Physics, Metaphysics and God

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Ancient of Years
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Physics, Metaphysics and God

Post #1

Post by Ancient of Years »

Question for debate:

Concerning the issue of why anything exists, is a metaphysical solution possible that does not rely on a non-physical conscious volitional purposeful entity responsible for creating everything that exists?

That is, if one does not wish to claim that the physical universe requires no non-physical explanation, is it necessary to introduce the idea of God?
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.

William Blake

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Post #41

Post by Ancient of Years »

Jashwell wrote:
Ancient of Years wrote:
Jashwell wrote:
I don't think you should think of either as being 'the default', but regardless, do you then agree that nothing is more specific than something?
No. In order to be specific, it would need to have specifications that distinguish it from other things. But nothing is not a thing. It is no thing. It is a label for the state of non-existence. Some thing is a vague concept. It is not a thing in itself. Every thing that might satisfy the abstract notion of some thing is a particular thing to which specifications could be applied. If there is something, then there is some particular thing that could be specified in some degree of detail. (But keep in mind that human specifications describing some definite thing are ultimately limited and will never exhaust the thing in itself.)
But no thing is more specific than some thing. To be less specific, nothing would need to have more configurations than something.

Nothing only refers to one configuration, something refers to n-1 configurations.
For example: an empty box is more specific than a full box - a full box could refer to more things. The same can be said for an empty glass as opposed to a full glass, for a lack of traffic in comparison to traffic, etc.
No. ‘Full box’ is an abstraction. A particular full box is highly specific, requiring extensive specification to be distinguished from another particular full box. An empty box is never really empty of course. It contains at least physical fields. It can only be empty with respect to some kind of expectation.

If one is looking for apples, finding only leftover apple stems and leaves does not count. The box is empty with respect to apples. If one wishes to find a box suitable for storing clothing, that box must first be emptied of those stems and leaves. Two boxes of the same description (size, strength, whatever) that are empty with respect to the expectation of storing clothing are equivalent. No need to specify which box. But if one has several boxes that are full of clothing, only one of them will contain that rain jacket I want to wear today.

The term ‘empty’ and the related term ‘nothing’ are relative to expectation. Similarly the term ‘full’ is relative to expectation. Want to store more clothing? Get another box, which may or may not be empty but cannot be full. Looking for that rain jacket? Only one box will do, even if it is not full. But do not go looking for the jacket in a box full of apples.

Two empty boxes are equivalent ceteris paribus and therefore not specific. Two full boxes are only equivalent with respect to expectations. In terms of physical fact regardless of expectations, two full boxes are not at all equivalent, their detailed physical descriptions being each highly specific.

Real full boxes are much more specific than empty boxes. Abstract full boxes are exactly that – abstractions – and do not exist in physical reality.
Jashwell wrote:
[ ... ]
The casual use of ‘nothing’ is always in relation to a specification. There is ‘nothing’ in the bag in terms of apples but not absolutely. The empty set ‘nothing’ is always specific in relation to the definition of the set. And sets can come and go according to what classification scheme one wishes to use. Sets are not real concrete things.

If there is in fact one apple in the bag, we could talk about what kind of apple it is, its size and weight, its ripeness, whether the stem or leaves are attached etc. Something (a particular apple in the bag) is more specific than nothing (no apples in the bag).

The absolute ‘nothing’ is the state of total non-existence. It is a way of saying that there is not any thing that exists. If there is any thing that can be specified, absolute ‘nothing’ is not the case. Some thing (whatever it might be) is specific. Absolute nothing has no specifications. Something is more specific than nothing.
You've just stated that an apple has more configurations than no apples - and that you can specify further - e.g. taste. A long list of adjectives preceding the word apple is only specific in the sense that we don't care about the other differences, e.g. the exact position of every particle in the apple, assuming the apple in question is composed of particles, and we have specified further (but we still haven't specified to the same level of detail - we have HAD to specify further to try to approach).

In a sense, if you were to take the problem such that an apple was a fundamental unit, as far as you cared, with no properties of its own, 1 apple would be as specific as no apples. But as soon as their are any properties, this is no longer the case. If apples could be red or green, 1 apple is less specific than no apples. Is the 1 apple red or green? As soon as there are other possible numbers of apples, e.g. 2, "no apples" is more specific than "some number of apples".

The fact that a configuration can be further specified and questioned without redundancy indicates it was not specific enough in the first place.
It is the apple itself that has the properties that would be specified. More specifications are needed to describe a particular apple because the apple is so specific a concrete entity. The specifications we apply are convenient abstractions. Is the apple a Mac or a Golden etc. and is it in good condition and of good appearance is sufficient specification if we are sorting apples into bins.

Isolating the apple from the rest of the universe is itself an abstraction. We might be interested in looking for new species of worms and not care about the rest of the apple. Or maybe it is whole trees that we are interested in. Apples are not fundamental units. Entire universes are. Anything below that level is an abstraction.

The apple is highly specific because it is a concrete entity distinguishable from all other apples at some level of analysis. The absence of a particular apple (in some setting) is indistinguishable from the absence of any other particular apple. ‘Nothing’ is not specific in any concrete sense.

Absolute nothing – a label for the total absence of existence – is not an existing thing. ‘No thing’ is not itself a thing. If it were a thing we could assign it a label, say N, and ask what it might be like if N did not exist. (I could probably make another word game out of this to ‘prove’ that everything that can be must be. But I will abstain.)
Jashwell wrote:
Jashwell wrote: I think the original point of this was more along the lines of a sidelined issue (related to a universe of only donkeys - this would be a universe of only people) and another issue (why not that universe).

Actually, how could you distinguish between the soul Universe and this Universe?
Define soul. If it is material in the broad sense of being part of this universe then why label this a soul universe vs. for example a snowflake universe? If it is not material – not part of the universe – then my previous objection stands.
A soul is an immaterial person. Any Universe in which a person was a primitive, a fundamental unit, such a person would count as a soul. Others might still allow for souls, but that isn't important. (Further specification is not particularly necessary, this example is the only one needed.)

Presumably, a person in such a Universe/a soul may well have the same experiences as a person in any other Universe, and hence you would not be able to tell the difference.
As discussed above, universes are the fundamental units. Using the broad definition of material I gave above – essentially being part of a universe – souls would not be immaterial.
Jashwell wrote:
Jashwell wrote: But (in the general context) to say any given abstraction doesn't exist is to say there is nothing that can reasonably be called an instantiation of it - to say a group doesn't exist is to claim that there is nothing which can reasonably called a member of that group (or nothing anymore, etc).

When it comes to discussing the existence of an abstraction, the details don't matter - and in your multiverse, all possibilities that match your conditions are, including every possible implementation - as well as that "abstraction" itself being a fundamental unit of a particular Universe.
An abstraction is by definition not the thing but a specification of certain details about the thing and leaving out other details. It is in a manner of speaking like a reflection in a mirror. Do reflections exist? That is, do they have certain predictable effects? Sure. Do the electrochemical processes that go on in the brain when one thinks of an abstraction exist? Sure. I suppose there are other concrete things one could label as abstractions - maybe entries in a diary, photos on a hard disk etc. However these are only recognizable as abstractions by beings capable of making abstractions. In concrete reality they are not at all like the original thing, which might be many successive abstractions away in the diary example.
Yes, abstractions could be thought of as a kind of label. The photos on your hard disk could be the entries in your diary. (Perhaps they're of your reflection.)
I was not saying that labels are abstractions. I was saying that there are concrete things – a photo for example – that it could be reasonable to call an abstraction because to humans it is a record of certain characteristics of an actual concrete thing. A label is arbitrary and need have nothing to do with the thing. An abstraction presumably does.

The books in my (multi-room!) library are not arranged in any kind of order except how they fit well on shelves. I have been working on and off for a long time on numbering the books by their physical location (room, bookcase, shelf, left to right order) and entering them into a database so that I can search on title, author, subject, physical format and other characteristics and be directed to where the book resides. The label (a sticker on the book) is not related to anything about the book except its location and that was originally very arbitrary. Not much of an abstraction. (I despair of ever finishing this project. Every time I enter ten or so books, I come across one I want to peruse again.)
Jashwell wrote:
Can non-concrete abstractions exist in any universe? By definition, no. ‘Concrete’ in another universe might seem very strange to us. But it would not be the mental constructs we call abstractions. Unless you want to have a really existing Platonic realm. In that case go start your own thread ;)
In your multiverse, what was an abstraction may be fundamental in some other Universe (and is, as it can be). I think for convenience, continuing to call it an abstraction is more convenient - especially since the context of the usage directly states different implementations. The sense in which something is an abstraction is contextual (perhaps all labels are abstract), in fact that's probably necessary for human thinking.
An abstraction is by definition not a concrete reality. It is possible that what is an abstraction in this universe – a partial description of something – might correspond to the entirety of the reality of something in another universe. However it would not be an abstraction there but a concrete reality.
Jashwell wrote: The Problem with God
[combined, quotes really add so much extra padding]
A][...]
B] But my proposal is to offer an alternative to the creator God, not Aristotle’s. And a creator God would be conscious volitional and purposeful, else what significance could be applied to the term “create�? Of course one might hypothesize a principle responsible for creation that does not have these attribures….and I did.
C][...]
D]Infinitesimal. But infinitesimal is not zero. See Hyperreal numbers.
A: I thought we were using conscious, volitional, etc as definitional.
B: What about a [conscious volitional purposeful creator God]?
C: I don't believe in fundamental chance; I'm really in no position to defend it.
D: Not in this number system at least.
In the hyperreal number system, 0.999 [...] 999 does not equal 1 - there is an infinitesimal (hyperreal non-zero) difference.
In other number systems, infintesimal may well be zero - for instance, the real numbers (0.999 [...] 999 [...] = 1, as much as I hate to admit it).

Not sure why I know such random trivia, probably Wikipedia's fault.
There are hypothetical entities often labeled God that are not creative entities, such as Aristotle’s. Being creative in the sense normally espoused by theologians implies being conscious volitional and purposeful. That is the definition of God I am using because I am presenting an alternative to the usual (divine) accounting for existence.

Strictly speaking, in number systems that do not include hyperreals infinitesimals do not exist, even as zero. The idea, introduced by Newton and criticized by Berkeley, was replaced by the limit method which never involves a real infinity.
Jashwell wrote:
So you are basing a belief in a one and only possible universe on it not having been disproven? Even though physicists in general do not believe that? Universe of the Gaps?
In a physical multiverse, it'd still be one "Universe" (a different sense of the term), analogous to how we could still call it one world, or many worlds (or many worlds of many further worlds.) Though as there's apparently not much reason to believe in a multiverse beyond interpretation fundamental constants (an argument I don't find convincing), I'm happy believing in one for now - it's simpler and more relevant (though personally I don't believe there's any real difference in simplicity between 2 universes and 200 trillion, except from maybe some system of number complexity (maybe Kolmogorov complexity)).

I have semantic objections to less physical multiverses, like the one you're proposing, but they aren't particularly relevant. (Similar to how I claimed (at least once) that a multiverse and a single Universe aren't that different - they just have different meanings of possible and real.)

What do you mean 'on it not having been disproven'?

I won't try and phrase a proof on how I (based on my understanding of continuing personal identity) can only be in one containing place/context/etc at a time.
The multiverse is not comparable to a super-universe because there can be no interaction between universes. A universe by definition is a single internally interacting entity. A physical multiverse in that sense is a contradiction. No such thing.

Kolmogorov complexity is a difficult concept to relate to the multiverse. Since all universes are discrete, their cardinality is that of the counting numbers. That number can be produced by a very simple program assuming it can run forever. But Kolmogorov complexity is related to finite strings so running forever (no halting condition) is not considered an option.

For a finite number of universes, that number can be produced by a simple program. The greater the number of universes, the larger the number that will be required as the limit. Assuming that larger numbers require more bits (not exactly true), a program to produce a larger number would have greater Kolmogorov complexity. Note that the program need only consist of the number itself and a means to output it. Or even simpler, a means to input the number and output that input. A very simple program that works for any input-able number.

Talking about the Kolmogorov complexity of a given universe may not be meaningful. The universe is the result of a set of ‘ground rules’. Even if one assumes that ground rules must be finite in number, there is still the issue that parameter values may be real numbers and not representable as strings. It is definitely not meaningful for all universes taken together since the string would be of infinite length with no repetitions of the string corresponding to any one universe.
Jashwell wrote: Existential Imperative
[...]
(Same discussion as above.)
Jashwell wrote:
I could say you could have been in Paris but you are in New York so stop looking for the Eiffel Tower. [...] As I said, a similar building in Paris would not be this building.
Then there's no need for someone who says "This is the only possible Universe" to explain why the Universe is the way it is or isn't different, as I've been saying. The same can be said for theists who believe this is God's ideal Universe.
It is incumbent on those persons to explain why they think this is the only possible universe. As I have been saying. Repeatedly. Argument by fiat is not valid argument.
This is the argument you've been giving. It supports a single-possible Universe.
The multiverse is the result of the proposal not the proposal itself. Simply put, the proposal is that existence is being possible. This removes all mystery from why the universe exists (it is possible) and why it is the way it is (it is one instance of all possibilities) all without invoking any other requirements. The single universe scenario by itself explains none of that. The single-possible universe is highly improbable from the point of view of physics and extremely mysterious from the point of view of metaphysics, as has been discussed repeatedly. But if this is the only possible universe then it exists because it is possible. My proposal would still stand.

The theists would still have to explain why God exists, has the required attributes for creation plus why the specific criteria for determining what is ideal are what they are. (Plus why it all sounds so suspiciously anthropomorphic. But that is a completely different topic.)
Jashwell wrote:
[...]
(Below.)
Jashwell wrote: Similarly, in an exemplar, "she's inclined to gossip", there is no explicit comparison or inclination over anything else - you may consider not gossiping to be implicit, but her/her-like behaviour in a multiverse would allow for her being inclined to gossip and being inclined to not gossip, perfectly consistently (as they're in different contexts). Meanwhile, in a single Universe, that can't be the case - she's either inclined to gossip or she isn't.
To begin with, ‘she’ exists in only one universe. There may be a universe which is very similar to this one in which a person very similar to this one acts in a different way. But that is determined by the entire context of the universe. There must be some slight difference in the ground rules for there to be a difference at all. Some person being “inclined to gossip� or not is not a fundamental aspect of a universe. In the multiverse concept, every possible configuration of ground rules is realized. No possibility is left out. There is no unexplained imbalance, bias or inclination overall. Every “bias or inclination� one might find in a particular universe is the result of the ground rules being different.
Personal identity aside (and I doubt we're here to discuss hypothetical teleporters and partial brain transplants), she most certainly exists in multiple universes. There's no reason whatsoever to refuse or withhold the label. Labels do not implicitly respect a multiverse. A world in which the bus was 10 minutes later - still the bus. A label is not inherently unique to one universe within a multiverse context.
Neither she nor the bus exist in multiple universes. The fact that they are different (gossip/non-gossip) (on time / 10 minutes late) shows that. A is A, A is not not-A, there is no middle ground. This is basic logic. In fact it is the foundation of logic. Labels are arbitrary inventions and do not exist as concrete entities. Two different things with the same label are not the same thing.
Jashwell wrote:
You are misusing the words. You are saying that if something is perfectly balanced in all directions it is really out of balance in all directions. If you insist that the multiverse changes the meaning, then the changed meaning removes any problem you are trying to impute to the idea.
I am not misusing the words, the fact is that your multiverse adds an extra dimension/degree of separability in which previously contradictory results are no longer so. For something to continue to be contradictory, you now have to add "in universe X" (where X is unique).
E.g. "The planet has been destroyed!" "The planet has not been destroyed!"
Leaving aside time (the Earth "could" be destroyed, rebuilt, and then destroyed again) and space (different planets), you could now contend that they are not the same Universe.

And again, in order to say perfectly balanced, you have to maintain typical use of language - i.e. a "cat" is still a cat, regardless of whether or not a star three billion light years away exploded, in the "cat"'s given Universe. Otherwise you wouldn't speak of balance. For instance, "in this Universe, the speed of light is ..." - you'd say it wasn't the speed of light.
Two cats are not one cat no matter how similar they appear. The typical use of language is NOT that they are the same cat. If the star explosion was in the past light cone of the cat it would have a real influence even if it were not obvious. At the least the electromagnetic and gravitational fields the cat is inside would have slightly different configurations. A cosmic ray from that star could damage the DNA in a cell in a cat’s brain leading to a tumor that in time makes the cat insane and badly scratches its owners face. This gets infected causing the owner to miss work and not be involved in that train crash. Her husband would never be in the position of marrying someone else and not father an important President of the United States. That would be not the same cat. If we look at an array of universes having similar cats where does one draw the line on when it is the same cat and when it is not.

But of course it was never the same cat to begin with. Different universes have different physical ground rules. That is why they are different universes. At some possibly minor but nonetheless fundamental level the cat is of a different makeup. As we discussed way back not everything that can be imagined is possible.

Concerning the speed of light, in a universe with something recognizable as a speed of light but having a different value, it would be the case that the universe in question has a different speed of light. In a universe where a person is a gossip and a very similar person in another universe is not a gossip, they are both persons but they are not the same person. Please do not misrepresent my views.
Jashwell wrote:
But there is an unexplained imbalance in the single universe where the ground rules result in someone being “inclined to gossip� as opposed to not being so inclined. Why should that be?
A ‘just so’ universe or a ‘just so’ creator are not acceptable answers except by fiat. Which is not good argumentation.
(Below... probably near the bottom.)
Not sure I see it.
Jashwell wrote: What About Parsimony?
Jashwell wrote: Whether you consider it a "real context" or a "pseudo-context" is beyond the point, the fact is the qualities and effects are there. Universes do not require being made sense of. (More to the point, why would contexts themselves be real and hierarchical above contextuals?)
If universes do not require being made sense of why should anything require being made sense of? Your argument is not a reasonable one. Sounds like an excuse for a ‘just so’ story.
What do you mean my argument?

Everything must be complete ,.. except Universes
It is only universes that are complete in themselves. Anything below the level of a universe only makes sense as part of the universe it is in, being the product of the ground rules of the universe. Universes make sense as each one is the embodiment of a unique configuration of ground rules and all such configurations exist by virtue of the proposed principle that what is possible exists.

The multiverse is simply a convenient label for the existence of all possible universes. It is not a separate thing apart from the universes and has no qualities of its own. I have said this before, several times I believe. Since a context is a set of ground rules as embodied in a universe, it is clear that the multiverse is not a context. The universes are what they are because of the fundamental rules of logic: A is A, A is not not-A, there is no middle ground. Are the rules of logic what you mean by a “pseudo-context�? Do you have a problem with them?
Jashwell wrote:
By ‘contextuals’ I presume you mean the contents of universes. There is no hierarchy. Only universes exist. Anything labeled separately below that level is an abstraction. And because abstractions leave out the details inherent in the configurations being labeled they are not concrete entities.
Completeness is given as a requirement for contextuals. (and you don't like reusing labels across contexts)
Completeness is a requirement for universes. These are the ‘fundamental units’, to sue your phrase. Things conceptually isolated from the universe are not complete since the context in which they make sense is missing. Labels are convenient tools but they are not concrete things. Re-use them as much as you want but do not confuse them with concrete reality.

There is a person named Mary in New York City.
There is a person named Mary in Paris.
Therefore Mary lives in both New York City and Paris.

NOT a good syllogism.
Jashwell wrote:
Jashwell wrote: The same thing can be said by a single-Universe proposer.
But the single universe proposer has no explanation for why the universe is the way it is or even why it is at all.
Your problems with a single Universe are qualitatively the same for a multiverse. Your counterarguments are equally applicable (regardless of their validity).
To explain the existence and nature of the proposed single universe, the proposer is forced into one of three positions:

1) That the universe exists without explanation. This is saying that logic works fine up to a certain point and then goes away.

2) That a God whose existence and nature are unexplained did it. This is also saying that logic works fine up to a certain point and then goes away.

3) That this is the only possible universe, in the sense of possible physics, and it exists because it can. This is my proposal with the additional assumption that no other universes are possible. This is contrary to what physicists in general hold to be the case.

I will stick to my proposal.
Jashwell wrote:
The answer is that you are here because you are a part of here. You are the result of how this ‘here’ works. It makes no sense to say that you could have been somewhere else that you are not a part of, a somewhere that did not result in you.
Jashwell wrote: It doesn't matter whether or not all are fundamental, what matters is whether or not some are fundamental.

As for 'no serious proposals', along with the false implication that there have to be new developments for it to be a good idea, I see no reason to prefer alternatives.
(Nor does a multiverse benefit you - (part of the ship lost at sea metaphor) - see below.)
It may very well be that some of the values of physical constants are not fundamental but are derived from other constants. But that is not the point. Ultimately there will be some particular values that are inherent in the nature of this universe.
I agree.
Why those values?
Why those values for the Universe we're in?
Because they are possible and account exactly for our existence. Your question seems to be assuming that “we� represents something other than our existence as part of this universe. Why do you live where you live and not someplace else? Because all of the events that influenced where you live resulted in you living where you do. You are in this universe because all the events that led up to you existing are events in this universe.
Jashwell wrote:
The ship’s location is not the configuration. The ship’s configuration is the configuration. Universes do not have locations.
The ship's location was the configuration.
There were no imminent reason why other places weren't equally possible.

Even if you didn't believe it was still a ship, were it a slightly different Universe, the question can still be applied to systems within a Universe.

For context, most (if not all) of these responses are analogous to your own responses to your own problem with single-Universes, applied to your multiverse.
Of course another ship is a ship. But it is a different ship. Another universe is a universe, the embodiment of another possible configuration of ground rules. But it is a different universe. All other possible universe are possible. By my proposal all possible universes exist.

To return to the metaphor, all possible types of ship exist but they are all different in some way, having at least slightly different blueprints’. Blueprints are of course abstractions, and universes are concrete, so the metaphor is only approximate. Everyone on each ship is part of the ship’s configuration. It is pointless to ask why they are on the particular ship they are on. They were born there.
Jashwell wrote:
"It's the only type of ship"
Passengers with engineering backgrounds clearly see that various parts of this ship could have been different and even that entirely different ships could have been built. Why should this specific ship be the only one built?
How do they know that? How do they know that, as far as the ship's design was concerned, it wasn't the only available type of ship? They might think it could've been different (to which the captain would no doubt say, "ah, but this ship can't have been"), but that doesn't mean it could have been.

In a more restrictive context, maybe they're better engineers than the planners of the ship. Maybe the country that built the ship only knew one type of ship.

There are a boatload of possible responses.

(& includes following issue)
"It wouldn't be this ship if it were a different type"
The statement above is completely true. Are you saying it is not true? If so, please justify your claim.
But it IS this ship so maybe there are other types.
I'm not quite sure how this response (from the quote of me) is supposed to be an explanation as to why it's not a different type of ship.
This ship is the type of ship it is. It is not any other type of ship. A is A. A is not not-A. There is no middle ground. In my proposal all possible types of ship exist. What is the mystery?
Jashwell wrote:
"You're on this ship. You wouldn't be on this ship if you were on a different type of ship"
The statement above is completely true. Are you saying it is not true? If so, please justify your claim.
But maybe there are other people on other ships.
Maybe there are other people in different universes.
"You are part of this ship, it wouldn't be you otherwise"
Your wording here is confused. You are part of the ship (e.g., on the passenger list). There is no otherwise. You do exist. You are on this ship. It is not possible to go to any other ship. They are infinitely far away. What exactly is it that you think “it� means in your statement above that “wouldn’t be you�?
As well as considering the previous response;

You wouldn't call them them if it they were on a different ship at this time. It's fundamental to who they are. Had something differed only by which ship 'you' were on, it would not be you.
(compare "you" in a different Universe that's almost exactly the same)

Similar to messing around with labels and restricting them to specific Universes, as if they have to follow the same rules as reality.

At this point, I'd like to highlight the fact that the text input box takes up 500 x 200 pixels of my 1920 x 1080 display (5%).
I am in this universe and so are you. Neither one of us is in a different universe. Almost exactly the same does not count. An identical twin brother is a different person. To be identical, the entire universe would have to be identical and indiscernibles are not separate things.

Labels are not real things. They do not exist as concrete entities in any universe.

What it the maximum Kolmogorov complexity of a text box? Or is there no halting condition?
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.

William Blake

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Excubis
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Post #42

Post by Excubis »

[Replying to post 32 by Ancient of Years]

No offense taken and true metaphysics is concept driven. Although I do not agree I am more nitpicking due to my opinion toward metaphysics. Think it's best i stay out of this and philosophy for the most part.

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Post #43

Post by Jashwell »

Ancient of Years wrote:
Jashwell wrote: You've just stated that an apple has more configurations than no apples - and that you can specify further - e.g. taste. A long list of adjectives preceding the word apple is only specific in the sense that we don't care about the other differences, e.g. the exact position of every particle in the apple, assuming the apple in question is composed of particles, and we have specified further (but we still haven't specified to the same level of detail - we have HAD to specify further to try to approach).

In a sense, if you were to take the problem such that an apple was a fundamental unit, as far as you cared, with no properties of its own, 1 apple would be as specific as no apples. But as soon as their are any properties, this is no longer the case. If apples could be red or green, 1 apple is less specific than no apples. Is the 1 apple red or green? As soon as there are other possible numbers of apples, e.g. 2, "no apples" is more specific than "some number of apples".

The fact that a configuration can be further specified and questioned without redundancy indicates it was not specific enough in the first place.
It is the apple itself that has the properties that would be specified. More specifications are needed to describe a particular apple because the apple is so specific a concrete entity. The specifications we apply are convenient abstractions. Is the apple a Mac or a Golden etc. and is it in good condition and of good appearance is sufficient specification if we are sorting apples into bins.
If the apple can be specified further, then it is correct to say that a box with no apples is more specific than a box with apples. If the specifications were due to anything other than the apple, that wouldn't be the case (as it wouldn't be clear that it didn't also apply in the no-apple box).
Isolating the apple from the rest of the universe is itself an abstraction. We might be interested in looking for new species of worms and not care about the rest of the apple. Or maybe it is whole trees that we are interested in. Apples are not fundamental units. Entire universes are. Anything below that level is an abstraction.
It doesn't matter if the label apple is an abstraction or if the terms "box with apples" and "box with no apples" are abstractions. "Box with no apples" is still more specific. If you took all the concrete instances of "a box with no apples", and all the concrete instances of "a box with apples", there would be far fewer configurations on part of the no-apple boxes.
The apple is highly specific because it is a concrete entity distinguishable from all other apples at some level of analysis. The absence of a particular apple (in some setting) is indistinguishable from the absence of any other particular apple. ‘Nothing’ is not specific in any concrete sense.
If any individual apple is indistinguishable from another apple (i.e. we treat the apple as a fundamental unit), then there is still the case of quantity of apples. "Box with no apples" would be more specific than "Box with apples" (which may be more specific than "box with one or more apples", depending on whether 'apples' includes 'an apple').
Absolute nothing – a label for the total absence of existence – is not an existing thing. ‘No thing’ is not itself a thing. If it were a thing we could assign it a label, say N, and ask what it might be like if N did not exist. (I could probably make another word game out of this to ‘prove’ that everything that can be must be. But I will abstain.)
It wouldn't matter whether or not nothing is an abstract label, as to say "nothing exists" is to say "everything does not exist". "Nothing exists" is more specific than "Something exists/some things exist". "Everything does/does not" is necessarily more specific than "something does/does not".
Jashwell wrote: Yes, abstractions could be thought of as a kind of label. The photos on your hard disk could be the entries in your diary. (Perhaps they're of your reflection.)
I was not saying that labels are abstractions. I was saying that there are concrete things – a photo for example – that it could be reasonable to call an abstraction because to humans it is a record of certain characteristics of an actual concrete thing. A label is arbitrary and need have nothing to do with the thing. An abstraction presumably does.
A photo could refer to any one of a number of things. Some of which aren't even tangible (a digital image).
Jashwell wrote:
Can non-concrete abstractions exist in any universe? By definition, no. ‘Concrete’ in another universe might seem very strange to us. But it would not be the mental constructs we call abstractions. Unless you want to have a really existing Platonic realm. In that case go start your own thread ;)
In your multiverse, what was an abstraction may be fundamental in some other Universe (and is, as it can be). I think for convenience, continuing to call it an abstraction is more convenient - especially since the context of the usage directly states different implementations. The sense in which something is an abstraction is contextual (perhaps all labels are abstract), in fact that's probably necessary for human thinking.
An abstraction is by definition not a concrete reality. It is possible that what is an abstraction in this universe – a partial description of something – might correspond to the entirety of the reality of something in another universe. However it would not be an abstraction there but a concrete reality.
This seems to be an inconsistency between language and your multiverse.
There may (or may not) be purely abstract things, that by definition can never be instantiated, but anything that can be instantiated will be in your multiverse.

Effectively, your multiverse reduces the answer to "is X an abstraction?" to being universe specific.
Jashwell wrote: In a physical multiverse, it'd still be one "Universe" (a different sense of the term), analogous to how we could still call it one world, or many worlds (or many worlds of many further worlds.) Though as there's apparently not much reason to believe in a multiverse beyond interpretation fundamental constants (an argument I don't find convincing), I'm happy believing in one for now - it's simpler and more relevant (though personally I don't believe there's any real difference in simplicity between 2 universes and 200 trillion, except from maybe some system of number complexity (maybe Kolmogorov complexity)).

I have semantic objections to less physical multiverses, like the one you're proposing, but they aren't particularly relevant. (Similar to how I claimed (at least once) that a multiverse and a single Universe aren't that different - they just have different meanings of possible and real.)

What do you mean 'on it not having been disproven'?

I won't try and phrase a proof on how I (based on my understanding of continuing personal identity) can only be in one containing place/context/etc at a time.
The multiverse is not comparable to a super-universe because there can be no interaction between universes. A universe by definition is a single internally interacting entity. A physical multiverse in that sense is a contradiction. No such thing.
A Universe is not defined to be a single internally interacting entity, nor is a physical multiverse a contradiction - in fact it's the main form which theoretical multiverses take.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse
...
My reference to Kolmogorov complexity was more along the lines of the complexity of the quantity itself.

A relatively simple program could output 982,451,653 (a prime), but a much simpler program could output 1000. An even simpler program could output 1024.

Existential Imperative
The multiverse is the result of the proposal not the proposal itself. Simply put, the proposal is that existence is being possible. This removes all mystery from why the universe exists (it is possible) and why it is the way it is (it is one instance of all possibilities) all without invoking any other requirements. The single universe scenario by itself explains none of that. The single-possible universe is highly improbable from the point of view of physics and extremely mysterious from the point of view of metaphysics, as has been discussed repeatedly. But if this is the only possible universe then it exists because it is possible. My proposal would still stand.
It is not improbable in the literal sense of the word (probability of 1), nor do I believe it improbable in any other sense - you can always ask a similar question, even in a multiverse (i.e. "Why is this Universe the way it is?"). It's not even evident that there are reasonable grounds for assuming other possibilities.
Jashwell wrote: Personal identity aside (and I doubt we're here to discuss hypothetical teleporters and partial brain transplants), she most certainly exists in multiple universes. There's no reason whatsoever to refuse or withhold the label. Labels do not implicitly respect a multiverse. A world in which the bus was 10 minutes later - still the bus. A label is not inherently unique to one universe within a multiverse context.
Neither she nor the bus exist in multiple universes. The fact that they are different (gossip/non-gossip) (on time / 10 minutes late) shows that. A is A, A is not not-A, there is no middle ground. This is basic logic. In fact it is the foundation of logic. Labels are arbitrary inventions and do not exist as concrete entities. Two different things with the same label are not the same thing.
You seem adamant on making me choose between discussing a multiverse and employing natural language.

She (Generic) is C.
She (Universe A) is A.
She (Universe B) is B.

A is an instance of C,
B is an instance of C,
A is not an instance of B.

It would take a long time to discuss the exact details of how we establish identity or other things in given contexts, i.e. what 'that bus' actually means (the physical vehicle? the scheduled arrival on this particular route? both? etc), but it's certainly meaningful and consistent to say they're both her. It's certainly the natural use of language.
Two cats are not one cat no matter how similar they appear. The typical use of language is NOT that they are the same cat.
I didn't mean the same cat, but you seem to be tacitly admitting that it's still a cat, even in a different Universe.
Concerning the speed of light, in a universe with something recognizable as a speed of light but having a different value, it would be the case that the universe in question has a different speed of light. In a universe where a person is a gossip and a very similar person in another universe is not a gossip, they are both persons but they are not the same person. Please do not misrepresent my views.
I didn't represent any specific view, in fact I explicitly made way for both cases - what I meant by "for instance" was that it was an example of the 'otherwise' (although it probably would've been better as another part of the previous sentence, rather than a continuation). That if you were to say that it is no longer a cat, then you should be consistent in saying it is also no longer the speed of light (and hence, the 'speed of light' wouldn't be balanced between Universes - it'd only be in one).

But regardless, you regularly make statements about how it's not the same because it's not part of the same Universe, and other statements that directly contradict this. Do you think speed of light is different to other things in this issue? Would I be correct to say "that Universe has a different speed of light" but incorrect to say "that Universe has a different Ancient of Years"?

What About Parsimony?
Jashwell wrote: Everything must be complete ,.. except Universes
It is only universes that are complete in themselves. Anything below the level of a universe only makes sense as part of the universe it is in, being the product of the ground rules of the universe. Universes make sense as each one is the embodiment of a unique configuration of ground rules and all such configurations exist by virtue of the proposed principle that what is possible exists.
"Complete in themselves" is indistinguishable from "not complete". But what it's called doesn't matter.

Is 'Universes' just what all internally complete things are called?
How do we know that things within a Universe may not be internally complete?
How do we know that everything isn't internally complete?
Since a context is a set of ground rules as embodied in a universe, it is clear that the multiverse is not a context. The universes are what they are because of the fundamental rules of logic: A is A, A is not not-A, there is no middle ground. Are the rules of logic what you mean by a “pseudo-context�? Do you have a problem with them?
What's the difference between a context and a Universe?

My other point is no longer relevant, as you've already gone one of two ways to which I referred. (I.e. that there is no general context for Universes/they are "incomplete"/"internally complete").

Jashwell wrote: Completeness is given as a requirement for contextuals. (and you don't like reusing labels across contexts)
Completeness is a requirement for universes. These are the ‘fundamental units’, to sue your phrase. Things conceptually isolated from the universe are not complete since the context in which they make sense is missing. Labels are convenient tools but they are not concrete things. Re-use them as much as you want but do not confuse them with concrete reality.
How do you know all things aren't internally complete? What makes you think there are Universes/contexts?
There is a person named Mary in New York City.
There is a person named Mary in Paris.
Therefore Mary lives in both New York City and Paris.

NOT a good syllogism.
A Mary lives in both New York City and Paris.

If I believed in a multiverse, I'd believe in an Ancient of Years that doesn't.
To explain the existence and nature of the proposed single universe, the proposer is forced into one of three positions:

1) That the universe exists without explanation. This is saying that logic works fine up to a certain point and then goes away.
2) That a God whose existence and nature are unexplained did it. This is also
saying that logic works fine up to a certain point and then goes away.
Logic doesn't require things to have further explanations.
3) That this is the only possible universe, in the sense of possible physics, and it exists because it can. This is my proposal with the additional assumption that no other universes are possible. This is contrary to what physicists in general hold to be the case.
I will stick to my proposal.
Is there a difference between "It exists because it can" and "It can exist because it does"?

Further, could your multiverse have been different?
If yes, why would you need a multiverse?
If no, isn't it the only possible multiverse?
Why those values?
Why those values for the Universe we're in?
Because they are possible and account exactly for our existence. Your question seems to be assuming that “we� represents something other than our existence as part of this universe. Why do you live where you live and not someplace else? Because all of the events that influenced where you live resulted in you living where you do. You are in this universe because all the events that led up to you existing are events in this universe.
What part of that requires a multiverse?
Jashwell wrote: I'm not quite sure how this response (from the quote of me) is supposed to be an explanation as to why it's not a different type of ship.
This ship is the type of ship it is. It is not any other type of ship. A is A. A is not not-A. There is no middle ground. In my proposal all possible types of ship exist. What is the mystery?
The mystery is why there's a problem for people who only believe in one possible Universe.
Labels are not real things. They do not exist as concrete entities in any universe.
"Cat" is a label. Cats exist, while for the label "cat" to exist itself may well be meaningless (in this context), but the existence of labels themselves is entirely irrelevant. "Cat" could apply in other Universes of a multiverse. They wouldn't be cat-like, they would be cats. (Not that cat-like non-cats couldn't exist.)

Someone that is almost exactly the same as me is not me only in the possible sense of personal identity. In every other sense, they are. It's a bad comparison to choose something for which there is relevance to the notion of personal identity. (Even then, it's not clear that their personal identity wouldn't be the same.)

There is no need, reason or good motivation (and plenty of opposing need, reason and good motivation) to say that something in a different Universe would not be a cat because it is in a different Universe, or that a horse is not a horse if it isn't made from atoms.
What it the maximum Kolmogorov complexity of a text box? Or is there no halting condition?
It was more along the lines of the difficulty of long posts. I may as well be typing this on a smartphone.

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Post #44

Post by Excubis »

[Replying to post 32 by Ancient of Years]

I was having an off moment.
Ancient of Years wrote:
Excubis wrote:Some great stuff. Very interesting posts, replies, and OP. Although I was attempting to restrain myself I won't. I'm not going to the trouble of quoting specifics since I'm about to go to sleep.

I have an objection to some of what Ancient of Years has stated pertaining to nothing, empty sets, and mathematics.

1) Pure math is conceptual yes, but physics is real value based workings derived from measured physical interactions. Yes our value place system(numbers) is conceptual but the observed value is not. Amounts are real and tangible beyond our place setting system. That is why we can use these values and interacting qualities as expressed numerically in a algebraic equation, without observing exact interacting cause. Prime example electricity.
The mathematics of electrical engineering and quantum mechanics among others employ complex numbers. These do not correspond to any observed physical values. In the case of non-linear conditions (much of engineering) one must first find the most appropriate (set of?) linear approximations for the case at hand, convert those differential equations to difference equations, convert those to code and run the program. As often as not this involves many iterations, e.g., matrix relaxation. Then check to see how wrong the result is compared to the real world. Rinse, repeat. And if we are talking about aerodynamics…hoo boy! There is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between the mathematical formalism and the reality. In general, the more realistic the situation one is trying to deal with the less of a correspondence. In the meantime reality does its thing without doing any math at all.
No they do actually, just because this is basically trial and error to find correct interacting value differentials does not change it is, otherwise these values amounts would not interact and subsequently cause an effect. All dynamic forces use differentials true and yes a true 1 to 1 ratio is not apparent when talking about forces but resulting destruction or creation of matter(atoms/particles) is. All math is a representation of naturally occurring values, so yes reality is not dependent on math but to exploit realty it is very useful, and by exploitation we learn the workings of. So I am saying sets in matter are not a concepts, in causal forces perhaps, I would actually agree on that, yet would that be considered a reality?
Ancient of Years wrote:
Excubis wrote:2) Nothing and how it pertains to physics. This is a nomenclature misunderstanding and does not mean NOTHING by definition. If all matter and energy are indeed made up of parts of something so small such as string, loops ect... and all these strings ect.. were originally something to itself and the big bang was a separation from the whole(brane creation) which then drove interacting laws we now can measure. Yet since before big bane there is no indication of the interacting laws we now measure and since our reality and all things was shaped by these interacting laws, pre big bang can logically be thought of as nothing.
If there were colliding branes or whatever, there was not nothing. In the brane scenario, the existence and nature of this universe is due to the details of the collision. One cannot ignore that and pretend there was nothing pre big bang.
Although I understand as applied to OP you are correct. My mistake.

Ancient of Years wrote:
Excubis wrote:3) Empty set 0,0 and how this pertains to both of the above. All mathematics both applied(physics) and conceptual(geometry, HA) both need an empty set to give value to 0,1 without 0 there is no 1. There is no something without nothing, negatives also need a 0 as well. The empty set is the control and is far more important than 0,1 or -1,0, if we did not have no electricity we would of never been able to extrapolate proper values and therefore harness it for use. This goes for all fundamental applied physics, mechanics, ect....
Sets do not exist in reality. See my comments about apples above. Also see my comments in this post about mathematics and reality.
Now perhaps this is a miss understanding, sets exists in reality as matter, and these sets are not necessarily the same exactly but are transitional phases of each other. Also sets does not mean matching pair just a group of corresponding or similar interactive qualities. Now the underlying fabric of this reality of matter does not but does produce sets. I would then ask what is reality but that is a whole other OP. I think perhaps we have different view of what reality is. I myself do not see that as a reality but is that which produces a reality or sets. Although apart of reality is not one on its own just as the above would not be without the below.
Ancient of Years wrote:
Excubis wrote:Just saying. Even a speedometer needs a start, at rest 0 kph or 0 mph. This nomenclature misunderstanding is quite old and believe it originates from the discovery of light spectrum and the discovery that black(nothing) was actually not an absence of color but the amalgamation(absorption) of all colors. Why is something red because it is not red, it is actually all colors but red. Red is the illusion caused by it reflecting red at you while absorbing the rest of the spectrum. So once again nothing(no interacting qualities) is actually something.
I have been using the term ‘nothing’ to designate the absence of existence, the total absence of anything as in the question ‘why is there something rather than nothing’. If you want to say that no thing is some thing, you are contradicting yourself. I do not see that your examples are relevant to the definition of ‘nothing’ in use here.

Please do not take offense. Your examples are entirely correct and of interest to a discussion of epistemology and phenomenology. But I am trying to talk about metaphysics.
Okay I can agree on that default position of nothing as applied for debate. You are correct on my example of speedometer and numbered sets. Sorry should of been more specific, transitional sets are real as stated above as matter. So as per metaphysics sets apply since the underlying trend to reality are transitional forms. So then what was the first form that reality transitioned out of and why. Yet must add epistemology and phenomenology can be thought of as apart of metaphysics in many cases.

Well I would first conclude there was never actually nothing since something had to interact with something for there to be anything at all. Then was anything ever created or are there two original forms that interacted and brought the universe. So therefore all reality has always been but in a different forms, such as ultra dense(a singular resting mass) and infinitely sparse(space), just a thought. Then also what is time to the whole mess, is it a by product or a precursor. Could space itself be time itself, so was space created but wouldn't it always have to be in order for any type of creation to occur. Can space be created when there is no space to begin with? Are we walking down the dimensional road now, yet then how can we perceive anything beyond our own dimensions. Is there higher dimensions or lower ones, is it the mingling of different dimensional wave lengths all coalescing to bring fourth reality.

Love it all. Maybe I will go back to OP but will be busy again soon with RL, if the forest fires ever die down that is.
"It should be possible to explain the laws of physics to a barmaid." Albert Einstein

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Re: Physics, Metaphysics and God

Post #45

Post by Excubis »

[Replying to post 2 by Ancient of Years]

I am not going to quote entirety of OP since much I do agree, I will though take no on the following:
Ancient of Years wrote:The Multiverse

If all possibilities exist, then how does one reconcile that with the requirement for both coherency and consistency? If, for example, A represents the value of the speed of light, a specific definite value in accordance with the coherency requirement, how can it have all possible values? The answer is that different universes can have different values for the speed of light. (Not all universes even need to have a speed of light at all.)

If all possibilities exist, then how does one reconcile this with the idea of something being describable in terms of a definite context? The answer is that different universes can have different contexts, e.g., laws, constants, values.

Conclusion: The idea that everything that can be is, while preserving the definition of existence (coherent, consistent, complete) requires that all universes that can exist do exist. This is commonly called the multiverse.
First how can one logically determine what is possible beyond what is observed or measured. Although I agree that what is possible is but we can have no way to know what is entirely possible or even impossible so therefore possibilities is a abstraction and not of reality in a metaphysical terms.

I agree everything can be is but not necessarily that there are or are not other possibilities. This is outside what is and therefore is not real beyond imagination. We can only deduce from what is not what may be. Since what is, is it therefore coherent, consistent, but not necessarily complete, this to is of the same abstraction. We are able to find coherency and consistency from things that are not complete quite readily. I would use one such example as DNA with it's double helix structure will never be complete(closed).As per applied to the macro scale completeness seams present yet we know this is not true when applied to forces, ie: dark energy & dark matter to name a couple.
Ancient of Years wrote:Physics

Physics today is all about symmetries. Anti-matter was first predicted on grounds of mathematical symmetries then discovered exactly as predicted. Furthermore the principle was discovered to be universal. All particles have anti-particles. Today’s symmetries are highly sophisticated and have successfully predicted not just anti-particles but entirely new particles.

The ultimate in symmetry would be the existence of all possible forms of physics – all coherent, consistent and complete laws, constants and values. The existence of all possible universes is entirely compatible with physics and perhaps even suggested by past experience, the fulfillment of symmetry.

But is simply being possible, as defined above, sufficient to account for the fact of existence? Physics suggests that it could be. Virtual particles are constantly appearing and disappearing throughout space courtesy of Heisenberg Uncertainty. All possible particles are present in this stew. All possible particles, that is, that are allowable by the laws of physics of this universe. All those that are possible, exist spontaneously.

What are the laws that decide if a particular universe as a whole is possible? To exist a universe must be coherent (have defining parameters) consistent (not contain contradictions) and complete (maintain a consistent context). Instead of all possible particles existing spontaneously exactly because they are possible, why not all possible universes existing spontaneously exactly because they are possible?

It is interesting to consider that as in the symmetries in physics (e.g., matter/antimatter and others) if we add up the physicals constants of all possible universes (positive and negative values) the net sum is zero. In this universe we see virtual particle/anti-particle pairs adding up to zero but all possible virtual particle types existing. In the multiverse everything adds up to nothing. Why is there something rather than nothing? There is not just something, there is everything but in the end it is also nothing.
Particle and anti particle absolutely agree on this SET of matter. Now once again what is possible, how can we define what is possible outside of what occurs or we can make occur in our universe using physics. This is not tangible and is of thought driven imagination that other possibilities must be.

Now I agree completely on this "Why is there something rather than nothing? There is not just something, there is everything but in the end it is also nothing." but still say multi verse does not have to be for symmetry to occur. We can only test what can happen not what we think could happen so therefore what we think could happen as per a multi-verse is not what does happen only what we think could happen. There are no possibilities other than the ones applied to our reality of already interacting qualities, anything outside of that is a guess at best in my opinion.
Ancient of Years wrote:What About Parsimony?

The multiverse proposal has been criticized as extremely non-parsimonious, postulating a vast number of other universes. On the contrary, it is the ultimate in parsimony, with everything deriving from a single principle, that what can be, is. The universes are not postulated. They are the result.
True yet any imagined postulate can equal zero since value placement would also be imagined. I will add imaginative constructs can be very logical sounding yet often deviate from what occurs in reality and is created from unknown interacting variables. Also computer simulations of the multi verse are just that a created construct by imagination not by subsequent reality based quantitative values. So therefore are postulated not a result by any real tangible means.

Now I should probably go to bed but since no sign of rain to quell the fires I will just stay in tomorrow and I want to share my own hypo's in a much more adequate way.

First I should touch on higher dimensions as applied to Quantum Theory and Mechanics. There is no need to postulate higher dimensional states to explain velocities, that accelerate beyond the speed of light. I do not see reality outside of what is so here are just a tidbits of what I am working on.

The first assumption to overcome is a plane driven universe, although observed this is a matter of what is perceivable or interactive on a 3d scale of existence. Now why is this so, I will attempt to explain the cause for misinterpretation of these phenomenon. If we take object a 1d object travelling through a 3d volume how would this interact or be perceived, well since a 1d object has no width or length to constrict its existence it would travel through the volume everywhere simultaneously but when perceived in the volume of something of volume would it not appear as a wave? I will also add a 2d object travelling through a volume would have effects of a line.

How does this apply to traveling faster than light yet not overturning relativity nor a creation of a multi verse, well here we go, all energy and matter do not exists on planes or lines but in a volume and therefore have a range of existence in the volume(a circumference of existence without having to travel to any given point to be there) as per 3d as applied 360 degrees from a central point to every possible point within the circumference or range of existence(RE). When something exists as a volume or 3d it's RE is large just under C cubed and max velocity would be in relation from what is left from C cubed. How does light work and C, in this concept light is a 2d something and anything lacking 3d would be energy as perceived in a volume. So light is 2d yet C is its speed but it is also not, the speed of light is a interactive measurement as in the act of measuring it, slows it and therefore to the max allowed velocity to have a physical representation perceived by objects in a volume. Yet when not perceived or measured travels faster since no longer being interacted upon by higher dimensions(3d). So velocity is relative to range of existence, this is symmetrical, and does not refute any all ready working postulates that we know are real also only uses only already observed phenomena but changes the interpretation of what is being perceived.

Now I want to add that an RE is not about size(volume) an RE is not reduced by empty space which all matter in a 3d existence is primarily made up of. I will add another tidbit and it is a correlation of empty space contained within a 3d objects and the attractive qualities we see, this is space attempting to rejoin space.This is also why E=MC2 works in fission a partcle is compressed this limits it's RE and if compressed enough a reactionary effect is produced by the particle transitioning to a 2d state the resulting effect is a massive amount of energy(2d) being released. This is similar to the reaction in a particle accelerator when particles collide the resulting release is of 2d objects as a slower pace due to the collision and therefore are easier to detect. I have much much more but will restrain myself.
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Post #46

Post by Ancient of Years »

Excubis wrote: [Replying to post 32 by Ancient of Years]

No offense taken and true metaphysics is concept driven. Although I do not agree I am more nitpicking due to my opinion toward metaphysics. Think it's best i stay out of this and philosophy for the most part.
Sorry I got tied up elsewhere and did not get back to you sooner. No need for you to stay away from philosophy. Your points were interesting and worthy of discussion. It just seemed to me that it was different topic from this thread. (As if that never happens around here!)

I will get back to your more recent post when I can. Soon I hope
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And Eternity in an hour.

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Post #47

Post by Ancient of Years »

Hi Jashwell!

Will be back hopefully later today. (Likewise Excubis) Just broke free from a thread so complicated I seem to have hit a size limit for posts. :tongue:

Tuesday is Senior Discount Day and I am the de facto shopper for several less mobile seniors. Many miles between stores around here so this is an all day affair.
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.

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Post #48

Post by Ancient of Years »

Jashwell wrote:
Ancient of Years wrote:
Jashwell wrote: You've just stated that an apple has more configurations than no apples - and that you can specify further - e.g. taste. A long list of adjectives preceding the word apple is only specific in the sense that we don't care about the other differences, e.g. the exact position of every particle in the apple, assuming the apple in question is composed of particles, and we have specified further (but we still haven't specified to the same level of detail - we have HAD to specify further to try to approach).

In a sense, if you were to take the problem such that an apple was a fundamental unit, as far as you cared, with no properties of its own, 1 apple would be as specific as no apples. But as soon as their are any properties, this is no longer the case. If apples could be red or green, 1 apple is less specific than no apples. Is the 1 apple red or green? As soon as there are other possible numbers of apples, e.g. 2, "no apples" is more specific than "some number of apples".

The fact that a configuration can be further specified and questioned without redundancy indicates it was not specific enough in the first place.
It is the apple itself that has the properties that would be specified. More specifications are needed to describe a particular apple because the apple is so specific a concrete entity. The specifications we apply are convenient abstractions. Is the apple a Mac or a Golden etc. and is it in good condition and of good appearance is sufficient specification if we are sorting apples into bins.
If the apple can be specified further, then it is correct to say that a box with no apples is more specific than a box with apples. If the specifications were due to anything other than the apple, that wouldn't be the case (as it wouldn't be clear that it didn't also apply in the no-apple box).
First to make sure my point is clear: An apple is particular thing. What exactly constitutes the apple could be a matter of opinion, e.g., is the dust on the apple part of the apple or not? It is also constantly if subtly changing. (Ultimately there is only the dance of the universe. It is convenient for us to label a certain temporary configuration ‘apple’. But no matter.) But whatever one wishes to define as the apple there are real aspects of its makeup that will be left out of any human description of even an individual apple. My use of the term ‘specific’ as opposed to ‘specification’ has probably caused confusion. I will try to be clearer.

As said, a particular apple – however delineated – possesses (at least temporarily) a great multitude of very definite physical aspects. Although it is not possible for humans to write a full list of specifications, it should be possible to list enough details to be able to distinguish this apple from any other apple. The apple itself is of course a different apple from any other apple but we are talking about a list of specifications made by humans.

Any given apple is therefore very specific and can be distinguished from any other apple. A certain box of particular apples is therefore very specific. But a box containing no apples cannot be distinguished from any other box containing no apples. An empty box is non-specific. (I am ignoring whatever else might be in the box that is not an apple.)

‘Nothing’, in this case the condition of there being no apples present, is non-specific.
Jashwell wrote:
Isolating the apple from the rest of the universe is itself an abstraction. We might be interested in looking for new species of worms and not care about the rest of the apple. Or maybe it is whole trees that we are interested in. Apples are not fundamental units. Entire universes are. Anything below that level is an abstraction.
It doesn't matter if the label apple is an abstraction or if the terms "box with apples" and "box with no apples" are abstractions. "Box with no apples" is still more specific. If you took all the concrete instances of "a box with no apples", and all the concrete instances of "a box with apples", there would be far fewer configurations on part of the no-apple boxes.
“Box with apples� is not itself a thing. A particular box containing particular apples is a very specific thing. It can be readily distinguished from all other boxes containing apples. A box with no apples is the same as any other box with no apples. Totally non-specific.
Jashwell wrote:
The apple is highly specific because it is a concrete entity distinguishable from all other apples at some level of analysis. The absence of a particular apple (in some setting) is indistinguishable from the absence of any other particular apple. ‘Nothing’ is not specific in any concrete sense.
If any individual apple is indistinguishable from another apple (i.e. we treat the apple as a fundamental unit), then there is still the case of quantity of apples. "Box with no apples" would be more specific than "Box with apples" (which may be more specific than "box with one or more apples", depending on whether 'apples' includes 'an apple').
Apples are not fundamental units. In physical reality they are all unique. The generic apple does not exist in reality. And physical reality is what I have been talking about all along, why it is and why it is what it is.
Jashwell wrote:
Absolute nothing – a label for the total absence of existence – is not an existing thing. ‘No thing’ is not itself a thing. If it were a thing we could assign it a label, say N, and ask what it might be like if N did not exist. (I could probably make another word game out of this to ‘prove’ that everything that can be must be. But I will abstain.)
It wouldn't matter whether or not nothing is an abstract label, as to say "nothing exists" is to say "everything does not exist". "Nothing exists" is more specific than "Something exists/some things exist". "Everything does/does not" is necessarily more specific than "something does/does not".
Indefinite “something� does not describe reality. Nothing is not a thing. It is not at all specific because it does not exist. The idea of being specific is that is distinguishable from other specifics. If absolute nothing is the case the idea of being distinguished from something else is meaningless. If everything possible exists, the entre ensemble of ‘everything’ also cannot be distinguished from anything else because by definition there is no other thing that it can be distinguished from. We know that absolute nothing is not the case. At least one something exists that is very specific – this universe. It is specific in that it can be described in specific terms that might be described in other contradictory ways. Example: there is such a thing as the speed of light and it has a particular value. Whether there actually are other universes with other values is not the point. It is that specific descriptions can be applied. If there were other different universes this one could be distinguished. Other ‘nothings’ and other ‘somethings’ do not make sense.

Since absolute nothing is not the case we can ask why that is so. My proposal is that existence is simply being possible. Things exist because they can. Since existence IS being possible, all possibilities exist. Simple as that.
Jashwell wrote:
Jashwell wrote: Yes, abstractions could be thought of as a kind of label. The photos on your hard disk could be the entries in your diary. (Perhaps they're of your reflection.)
I was not saying that labels are abstractions. I was saying that there are concrete things – a photo for example – that it could be reasonable to call an abstraction because to humans it is a record of certain characteristics of an actual concrete thing. A label is arbitrary and need have nothing to do with the thing. An abstraction presumably does.
A photo could refer to any one of a number of things. Some of which aren't even tangible (a digital image).
The digital image could be a representation of something never observed. Dragons anyone? It could even be a representation of something that cannot be, as in M.C. Escher prints. Most definitely not real. Abstractions are not real things. Likewise labels.
Jashwell wrote:
Jashwell wrote:
Can non-concrete abstractions exist in any universe? By definition, no. ‘Concrete’ in another universe might seem very strange to us. But it would not be the mental constructs we call abstractions. Unless you want to have a really existing Platonic realm. In that case go start your own thread ;)
In your multiverse, what was an abstraction may be fundamental in some other Universe (and is, as it can be). I think for convenience, continuing to call it an abstraction is more convenient - especially since the context of the usage directly states different implementations. The sense in which something is an abstraction is contextual (perhaps all labels are abstract), in fact that's probably necessary for human thinking.
An abstraction is by definition not a concrete reality. It is possible that what is an abstraction in this universe – a partial description of something – might correspond to the entirety of the reality of something in another universe. However it would not be an abstraction there but a concrete reality.
This seems to be an inconsistency between language and your multiverse.
There may (or may not) be purely abstract things, that by definition can never be instantiated, but anything that can be instantiated will be in your multiverse.

Effectively, your multiverse reduces the answer to "is X an abstraction?" to being universe specific.
Anything that would result from a possible configuration of ground rules exists in some universe. Consider my apple example above. It may be possible for some universe where physics is much more granular for some entity to be entirely describable by what we could recognize as a list of specifications. What is an abstraction in one universe, a non-exhaustive description, might correspond to a description that is exhaustive in another universe. But the entity in the other universe is not itself an abstraction. It is a real physical entity in accordance with whatever laws of physics apply to it. The correspondence between the ‘this-universe’ abstraction and the ‘that-universe’ entity would be coincidental, a result of all possible universes being realized and of the process by which the abstraction was made.

In any case, the description is not the thing itself even if the description is exhaustive. As Korzybski put it, the map is not the territory. A description requires adherence to some convention for making descriptions. An alternative standard might result in a description that reads very differently yet still be exhaustive.

As usual there is also the issue of the conventions by which the entity being partially described in this-universe and the entry being fully described in that-universe are identified as separate from their respective universes for the purpose of description. So the entity is not an instantiation of an abstraction. The entity is physically real, a configuration within the overall context of the universe. The abstraction is not real.
Jashwell wrote:
Jashwell wrote: In a physical multiverse, it'd still be one "Universe" (a different sense of the term), analogous to how we could still call it one world, or many worlds (or many worlds of many further worlds.) Though as there's apparently not much reason to believe in a multiverse beyond interpretation fundamental constants (an argument I don't find convincing), I'm happy believing in one for now - it's simpler and more relevant (though personally I don't believe there's any real difference in simplicity between 2 universes and 200 trillion, except from maybe some system of number complexity (maybe Kolmogorov complexity)).

I have semantic objections to less physical multiverses, like the one you're proposing, but they aren't particularly relevant. (Similar to how I claimed (at least once) that a multiverse and a single Universe aren't that different - they just have different meanings of possible and real.)

What do you mean 'on it not having been disproven'?

I won't try and phrase a proof on how I (based on my understanding of continuing personal identity) can only be in one containing place/context/etc at a time.
The multiverse is not comparable to a super-universe because there can be no interaction between universes. A universe by definition is a single internally interacting entity. A physical multiverse in that sense is a contradiction. No such thing.
A Universe is not defined to be a single internally interacting entity, nor is a physical multiverse a contradiction - in fact it's the main form which theoretical multiverses take.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse
I believe I commented someplace about how much of philosophy is all wrapped up in language. I do not find semantic difficulties to be of any consequence.

A physical multiverse would imply following some particular laws of physics. That is contrary to the reasoning that leads to the multiverse, that what is possible exists, that existence is exactly being possible. An ‘eternal inflation’ type of physical multiverse, for example, would need to have physical laws that allowed inflation. That would require inflation to be an inherent property of what it means to exist. A whopping big assumption there. In addition, inflation involves specific parameters that determine how inflation operates. Where did those specific parameters come from? The other types of physical multiverses all have similar problems, requiring some form of pre-existing physics to explain everything else.

I am not concerned with how other people use the label ‘multiverse’. I have explained clearly how I am using it. And it is not physical.
Jashwell wrote:
...
My reference to Kolmogorov complexity was more along the lines of the complexity of the quantity itself.

A relatively simple program could output 982,451,653 (a prime), but a much simpler program could output 1000. An even simpler program could output 1024.
This brings up the subject of the mathematical multiverse, which proposes that every universe that can be mathematically described exists. (Mentioned in the wiki link you provided) The difference is that I do not require a universe to have a mathematical description. In addition to the issues that the word ‘description’ raises, I am not positive that reality can necessarily be described in full detail by mathematics, even excluding the obvious data gathering problem. My skepticism about this undoubtedly stems from long experience with engineering.

Existential Imperative
Jashwell wrote:
The multiverse is the result of the proposal not the proposal itself. Simply put, the proposal is that existence is being possible. This removes all mystery from why the universe exists (it is possible) and why it is the way it is (it is one instance of all possibilities) all without invoking any other requirements. The single universe scenario by itself explains none of that. The single-possible universe is highly improbable from the point of view of physics and extremely mysterious from the point of view of metaphysics, as has been discussed repeatedly. But if this is the only possible universe then it exists because it is possible. My proposal would still stand.
It is not improbable in the literal sense of the word (probability of 1), nor do I believe it improbable in any other sense - you can always ask a similar question, even in a multiverse (i.e. "Why is this Universe the way it is?"). It's not even evident that there are reasonable grounds for assuming other possibilities.
A given universe is the way it is because it is possible and all possible universes are realized. Shuffle a deck of cards. Look at the top card. Why is that card the top card? No matter what card was on top you would want to ask that question. Some card had to be. An observer of a universe is by definition part of that universe. In a universe that produces observers, those observers will observe that universe. Why is this mysterious? Why is this universe this universe and not another univer? Why are you you and not somebody else? The question makes no sense.
Jashwell wrote:
Jashwell wrote: Personal identity aside (and I doubt we're here to discuss hypothetical teleporters and partial brain transplants), she most certainly exists in multiple universes. There's no reason whatsoever to refuse or withhold the label. Labels do not implicitly respect a multiverse. A world in which the bus was 10 minutes later - still the bus. A label is not inherently unique to one universe within a multiverse context.
Neither she nor the bus exist in multiple universes. The fact that they are different (gossip/non-gossip) (on time / 10 minutes late) shows that. A is A, A is not not-A, there is no middle ground. This is basic logic. In fact it is the foundation of logic. Labels are arbitrary inventions and do not exist as concrete entities. Two different things with the same label are not the same thing.
You seem adamant on making me choose between discussing a multiverse and employing natural language.

She (Generic) is C.
She (Universe A) is A.
She (Universe B) is B.

A is an instance of C,
B is an instance of C,
A is not an instance of B.

It would take a long time to discuss the exact details of how we establish identity or other things in given contexts, i.e. what 'that bus' actually means (the physical vehicle? the scheduled arrival on this particular route? both? etc), but it's certainly meaningful and consistent to say they're both her. It's certainly the natural use of language.
The ‘She (Generic)’ that you label C is an abstraction and not a real thing. You are calling A an instance of C but that is merely a convention, a way of saying that A is a thing labeled ‘Mary’. Likewise B. Using another convention D (brunettes) A might satisfy that convention and B might not. But in the end A is A and B is B and neither of them is C or D. A and B might have similarities in some descriptive system but that system will only be a convention not a reality.

Natural language is a matter of convenience for human affairs. It is not a good tool for describing actual reality.
Jashwell wrote:
Two cats are not one cat no matter how similar they appear. The typical use of language is NOT that they are the same cat.
I didn't mean the same cat, but you seem to be tacitly admitting that it's still a cat, even in a different Universe.
‘Cat’ is a label that is applicable to the extent that it is convenient. But it is an abstraction. No two cats are one cat. And if one were able to observe a panoply of universes, one would reach the point where it would be a matter of opinion if a certain entity were a cat or not.
Jashwell wrote:
Concerning the speed of light, in a universe with something recognizable as a speed of light but having a different value, it would be the case that the universe in question has a different speed of light. In a universe where a person is a gossip and a very similar person in another universe is not a gossip, they are both persons but they are not the same person. Please do not misrepresent my views.
I didn't represent any specific view, in fact I explicitly made way for both cases - what I meant by "for instance" was that it was an example of the 'otherwise' (although it probably would've been better as another part of the previous sentence, rather than a continuation). That if you were to say that it is no longer a cat, then you should be consistent in saying it is also no longer the speed of light (and hence, the 'speed of light' wouldn't be balanced between Universes - it'd only be in one).

But regardless, you regularly make statements about how it's not the same because it's not part of the same Universe, and other statements that directly contradict this. Do you think speed of light is different to other things in this issue? Would I be correct to say "that Universe has a different speed of light" but incorrect to say "that Universe has a different Ancient of Years"?
The speed of light is part of the ground rules of the universe (possibly fundamental, possibly derived from other fundamentals). It could be that in another universe there is a parameter that could reasonably be called ‘speed of light’ but has a different value. But it is not the same speed of light. It could be that in another universe there is an entity very similar to me. But if that entity gets hit by a bus I do not get a broken leg. That other entity is not me.

As I pointed out above, the term ‘cat’ is a convention. If one looks at the possible spread of entities in different universes that might be labeled ‘cat’ the convention will eventually break down and become ambiguous. The same could be said of the ancestry of a given cat. Somewhere back in the genetic line there will be an ancestor that cannot reasonably be called a cat. Where in between then and now did ‘cats’ start? A matter of convention.

What About Parsimony?
Jashwell wrote:
Jashwell wrote: Everything must be complete ,.. except Universes
It is only universes that are complete in themselves. Anything below the level of a universe only makes sense as part of the universe it is in, being the product of the ground rules of the universe. Universes make sense as each one is the embodiment of a unique configuration of ground rules and all such configurations exist by virtue of the proposed principle that what is possible exists.
"Complete in themselves" is indistinguishable from "not complete". But what it's called doesn't matter.

Is 'Universes' just what all internally complete things are called?
How do we know that things within a Universe may not be internally complete?
How do we know that everything isn't internally complete?
Earth-like donkeys (remember those donkeys? ;) ) require air and food to exist. No air? No food? No donkeys. The hypothesized universe consisting entirely of earth-like donkeys is not complete. It has aspects that require the presence of something that is in fact absent. The hypothesized donkeys are not complete in themselves. Since the hypothesized universe is to consist entirely of earth-like donkeys it is not complete and therefore does not exist.

Only whole universes can be complete, being the embodiment of possible configurations of ground rules. If things within a universe were complete in themselves they would not be the result of the ground rules of that universe and therefore not part of that universe. If they were the product of the ground rules they would not be complete in themselves but dependent on the ground rules for their specific nature. Only universes can be complete.
Jashwell wrote:
Since a context is a set of ground rules as embodied in a universe, it is clear that the multiverse is not a context. The universes are what they are because of the fundamental rules of logic: A is A, A is not not-A, there is no middle ground. Are the rules of logic what you mean by a “pseudo-context�? Do you have a problem with them?
What's the difference between a context and a Universe?

My other point is no longer relevant, as you've already gone one of two ways to which I referred. (I.e. that there is no general context for Universes/they are "incomplete"/"internally complete").
There is no overall physical context for all the universes, since that would be a contradiction. The reason all the universes exist is that they can, that existence is simply being possible. That is my proposal. You keep trying to insert a middleman. The entire point of the proposal is that no middlemen are needed.

The context of a universe is the unique configuration of ground rules from which the universe arises. Since the universe is exactly the result of the ground rules there is really no distinction. One goes with the other.
Jashwell wrote: Completeness is given as a requirement for contextuals. (and you don't like reusing labels across contexts)
Completeness is a requirement for universes. These are the ‘fundamental units’, to sue your phrase. Things conceptually isolated from the universe are not complete since the context in which they make sense is missing. Labels are convenient tools but they are not concrete things. Re-use them as much as you want but do not confuse them with concrete reality.
How do you know all things aren't internally complete? What makes you think there are Universes/contexts?[/quote]
Dealt with that above.
Jashwell wrote:
There is a person named Mary in New York City.
There is a person named Mary in Paris.
Therefore Mary lives in both New York City and Paris.

NOT a good syllogism.
A Mary lives in both New York City and Paris.

If I believed in a multiverse, I'd believe in an Ancient of Years that doesn't.
How about the cat that scratched the woman’s face and the cat that did not? Not the same cat.
Jashwell wrote:
To explain the existence and nature of the proposed single universe, the proposer is forced into one of three positions:

1) That the universe exists without explanation. This is saying that logic works fine up to a certain point and then goes away.
2) That a God whose existence and nature are unexplained did it. This is also saying that logic works fine up to a certain point and then goes away.
Logic doesn't require things to have further explanations.
We might as well have stuck with Aristotle’s idea that smoke rises because it belongs up there. The question arose as to why it belongs up there. Much better explanations came along because people looked for them.

Syllogisms start with arbitrary propositions.

P1: All men are named Harry.
P2: The bus driver is a man.
C: The bus driver is named Harry.

Perfectly logical but not reasonable. In reality not all men are named Harry. We see that things have causes. It is unreasonable to stop the search for causes and say that there is no cause beyond arbitrary point X, so stop looking.
Jashwell wrote:
3) That this is the only possible universe, in the sense of possible physics, and it exists because it can. This is my proposal with the additional assumption that no other universes are possible. This is contrary to what physicists in general hold to be the case.
I will stick to my proposal.
Is there a difference between "It exists because it can" and "It can exist because it does"?

Further, could your multiverse have been different?
If yes, why would you need a multiverse?
If no, isn't it the only possible multiverse?
Multiverse is a convenient term, not a specific thing distinct from all other specific things. The multiverse idea says that everything that can exist does exist. It could not be different unless one arbitrarily excludes things that could exist from existence. This would contradict the proposal and would raise the question of why those valid possibilities were excluded.

There is a big difference between "It exists because it can" and "It can exist because it does". The first addresses the question of why it exists. The second does not. If it exists then obviously it can. No new information. No explanation, And it still leaves the question: Why does it exist in the first place?

Jashwell wrote:
Why those values?
Why those values for the Universe we're in?
Because they are possible and account exactly for our existence. Your question seems to be assuming that “we� represents something other than our existence as part of this universe. Why do you live where you live and not someplace else? Because all of the events that influenced where you live resulted in you living where you do. You are in this universe because all the events that led up to you existing are events in this universe.
What part of that requires a multiverse?
That things could be different according to the general consensus of physicists who address the question.
Jashwell wrote:
Jashwell wrote: I'm not quite sure how this response (from the quote of me) is supposed to be an explanation as to why it's not a different type of ship.
This ship is the type of ship it is. It is not any other type of ship. A is A. A is not not-A. There is no middle ground. In my proposal all possible types of ship exist. What is the mystery?
The mystery is why there's a problem for people who only believe in one possible Universe.
On what grounds do they believe that? But if this is the only possible universe (as opposed to the only universe with no explanation required) then we come to my #3, which you omitted above.

3) That this is the only possible universe, in the sense of possible physics, and it exists because it can. This is my proposal with the additional assumption that no other universes are possible. This is contrary to what physicists in general hold to be the case.
Jashwell wrote:
Labels are not real things. They do not exist as concrete entities in any universe.
"Cat" is a label. Cats exist, while for the label "cat" to exist itself may well be meaningless (in this context), but the existence of labels themselves is entirely irrelevant. "Cat" could apply in other Universes of a multiverse. They wouldn't be cat-like, they would be cats. (Not that cat-like non-cats couldn't exist.)

Someone that is almost exactly the same as me is not me only in the possible sense of personal identity. In every other sense, they are. It's a bad comparison to choose something for which there is relevance to the notion of personal identity. (Even then, it's not clear that their personal identity wouldn't be the same.)

There is no need, reason or good motivation (and plenty of opposing need, reason and good motivation) to say that something in a different Universe would not be a cat because it is in a different Universe, or that a horse is not a horse if it isn't made from atoms.
The label ‘cat’ is a matter of convenience and convention. Likewise ‘horse’. In the end the convention will break down. Whether an entity not composed of atoms can be labeled ‘horse’ is a matter of opinion and intent. If one says that it looks like a horse and should be called a horse that is fine. If one wants to talk about its chemical composition, which depends on atoms, then it is not a horse. Convenience and convention. But in the end this ‘horse’ is an arbitrarily labeled abstraction from the universe it resides in. In reality, it does not exist as a discrete entity.
Jashwell wrote:
What it the maximum Kolmogorov complexity of a text box? Or is there no halting condition?
It was more along the lines of the difficulty of long posts. I may as well be typing this on a smartphone.
It was a joke. But what I do is Quote and a copy/paste into Word. Much easier than doing it all in the text box. The paste back and Preview.
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.

William Blake

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Ancient of Years
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Post #49

Post by Ancient of Years »

Excubis wrote: I have an objection to some of what Ancient of Years has stated pertaining to nothing, empty sets, and mathematics.

1) Pure math is conceptual yes, but physics is real value based workings derived from measured physical interactions. Yes our value place system(numbers) is conceptual but the observed value is not. Amounts are real and tangible beyond our place setting system. That is why we can use these values and interacting qualities as expressed numerically in a algebraic equation, without observing exact interacting cause. Prime example electricity.
Ancient of Years wrote: The mathematics of electrical engineering and quantum mechanics among others employ complex numbers. These do not correspond to any observed physical values. In the case of non-linear conditions (much of engineering) one must first find the most appropriate (set of?) linear approximations for the case at hand, convert those differential equations to difference equations, convert those to code and run the program. As often as not this involves many iterations, e.g., matrix relaxation. Then check to see how wrong the result is compared to the real world. Rinse, repeat. And if we are talking about aerodynamics…hoo boy! There is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between the mathematical formalism and the reality. In general, the more realistic the situation one is trying to deal with the less of a correspondence. In the meantime reality does its thing without doing any math at all.
No they do actually, just because this is basically trial and error to find correct interacting value differentials does not change it is, otherwise these values amounts would not interact and subsequently cause an effect. All dynamic forces use differentials true and yes a true 1 to 1 ratio is not apparent when talking about forces but resulting destruction or creation of matter(atoms/particles) is. All math is a representation of naturally occurring values, so yes reality is not dependent on math but to exploit reality it is very useful, and by exploitation we learn the workings of. So I am saying sets in matter are not a concepts, in causal forces perhaps, I would actually agree on that, yet would that be considered a reality?
There are never any measured physical values that are complex numbers. In electrical engineering a direct current circuit has only resistance, a scalar. In an alternating current circuit, frequency and phase shift must also be taken into account and impedance (a complex number) takes the place of resistance. But like resistance, impedance is not a directly measured value like voltage and amperage can be. It is the result of calculation, a way of accounting for physically detectable values (frequency and phase shift) that change over time. (BTW phase shift in this case is the sinusoidal waveforms of voltage and amperage not coinciding because of inductance and capacitance in the circuit that push the current ahead or hold it back respectively.)
Excubis wrote: 3) Empty set 0,0 and how this pertains to both of the above. All mathematics both applied(physics) and conceptual(geometry, HA) both need an empty set to give value to 0,1 without 0 there is no 1. There is no something without nothing, negatives also need a 0 as well. The empty set is the control and is far more important than 0,1 or -1,0, if we did not have no electricity we would of never been able to extrapolate proper values and therefore harness it for use. This goes for all fundamental applied physics, mechanics, ect....
The empty set does not exist in the real world. Consider the following.
Philosophical issues

While the empty set is a standard and widely accepted mathematical concept, it remains an ontological curiosity, whose meaning and usefulness are debated by philosophers and logicians.

The empty set is not the same thing as nothing; rather, it is a set with nothing inside it and a set is always something. This issue can be overcome by viewing a set as a bag—an empty bag undoubtedly still exists. Darling (2004) explains that the empty set is not nothing, but rather "the set of all triangles with four sides, the set of all numbers that are bigger than nine but smaller than eight, and the set of all opening moves in chess that involve a king."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empty_set ... cal_issues
A set is only meaningful when one states what the set encompasses. Sets are collections but the collecting is only abstract. If one considers a particular Golden Delicious apple, first including it in the set of all apples, but then changing the desired set to include only red apples, nothing physically happens to the apple. Sets are a way of labeling specified collections. The specification may be generic (all red apples) or arbitrary (a banana, a horseshoe and a unicorn). As Darling explained in the above quote the empty set is a label for things of a certain description that do not in fact exist. Another example might be the set of badgers on my bed. (*) The empty set is not nothing. It is an empty bag with a label on it. But when one recognizes that the bag does not physically exist, one is left with no thing in the real world sense, aka nothing.

(*) We don’t need no stinking badgers!
Excubis wrote:
Ancient of Years wrote:Sets do not exist in reality. See my comments about apples above. Also see my comments in this post about mathematics and reality.
Now perhaps this is a miss understanding, sets exists in reality as matter, and these sets are not necessarily the same exactly but are transitional phases of each other. Also sets does not mean matching pair just a group of corresponding or similar interactive qualities. Now the underlying fabric of this reality of matter does not but does produce sets. I would then ask what is reality but that is a whole other OP. I think perhaps we have different view of what reality is. I myself do not see that as a reality but is that which produces a reality or sets. Although apart of reality is not one on its own just as the above would not be without the below.
Physical entities that are referenced by set descriptions might exist in reality. But the sets themselves do not exist independently of what they reference. The ‘bags’ are imaginary. Once the ‘bag’ is empty there are no longer any actually existing referents. (Of course a set might refer to things that are purely conceptual. Different subject.)

Are you talking about a Platonic realm of Ideals or something like that? If so we definitely have different notions of reality. My proposal explains why this universe exists and why we see what we see, all from a very simple assumption and no other mysteries. If there is anything else than physical universes (all possible physics of course) whoever proposes it has to account for its existence.
Excubis wrote:
Ancient of Years wrote:
Excubis wrote:Just saying. Even a speedometer needs a start, at rest 0 kph or 0 mph. This nomenclature misunderstanding is quite old and believe it originates from the discovery of light spectrum and the discovery that black(nothing) was actually not an absence of color but the amalgamation(absorption) of all colors. Why is something red because it is not red, it is actually all colors but red. Red is the illusion caused by it reflecting red at you while absorbing the rest of the spectrum. So once again nothing(no interacting qualities) is actually something.
I have been using the term ‘nothing’ to designate the absence of existence, the total absence of anything as in the question ‘why is there something rather than nothing’.
Okay I can agree on that default position of nothing as applied for debate. You are correct on my example of speedometer and numbered sets. Sorry should of been more specific, transitional sets are real as stated above as matter. So as per metaphysics sets apply since the underlying trend to reality are transitional forms. So then what was the first form that reality transitioned out of and why. Yet must add epistemology and phenomenology can be thought of as a part of metaphysics in many cases.
Epistemology is about how we know. Phenomenology is about how we experience. Both are human-centric. What I am addressing here is what reality is all about ‘under the hood’ independent of human knowledge or experience. Metaphysics is about being.
Excubis wrote: Well I would first conclude there was never actually nothing since something had to interact with something for there to be anything at all. Then was anything ever created or are there two original forms that interacted and brought the universe. So therefore all reality has always been but in a different forms, such as ultra dense(a singular resting mass) and infinitely sparse(space), just a thought. Then also what is time to the whole mess, is it a by product or a precursor. Could space itself be time itself, so was space created but wouldn't it always have to be in order for any type of creation to occur. Can space be created when there is no space to begin with? Are we walking down the dimensional road now, yet then how can we perceive anything beyond our own dimensions. Is there higher dimensions or lower ones, is it the mingling of different dimensional wave lengths all coalescing to bring fourth reality.
This sounds rather like eternal inflation. That is an interesting topic but it still assumes that there are particular ‘ground rules’ driving the process of universe creation, ground rules that might have been different. Where did those rules come from? Why those rules?
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.

William Blake

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Post #50

Post by Ancient of Years »

Excubis wrote: [Replying to post 2 by Ancient of Years]

I am not going to quote entirety of OP since much I do agree, I will though take no on the following:
Ancient of Years wrote:The Multiverse

If all possibilities exist, then how does one reconcile that with the requirement for both coherency and consistency? If, for example, A represents the value of the speed of light, a specific definite value in accordance with the coherency requirement, how can it have all possible values? The answer is that different universes can have different values for the speed of light. (Not all universes even need to have a speed of light at all.)

If all possibilities exist, then how does one reconcile this with the idea of something being describable in terms of a definite context? The answer is that different universes can have different contexts, e.g., laws, constants, values.

Conclusion: The idea that everything that can be is, while preserving the definition of existence (coherent, consistent, complete) requires that all universes that can exist do exist. This is commonly called the multiverse.
First how can one logically determine what is possible beyond what is observed or measured. Although I agree that what is possible is but we can have no way to know what is entirely possible or even impossible so therefore possibilities is a abstraction and not of reality in a metaphysical terms.

I agree everything can be is but not necessarily that there are or are not other possibilities. This is outside what is and therefore is not real beyond imagination. We can only deduce from what is not what may be. Since what is, is it therefore coherent, consistent, but not necessarily complete, this to is of the same abstraction. We are able to find coherency and consistency from things that are not complete quite readily. I would use one such example as DNA with it's double helix structure will never be complete(closed).As per applied to the macro scale completeness seams present yet we know this is not true when applied to forces, ie: dark energy & dark matter to name a couple.
I do not have to determine what is possible. Reality takes care of that. What is impossible is ‘something’ that is incoherent (not a thing after all), inconsistent (self-contradictory) or incomplete (having insufficient explanation). That which is coherent, consistent and complete is possible. My proposal is that existence is simply being possible. Entities within a universe can be coherent and consistent. But only entire universes can be complete, being the full blown embodiments of possible configurations of ground rules.
Excubis wrote:
Ancient of Years wrote:Physics

Physics today is all about symmetries. Anti-matter was first predicted on grounds of mathematical symmetries then discovered exactly as predicted. Furthermore the principle was discovered to be universal. All particles have anti-particles. Today’s symmetries are highly sophisticated and have successfully predicted not just anti-particles but entirely new particles.

The ultimate in symmetry would be the existence of all possible forms of physics – all coherent, consistent and complete laws, constants and values. The existence of all possible universes is entirely compatible with physics and perhaps even suggested by past experience, the fulfillment of symmetry.

But is simply being possible, as defined above, sufficient to account for the fact of existence? Physics suggests that it could be. Virtual particles are constantly appearing and disappearing throughout space courtesy of Heisenberg Uncertainty. All possible particles are present in this stew. All possible particles, that is, that are allowable by the laws of physics of this universe. All those that are possible, exist spontaneously.

What are the laws that decide if a particular universe as a whole is possible? To exist a universe must be coherent (have defining parameters) consistent (not contain contradictions) and complete (maintain a consistent context). Instead of all possible particles existing spontaneously exactly because they are possible, why not all possible universes existing spontaneously exactly because they are possible?

It is interesting to consider that as in the symmetries in physics (e.g., matter/antimatter and others) if we add up the physicals constants of all possible universes (positive and negative values) the net sum is zero. In this universe we see virtual particle/anti-particle pairs adding up to zero but all possible virtual particle types existing. In the multiverse everything adds up to nothing. Why is there something rather than nothing? There is not just something, there is everything but in the end it is also nothing.
Particle and anti particle absolutely agree on this SET of matter. Now once again what is possible, how can we define what is possible outside of what occurs or we can make occur in our universe using physics. This is not tangible and is of thought driven imagination that other possibilities must be.

Now I agree completely on this "Why is there something rather than nothing? There is not just something, there is everything but in the end it is also nothing." but still say multi verse does not have to be for symmetry to occur. We can only test what can happen not what we think could happen so therefore what we think could happen as per a multi-verse is not what does happen only what we think could happen. There are no possibilities other than the ones applied to our reality of already interacting qualities, anything outside of that is a guess at best in my opinion.
My proposal is that all possible universes exist. If it were the case that this universe is the only possible universe (a real long shot) this would not contradict my proposal. And my proposal would account for the existence of this universe by virtue of this universe being possible.
Excubis wrote:
Ancient of Years wrote:What About Parsimony?

The multiverse proposal has been criticized as extremely non-parsimonious, postulating a vast number of other universes. On the contrary, it is the ultimate in parsimony, with everything deriving from a single principle, that what can be, is. The universes are not postulated. They are the result.
True yet any imagined postulate can equal zero since value placement would also be imagined. I will add imaginative constructs can be very logical sounding yet often deviate from what occurs in reality and is created from unknown interacting variables. Also computer simulations of the multi verse are just that, a created construct by imagination not by subsequent reality based quantitative values. So therefore are postulated not a result by any real tangible means.
There is undoubtedly more to learn about how this universe works. Yet no matter how simple a ToE might eventually appear, the thought that it would have NO arbitrary elements is a difficult one.

If for example this hypothetical ToE had 3 open spatial dimensions, 6 rolled up dimensions and 1 time dimension it would have to somehow explain why 3-6-1 is the only possible configuration. Not just that it is the only possible explanation for what we see. It would be circular reasoning to say that was the end of the road from the point of view of metaphysics. For this to be the only possible universe, the ToE would have to be the only possible consistent physical theory, period, with all other candidates being internally inconsistent, regardless of agreement or not with observations made in this universe. Another internally consistent theory could describe another existing universe.

There are 19 physical constants that have been quantified by observation and are plugged into the various theories by hand. As far as we now know their values are independent of each other. Future research might show that some of the constants are not independent but different aspects of something more fundamental. But to think that all 19 of these quite arbitrary seeming numeric values could somehow be reduced to zero numeric values put in by hand and still explain what we observe does not strike me as a reasonable expectation.
Excubis wrote: Now I should probably go to bed but since no sign of rain to quell the fires I will just stay in tomorrow and I want to share my own hypo's in a much more adequate way.
I will defer addressing your physical theories until such time as you may have the ‘much much more’ you mentioned to add to the present ‘tidbits’.

If only it were possible (in this universe) to send some of my rain your way.
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.

William Blake

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