How Widely Is Science Abused to Propagate Ideology?

[harvey1]

It seems to me that science is frequently abused by those who should know better in propagating their ideology. My view is that this abuse is more likely to be done by those who are the "free thinkers" among us who often use science to propagate their materialist ideology. I'm curious how others view the abuse of science with respect to ideology, and whether there are any materialists who agree that some materialists in writing to the public are exercising this abuse. How widely is this problem, especially among those who supposedly give their allegiance to scientific thinking?

[Bugmaster]

Because a law is a metaphysical entity that enforces itself onto the material.

Of course, that's not how I see it, and I think you know that by now. I don't believe in dualistic entities, and I have no evidence for them, either.

[harvey1]

Because a law is a metaphysical entity that enforces itself onto the material.

Of course, that's not how I see it, and I think you know that by now. I don't believe in dualistic entities, and I have no evidence for them, either.

I know, so in actuality how can you believe there are laws since there is nothing that forces matter to act a particular way? Wouldn't it just behave whatever way it behaves for no lawful reason?

[QED]

Because a law is a metaphysical entity that enforces itself onto the material.

Or a law is a consequence of the material. LEGO bricks obey laws determined by their size and location of pips: these properties do not descend from some platonic realm -- they are injection molded in a Scandinavian toy factory.

The material world is conforming to the mathematical equations stated in the law.

Or it maybe the other way round.

In order for that to occur, there must be a satisfaction principle such that law F is enforced iff certain conditions are satisfied. Satisfaction is a cognitive term..

Satisfaction is not exclusively a cognitive term. LEGO bricks locking together is a form of satisfaction (in addition to the delight experienced in a first or second childhood).

...meaning that there exists a correspondence and coherence between the material thing that exists, and the logical pattern that it must conform to. This means that law requires mind.

Not necessarily. And not even likely. I don't think it's unreasonable to say that mind is what you get after a few billion years of material interactions -- not the other way around.

[harvey1]

Or a law is a consequence of the material. LEGO bricks obey laws determined by their size and location of pips: these properties do not descend from some platonic realm -- they are injection molded in a Scandinavian toy factory.

The problem with the descriptive account of laws is that they aren't really laws. For example, I almost always stop for coffee in the morning, and if there were conscious birds near the coffee shop they undoubtedly think that it is a law of nature that I stop for coffee (because I do it so regularly). Now, is it really a law of nature that I should stop for coffee? No. There is no violation of any requirement for nature if I don't stop for coffee, and likewise there is no violation of any requirement for nature if information signals are sent faster than c (under this interpretation). However, the mathematical equations of physics show that you would get massive contradictions if many of the mathematical equations were violated (i.e., nature didn't stop for coffee that morning). And, this is why a descriptive account is an insufficient interpretation of the laws. We might see violations of certain laws, but even those violations are lawfully violated within the context of a meta law. If it were really true that nature was merely stopping for coffee, and that's why the behavior of nature appeared to be lawful, then any violation of that law would certainly not have a meta law that was equally simply stated in a meta equation.

The material world is conforming to the mathematical equations stated in the law.

Or it maybe the other way round.

Then in that case there is no reason why an equation (such as F=ma) is "F=ma" instead of "F=ma/k*2^23-16". And there's certainly no reason why Feynman's path integral easily shows F=ma as a very good approximation when Planck's constant is a very insignificant number (i.e., when scaling to classical distances).

In order for that to occur, there must be a satisfaction principle such that law F is enforced iff certain conditions are satisfied. Satisfaction is a cognitive term..

Satisfaction is not exclusively a cognitive term. LEGO bricks locking together is a form of satisfaction (in addition to the delight experienced in a first or second childhood).

Of course if there are no rules to nature, then satisfaction is a description of how material things connect in a brute fact fashion. However, satisfaction of this sorts is conforming to parsimony, and that appears to be law driven (e.g., a law of parsimony). If parsimony is not itself a law, then it would seem that you are saying that the laws of physics could suddenly change for no reason (i.e., since they exist for no reason, they can change for no reason). I might add that this flies in the face of what the mathematical equations tell us, which is nature is like it is for a reason.

...meaning that there exists a correspondence and coherence between the material thing that exists, and the logical pattern that it must conform to. This means that law requires mind.

Not necessarily. And not even likely. I don't think it's unreasonable to say that mind is what you get after a few billion years of material interactions -- not the other way around.

As we see from my arguments above, it is not reasonable to say that the laws of physics can suddenly change and that parsimony is not a prescriptive law of nature. Therefore, it is not just likely that a mind exists, it is necessary that a mind exist. Of course, we can see from the special values of the physical constants alone that this is the case, so there's really no real controversy here.

[QED]

Or a law is a consequence of the material. LEGO bricks obey laws determined by their size and location of pips: these properties do not descend from some platonic realm -- they are injection molded in a Scandinavian toy factory.

The problem with the descriptive account of laws is that they aren't really laws. For example, I almost always stop for coffee in the morning, and if there were conscious birds near the coffee shop they undoubtedly think that it is a law of nature that I stop for coffee (because I do it so regularly).

Hold on a moment, I don't think the word descriptive captures the essence of what I am talking about here -- there is no choice in the possibilities offered by LEGO bricks. Their shape dictates the law of how they may fit -- it's not merely a suggestion.

[harvey1]

Hold on a moment, I don't think the word descriptive captures the essence of what I am talking about here -- there is no choice in the possibilities offered by LEGO bricks. Their shape dictates the law of how they may fit -- it's not merely a suggestion.

Well, what happens if the atoms start flying off in all sorts of directions, what prevents that from happening? If there are no prescriptive laws that prevent the atoms from flying off into space, then why does this not happen?

[QED]

Well, what happens if the atoms start flying off in all sorts of directions, what prevents that from happening? If there are no prescriptive laws that prevent the atoms from flying off into space, then why does this not happen?

Because of the constraints imposed by the nature of the matter concerned. You must know that there exists another one of those endless looping arguments here. I think we both ought to remain agnostic about it.

[harvey1]

Because of the constraints imposed by the nature of the matter concerned. You must know that there exists another one of those endless looping arguments here. I think we both ought to remain agnostic about it.

You mean you'll meet me halfway? In all seriousness, once you do start unravelling the causal chain we have three alternatives:

1) The causal chain is a non-ending chain of causes bringing about effects, which are just the effects of earlier causes

2) The causal chain terminates with an uncaused event, and this uncaused event is a brute fact

3) The causal chain terminates with a basic set of principles which are true because there's no possible way that they could be untrue

Both (1) and (2) are irrational, and on the basis that I reject all irrational beliefs once shown to be irrational, I believe (3) is the only possible correct answer. If I were agnostic about (3), then I would need to admit irrational possibilities, but then I should allow for irrational possibility in every situation. Since I cannot do that, I must reject agnosticism.

[QED]

1) The causal chain is a non-ending chain of causes bringing about effects, which are just the effects of earlier causes

2) The causal chain terminates with an uncaused event, and this uncaused event is a brute fact

3) The causal chain terminates with a basic set of principles which are true because there's no possible way that they could be untrue

Both (1) and (2) are irrational, and on the basis that I reject all irrational beliefs once shown to be irrational, I believe (3) is the only possible correct answer. If I were agnostic about (3), then I would need to admit irrational possibilities, but then I should allow for irrational possibility in every situation. Since I cannot do that, I must reject agnosticism.

Nicely summarized, however there are some comments I would make about your conclusions: (1) Theories such as the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal effectively provides us with an infinitely old universe. Cosmologists, mathematicians and philosophers are not all in agreement over the finite nature of time and space. I don't think your conclusion about (1) can be arrived at so readily. As for (2) and (3) might they not simply amount to the same thing? Introducing a mind to be the arbiter of what can and cannot possibly be true just sounds like adding another turtle to support the ones above to me.

[harvey1]

Nicely summarized, however there are some comments I would make about your conclusions: (1) Theories such as the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal effectively provides us with an infinitely old universe.

Well, I would disagree with that. Listen to Quentin Smith quoting Hawking here (you might remember this site which you told me about):

Hawking also recently emphasizes that the universe "would quite literally be created out of nothing: not just out of the vacuum, but out of absolutely nothing at all, because there is nothing outside the universe."56 By "be created" Hawking, like other physicists, means began to exist. The statement that universe is "created out of nothing" means (in the familiar terms of analytic philosophy) that the universe (a maximal spacetime containing mass-energy) began to exist and that it is not that the case that the universe is caused to exist or consists of anything that exists temporally prior to the universe or that there is time prior to the universe.

Cosmologists, mathematicians and philosophers are not all in agreement over the finite nature of time and space. I don't think your conclusion about (1) can be arrived at so readily.

Why? If it is rationally explained, then that means that there exists an explanation for it, which means there is a cause. However, (1) precludes that by its own lights, so it is irrational.

As for (2) and (3) might they not simply amount to the same thing?

(2) is a brute beginning without necessity, whereas (3) is a beginning with necessity (like the H-H wavefunction causing the universe).

Introducing a mind to be the arbiter of what can and cannot possibly be true just sounds like adding another turtle to support the ones above to me.

If (3) is the case, and logical necessity L requires there to be something X, then X must satisfy L. How can you have X satisfying L without the Universe having understanding? Satisfaction in this case is a semantic term since L is a logical statement and that logical statement must be compared to a real world state. The Universe must understand that X satisfies L. Of course, we can label it something else, but that doesn't change the property needed by the Universe for X to satisfy L.