Can Atheism ground objective morality?

[The Tanager]

In my exploration and discussions, I have not seen an atheistic worldview be able to logically account for morality being objective. The closest I've seen is an atheistic platonic kind of moral system, but while that seems to be able to account for the existence of 'good' and 'evil', it still doesn't seem to account for why humans would be obligated to choose Good over Evil. I'd love to hear cases from those who think atheism can account for objective morality to make sure I haven't missed (or misunderstood) thoughts in my exploration.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Bradskii in post #60]

These are two different things. (1) Do you think that if objective morality existed, atheism has something (beyond blind faith) that could account for it? And (2) does objective morality exist?

I’ve been asking the first. If you want to assert the second, then I’d love to see your reasoning that shows that claim to be the most rational position.

I honestly can't answer the first. I hope you don't see this as a means to avoid answering, but the question makes no sense to me.

Can you help me to see why the first question doesn’t make sense to you? Does this question also not make sense to you: Do you think that if an objective shape of the earth existed, atheism has something (beyond blind faith) that could account for it being so?

But...the theist may say that it's God's decision. But the bible cannot give guidance to every act. So how would one know that God has determined it? If I ask Jim, he might say that God has told him it's ok. If I ask Jill, she might say just the opposite. And we both know of countless examples when different theists hold to opposing views on moral matters. So there's only one conclusion: If someone wants to argue that objective morality exists, then they'd have to admit that it's unknowable. That seems to me to be a nonsensical position to hold.

First, why would it be nonsensical to believe objective morality exists, but it is unknowable? Impractical perhaps, but not nonsensical. Existence of and knowledge of what the thing that exists is like are two different questions.

Second, and more importantly, why does disagreement about X mean admitting that X is unknowable?

So I wasn't saying that subjective is in opposition to facts about the world. They are entirely different. So it's a fact that I think chocolate is better than vanilla. And that's a relative position because it's just my preference. But it's not an objective fact about the world that chocolate is better.

It’s an objective fact that eating chocolate is better for you (assuming all other considerations such as health, etc., are equal). It’s an objective fact that eating vanilla is better for Timmy. That is a subjective view of taste. Reality is based on each person’s perspective on the matter, rather than being independent of the person. You would view Timmy’s eating of vanilla as what Timmy ought to do.

If morality is like that, then if Timmy prefers to sexually assault his daughter for whatever reason, sexually assaulting her is truly better for Timmy. Of course, it's truly worse for his daughter because she doesn't like being sexually assaulted.

Only an objectivist can say Timmy ought not to assault his daughter in spite of his preference to do so. A subjectivist views Timmy's preference and his daughter's counter-preferences as equal in value akin to them liking different ice cream flavors. Nothing wrong for either of them in their preferences. If one appeals to pain or something else outside of the individuals' preferences involved as the deciding factor between the two, then they are being an objectivist.

[Vilferatus]

[Replying to Bradskii in post #60]

These are two different things. (1) Do you think that if objective morality existed, atheism has something (beyond blind faith) that could account for it? And (2) does objective morality exist?

I’ve been asking the first. If you want to assert the second, then I’d love to see your reasoning that shows that claim to be the most rational position.

I honestly can't answer the first. I hope you don't see this as a means to avoid answering, but the question makes no sense to me.

Can you help me to see why the first question doesn’t make sense to you? Does this question also not make sense to you: Do you think that if an objective shape of the earth existed, atheism has something (beyond blind faith) that could account for it being so?

But...the theist may say that it's God's decision. But the bible cannot give guidance to every act. So how would one know that God has determined it? If I ask Jim, he might say that God has told him it's ok. If I ask Jill, she might say just the opposite. And we both know of countless examples when different theists hold to opposing views on moral matters. So there's only one conclusion: If someone wants to argue that objective morality exists, then they'd have to admit that it's unknowable. That seems to me to be a nonsensical position to hold.

First, why would it be nonsensical to believe objective morality exists, but it is unknowable? Impractical perhaps, but not nonsensical. Existence of and knowledge of what the thing that exists is like are two different questions.

Second, and more importantly, why does disagreement about X mean admitting that X is unknowable?

So I wasn't saying that subjective is in opposition to facts about the world. They are entirely different. So it's a fact that I think chocolate is better than vanilla. And that's a relative position because it's just my preference. But it's not an objective fact about the world that chocolate is better.

It’s an objective fact that eating chocolate is better for you (assuming all other considerations such as health, etc., are equal). It’s an objective fact that eating vanilla is better for Timmy. That is a subjective view of taste. Reality is based on each person’s perspective on the matter, rather than being independent of the person. You would view Timmy’s eating of vanilla as what Timmy ought to do.

If morality is like that, then if Timmy prefers to sexually assault his daughter for whatever reason, sexually assaulting her is truly better for Timmy. Of course, it's truly worse for his daughter because she doesn't like being sexually assaulted.

Only an objectivist can say Timmy ought not to assault his daughter in spite of his preference to do so. A subjectivist views Timmy's preference and his daughter's counter-preferences as equal in value akin to them liking different ice cream flavors. Nothing wrong for either of them in their preferences. If one appeals to pain or something else outside of the individuals' preferences involved as the deciding factor between the two, then they are being an objectivist.

I admire your patience and the way you can explain your position multiple times, in different ways, as if it was your responsability to make others understand you. I dont know how to do that, i get frustrated when people missrepresent my position just because of their own bias, and then blame me for "not being clear" and "refuse to answer" their irrelevant questions to the subject.