The Tanager wrote: ↑Fri Sep 18, 2020 8:56 am
In (C), one is only considering their own subjective experience of reality. (A) and (B) are both based on looking at reality outside of one's self, but in different ways. In (A), one believes the X being looked at is objectively true, where everyone should have the same answer. The Earth is the same shape for everyone. In (B), one believes the X being looked at is not objectively true, where different people should have different answers. That chocolate ice cream tastes good is true for some people and false for others.
Okay, then I think my original response answers that, with a little rephrasing...
No, I meant the same thing by both phrasings. The difference? My subjective feelings on chocolate ice cream is that it tastes good. But in believing ice cream taste to be a subjective feature of reality, I believe chocolate ice cream tastes good to some and not to others.
That's what I said in my original response when I said we believe X is subjective because there is no objective truth about X. Let me try again.
Yes, I agree there are three kinds of reasoning and I use all three for different kind of claims.
A. We believe X is Y because there is an objective truth about X.
B. We believe X is Y because there is no objective truth about X.
C. We believe X is Y because there is some other reason than (A) or (B).
I hold this claim "the Earth is not flat" because there is an objective truth about the Earth, that it is not flat.
I hold this claim "morality is subjective" because there is no objective truth about morality.
I hold this claim "child abuse is wrong" because there is some other reason than (A) or (B), namely my subjective feelings.
(C) ignores the objectivism/non-objectivism issue as that it is a statement of my preference.
But I am not ignoring the objectivism/non-objectivism issue when I fall under (C) while talking about morality. Because I believe in non-objectivism, I conclude that "child abuse is wrong" is not distinct from, but identical to contents of my subjective feeling on child abuse, as such: I can rule out (A) "child abuse is wrong because there is an objective truth about child abuse" as trivially contradictory. I can rule out (B) "child abuse is wrong because there is no objective truth about child abuse" as nonsensical as that cannot inform the content of my subjective feelings on the matter.
In short. Yes, (C) ignores the objectivism/non-objectivism issue, but I
am not ignoring the objectivism/non-objectivism issue when I state (C).
Is this attempt better?
Why am I okay with people eating pistachio ice cream even though I hate it? Is it because of a different subjective feeling I have (like that I experience joy when allowing freedom in ice cream consumption to others) or is it because I look outside of myself and believe that ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality, regardless of the warm fuzzies I get? I'm not passing judgment on one over the other, just noting that there are different things going on.
Well, I am passing judgement. The latter makes no sense: That ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality does not, cannot, inform the content of your subjective feelings on the matter; it has no logical implications other than the three things I mentioned before re: lack of correctness, uselessness of facts and reasons, impossibility of disagreement.
1. I like chocolate ice cream.
2. I am fine with Johnny eating pistachio ice cream.
While I think these two statements can be meant as identical kinds of statements (presenting one's feelings/opinions on an issue), I don't think that is necessarily the case; they can be distinct kinds of statements. (1) gives my subjective experience of ice cream and (2) comes from my view that good ice cream is different for different people (ignoring my own subjective experience of ice cream flavors).
But you cannot tell me how the premise "good ice cream is different for different people" lead to the conclusion "I am fine with Johnny eating pistachio ice cream." You just took it for granted as definitionally true.
It seems to me that you think they are identical kinds of statements where (2) is just telling of a different feeling/opinion one has about another issue (freedom in ice cream taste versus personal ice cream taste).
But, if you do, then "I believe the Earth is flat" would also be an identical kind of statement, just a different feeling/opinion one has about another issue.
Sure, the difference is the bit that comes after it: because it is an objective truth vs because of my subjective feelings.
Looking at the sensation of taste, a defective tongue would not change based on the objective answer, but a non-defective tongue would change. The non-defective tongue's sensation would be based on what the objective answer was. If chocolate is objectively good, then the non-defective tongue's sensation of chocolate would be that it was good. If vanilla, then vanilla. The same for morality.
That's changing based on what the objective answer is - that's (A) type reasoning; as opposed to changing based on whether the question has an objective answer or not, marking the difference between (A) and (B) type reasoning.
You said you were against child abuse because of the emotions it invokes in you, not because of a consideration of the damage being done. You said such a justification was a post hoc justification. Filtering the situation by an intellectual perception that damage is being done and responding emotionally because of that filter sounds pre-hoc not post-hoc.
Nah. I dislike child abuse because that's the way I roll, not because child abuse is damaging. Damage vs no damage is just there to inform me of the objective fact as to whether an action is child abuse or not, that's a very different issue as to whether I like/dislike or not.
In short, pre-hoc reasoning to determine child abuse or not; post-hoc justification if use to justify child abuse as wrong.
If it helps, let me remind you that I am not saying damage can never be justification for saying something is wrong, it just isn't the case with child abuse. Much earlier on, I mentioned the morality of (if I remember correctly) environmental policies, and that this topic doesn't invoke raw emotional responses. I would analyse cost and benefit to the natural surroundings vs societal convenience then make a decision as to the right or wrongness of a policy. (Having said all that, while damage is part of the consideration, it still the fact that I dislike
damages that makes something wrong, rather than damage therefore wrong.)
Oh, okay. I didn't mean that to come across as an argument for a separate moral sense, it was just a summary of all that I think goes into it. My original point was that I choose to believe something about X that goes against my subjective experience of X because of outside factors.
Yep, and I am claiming that it's impossible to tell the difference between this and "believing something about X that matches with some other, more influential, subjective experience of X" in practical. Point being that subjectivism can explain your morality experience as well as objectivism; with a further underlying point that your moral experience is not evidence against subjectivism.
You are misunderstanding the analogy...
I don't think I am misunderstanding it, it's more I am disputing it. Eating the ice cream I do is as much applying my dream/hallucination to everyone else as saying Johnny shouldn't abuse children, both are simple expression of my personal preference. I am not apply my subjective experience of reality to anyone when I judge Johnny's actions, I am only apply it to myself. Applying my experience to him means making him experience my experiences. I have not done that because I cannot. In order to my apply my subjective experience of reality (child abuse is "yuck!") to Johnny I would need to use some sci-fi-esque mental projection on him.
Now, you will probably think that we are switching issues and the different subjective experiences you are applying to their actions are:
1. personal freedom in morality is "yuck!"
2. personal freedom in food taste is "yeah!"
That's fine, but it doesn't address the objectivism/non-objectivism issue because you are only basing it on your own subjective experience of reality, regardless of the truth outside of your subjective experience. That's why I still think you are stuck (non-perjorative use here) in simple subjectivism.
Yes, I affirmed as much weeks ago. It is simple subjectivism, it's a (C) type reasoning. Making the claim that the morality of child abuse is a matter of taste with (B) type reasoning, contradicting your (A) type claim that morality of child abuse is distinct from taste, that
In the former my experience is that "chocolate ice cream tastes good," while my action towards others is being okay with them eating other flavors of ice cream. I am okay with other people doing things that contradict my dream/hallucination.
In the latter your experience is "child abuse is bad," while your action towards others is not being okay with them acting in a different 'flavor'. You are not okay with other people doing things that contradict your dream/hallucination in moral issues, but you are in aesthetic issues.
Here you are speaking of being okay and not okay with people doing stuff, how is being okay/not okay anything other than an expression of personal tastes?