Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

[dakoski]

Hadn’t seen Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism as a thread (at least for a while) so thought it would be good to discuss.

Here’s the argument:

Premise 1: The probability of reliable cognition and reasoning is low or uncertain if evolution and naturalism are true.

Natural selection acts on hereditary traits that promote survival. Therefore, our cognitive and reasoning systems have not necessarily evolved to generate true inferences, but rather inferences that enhance our survival.

But isn’t the ability to generate true inferences by definition associated with greater probability of survival? Not necessarily, there are several reasons why this may not be the case. For example:

a) Error management theory argues that natural selection may favour avoidance of large risk at the expense of optimal logical inferences. An example atheists might like is that this theory can be used to support the high prevalence of false beliefs regarding theism, on the assumption that naturalism is true.

b) Neuroscience research suggests that higher serotonin is associated with over-optimistic bias. However, given the potential association between serotonin and depression, lower levels of serotonin may be associated with more accurate inferences but less adaptive.

c)For reductive materialists – human behaviour is determined by external factors as we do not have free will. In this context, its irrelevant to survival whether we are able to generate true inferences therefore there is no reason to think natural selection would select for reliable cognition and reasoning.

Premise 2: Anyone who believes that:
- naturalism and evolution are true
- naturalism and evolution are associated with a low or inscrutable probability of reliable cognition and reasoning
Have a defeater for their belief that their cognition and reasoning are reliable.

The obvious objection to this premise is that we know from experience that our cognition and reasoning are reliable. However this objection has a few limitations:

a) The argument is addressing the reliability of our cognition and reasoning – therefore we can’t use the conclusions of our cognition and reasoning to demonstrate the reliability of our cognition and reasoning (i.e. we’re engaging in circular reasoning)

b) The argument isn’t addressing the reliability of our cognition and reasoning given our experience, it’s addressing their reliability given the assumption that naturalism and evolution are true. The objection conflates these - they would first have to demonstrate the truth of naturalism for this objection to be valid.

Premise 3: Anyone who has a defeater for the belief that their cognition and reasoning are reliable – have a defeater for all their beliefs including naturalism. This follows from premise 2.

Premise 4: Anyone who believes both naturalism and evolution acquires a defeater for these beliefs. Therefore believing both naturalism and evolution is self-defeating and can’t be rationally accepted.

Question for debate:
Which premises do you agree or disagree with? Of course providing a rationale for accepting or rejecting the premises.

Some caveats:
1) Plantinga isn’t arguing that our cognition and reasoning are unreliable – that’s the point of the argument to show that naturalism is inconsistent with our experience of relatively reliable cognition and reasoning

2) Plantinga’s argument isn’t trying to refute evolution

[Divine Insight]

1) I'm unclear why you keep insisting on this straw man that theism requires all people to have the same level of cognitive abilities - whilst also insisting you don't need to justify why you are asserting this.

I feel that I have already justified it.

Theism is a belief in a God who purposefully and intentionally created humans. Therefore this God is also the "designer" of humans. In fact, much of the argument of theism is based upon the argument that the world appears to have been "designed".

If this is true, then why should we think that the world would contain any "poorly designed" humans?

In other words, poorly designed humans is already the antithesis of any theism that argues that there must be a God because the world, or humans, are so "well-designed".

This is even more true in any theology that proclaims that their designer God is going to judge individual humans on how well designed they are.

So I can't imagine what it is you expect me to justify. These things should be obvious to anyone who's paying attention to the underlying arguments of theism.

2) Plantinga's argument doesn't need to assume our reasoning is reliable. The argument's conclusion is simply that it is logically incoherent to both hold the assumption that naturalism is true and that our reasoning is likely to be reliable.

Yes his does. It's contained within his very first premise:

I highlighted it in bold blue letters in the hopes that it wouldn't be missed.

Pantinga's Premise 1: The probability of reliable cognition and reasoning is low or uncertain if evolution and naturalism are true.

Well, if his intent is to argue from the above premise, then if the probability of reliable cognition and reasoning is low or uncertain, then by Plantinga's own premise, evolution and naturalism are true.

And so now you want to argue that the probability of reliable cognition and reasoning is indeed low or uncertain. That's the antithesis of Pantinga's argument.

So Plantinga has no choice but to hold that human cognition is both reliable and certain. Otherwise he's shot himself in his own foot via his very first premise.

If he can't stand by his first premise he needs to go back to the drawing board and come up with a new argument.

Could arguments be made for various theologies for why humans don't have reliable and certain cognition? Sure, theists makes these sorts of arguments all the time. In fact, in religions like Christianity humans are considered to be utter fools, totally incapable of reliable and certain cognition without God. So Christian theology itself would be in total denial of Plantinga's Premise #1.

Christianity demands that humans are totally incapable of much of anything without their God. In fact, they claim that humans who think they can rely on their own cognition are "fools". In fact, this is definitely Paul's position in the New Testament. This is where Christianity gets this idea from. They get it directly from Paul.

So Plantinga's argument certainly couldn't be used to support Christianity. Plantinga begins his argument with the premise that human cognition is neither low, nor uncertain.

But even from a pure secular logical perspective Plantinga's argument fails if he needs for humans to have both, reliable, and non-reliable cognition simultaneously in order to make his case.

This violates his very own starting premise.

In logic you can't start an argument founded on a premise that you later defy yourself after you realize that it can't be true.

He either needs to stand by his foundational premise, or chuck it and start over from scratch with a whole new premise. But doing the latter shows that his current argument has no validity. So he's dead in the water until he comes up with a brand new argument based on a premise that he won't later need to violate. He can't be violating his own premises in an effort to keep a failed argument alive.

[Bust Nak]

I get that we need to make presuppositions as starting points for a worldview to get off the ground. Such presuppositions are necessarily circular so we can’t test them directly.

A minor quibble: Circular isn't the right word here. "My senses are accurate because my senses are accurate" is circular. "My senses are accurate" is not circular, but unjustified. I presuppose the latter, not the former.

I get that you make the presuppositions:
1) our reasoning is valid
2) naturalism is true

What I’m unclear about is whether you are open to examining whether these assumptions are logically coherent.

Sure, and I am arguing that these two are indeed logically coherent, they do not contain any internal contradictions, nor do they contradict each other.

It seems to me, but I may be mistaken, but you seem to be presupposing their logical coherence...

Well, I am not trying to. So challenge my claims above.

...essentially you’ve stated that these presuppositions are [testable] indirectly.

No way. I am stating that they are not merely testable indirectly, but passed the test with flying colors - what we find by experience, matches up exactly with what we expected to see, if those 2 presuppositions above are true.

1) the proposed mechanism for the origin of our reasoning, natural selection, does not select for our ability to make logically valid inferences... if naturalism is true, it can’t be guaranteed either.

No need for such a guarantee, given that by experience, we evolved reliable cognition despite the lack of a guarantee.

2) if you’re a reductive materialist (i.e. all matter is reduced to the physical) then the probability of reliable cognition being adaptive is most probably low.

Which being is fitter, one that has accurate senses, or one that has inaccurate senses? Seems trivial to me it's the former.

As our behaviour represents conditioned responses to our behaviour – therefore reliable reasoning isn’t needed at all as we don’t have the freedom of will to act according to the conclusions of our inferences. That's not to say its impossible, its just unlikely.

And that too is what we see from experience, most species of life don't reason at all, let alone reliably.

3) There is evidence to suggest that unreliable cognition can be adaptive.

That too matches up, re: optical illusion, common logical fallacies.

Taken together I don’t think we can conclude that it is certain given naturalism, we have reliable reasoning. Its seems to me it would be highly uncertain, and therefore the most appropriate response to the evidence would be agnosticism about the reliability of our reasoning, given naturalism. Therefore, there is reason to doubt the logical coherence of presupposing these two assumptions.

Again, why would we doubt our sense it matches up so well with what we expect to see if naturalism is true?

Plantinga’s argument shows that we cannot logically conclude presupposition 1) using presupposition 2) as a premise. True enough we can't. But it matters not since they are affirmed as presuppositions and presented as unjustified, and they compliment each other very well.

[Divine Insight]

1) the proposed mechanism for the origin of our reasoning, natural selection, does not select for our ability to make logically valid inferences... if naturalism is true, it can’t be guaranteed either.

No need for such a guarantee, given that by experience, we evolved reliable cognition despite the lack of a guarantee.

Exactly.

Besides, why should we embrace the idea that "1) the proposed mechanism for the origin of our reasoning, natural selection, does not select for our ability to make logically valid inferences.."

Why wouldn't natural selection select for an ability to make logically valid inferences?

I would suggest precisely the opposite.

Organisms that are incapable of making logically valid inferences aren't likely to survive very well in complex environments.

This also goes back to what I had said earlier about amoebas. Very simple lifeforms don't need to make logical inferences because their requirements are pretty much provided by the environment in which they live. They don't need to figure out logical strategies to obtain food, for example.

But more complex animals certainly would benefit from making logical inferences, even if they aren't sentient that this is what they are doing. For example animals like monkey, apes, and even dogs and horses, etc., are all capable of making reliable logical inferences in certain situations. They may not mentally think in terms of trying to 'figure something out using logic', but their brains are clearly processing logical thought patterns none the less, at least to some degree.

In fact, I think this assumption that natural selection wouldn't favor the evolution of logical reasoning is totally unwarranted. I would already be arguing against that assertion. I don't see where that assertion has any merit at all.

[dakoski]

[Replying to Bust Nak]

It seems to me your whole argument is circular. I've tried to show this below but I don't expect you'll agree, it seems obvious to me but I think we'll probably just have to agree to disagree.

A minor quibble: Circular isn't the right word here. "My senses are accurate because my senses are accurate" is circular. "My senses are accurate" is not circular, but unjustified. I presuppose the latter, not the former.

You're misunderstanding:

I get that you are presupposing that your senses are accurate.

However later you claim you justify the accuracy of your senses using the experience of your senses.
-firstly you presuppose the reliability of your reasoning
-then test your reasoning by comparing it with formal logic - which is also derived from your reasoning - which you have presupposed is reliable
-then conclude your reasoning is reliable

Which is just another way of saying 'my reasoning is accurate because my reasoning is accurate' - since your premise includes your conclusion.

Sure, and I am arguing that these two are indeed logically coherent, they do not contain any internal contradictions, nor do they contradict each other.

Yeah I get that's your conclusion, but in order to justify that conclusion you have to show your workings as I often have to tell my students

You keep asserting it - that's why it seems like a presupposition to me. Particularly given the thread is about Plantinga's argument that these two presuppositions are logically incoherent - I haven't seen you address the argument but just assert you disagree.

Well, I am not trying to. So challenge my claims above.

That's the point of the thread, do you have any response to Plantinga's arguments - how do you refute his premises? I haven't heard much more than you presuppose your reasoning is reliable and that naturalism is true and from there make circular arguments.

No way. I am stating that they are not merely testable indirectly, but passed the test with flying colors - what we find by experience, matches up exactly with what we expected to see, if those 2 presuppositions above are true.

It would be nice if you could unpack this a little more and show that you can demonstrate this without resorting to circularity.

No need for such a guarantee, given that by experience, we evolved reliable cognition despite the lack of a guarantee.

The problem is that this is a circular argument:
- you presuppose naturalism is true and your cognition is reliable
-therefore
i)you test your cognition by comparing whether it agrees with rules determined by our cognition (which you presuppose to be reliable) - unsurprisingly our cognition tends to confirm our cognition
ii)you test naturalism by comparing it with your experience (which you presuppose to be identical with naturalism since you presuppose the truth of naturalism) - unsurprisingly our experience confirms our experience

The major problem with this argument is that given the rigid circularity it doesn't matter what data you observe there is no way you could ever conclude that i) naturalism isn't true ii) that our cognition is unreliable iii)that these two assumptions are not logically coherent. Since how you define and evaluate your experience with regards to naturalism and reliability of your reasoning is determined entirely by your presuppositions.

Which being is fitter, one that has accurate senses, or one that has inaccurate senses? Seems trivial to me it's the former.

You've not even attempted to respond to the points raised - just asserting your conclusion.

And that too is what we see from experience, most species of life don't reason at all, let alone reliably.

Exactly, reasoning isn't required for survival so its no guarantee given naturalism that reliable reasoning would evolve - hence the need for agnosticism given naturalism.

That too matches up, re: optical illusion, common logical fallacies.

Again, argues against your assertion that reliable cognition is necessarily adaptive.

Again, why would we doubt our sense it matches up so well with what we expect to see if naturalism is true?

Plantinga’s argument shows that we cannot logically conclude presupposition 1) using presupposition 2) as a premise. True enough we can't. But it matters not since they are affirmed as presuppositions and presented as unjustified, and they compliment each other very well.

That's a very nice circular argument you've constructed there. I think the reality is if you have confidence in the coherence of your presuppositions that naturalism is true and that our cognition is reliable then you would try to engage with the argument.

[dakoski]

[Replying to post 41 by Divine Insight]

I feel that I have already justified it.

Theism is a belief in a God who purposefully and intentionally created humans. Therefore this God is also the "designer" of humans. In fact, much of the argument of theism is based upon the argument that the world appears to have been "designed".

If this is true, then why should we think that the world would contain any "poorly designed" humans?

In other words, poorly designed humans is already the antithesis of any theism that argues that there must be a God because the world, or humans, are so "well-designed".

This is even more true in any theology that proclaims that their designer God is going to judge individual humans on how well designed they are. Rolling Eyes

So I can't imagine what it is you expect me to justify. These things should be obvious to anyone who's paying attention to the underlying arguments of theism.

As a former Christian you must be aware that the Christian worldview states:
-we are made in the image of God (hence we have the capability of generating reliable inferences)
-but we're also fallible (so we make mistakes in our inferences for various reasons)
- we are not all identical but have different gifts - some of us have greater cognitive abilities than others, some of us have great physical strength, some of us are really gifted with music or art, some of us are really good and building and working with our hands. Radical individualism would require we all be exactly the same so we wouldn't need anyone else. The Christian worldview argues we are made for interdependence so that we can help and serve one another with our different gifts.

Plantinga's Premise 1: The probability of reliable cognition and reasoning is low or uncertain if evolution and naturalism are true. Well, if his intent is to argue from the above premise, then if the probability of reliable cognition and reasoning is low or uncertain, then by Plantinga's own premise, evolution and naturalism are true.

And so now you want to argue that the probability of reliable cognition and reasoning is indeed low or uncertain. That's the antithesis of Pantinga's argument. So Plantinga has no choice but to hold that human cognition is both reliable and certain. Otherwise he's shot himself in his own foot via his very first premise.

If he can't stand by his first premise he needs to go back to the drawing board and come up with a new argument.

His premise as you rightly state is that reliable cognition and reasoning is low if evolution and naturalism are true. So he is arguing cognition and reasoning is low conditional on naturalism being true.

You've tried to restate his argument as:
-reliability of our cognition and reasoning is low given our experience
-therefore evolution and naturalism is true

He isn't arguing that the probability of the reliability of our cognition and reasoning is low conditional on our experience as that has nothing to do with the scope of his argument.

Could arguments be made for various theologies for why humans don't have reliable and certain cognition? Sure, theists makes these sorts of arguments all the time. In fact, in religions like Christianity humans are considered to be utter fools, totally incapable of reliable and certain cognition without God. So Christian theology itself would be in total denial of Plantinga's Premise #1.

Christianity demands that humans are totally incapable of much of anything without their God. In fact, they claim that humans who think they can rely on their own cognition are "fools". In fact, this is definitely Paul's position in the New Testament. This is where Christianity gets this idea from. They get it directly from Paul.

So Plantinga's argument certainly couldn't be used to support Christianity. Plantinga begins his argument with the premise that human cognition is neither low, nor uncertain.

This is just straw man - so there's nothing really to respond to here.

But even from a pure secular logical perspective Plantinga's argument fails if he needs for humans to have both, reliable, and non-reliable cognition simultaneously in order to make his case.

This violates his very own starting premise.

In logic you can't start an argument founded on a premise that you later defy yourself after you realize that it can't be true.

He either needs to stand by his foundational premise, or chuck it and start over from scratch with a whole new premise. But doing the latter shows that his current argument has no validity. So he's dead in the water until he comes up with a brand new argument based on a premise that he won't later need to violate. He can't be violating his own premises in an effort to keep a failed argument alive.

This is also strawman his argument does not require them to both have reliable and unreliable cognition - he is simply trying to evaluate the logical coherence of assumptions with naturalism i.e. naturalism is true, our cognition is reliable

[Divine Insight]

As a former Christian you must be aware that the Christian worldview states:
-we are made in the image of God (hence we have the capability of generating reliable inferences)

I don't see why you draw the conclusion you draw.

No Christian would say, "We are made in the image of God hence we are omnipotent and omniscient."

And besides, any Christian who claims that we are capable of generating "reliable" inferences is in direct contradiction to the Gospel of Paul who claims that we are fools if we think that we can make "reliable" inferences.

-but we're also fallible (so we make mistakes in our inferences for various reasons)

And now you've just shot your very own argument in the foot.

We are made in the image of God hence we are fallible and make mistakes?

Sorry, but clearly you're arguments need some work because you aren't being consistent in your conclusions.

- we are not all identical but have different gifts - some of us have greater cognitive abilities than others, some of us have great physical strength, some of us are really gifted with music or art, some of us are really good and building and working with our hands. Radical individualism would require we all be exactly the same so we wouldn't need anyone else. The Christian worldview argues we are made for interdependence so that we can help and serve one another with our different gifts.

In other words, the Christian worldview is inconsistent and self-contradictory. Also, where in the Bible does it teach us that we are made for interdependence? That's a liberal secular view that is considered anti-Christian.

Christians are supposed to depend on Jesus and God, not on other humans.

So the arguments you have accepted for Christianity don't hold water.

You've misunderstood his argument. I've tried to already clarify this several times above that the point of his argument is to challenge the internal coherence of a naturalist worldview. He's taking two presuppositions of the naturalist worldview and arguing they are contradictory.

My answer to this is that I claim that he's misrepresenting the naturalist worldview. He makes claims about the naturalist worldview that simply aren't true. So his argument fails via his own ignorance of a naturalist worldview.

His premises don't require that if our cognition is unreliable then naturalism must be true, nor that if our cognition is reliable that naturalism must be false. So you're just constructing a straw man.

Have you been paying attention at all?

Here is his premise #1 as you had posted it in the OP:

Premise 1: The probability of reliable cognition and reasoning is low or uncertain if evolution and naturalism are true.

So he has already premised this as a condition for his argument. If he wants to withdraw that premise, that's fine. But then he needs to back up to square one and try again with a new premise.

In other words, he cannot now argue that cognition is unreliable or uncertain when he had already stated as a premise that these conditions would indeed exist if evolution and naturalism are true.

He'll need to make up his mind where he stands on this. And if his argument is that human cognition is reliable and certain, then he needs to explain why this isn't the case for ALL humans.

If it's not the case for ALL humans, then how can it be said to be either reliable or certain?

He's already drowned in his own self-contradictory position.

He can't have his cake and eat it too.

Not only this, but theism and Christianity don't even matter. His argument fails already from pure logical contradictions in his position. It wouldn't matter what he's arguing for. Arguments that rebuke their very own premises fail. Period. It wouldn't matter what they are about.

[dakoski]

[Replying to post 46 by Divine Insight]

I don't see why you draw the conclusion you draw.

No Christian would say, "We are made in the image of God hence we are omnipotent and omniscient."

And besides, any Christian who claims that we are capable of generating "reliable" inferences is in direct contradiction to the Gospel of Paul who claims that we are fools if we think that we can make "reliable" inferences.

Do you seriously think I'm claiming I think human beings are omnipotent and omniscient? Its a crass straw man.

Name me one Christian theologian who argues that Paul doesn't think we are able to make reliable inferences.

And now you've just shot your very own argument in the foot.

We are made in the image of God hence we are fallible and make mistakes? Think

Sorry, but clearly you're arguments need some work because you aren't being consistent in your conclusions.

Again you don't appear to be familiar with Christian theology regarding humans being made in the image of God. You also don't appear to be aware that the Bible teaches human beings are fallible - these views are a big surprise to you?

The Bible speaks about both - and I think our experience reflects this that humans are capable of incredible good but also incredible folly. Not in the reductionist 'us' and 'them' categories you're trying to construct but often within the same individual - we know we are capable of both as are our fellow human beings.

In other words, the Christian worldview is inconsistent and self-contradictory. Also, where in the Bible does it teach us that we are made for interdependence? That's a liberal secular view that is considered anti-Christian.

Christians are supposed to depend on Jesus and God, not on other humans.

So the arguments you have accepted for Christianity don't hold water.

You're building an army of straw men. Of course the interdependence of people is a central message of the Bible. See for example: 1 Corinthians 12:12-26.

Just as a body, though one, has many parts, but all its many parts form one body, so it is with Christ. 13 For we were all baptized by[c] one Spirit so as to form one body—whether Jews or Gentiles, slave or free—and we were all given the one Spirit to drink. 14 Even so the body is not made up of one part but of many.

15 Now if the foot should say, “Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body,� it would not for that reason stop being part of the body. 16 And if the ear should say, “Because I am not an eye, I do not belong to the body,� it would not for that reason stop being part of the body. 17 If the whole body were an eye, where would the sense of hearing be? If the whole body were an ear, where would the sense of smell be? 18 But in fact God has placed the parts in the body, every one of them, just as he wanted them to be. 19 If they were all one part, where would the body be? 20 As it is, there are many parts, but one body.

21 The eye cannot say to the hand, “I don’t need you!� And the head cannot say to the feet, “I don’t need you!� 22 On the contrary, those parts of the body that seem to be weaker are indispensable, 23 and the parts that we think are less honorable we treat with special honor. And the parts that are unpresentable are treated with special modesty, 24 while our presentable parts need no special treatment. But God has put the body together, giving greater honor to the parts that lacked it, 25 so that there should be no division in the body, but that its parts should have equal concern for each other. 26 If one part suffers, every part suffers with it; if one part is honored, every part rejoices with it

My answer to this is that I claim that he's misrepresenting the naturalist worldview. He makes claims about the naturalist worldview that simply aren't true. So his argument fails via his own ignorance of a naturalist worldview.

Is it misrepresenting the naturalist worldview to say that many who hold this worldview claim:
1) naturalism is true
2) that our cognition is reliable?

Have you been paying attention at all? Think

Here is his premise #1 as you had posted it in the OP:

Premise 1: The probability of reliable cognition and reasoning is low or uncertain if evolution and naturalism are true.

So he has already premised this as a condition for his argument. If he wants to withdraw that premise, that's fine. But then he needs to back up to square one and try again with a new premise.

In other words, he cannot now argue that cognition is unreliable or uncertain when he had already stated as a premise that these conditions would indeed exist if evolution and naturalism are true.

He'll need to make up his mind where he stands on this. And if his argument is that human cognition is reliable and certain, then he needs to explain why this isn't the case for ALL humans.

If it's not the case for ALL humans, then how can it be said to be either reliable or certain? Think

He's already drowned in his own self-contradictory position.

He can't have his cake and eat it too.

Not only this, but theism and Christianity don't even matter. His argument fails already from pure logical contradictions in his position. It wouldn't matter what he's arguing for. Arguments that rebuke their very own premises fail. Period. It wouldn't matter what they are about.

While you were replying, I'd realised what I wrote was unclear and have edited it above apologies for the lack of clarity I was trying to rush off a message.

[Divine Insight]

Do you seriously think I'm claiming I think human beings are omnipotent and omniscient? Its a crass straw man.

Of course not. I'm just showing the inconsistency of your argument.

On the one hand, you claim that because we were supposedly created in the image of God we should have a similar trait of being able to have reliable cognizance like God supposedly has. But the moment I point out that we don't have other characteristics of this God you start screaming "straw man".

But wait-a-minute, you haven't explained why we should only have characteristics of God that support your argument, and not characteristics that would clearly make your argument obviously false.

In short, why should you expect me to embrace only the parts of your arguments that you deem to be important to your points, and not notice the problems with your arguments in general?

For example, if God is perfect, and we are made in the image of God, and this is grounds for an argument that we should then have traits that are common to God, then why aren't we also perfect?

You want to pick and choose only traits that you think we should inherit from God, but not others.

And when I point out that flaw in this argument you scream "straw man".

Is it misrepresenting the naturalist worldview to say that many who hold this worldview claim:
1) naturalism is true
2) that our cognition is reliable?

I don't see any problem with this. It's my position that reliable cognition would indeed evolve from the process of natural selection. And it would also evolved in precisely the way we see it. Some humans clearly have more reliable cognition than others.

Now, let's go back to your argument:

You argue that all humans are created in the image of God, and this is why we should expect them to have reliable cognition.

Well, there you go! If that's your argument then all humans should have precisely the same level of reliable cognition. Unless you now want to argue that some humans are created in the "image of God" more so than others.

But surely you can see where that would quickly become highly problematic.

So as far as I can see Naturalism is winning hands-down here.

[Bust Nak]

However later you claim you justify the accuracy of your senses using the experience of your senses.

No, you have the wrong end of the stick. I am justifying the logical consistency of naturalism with my presupposition of the accuracy of my senses. I don't need to justify the accuracy of my senses at all as it is presupposed to be accurate.

Yeah I get that's your conclusion, but in order to justify that conclusion you have to show your workings as I often have to tell my students

That's what the two and bit points are for: animals with accurate senses are fitter than those with inaccurate senses; most organisms are bad at reasoning; optical illusion, common logical fallacies.

That's the point of the thread, do you have any response to Plantinga's arguments - how do you refute his premises?

I don't need to refute his premises as I agree with them. The problem is how you and Plantinga tries to portrait it as some sort of weapon, as we naturalists accept the conclusion of the argument as a feature, not a problem of naturalism.

I haven't heard much more than you presuppose your reasoning is reliable and that naturalism is true and from there make circular arguments.

That's merely your impression. There is nothing circular about my reasoning.

It would be nice if you could unpack this a little more and show that you can demonstrate this without resorting to circularity.

That's what those two and a bit points are!

The problem is that this is a circular argument:
- you presuppose naturalism is true and your cognition is reliable
-therefore
i)you test your cognition....

BUZZ, there is no need to test that, it's taken for granted as a presupposition. I've bang on and on about this right from the get go. The whole point of a presupposition is that you presuppose it without justification. If I had any sort of justification for an assumption then it wouldn't be called a presupposition. Stop treating anything I said as any sort of justification for the accuracy of my senses. I told you what my presupposition is in my very first post, I have been very explicit, leaving little room for misinterpretation. Just quit it with the strawman argument.

ii)you test naturalism by comparing it with your experience (which you presuppose to be identical with naturalism since you presuppose the truth of naturalism) - unsurprisingly our experience confirms our experience.

Well there you go, acceptance of naturalism is trivial, it is indeed unsurprising. Do you understand that by pointing out that our experience does confirms our experience, you've conceded the logical consistency of naturalism with our presumed accurate sense? You've sunk your whole case.

there is no way you could ever conclude that i) naturalism isn't true...

So why not accept it as true?

ii) that our cognition is unreliable

Don't care since my senses are reliable as presupposed.

iii)that these two assumptions are not logically coherent.

But they are logically coherent though. Everything we see matches up with what we expect to see should these two assumptions are true, those two and a bit points are just a tiny taste of how great these two assumptions stick together.

And this here is the problem with Plantinga's argument, not with the argument itself mind you, but how it is presented as an argument against coherence of naturalism and accurate senses. You can't jump from the actual conclusion of Plantinga's argument (namely, there is no guarantee of accurate senses) to your conclusion that my assumptions are not logically coherent. That last jump is a non sequitur.

Since how you define and evaluate your experience with regards to naturalism and reliability of your reasoning is determined entirely by your presuppositions.

Correction. How I define and evaluate my experience with regards to naturalism is determined entirely by my presuppositions of accurate senses. And that's fine because everyone does that, naturalist or otherwise. It is unavoidable, as the alternative is literally madness.

You've not even attempted to respond to the points raised - just asserting your conclusion.

What did you think my rhetorical question was, if not an attempted to respond to the points raised? If it wasn't care before, let me be more explicit: the probability of reliable cognition evolving for a particular species is indeed low, but the probability of reliable cognition evolving given a particular survival strategy is very high - reliable cognition provide a huge boost to evolutionary fitness.

Exactly, reasoning isn't required for survival so its no guarantee given naturalism that reliable reasoning would evolve - hence the need for agnosticism given naturalism.

But there are reason to move from that agnosticism given naturalism though. Again, the two and a bit points.

Again, argues against your assertion that reliable cognition is necessarily adaptive.

Who the hell made that assertion? I said reliable cognition is adaptive, and that much is true.

That's a very nice circular argument you've constructed there.

Again, there is nothing circular there. Any circularity you see are your own strawman creation. Just have a little think about your own position, if Plantinga's argument actually works against naturalism, it can be tweaked slightly and work against supernatural creator - you have zero guarantee that a creator gave you accurate sense after all. Plantinga's argument doesn't work against naturalism, any more than arguments along the lines of "no guarantee you were created with accurate sense" work against a creator.

I think the reality is if you have confidence in the coherence of your presuppositions that naturalism is true and that our cognition is reliable then you would try to engage with the argument.

Not sure what you are saying here exactly, if by "the argument" you are referring to Plantinga's then no, as its conclusion is perfectly compatible with naturalism.

[dakoski]

[Replying to Divine Insight]

Of course not. I'm just showing the inconsistency of your argument.

On the one hand, you claim that because we were supposedly created in the image of God we should have a similar trait of being able to have reliable cognizance like God supposedly has. But the moment I point out that we don't have other characteristics of this God you start screaming "straw man".

But wait-a-minute, you haven't explained why we should only have characteristics of God that support your argument, and not characteristics that would clearly make your argument obviously false.

In short, why should you expect me to embrace only the parts of your arguments that you deem to be important to your points, and not notice the problems with your arguments in general?

For example, if God is perfect, and we are made in the image of God, and this is grounds for an argument that we should then have traits that are common to God, then why aren't we also perfect?

You want to pick and choose only traits that you think we should inherit from God, but not others.

And when I point out that flaw in this argument you scream "straw man".

This argument is a little silly – if it was common for Christian’s to interpret the image of God as reflecting that we are omniscient then you might have a point. However, since I have never seen a Christian claim that then it is pretty obviously a strawman.

You’re also continuing to pursue the false antithesis between omniscience and reliability. If someone isn’t omniscient then their cognition is unreliable - this is just simply false. Do you believe yourself to be omniscient? If not, do you believe yourself to be incapable of valid inferences? Of course the answer to both questions is no.

I don't see any problem with this. It's my position that reliable cognition would indeed evolve from the process of natural selection. And it would also evolved in precisely the way we see it. Some humans clearly have more reliable cognition than others.

You originally attempted to challenge Plantinga’s premises but I’ve responded to your arguments several times but rather than actually respond to my comments you continue to restate your conclusion without actually interacting with my critique and also continuing to restate strawmen arguments. So the conversation can’t really progress.

Now, let's go back to your argument:

You argue that all humans are created in the image of God, and this is why we should expect them to have reliable cognition.

Well, there you go! If that's your argument then all humans should have precisely the same level of reliable cognition. Unless you now want to argue that some humans are created in the "image of God" more so than others.

But surely you can see where that would quickly become highly problematic.

So as far as I can see Naturalism is winning hands-down here.

Its frustrating, but also funny, that you continue to repeat this straw man.