inform the content of my subjective feelings on the matter.

In short. Yes, (C) ignores the objectivism/non-objectivism issue, but I am not ignoring the objectivism/non-objectivism issue when I state (C).

Is this attempt better?
Why am I okay with people eating pistachio ice cream even though I hate it? Is it because of a different subjective feeling I have (like that I experience joy when allowing freedom in ice cream consumption to others) or is it because I look outside of myself and believe that ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality, regardless of the warm fuzzies I get? I'm not passing judgment on one over the other, just noting that there are different things going on.
Well, I am passing judgement. The latter makes no sense: That ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality does not, cannot, inform the content of your subjective feelings on the matter; it has no logical implications other than the three things I mentioned before re: lack of correctness, uselessness of facts and reasons, impossibility of disagreement.
1. I like chocolate ice cream.
2. I am fine with Johnny eating pistachio ice cream.

While I think these two statements can be meant as identical kinds of statements (presenting one's feelings/opinions on an issue), I don't think that is necessarily the case; they can be distinct kinds of statements. (1) gives my subjective experience of ice cream and (2) comes from my view that good ice cream is different for different people (ignoring my own subjective experience of ice cream flavors).
But you cannot tell me how the premise "good ice cream is different for different people" lead to the conclusion "I am fine with Johnny eating pistachio ice cream." You just took it for granted as definitionally true.
It seems to me that you think they are identical kinds of statements where (2) is just telling of a different feeling/opinion one has about another issue (freedom in ice cream taste versus personal ice cream taste).

But, if you do, then "I believe the Earth is flat" would also be an identical kind of statement, just a different feeling/opinion one has about another issue.
Sure, the difference is the bit that comes after it: because it is an objective truth vs because of my subjective feelings.
Looking at the sensation of taste, a defective tongue would not change based on the objective answer, but a non-defective tongue would change. The non-defective tongue's sensation would be based on what the objective answer was. If chocolate is objectively good, then the non-defective tongue's sensation of chocolate would be that it was good. If vanilla, then vanilla. The same for morality.
That's changing based on what the objective answer is - that's (A) type reasoning; as opposed to changing based on whether the question has an objective answer or not, marking the difference between (A) and (B) type reasoning.
You said you were against child abuse because of the emotions it invokes in you, not because of a consideration of the damage being done. You said such a justification was a post hoc justification. Filtering the situation by an intellectual perception that damage is being done and responding emotionally because of that filter sounds pre-hoc not post-hoc.
Nah. I dislike child abuse because that's the way I roll, not because child abuse is damaging. Damage vs no damage is just there to inform me of the objective fact as to whether an action is child abuse or not, that's a very different issue as to whether I like/dislike or not.

In short, pre-hoc reasoning to determine child abuse or not; post-hoc justification if use to justify child abuse as wrong.

If it helps, let me remind you that I am not saying damage can never be justification for saying something is wrong, it just isn't the case with child abuse. Much earlier on, I mentioned the morality of (if I remember correctly) environmental policies, and that this topic doesn't invoke raw emotional responses. I would analyse cost and benefit to the natural surroundings vs societal convenience then make a decision as to the right or wrongness of a policy. (Having said all that, while damage is part of the consideration, it still the fact that I dislike damages that makes something wrong, rather than damage therefore wrong.)
Oh, okay. I didn't mean that to come across as an argument for a separate moral sense, it was just a summary of all that I think goes into it. My original point was that I choose to believe something about X that goes against my subjective experience of X because of outside factors.
Yep, and I am claiming that it's impossible to tell the difference between this and "believing something about X that matches with some other, more influential, subjective experience of X" in practical. Point being that subjectivism can explain your morality experience as well as objectivism; with a further underlying point that your moral experience is not evidence against subjectivism.
You are misunderstanding the analogy...
I don't think I am misunderstanding it, it's more I am disputing it. Eating the ice cream I do is as much applying my dream/hallucination to everyone else as saying Johnny shouldn't abuse children, both are simple expression of my personal preference. I am not apply my subjective experience of reality to anyone when I judge Johnny's actions, I am only apply it to myself. Applying my experience to him means making him experience my experiences. I have not done that because I cannot. In order to my apply my subjective experience of reality (child abuse is "yuck!") to Johnny I would need to use some sci-fi-esque mental projection on him.
Now, you will probably think that we are switching issues and the different subjective experiences you are applying to their actions are:

1. personal freedom in morality is "yuck!"
2. personal freedom in food taste is "yeah!"

That's fine, but it doesn't address the objectivism/non-objectivism issue because you are only basing it on your own subjective experience of reality, regardless of the truth outside of your subjective experience. That's why I still think you are stuck (non-perjorative use here) in simple subjectivism.
Yes, I affirmed as much weeks ago. It is simple subjectivism, it's a (C) type reasoning. Making the claim that the morality of child abuse is a matter of taste with (B) type reasoning, contradicting your (A) type claim that morality of child abuse is distinct from taste, that addresses objectivism/non-objectivism.
In the former my experience is that "chocolate ice cream tastes good," while my action towards others is being okay with them eating other flavors of ice cream. I am okay with other people doing things that contradict my dream/hallucination.

In the latter your experience is "child abuse is bad," while your action towards others is not being okay with them acting in a different 'flavor'. You are not okay with other people doing things that contradict your dream/hallucination in moral issues, but you are in aesthetic issues.
Here you are speaking of being okay and not okay with people doing stuff, how is being okay/not okay anything other than an expression of personal tastes?

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Re: Subjective Morality

Post #539

Post by The Tanager »

I'm trying to simplify things here, not dodge anything. If you feel I skipped something important, then please ask it again. One possible way to map this out:

Personal hallucination: Chocolate ice cream tastes good.

Applying that hallucination to one's self: I should eat chocolate ice cream.

Applying that hallucination to others: I think Johnny should eat chocolate ice cream because I think chocolate ice cream tastes good.

Judging others on an objective feature of reality: Chocolate ice cream objectively tastes good. Johnny should eat chocolate ice cream (unless his tongue is defective).

Judging others on a subjective feature of reality: Chocolate ice cream tastes good to some and not to others (including Johnny). Johnny should not eat chocolate ice cream.

The last has nothing to do with the personal hallucination. I might as well have not had it. I don't think you accept this mapping as accurate. You seem to bring in a second personal hallucination:

Personal hallucination 2: I like allowing people the freedom to choose what ice cream to eat.

As a subjective feeling, this has nothing to do with the last two options above. That's fine. Do I understand you correctly? Or what would you change around?

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Re: Subjective Morality

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Post by Bust Nak »

Let me number those points. With my commentary at the bottom.
The Tanager wrote: Fri Sep 18, 2020 6:37 pm 1) Personal hallucination: Chocolate ice cream tastes good.

2) Applying that hallucination to one's self: I should eat chocolate ice cream.

3) Applying that hallucination to others: I think Johnny should eat chocolate ice cream because I think chocolate ice cream tastes good.

4) Judging others on an objective feature of reality: Chocolate ice cream objectively tastes good. Johnny should eat chocolate ice cream (unless his tongue is defective).

5) Judging others on a subjective feature of reality: Chocolate ice cream tastes good to some and not to others (including Johnny). Johnny should not eat chocolate ice cream.

6) Personal hallucination 2: I like allowing people the freedom to choose what ice cream to eat.
1) That's fine.

2) An expression of 1).

3) I deny this. It is not a valid stance, it does not make logical sense. "I think chocolate ice cream tastes good" implies neither "Johnny should eat chocolate ice cream," nor "Johnny should not eat chocolate ice cream."

4) This is valid stance, but not one I hold - I am not a taste objectivist.

5) I deny this. It is not a valid stance, it does not make logical sense. "Chocolate ice cream tastes good to some and not to others (including Johnny)" implies neither "Johnny should eat chocolate ice cream," nor "Johnny should not eat chocolate ice cream."

6) Same kind of statement as 1), with the corresponding version of 2) Applying that hallucination to one's self: I should let Johnny eat which ever ice-cream he chooses. In other words, Johnny should eat which ever ice-cream he chooses.

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