Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[The Tanager]

1) That's fine.

2) An expression of 1).

What do you mean by expression? Saying the same thing? I think saying something tastes good and choosing to eat it are clearly two distinct things - often connected but still distinct.

3) I deny this. It is not a valid stance, it does not make logical sense. "I think chocolate ice cream tastes good" implies neither "Johnny should eat chocolate ice cream," nor "Johnny should not eat chocolate ice cream."

I'm not saying it follows logically. I'm saying that someone could apply their view on the taste of ice cream to judge the ice cream choices of others. And that this would be applying their hallucination [since chocolate ice cream isn't objectively good] to how they judge other people's choices.

5) I deny this. It is not a valid stance, it does not make logical sense. "Chocolate ice cream tastes good to some and not to others (including Johnny)" implies neither "Johnny should eat chocolate ice cream," nor "Johnny should not eat chocolate ice cream."

Again, I'm not saying it follows logically here. I'm saying that someone could judge Johnny's action as a good thing because of their own belief that ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality and seeing that Johnny's action matches his subjective ice cream taste.

6) Same kind of statement as 1), with the corresponding version of 2) Applying that hallucination to one's self: I should let Johnny eat which ever ice-cream he chooses. In other words, Johnny should eat which ever ice-cream he chooses.

To say "Johnny should eat which ever ice-cream he chooses" is to judge Johnny, not yourself. Sure, you can phrase it as you judging your judgment of Johnny, but you are still judging Johnny, judging an other, applying a personal hallucination to another person.

[Bust Nak]

What do you mean by expression? Saying the same thing?

More or less, with the caveat that there might be other reasons other than it tastes good to eat something, but lets not go onto that tangent since we are focusing on taste/personal hallucination here.

I think saying something tastes good and choosing to eat it are clearly two distinct things - often connected but still distinct.

I am making the distinction between I should eat it and I am choosing to eat it.

I'm not saying it follows logically. I'm saying that someone could apply their view on the taste of ice cream to judge the ice cream choices of others.

I am saying they couldn't because it's not logically valid. Same for point 5.

To say "Johnny should eat which ever ice-cream he chooses" is to judge Johnny, not yourself. Sure, you can phrase it as you judging your judgment of Johnny, but you are still judging Johnny, judging an other

Yes, of course I am judging others, but....

applying a personal hallucination to another person.

How is it applying a personal hallucination to another person when I am doing the judging, and it is MY judgement? When you decide that chocolate ice-cream tastes good, are you applying a personal hallucination to an inanimate object (as opposed to applying to one's self)?

It would only count as applying my personal hallucination to Johnny, if somehow I am forcing him to judge himself according to my hallucination, which might not even be a coherent concept.

[The Tanager]

I am making the distinction between I should eat it and I am choosing to eat it.

I would still say those aren't the same expression. Sometimes I will eat something that I think I shouldn't.

I'm not saying it follows logically. I'm saying that someone could apply their view on the taste of ice cream to judge the ice cream choices of others.

I am saying they couldn't because it's not logically valid. Same for point 5.

Oh, okay. And the reasoning behind those claims? That someone logically can't say "because I like chocolate ice cream, I think you should too."

How is it applying a personal hallucination to another person when I am doing the judging, and it is MY judgement?

What do you understand "personal hallucination" to refer to here? When you say that you judge that Johnny should not abuse a child, what is the hallucination: "judge," "not abuse a child," something else?

When you decide that chocolate ice-cream tastes good, are you applying a personal hallucination to an inanimate object (as opposed to applying to one's self)?

That chocolate ice cream tastes good is my personal hallucination. Applying that hallucination to myself is being okay with choosing to eat the chocolate ice cream.

It would only count as applying my personal hallucination to Johnny, if somehow I am forcing him to judge himself according to my hallucination, which might not even be a coherent concept.

No, I do not mean it in that way. I'm not saying that you are giving them your hallucination, but judging them by the content of your hallucination.

[Bust Nak]

I would still say those aren't the same expression. Sometimes I will eat something that I think I shouldn't.

That's what I am saying. Choosing to eat it and I should eat it aren't the same expression; while this tastes good and I should eat it are the same (focusing on just taste/personal hallucination.)

Oh, okay. And the reasoning behind those claims? That someone logically can't say "because I like chocolate ice cream, I think you should too."

Yep, that's it.

What do you understand "personal hallucination" to refer to here?

The equivalent of "Chocolate ice cream tastes good" - "Johnny abusing children feels bad."

That chocolate ice cream tastes good is my personal hallucination. Applying that hallucination to myself is being okay with choosing to eat the chocolate ice cream.

In same sense, applying that hallucination to myself is not being okay with Johnny abusing children.

No, I do not mean it in that way. I'm not saying that you are giving them your hallucination, but judging them by the content of your hallucination.

The same way you judge ice-cream by the content of your hallucination. So how is one case applying to your own self but in the other, applying to someone else?

[The Tanager]

That's what I am saying. Choosing to eat it and I should eat it aren't the same expression; while this tastes good and I should eat it are the same (focusing on just taste/personal hallucination.)

Why are those the same expression? I often think that chocolate ice cream tastes good and, at the same time, that I should not eat it.

Oh, okay. And the reasoning behind those claims? That someone logically can't say "because I like chocolate ice cream, I think you should too."

Yep, that's it.

No, why do you think they can't logically say that?

The equivalent of "Chocolate ice cream tastes good" - "Johnny abusing children feels bad."

In same sense, applying that hallucination to myself is not being okay with Johnny abusing children.

If you are only talking about how it makes you feel, then this is simple subjectivism. We are talking about the objectivism/non-objectivism issue. Objectivism and non-objectivism involves talking about Johnny in a way separate than how Johnny's action makes you feel.

The same way you judge ice-cream by the content of your hallucination. So how is one case applying to your own self but in the other, applying to someone else?

Because in one case I'm talking about my action of eating the ice cream and in the other I'm talking about someone else's action of eating ice cream.

[Bust Nak]

Why are those the same expression? I often think that chocolate ice cream tastes good and, at the same time, that I should not eat it.

With reasons such as, "it's not healthy" or "I can't afford it" i.e. outside of the focus of taste/personal hallucination. Once we discard things outside of this focus, we are left with I should eat it and it's tasty having a one to one correspondence.

No, why do you think they can't logically say that?

I've already provided my reason for point 5 re: objectivism/non-objectivism issue informing one's preference.
For point 3, tastes is not transferable. I like it does not imply you like it.
In both cases, one does not imply the other, it's a non-sequitur fallacy.

If you are only talking about how it makes you feel, then this is simple subjectivism. We are talking about the objectivism/non-objectivism issue. Objectivism and non-objectivism involves talking about Johnny in a way separate than how Johnny's action makes you feel.

Yes, we have been through this many times. I am switching from simple subjectivism to objectivism/non-objectivism issue on the fly:
1) This is me in simple subjectivism mode: Johnny should not abuse children - this is only talking about how it makes me feel.
2) This is me in objectivism/non-objectivism mode: There is no correct answer to the question "should Johnny abuse children." People will give different answers depending on how they feel. Johnny gives a different answer. This is me talking in a way separate than how Johnny's action makes me feel.

Because in one case I'm talking about my action of eating the ice cream and in the other I'm talking about someone else's action of eating ice cream.

You are not just talking about your action of eating ice-cream, you are also talking about ice-cream. That's applying your hallucination to ice-cream.

[The Tanager]

With reasons such as, "it's not healthy" or "I can't afford it" i.e. outside of the focus of taste/personal hallucination. Once we discard things outside of this focus, we are left with I should eat it and it's tasty having a one to one correspondence.

But with those qualifications it is no longer simply "I should eat it," it's "if I am only talking about taste, and I like the taste, then I should eat it." Of course, if you discard any other reason to say "I should eat this," then the only reason not discarded will basically mean "I should do X."

I've already provided my reason for point 5 re: objectivism/non-objectivism issue informing one's preference.
For point 3, tastes is not transferable. I like it does not imply you like it.
In both cases, one does not imply the other, it's a non-sequitur fallacy.

But they aren't saying that you should like it because I like it; they are saying you should eat it because I like it.

If you are only talking about how it makes you feel, then this is simple subjectivism. We are talking about the objectivism/non-objectivism issue. Objectivism and non-objectivism involves talking about Johnny in a way separate than how Johnny's action makes you feel.

Yes, we have been through this many times. I am switching from simple subjectivism to objectivism/non-objectivism issue on the fly:
1) This is me in simple subjectivism mode: Johnny should not abuse children - this is only talking about how it makes me feel.
2) This is me in objectivism/non-objectivism mode: There is no correct answer to the question "should Johnny abuse children." People will give different answers depending on how they feel. Johnny gives a different answer. This is me talking in a way separate than how Johnny's action makes me feel.

Yet there is a correct answer to the question "should Johnny eat pistachio ice cream." A correct answer even though ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality.

People giving different answers is a part of (1), simply reporting what people believe (yourself and others). The way you are phrasing (2) I think is causing your confusion.

(1) Johnny says x
(2) Johnny says x is subjective.
(3) Johnny thinks that saying x is subjective means one can only fall back to statement (1).

(1) Johnny says the shape of the Earth is spherical.
(2) Johnny says the shape of the Earth is subjective.
(3) Johnny thinks that since the shape of the Earth is subjective, he can only say that the shape of the Earth is spherical.

You seem to think (3) follows (2). I don't understand why. (3) should not be about how one feels at all if it's a continuation from the objectivism/non-objectivism issue, but about what one makes of something being a subjective fact of reality. I think it's:

(3) Johnny thinks that since the shape of the Earth is subjective, he can say that people who disagree with him on the shape of the Earth are correct as well as him.

You are not just talking about your action of eating ice-cream, you are also talking about ice-cream. That's applying your hallucination to ice-cream.

Chocolate ice cream is the reality. My hallucination is that it tastes good. That's not me applying my hallucination, but having the hallucination. I apply that hallucination to myself and choose to eat chocolate ice cream. I apply that hallucination to Johnny and say he should also eat chocolate ice cream. Or I don't apply it and say that he should not eat chocolate ice cream because that is his hallucination on the reality of chocolate ice cream.

[Bust Nak]

But with those qualifications it is no longer simply "I should eat it," it's "if I am only talking about taste, and I like the taste, then I should eat it." Of course, if you discard any other reason to say "I should eat this," then the only reason not discarded will basically mean "I should do X."

Exactly, going back to my original point, since we are discarding other reasons to say "I should eat this," "I should do X" is an expression of "I like the taste."

But they aren't saying that you should like it because I like it; they are saying you should eat it because I like it.

Same thing, given that we are talking about taste/hallucination only. We are still focusing on taste/hallucination only, right? Or have you switched angle without me knowing?

Yet there is a correct answer to the question "should Johnny eat pistachio ice cream." A correct answer even though ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality.

No there isn't. Again, we've been through this, earlier you've affirmed that it made no sense to say "our personal preferences are objectively wrong or right when talking about a manner different from factual statements about those personal preferences" here.

People giving different answers is a part of (1), simply reporting what people believe (yourself and others). The way you are phrasing (2) I think is causing your confusion.

(1) Johnny says x
(2) Johnny says x is subjective.
(3) Johnny thinks that saying x is subjective means one can only fall back to statement (1).

(1) Johnny says the shape of the Earth is spherical.
(2) Johnny says the shape of the Earth is subjective.
(3) Johnny thinks that since the shape of the Earth is subjective, he can only say that the shape of the Earth is spherical.

You seem to think (3) follows (2). I don't understand why.

It's missing the premise "if the shape of the Earth is subjective, then he can only appeal to his own subjective experience." With this premise it's easies to see how (3) follows from (2).

I explained it here. In short, there are two main categories of reasoning to believe something - because of objective reasons - reality outside of one's self, i.e. (A) and (B) type that you brought up last week; or because of subjective reasons - (C) own subjective experience of reality. Given (2) x is subjective, we can rule objective reasons out, leaving the only viable option (C).

(3) should not be about how one feels at all if it's a continuation from the objectivism/non-objectivism issue, but about what one makes of something being a subjective fact of reality. I think it's:

(3) Johnny thinks that since the shape of the Earth is subjective, he can say that people who disagree with him on the shape of the Earth are correct as well as him.

Why not make this (4) and we can have both. Lets have both.

Chocolate ice cream is the reality. My hallucination is that it tastes good. That's not me applying my hallucination, but having the hallucination. I apply that hallucination to myself and choose to eat chocolate ice cream.

So in the exact same sense: Johnny abusing children is the reality. My hallucination is that it feels wrong. That's not me applying my hallucination, but having the hallucination. I apply that hallucination to myself and choose to ban Johnny from abusing children. Your suggestion that this somehow amounts to applying it to Johnny is inconsistent with what you said here.

[The Tanager]

Exactly, going back to my original point, since we are discarding other reasons to say "I should eat this," "I should do X" is an expression of "I like the taste."

I agree that, ignoring the other possible factors, saying "I should eat chocolate ice cream," means I choose to do so because of taste. I applied my taste to my choice. But that's still an application of a taste to a choice and not the experience of taste itself, so that (1) and (2) are not identical things being expressed. And (3) is still different because one is applying their taste to another person's choice to form a judgment.

Yet there is a correct answer to the question "should Johnny eat pistachio ice cream." A correct answer even though ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality.

No there isn't. Again, we've been through this, earlier you've affirmed that it made no sense to say "our personal preferences are objectively wrong or right when talking about a manner different from factual statements about those personal preferences" here.

The above "should" is not about something being objectively wrong or right. If I say that Johnny should eat pistach*-io ice cream, I'm not saying that it is a right action for everyone to undertake. I'm saying that Johnny should eat the flavor of ice cream that he likes because he subjectively likes it, rather than the flavor I like and he hates.

It's missing the premise "if the shape of the Earth is subjective, then he can only appeal to his own subjective experience." With this premise it's easies to see how (3) follows from (2).

Sure, that's how you put it into a deductively valid form, but I didn't mean to imply that I thought it logically invalid. The same critique remains, but is now just phrased as: why do you think that missing premise is true?

I think that premise is false. If he is talking about his own belief about the shape of the Earth, then, yes, he can only appeal to his own subjective experience. If he is talking about another person's belief about the shape of the Earth, then he can either:

1. Appeal to his own subjective experience (i.e., apply his personal hallucination/experience to judge the actions of others).

2. Appeal to shape being a subjective feature of the Earth (ignoring his own subjective experience of that shape) and form a belief based on that general claim.

I explained it here. In short, there are two main categories of reasoning to believe something - because of objective reasons - reality outside of one's self, i.e. (A) and (B) type that you brought up last week; or because of subjective reasons - (C) own subjective experience of reality. Given (2) x is subjective, we can rule objective reasons out, leaving the only viable option (C).

But under that categorization, saying that ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality is objectivism.

(3) should not be about how one feels at all if it's a continuation from the objectivism/non-objectivism issue, but about what one makes of something being a subjective fact of reality. I think it's:

(3) Johnny thinks that since the shape of the Earth is subjective, he can say that people who disagree with him on the shape of the Earth are correct as well as him.

Why not make this (4) and we can have both. Lets have both.

We can have both as possibilities, but the original (3) is false. When faced with the belief that shape is a subjective feature of reality, it is not true that one can only share their own subjective experience. One can do that (i.e., do (1)), but he can also conclude that everyone has their own hallucinations and, applying this belief, either choose to judge others according to (a) his own hallucination, (b) their own hallucinations, or (c) make no judgment at all. Possibly something else, but I've little time to think that through more for the moment.

So in the exact same sense: Johnny abusing children is the reality. My hallucination is that it feels wrong. That's not me applying my hallucination, but having the hallucination. I apply that hallucination to myself and choose to ban Johnny from abusing children. Your suggestion that this somehow amounts to applying it to Johnny is inconsistent with what you said here.

What do you mean by "ban" Johnny? Are you talking about you performing an action in response to Johnny's action? Because I'm talking about judging Johnny's action itself. It's like you see a mirage of water, Johnny sees a mirage of a city, admitting both of you are seeing mirages, and then wanting to ban (being upset at, or whatever equivalent works here) Johnny because he isn't trying to drink the "water".

[Bust Nak]

But that's still an application of a taste to a choice and not the experience of taste itself...

What choice, you haven't done anything yet. You haven't made a choice until you choose to eat an ice-cream.

And (3) is still different because one is applying their taste to another person's choice to form a judgment.

Different to what? Different to (1)? Sure. Different to applying their taste to ice-cream to form a judgment? No.

The above "should" is not about something being objectively wrong or right. If I say that Johnny should eat pistach*-io ice cream, I'm not saying that it is a right action for everyone to undertake. I'm saying that Johnny should eat the flavor of ice cream that he likes because he subjectively likes it, rather than the flavor I like and he hates.

Sure, but don't see how that changes anything I said. The fact that should is not about something being objectively wrong or right means there is no correct answer to the question "should Johnny eat pistachio ice-cream." Objectively right means the same thing as correct.

If he is talking about another person's belief about the shape of the Earth, then he can... Appeal to shape being a subjective feature of the Earth (ignoring his own subjective experience of that shape) and form a belief based on that general claim.

I am already ruling that out as being illogical. Shape being a subjective feature of the Earth does not imply anything on the content anyone's belief. Instead it implies stuff like correctness does not apply to a person's belief.

But under that categorization, saying that ice cream taste is a subjective feature of reality is objectivism.

Sure. Don't see what the problem is, it is objectively true that ice-cream taste is subjective; it is a fact that does not depend on anyone's subjective experience/feelings; correctness applies here and it is correct to say so. Have I ever given off the impression that this isn't the case?

We can have both as possibilities, but the original (3) is false. When faced with the belief that shape is a subjective feature of reality, it is not true that one can only share their own subjective experience. One can do that (i.e., do (1)), but he can also conclude that everyone has their own hallucinations and, applying this belief, either choose to judge others according to (a) his own hallucination, (b) their own hallucinations, or (c) make no judgment at all. Possibly something else, but I've little time to think that through more for the moment.

These are all alternative examples of (1), as opposed to a different kind of statements to (1). They are all various judgment.

What do you mean by "ban" Johnny? Are you talking about you performing an action in response to Johnny's action?

Physically stopping him, making it illegal, telling him not to, anything along those lines, i.e. the equivalent of eat chocolate ice cream.

Because I'm talking about judging Johnny's action itself...

No you were talking about actions re: eating ice-cream.