Understanding the Kalam Cosmological Argument

[The Tanager]

My desire in this thread is to discuss what the Kalam Cosmological Argument actually claims rather than assessing the truth of the conclusion. That's why I've put it in the philosophy section rather than the apologetic section, but maybe I'm wrong there. I've been reading Dan's Barker book godless and believe that he does not have a good grasp on what the argument says. You don't need to have read his chapter on it (chapter 8) to discuss the ideas he brings up, and the topic does not need to stay on Barker's understanding alone.

First (group of) question(s) for discussion: Do you agree with Barker that the "old" cosmological argument claimed that everything has a cause and, seeing that this fails, theists have changed the argument to try to "get God off the hook"? The attempt he then focuses on (while quickly speaking of two others) is the Kalam's addition of "that begins to exist" to make the key phrase everything that begins to exist has a cause. If you agree with him, what source(s) does this more "primitive" version of the argument come from?

[The Tanager]

[Replying to post 8 by William]

I assume then that a creator is included as a 'thing', which is why the argument fails?
If the argument were that all things are created things, and that GOD was not created, then GOD is not a created thing.

I'm not sure I follow. The formulation you gave (in red in your post) does not use 'thing'. I think Barker rightly notes in his chapter that the argument is saying there are, conceptually, two categories of entities: those that begin to exist and those that are beginningless. Premise 1 talks about things that begin to exist. Premise 2 says the universe fits into that category. The further argument then sets about to argue for how the cause of the universe fits would need to fit into the second category and how God is the best option.

The real problem with the equation is around the extended idea of GOD. As is clearly evident in theism, there are many ideas of GOD, and most if not all do indeed exist for the purpose of explaining why our universe exists...one can say in this that all theism agrees that GOD created the universe (thus GOD is creative)...the addition to, in this case:

"... transcending the entire universe there exists a cause which brought the universe into being ex nihilo [out of nothing]... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth."

is the assumption:

An uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who without the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and infinitely powerful.

... a convenient way in which a theist might slot his/her particular idea of GOD into that position whilst also denying other theist ideas of GOD the same right of assumption?

Craig does not assume those things, he argues to them as conclusions. Now, his reasoning may be off, but he does not just assert that conclusion as true.

"Who without the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful;"

William: IF this is to be the case THEN when the GOD is within this universe, The GOD becomes The Demiurge.

Could you explain this more fully? I'm not sure I'm following.

[The Tanager]

Yes, from talking to people. I mean, I just quoted Wikipedia. And I've read whatshisname's five ways. And one of Plantinga's books, but not directly bearing on this topic. And I've talked to a whole lot of people on the internet, like you, which I guess could be called "published" posts. But I'll say mostly just from talking to people.

I don't see any conflict between what I've read and what I've heard.

I was just wondering. I think some Christians don't present it even close to the ways professional thinkers do, but nowadays anyone can publish their own work and claim to be an expert worth listening to, so that gets muddied too. For that matter, many (but certainly not all) schools (secular and religious) churn out so-called experts that probably are poorly prepared for discussing the things they do.

No, no. My take is that the proponent of this argument wants you to think things are caused. At this point, all things. Yes, he'll make an exception later, but you never see this premise phrased to explicitly claim that some things are caused.

I disagree. Aquinas starts with the observation of the "world of sense", which would not include supernatural beings. And Aquinas isn't assuming the supernatural exists in doing this either, he's just not automatically ruling it out. He's starting with things we can physically sense and seeing what we can find out from those observations, eventually concluding that they point to the existence of something outside of the "world of sense". Therefore, I don't see how his conclusion is a later exception to what he first states.

The argument wouldn't go anywhere from that limited premise. Suppose we grant that some things are caused and others aren't. How would we get gods out of that?

If some things are caused and others not, then we have no need of a single first cause of everything else.

As I see it, the argument doesn't answer whether there are actual things in each category to start. It looks at a category the proponent claims we know some stuff about (things that exist) and then claims the universe is in that category, but (when the argument is extended) that the cause of the universe has certain characteristics that show it must be in the other category.

That's a charitable reading. I don't have a problem with charitable readings. They let us investigate whether an argument can be formed in a way that works.

If there is a workable form of the first cause argument, I want to know about it.

But I have no suspicion that the average Christian working at the next lathe or desk shares your sophisticated interpretation.

Well, the principle of charity is an excellent thing to use, but I really don't think it is that charitable to Aquinas. I would call it a knowledgeable reading. I would agree that the average person would not have that reading, but that's because they haven't put in the effort. That's the same with any subject.

That third one seems arbitrary and self serving. You happen to believe in that god, so you put it in the list.

The third one is not a synonym for a god, it's just the third logical possibility. If a rock is moving, we can ask why. Either the rock (1) caused itself to move, (2) there is an infinite chain of causation to trace back, or (3) there is some first cause thing responsible for it moving. Perhaps a human is the first cause, holding a stick that pushed the rock.

Suppose I worshiped a blue god. I'd say that things that aren't blue need causes. And I'd make a list of possible universal causes that include my blue god, plus other choices that are supposed to be dismissed at first glance by worshipers of the blue god.

Well, you wouldn't be doing what Aquinas or the KCA does, then. Aquinas says things that are caused cannot be self-caused and that there can't be an infinite chain of these causes, but that their must be an ultimate first cause that is itself uncaused. Otherwise the whole system wouldn't logically work.

With the Kalam, are you saying that eternal things need causes, too?

My mother and sister-in-law have informed me that god created himself. You obviously reject that yourself, but how do you manage to reject that as absurd while accepting the uncaused first cause? Which is weirder? Which is less palatable?

Because self-causation is absolutely absurd. You have to exist to be a cause of something. This is asking something to exist before it exists so that it can cause itself to exist. It's absurd by the very definition. The concept of an eternal existence is not absurd in that way.

And why did you neglect to mention the possibilities of two uncaused first causes, thirty-seven uncaused first causes, and an infinity of uncaused first causes?

I did not mean to imply that. There would need to be further argument to claim there is only one first cause or beginningless cause of the universe. I was thinking of the third option in the sense of there being at least one uncaused thing, but could have been more explicit in that.

Only if you believe in causes that precede effects. William Lane Craig denies that. When he gets into the first cause argument, he says that god created time. How can time be an effect if there was no prior cause? And how can there be a prior cause if there was no time before time?

Craig's way out of that hole is to deny that causes come before effects. If he's right about that, then the big bang may turn out to eventually be caused by the Large Hadron Collider.

In which case, we don't need a first cause.

Denying that causes come before effects is not the same thing as saying effects can precede their causes. Cause/effect (in a sense) are simultaneous, but the cause is still logically prior. I didn't actually become a cause (for example, fathering a child) until the moment an effect was created. I'm still a cause of my child coming into existence. Without me, that child isn't coming to be. Here you seem to be faulting cause/effect without time for how cause/effect acts within time. There is a "before" time, just not a temporal kind of "before" since time would not have existed.

And if we granted that some things don't need causes, then, once again, we no longer need a god. Why can't, for instance, the big bang be uncaused?

Other options get ruled out by other reasoning (but of course the reasoning can be flawed). My point is that God isn't just thrown in to fill a gap by a believer. At least, not if done right. The big bang theories assert that there is a beginning. Uncaused things don't have beginnings. To be caused is to have a beginning. God is the conclusion after arguments for the cause needing to be personal and all of that.

Is that stranger, less palatable, less logical, than an uncaused loving god who tortures people forever? An uncaused omnipotent god who can't defeat iron chariots? An omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent god who coexists with evil? A god who can be seen but can't be seen?

After the KCA, then we get into these other kinds of things about whether God tortures people forever, why an omnipotent God may not choose to defeat iron chariots, chooses to reveal itself in certain ways, allows evil, etc.

So, the existence of some uncaused, first cause is logically necessary as the only option left.

No. You arbitrarily shortened your list of possible origins from infinity to just three, and then you picked the one you liked without showing any reason to think it more plausible than the others.

What are the other options?

P1: Some things have causes.
P2: Some things don't have causes.
C: I get to decide what things don't have causes, and I pick my own god.

That's an interpretation consistent with the source material, and also consistent with your theory that a wise professor could fill in the missing premises to make the argument come out right.

Okay, the conclusion is a bit lippy. But what you're really saying is that the argument doesn't work by itself, which is also what I'm saying.

The conclusion is completely off. Aquinas does not just throw in his own god at the end. In the five ways (which must be taken all together) he's arguing for classical theism (he gets to the Christian God later in the Summa). One way is not meant to be taken separately from the rest (and the objection/replies as well). So, I think your interpretation is out of context and therefore not consistent with the source material. Now, whether Aquinas' argument of the five ways is convincing is another matter, or whether there are stronger cases for classical theism.

[Divine Insight]

[Replying to post 7 by Divine Insight]

I think you have some on point critiques of the Kalam, unlike Barker. I may not agree with your assessment of the evidence involved in those issues, but I can agree it is addressing the claims of the KCA.

My only disagreement would be concerning the point about the logic of concluding a timeless and immaterial cause. I think it does logically follow that if time and space only come into existence with the universe, then the necessarily prior cause of the universe could not fit into those categories. Now, whether our understanding of time and space is correct is certainly up for debate, as you pointed out.

That's exactly my point. We're making assumptions about things without sufficient reasons.

The KCA also makes an unwarranted assumption with its first premise:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

It has already asserted the conclusion it would like to obtain as its first premise.

If we accept premise #1 then we have no choice but to accept that whatever begins to exist has a cause.

So according to the KCA argument it's already been established that there must have been a cause.

But where does that get us even if we accept this premise? We still aren't in any position to make any meaningful statements about what the cause might have been.

Also we can't even know for certain that time and space only come into existence with the universe. Quantum Mechanics appears to deny that assumption in any case.

Although the "Macro" behavior of time and space may indeed be a property of the macro universe. In fact, this is already recognized to be the case. So it's not that time and space came into being with the universe, but rather the macro behavior of these phenomena are the properties of macro space. And "Macro Space" is simple the situation where many micro (or quantum) entities tend to behave in ways that are dependent upon large quantities of them interacting.

So as far as I can see, all we can truly say about "before" the universe is that there was apparently a time when micro (or quantum) entities were not coordinated into large ensembles of activity that depend upon the behavior of each other.

As far as I can see that's about all we could deduce from these assumption proposed by the KCA. And this has already been suggested by physicists that our universe may very well have arisen from a quantum fluctuation then underwent some form of inflation.

So in this sense the physicists already have answers to these questions. They may not be provable answers, but they are certainly answers based on reason. And no "Gods" needed to be invoked for that conclusion to hold.

~~~~~

Also, the very moment we start imagination some super intelligent "God" purposefully creating the universe "by design" this proposal actually leads to all manner of theological contradictions. So it created more unsolved problems than it originally attempted to solve. It doesn't get us anywhere but into a can of theological worms for which there are many contradictions.

So I don't see the value in that hypothesis. We would need the God to either be a very poor designer, or a malevolent designer, neither of which appears to me to be a very good hypothesis. The Hebrew (or Christian) theology that tries to pin the blame for a poorly designed universe onto humans seems to me to be an extremely weak argument. Especially when the theology doesn't even begin with that idea. The idea that humans "fell from grace" is quite frankly an unconvincing thesis. If the God created perfect humans then they shouldn't be falling from grace because they are perfect. On other other hand if the God created imperfect humans, then who could be blamed for that? Certainly not the humans who were created to be imperfect.

So this theology has far greater problems than the mystery of how the universe might have begun. It's hardly an explanation when it has more problems than it claims to explain.

By the way, the idea that some highly organized and intelligent "God" has always existed is itself an illogical premise. So that can hardly act as an "explanation" for anything.

An unexplained God is no explanation for anything.

[William]

William: I assume then that a creator is included as a 'thing', which is why the argument fails?
If the argument were that all things are created things, and that GOD was not created, then GOD is not a created thing.


The Tanager: I'm not sure I follow. The formulation you gave (in red in your post) does not use 'thing'.

William: The formulation speaks of this universe, and that is a 'Thing'.
My reasoned deduction on that goes as follows
IF:
GOD is also a 'Thing' like the universe is a 'Thing', and

IF: a 'Thing' requires a creator in order for it to exist,

THEN:

GOD also has to be a created object. "Thing"="Object"


The Tanager: I think Barker rightly notes in his chapter that the argument is saying there are, conceptually, two categories of entities: those that begin to exist and those that are beginningless.

William: Yes, I got that, but the deductive reasoning appears faulty for the reasons I gave...
I recently wrote about this idea, interacting with Member Waterfall. The reader can access this idea HERE:
Essentially my argument is that the reason this universe exists is because it was necessary to create it.
Member Ttruscott has similar ideas related to prior existence and why this universe had to be created...we veer off on the exact details.
In that, the assumption is that there can be entities that are beginningless. They interact as 'things' because they acknowledge each others existence.
Because these Eternal Entities had no beginning, should we assume that they were not created by a GOD?
If I understand Ttruscott's PCE theology, I agree with it...Eternal Entities can be a creation of (a) GOD.

Specific to that, re my interaction with member Waterfall - the following parable;

Waterfall: Lets say I fall from the spirituel world today.

Will I then get my own universe? Or will I go to a universe with many inhabitants?

Can you explain things from the beginning?

What happens when a soul falls from the spirituel world?

William: As a Christian Panentheist I would explain it as the following parable.
I got into argument with my sibling Spirits about the nature of GOD and if there was one. The problem with my argument was that my siblings and I had never not existed, so if GOD was a 'creator' but we had always existed, how then could GOD exist?
My argument was that GOD could still exist.
Consequently the idea for creating the VoP VR [added to this quote: "Void of Potential - Virtual Reality"] device was to allow for a way in which to explore the idea of GOD from the position of never having any memory of always ever having being.
It was tasked to me to be the one to experience never having ever being, and I do not know how that made me feel as a being who had always existed, to have to lose all memory of my self. Perhaps I felt nothing and just accepted that the loss would be temporal - it was just an experiment to see if an answer could be found for the BIG Q.

The Tanager: Premise 1 talks about things that begin to exist. Premise 2 says the universe fits into that category. The further argument then sets about to argue for how the cause of the universe fits would need to fit into the second category and how God is the best option.

William: There is still the Problem of Infinite Regress. IF The Eternal Entities are able to be created by GOD, then GOD as an Eternal Entity also, can equally be said to have been created.
The only way to find solution to that problem is to understand GOD as "That Which Is Not A Thing."
Eternal Entities are things because they acknowledge the existence of each other.
The First Source GOD is not an Object which was created as a thing.
As a Subject, The First Source GOD is undivided.

An uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who without the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and infinitely powerful.

The Tanager: Craig does not assume those things, he argues to them as conclusions. Now, his reasoning may be off, but he does not just assert that conclusion as true.

William: The assumption is in the use of the phrase "Personal Creator." which implies that the GOD can be interacted with...
The assumption is also in thinking that the creator of this universe was uncaused. There is no reason why one has to assume this as being the case.
The creator of this universe could have been created.
IF:
this is to be the case
THEN:
when the GOD is within this universe, The GOD becomes The Demiurge.

The Tanager: Could you explain this more fully? I'm not sure I'm following.

William: The Demiurge in the Platonic, Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and Neoplatonic schools of philosophy, is an artisan-like figure responsible for fashioning and maintaining the physical universe.
The Gnostics adopted the term "demiurge".
Although a fashioner, the demiurge is not necessarily the same as the creator figure in the monotheistic sense, [First Source] because the demiurge itself and the material from which the demiurge fashions the universe are both considered to be consequences of something else. Depending on the system, they may be considered to be either uncreated and eternal or the product of some other entity.
Therein the above definition, which I adapted from the WikiLink, the assumption that Eternal Entities are uncreated, because they are eternal and have always existed, is why the Gnostics have the role of those Gate-keepers who turn others away from entering and do not enter the Gate themselves...they are gazing at a reflection of First Source, thinking it is the actual rather than an image...

Generally this is because Gnostics have made an enemy of The Demiurge, based upon certain 'Fall" theist mythologies which do not sufficiently connect all the dots.

In short, the way around that aspect of the problem, is to understand that - yes indeed - Eternal Entities can be and were created.
IF:
Eternal Entities were given the idea that they never had a beginning and have always existed.
THEN:
They could indeed have been created this way, for that purpose.

Once one comes to that point, the only think left to do is to explain that purpose...why that was necessary.

[The Tanager]

That's exactly my point. We're making assumptions about things without sufficient reasons.

I would say the reasons are sufficient, but that is a different kind of thread.

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

It has already asserted the conclusion it would like to obtain as its first premise.

If we accept premise #1 then we have no choice but to accept that whatever begins to exist has a cause.

So according to the KCA argument it's already been established that there must have been a cause.

The conclusion of the KCA proper is that the universe had a cause. That is not included in the first premise.

But where does that get us even if we accept this premise? We still aren't in any position to make any meaningful statements about what the cause might have been.

That is why people extend the argument further with further premises and conclusions.

Also, the very moment we start imagination some super intelligent "God" purposefully creating the universe "by design" this proposal actually leads to all manner of theological contradictions. So it created more unsolved problems than it originally attempted to solve. It doesn't get us anywhere but into a can of theological worms for which there are many contradictions.

Supposed contradictions that would need to be dealt with in turn by one who searches after truth, but one must take things one thing at a time.

By the way, the idea that some highly organized and intelligent "God" has always existed is itself an illogical premise. So that can hardly act as an "explanation" for anything.

Since I'm talking about us understanding the argument properly, I think I should make sure we're understanding your critique properly as well. How is that illogical? Why does it being "highly organized" and intelligent contradict it being eternal? Or did I misread your critique their?

[The Tanager]

William: The formulation speaks of this universe, and that is a 'Thing'.
My reasoned deduction on that goes as follows
IF:
GOD is also a 'Thing' like the universe is a 'Thing', and

IF: a 'Thing' requires a creator in order for it to exist,

THEN:

GOD also has to be a created object. "Thing"="Object"

Where does the Kalam say that second IF statement? It says one category of things, those which begin to exist, require a cause. The Kalam argues that the universe fits into that category. It argues that at least one thing has to fit into the opposite category (i.e., a beginningless, uncaused cause)...ultimately disagreeing with your first IF statement.

Because these Eternal Entities had no beginning, should we assume that they were not created by a GOD?

How do you define "eternal" here? How can something that has "always" (we can't get away from temporal language, but it still shouldn't trip us up) existed, be brought into existence? Being brought into existence seems to speak of a prior state (with or without time) where it did not exist.

William: There is still the Problem of Infinite Regress. IF The Eternal Entities are able to be created by GOD, then GOD as an Eternal Entity also, can equally be said to have been created.
The only way to find solution to that problem is to understand GOD as "That Which Is Not A Thing."
Eternal Entities are things because they acknowledge the existence of each other.
The First Source GOD is not an Object which was created as a thing.
As a Subject, The First Source GOD is undivided.

A problem for the KCA or mixing the KCA and your theology? It seems to me that the KCA asserts that eternal created entities are illogical on par with married bachelors.

William: The assumption is in the use of the phrase "Personal Creator." which implies that the GOD can be interacted with...
The assumption is also in thinking that the creator of this universe was uncaused. There is no reason why one has to assume this as being the case.
The creator of this universe could have been created.

But Craig argues for something being the cause of the universe (creator) and for that cause to be personal. Whether further interaction is had would be a separate question that I don't think Craig says the extended KCA addresses.

And when talking about the uncaused cause of the universe, the universe means all of physical reality (whether that is just our observable universe, the multiverse, etc.). Ultimately, the KCA is talking about the ultimate cause of the whole collection of physical entities.

IF:
Eternal Entities were given the idea that they never had a beginning and have always existed.
THEN:
They could indeed have been created this way, for that purpose.

Once one comes to that point, the only think left to do is to explain that purpose...why that was necessary.

Are you saying that they think they are eternal, but aren't really eternal (i.e., they actually began to exist with a false memory/belief of eternality)?

[Divine Insight]

Since I'm talking about us understanding the argument properly, I think I should make sure we're understanding your critique properly as well. How is that illogical? Why does it being "highly organized" and intelligent contradict it being eternal? Or did I misread your critique their?

Where's the reasoning to jump to such an unwarranted conclusion?

The KCA premises that everything that begins to exist must have a cause.

If we accept this premise as being reasonable then why don't we also conclude that if things don't begin to exist then they don't exist?

This whole idea that it's supposed to somehow be reasonable that some things could always exist is an absurd premise in and off itself.

Moreover, if something has always existed why jump to the unwarranted conclusion that it would be highly organized to the point of having purposeful intelligent sentience? Wouldn't it be a far more reasonable assumption to think that if something has always existed it's actually quite simple?

After all, if we want to go by what is observably known, everything that we have ever observed that is complex has arisen from simpler constituents. So a theistic answer to the KCA not reasonable by any observational evidence of any kind.

Supposed contradictions that would need to be dealt with in turn by one who searches after truth, but one must take things one thing at a time.

You shrug off the problems with theology by insinuating that if someone was searching after truth and took one problem at a time they could deal with the contradictions in the theology. But that's simply false.

Even theologians cannot justify their theologies in any convincing or compelling way.

Let's not lose sight of the fact that theologians not only cannot impress non-believers with their weak and obviously failed apologies for their theologies, but they can't even convince other theologians. So there's clearly nothing there worthy of serious consideration.

The contradiction of the "Fall from Grace" issue is huge. It's not only a huge contradiction in the orthodox view where humans were first created on earth, but even the theologians who recognize the contradiction of earthly humans falling from grace can't do any better. Their apology is to simply claim that humans had fallen from grace prior to being placed on earth and that earth is some sort of reform school for only a few selected humans. But all this does is push the contradiction back one more level.

If it's a contradiction that human that were perfectly created a God could "fall from grace", then it's still a contradiction that any beings created prior to the creation of the earth could "fall from grace".

So this is a far greater problem than merely asking whether or not the universe had a cause.

In other words the KCA argument does absolutely nothing to support or move forward these kind of theologies. So to even suggest that an all-perfect eternal being created the universe and everything in it including humans doesn't hold water in any case.

The KCA isn't going to help that situation.

Think about the following:

Let's say it was proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that an intelligent creator creator our world and us, would this then mean that the stories of Thor being this God must be true? No of course not.

How about the Gods of the Greeks? Nope.

What about fairies? Nope.

How about one of the Goddess myths that a female creator gave birth to the universe? Nope.

Proof that a creator God exists doesn't even support any of those theologies.

So why should we think it should support the theology of the Hebrews?

It woiuldn't support those myths anymore than any other God myths.

So trying to use the KCA to support any theology is futile.

Even if the world was created by a "God" there many theological ideas that may or may not be true. In fact, many of the Eastern Mystical ideas make far more sense than the Middle Eastern jealous God theologies like Yahweh and Allan, etc.

At least the Middle Eastern God myths don't try to blame humans for the way things are. So they are at least from from the underlying contradiction of trying to pin the blame on humans for an imperfect world. They have other reasons to explain why the world simply has to be imperfect. They allow that their Creator God had to work within limitation, and that actually makes far more sense.

So even if we had proof that there must exist a Creator God, the Eastern Mystical religions would be a far more likely candidate for a meaningful theology anyway.

[William]

[Replying to post 16 by The Tanager]

The Tanager: Are you saying that they think they are eternal, but aren't really eternal (i.e., they actually began to exist with a false memory/belief of eternality)?

William: Yes. There is no reason why this cannot have happened. In the same way that we are able to experience having a beginning and not being aware that we are eternal entities.

With eternal beings the question is "were they created?" can they truly have been eternal if they were also created.
The mystery revealed is "Yes they can still have been created"..it is also true that we are eternal beings as well and if we take away all the THINGS - then we are left with GOD-The First Source, whom we are as One Being Undivided and if we put back all the THINGS, then we are individuate and respond accordingly...depending upon the form we are - as fragments of First Source - occupying. We are First Source occupying forms/things.
As humans we are experiencing what it is like to have a beginning. As eternal entities we created the physical universe which enabled us to experience having a beginning.
In the spirit of non-judgmentalism, (Unconditional Love) we accept we are First Source on a journey of experience of beginning, literally forced to make it up as we go along...GOD (as that concept) is "discovered" thus - we have found the answer that we as eternal beings asked. The BIG Q..."Is there a GOD?" (were we created?) The answer is "Yes - there is a GOD" and "No we were not created...because "WE" are not THINGS! We are First Source fragmented INTO things. It is only the THINGS which were created, and essentially WE created those things in order to experience those things.
If the head is hurting..."Think With The Heart and Feel With The Mind" - then the pain will subside - replaced with Unconditional Love....About as concise as I can be, given the subject matter.

[The Tanager]

The Tanager wrote:

Since I'm talking about us understanding the argument properly, I think I should make sure we're understanding your critique properly as well. How is that illogical? Why does it being "highly organized" and intelligent contradict it being eternal? Or did I misread your critique their?


Where's the reasoning to jump to such an unwarranted conclusion?

I'm not jumping to anything. I'm saying it sounds like you might be saying that and asking you to correct any misunderstandings on my part. You said that the idea that a "highly organized and intelligent God has always existed" is illogical. That makes it seem that you are saying those three characteristics (high organization, intelligence, and eternality) don't logically fit with each other (just as some philosophers used to say that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God that allows suffering to be experienced by its creation is illogical).

The KCA premises that everything that begins to exist must have a cause.

If we accept this premise as being reasonable then why don't we also conclude that if things don't begin to exist then they don't exist?

I'm missing the logical connection.

P1: Entities that begin to exist (BE) have a cause or P1: BE are C
P2: ???
C: Entities that do not begin to exist (NBE) don't exist or C: NBE are non-E

What are the missing premises to get from P1 to C?

This whole idea that it's supposed to somehow be reasonable that some things could always exist is an absurd premise in and off itself.

Presenting why it is absurd would be an on-point critique of the (extended) KCA.

Moreover, if something has always existed why jump to the unwarranted conclusion that it would be highly organized to the point of having purposeful intelligent sentience? Wouldn't it be a far more reasonable assumption to think that if something has always existed it's actually quite simple?

After all, if we want to go by what is observably known, everything that we have ever observed that is complex has arisen from simpler constituents. So a theistic answer to the KCA not reasonable by any observational evidence of any kind.

I want to make sure I'm understanding what you mean here. Are you using "purposeful intelligence" as a synonym for being "highly organized" and both of these are antonyms of being "simple"? Or is intelligence just one part of that distinction?

Focusing just on the intelligence part, Craig makes arguments (he doesn't just jump to) the conclusion of the cause of the universe being personal, freely deciding to create something thereby showing purposeful intelligence, something impersonal forces don't have.

You shrug off the problems with theology by insinuating that if someone was searching after truth and took one problem at a time they could deal with the contradictions in the theology. But that's simply false.

Even theologians cannot justify their theologies in any convincing or compelling way.

Let's not lose sight of the fact that theologians not only cannot impress non-believers with their weak and obviously failed apologies for their theologies, but they can't even convince other theologians. So there's clearly nothing there worthy of serious consideration.

I don't shrug them off. I do think they can be dealt with rationally, but my "shrugging" is saying those are questions that come later down the logical line. "Convincing" and "compelling" are in the eye of the beholder. Rejecting one argument because some are not convinced by other arguments surrounding God is not rational. Each argument must be heard on its own merit.

The contradiction of the "Fall from Grace" issue is huge. It's not only a huge contradiction in the orthodox view where humans were first created on earth, but even the theologians who recognize the contradiction of earthly humans falling from grace can't do any better. Their apology is to simply claim that humans had fallen from grace prior to being placed on earth and that earth is some sort of reform school for only a few selected humans. But all this does is push the contradiction back one more level.

If it's a contradiction that human that were perfectly created a God could "fall from grace", then it's still a contradiction that any beings created prior to the creation of the earth could "fall from grace".

So this is a far greater problem than merely asking whether or not the universe had a cause.

I'm trying to see how you think this affects the truth of the KCA. Which of the characteristics of the extended KCA is in conflict because of your above claim (assuming your reasoning is sound)?

So trying to use the KCA to support any theology is futile.

The KCA is not used to argued directly for a specific theology, at least by anyone that understands the argument. So, there is no reason to fault it for what it does not set out to do. You can remain unconvinced of the other conclusions, but that doesn't say anything against the KCA.

[The Tanager]

The Tanager: Are you saying that they think they are eternal, but aren't really eternal (i.e., they actually began to exist with a false memory/belief of eternality)?

William: Yes. There is no reason why this cannot have happened. In the same way that we are able to experience having a beginning and not being aware that we are eternal entities.

I fail to see how this addresses the Kalam. You seem to be arguing that eternal entities could be created by God, but the example you give to support that are beings that only think they are eternal, when, in fact, they are not actually eternal.

If your theology is true, then an eternal being could have an experience of what it would be like to have a beginning, but they still would never have had a real beginning. The eternal being is not being created, they are simply being transformed and having their memory wiped. A person who has amnesia didn't just begin to exist after waking up, even if that is all they can remember.