Understanding the Kalam Cosmological Argument

[The Tanager]

My desire in this thread is to discuss what the Kalam Cosmological Argument actually claims rather than assessing the truth of the conclusion. That's why I've put it in the philosophy section rather than the apologetic section, but maybe I'm wrong there. I've been reading Dan's Barker book godless and believe that he does not have a good grasp on what the argument says. You don't need to have read his chapter on it (chapter 8) to discuss the ideas he brings up, and the topic does not need to stay on Barker's understanding alone.

First (group of) question(s) for discussion: Do you agree with Barker that the "old" cosmological argument claimed that everything has a cause and, seeing that this fails, theists have changed the argument to try to "get God off the hook"? The attempt he then focuses on (while quickly speaking of two others) is the Kalam's addition of "that begins to exist" to make the key phrase everything that begins to exist has a cause. If you agree with him, what source(s) does this more "primitive" version of the argument come from?

[William]

[Replying to post 29 by The Tanager]


The Tanager: Okay, so previously I thought you were disagreeing with P1 (by saying some things that truly begin to exist are uncaused).

William: No thing which "begins to exist" can be logically said to be uncaused.
All things which exist, had a beginning.
Keep in mind that my argument does not regard GOD as a 'thing'... as an object which can be said to be 'GOD'. All objects had a beginning.

The Tanager: Now I interpret you to be disagreeing with P2 (by arguing that the beginning of our universe is a transformation of something eternal). Am I understanding you correctly?

William: Yes. For arguments sake, 'The Mind of GOD' is indistinguishable from 'GOD'
When "The Word of GOD" interacts with "The Mind of GOD", things "begin".
The "The Word of GOD" are the Thoughts of GOD and the thoughts of GOD create 'things' through the medium of "The Mind of GOD". All are equally OF GOD.

The Tanager: If so, that would be an on-point critique of the Kalam where one would need to weigh the support and rebuttals for each position.

William: Obviously, I think so...

[wiploc]

The third one is not a synonym for a god, it's just the third logical possibility. If a rock is moving, we can ask why. Either the rock (1) caused itself to move,

I don't have a problem with that. If you started a new (and otherwise empty) universe with two rocks in space, stopped relative to each other, they would immediately start themselves (or each other, if you choose to view it that way) moving.

Could you explain what you mean here further? What do you mean by space?

Just the regular meaning. I'm not even going to look it up at dictionary.com.

If the rocks aren't touching each other, then they can't stabilize each other, so they will start moving.

Why would the rocks start moving?

Gravity. Possibly electrical attraction or repulsion, but definitely gravity.

I don't see how a miracle could overcome logic. A miracle cannot make a round square or a married bachelor.

Okay, let's assume a punk-omnipotent (can do anything except violate logic) god rather than a true-omnipotent (can do anything) god.

First, I don't see causes preceding effects as being in the same category as squares having to be square.

Second, I don't see how you can void the rule when you want (so that causes can be simultaneous with effects) but not let me void the rule when I want (so that causes can follow effects). That seems to me just arbitrary. Special pleading.

Third, if you're going to do the special pleading in order to throw out the rule when it's inconvenient for you, then I don't see why you come back to reinstate the rule by claiming it so inviolable that even gods can't defeat it.

So you concede that the first cause argument, by itself, won't get us far. But you think it can establish that a single uncaused thing caused everything else. And you think other arguments, equally good, can establish that this single uncaused thing is a god.

You have my full attention. I want to see how you go about this.

I wonder at your use of "concede". I have never not acknowledged this, so I will assume that you are not implying that I am grudgingly acknowledging something I formerly did not.

Thank you.

Yes, the Kalam proper (Everything that begins to exist has a cause / The universe began to exist / Therefore, the universe had a cause) alone does not say anything about God's existence. Nor does it establish a single, uncaused thing yet. When we explore what the cause must be like further (what I've been saying is the extended Kalam, like Divine Insight partitioned out) we encounter lines of reasoning that assert that the (ultimate) cause of the physical universe must be uncaused, personal, etc.

I'm fine (for this thread) to look at what is claimed in those further arguments, but I really want this to be about understanding what the arguments claim, how they argue to the conclusions, rather than a debate about whether the reasoning is good or not. After this thread, I'd be happy to explore that further question with you and anyone else.

I think this isn't the thread for me.

I'm not willing to research Barker's state of mind, and Kalam's, in order to decide whether Barker knew what Kalam was thinking.

[wiploc]

[Replying to post 4 by wiploc]

Craig's response was to agree. According to him, these are things we know about god from other arguments. The only thing the KCA proves is that there was a cause.

The problem with this (as I noted from my interactions with For_The_Kingdom) is that each argument therefore doesn't stand on its own, it requires other arguments to support it.

Tanager might respond that while no brick is a wall, enough bricks can make a wall.

If the KCA was a good argument, and was supported by other good arguments, and if together they proved the existence of gods, I would accept that gods existed.

My perception is that the KCA doesn't work, and neither do the "supporting" arguments. They all come to nothing. Their functional purpose is to allow motivated believers to think that their beliefs are justified. This works only so long as the believers don't look at the arguments critically, and/or switch to a new (or previously discredited) argument each time they realize their current argument is untenable.

FtK inserted Kalam as a fait accompli in his argument with myself on the Modal Ontological Argument (and with you, if I recall correctly, wiploc?). And then Modal (and other arguments I presume) need Kalam. So we then end up in an endless circle of arguments needing other arguments needing the original argument we started with, and my response is to repeat the computer from the movie Wargames
"The winning move is not to play".

I like to play. I like to keep my hand in. I like to make theists keep switching from one argument to another as weak reeds fail.

The reason they've been sent out to do battle with stupid arguments is that theists don't have any good arguments. It seems to me that we're doing a good thing for theists and the world if we keep pointing out that they don't have any good arguments.

The individual theist whom you're debating may not be reachable, but we could be doing a world of good for people reading over our shoulders.

[The Tanager]

I think this isn't the thread for me.

I'm not willing to research Barker's state of mind, and Kalam's, in order to decide whether Barker knew what Kalam was thinking.

I'm not saying this thread is about Barker's state of mind, but simply about understanding what the Kalam claims since many critiques (like Barker's) simply miss the point. It's trying to weed out the bad critiques so that we can then focus on the on-topic issues. I think some people (from all worldviews) feel reinforced in their worldview or in their rejection of certain arguments from a vague feeling of there being so many errors, when most of the errors (if not all) are the result of category mistakes and other misunderstandings of what is being said. Hopefully, atheists reject Barker's flawed attempts like Christians should reject similarly bad Christian attempts.

If the rocks aren't touching each other, then they can't stabilize each other, so they will start moving.

Gravity. Possibly electrical attraction or repulsion, but definitely gravity.

I'm trying to understand how this is self-causation.

Okay, let's assume a punk-omnipotent (can do anything except violate logic) god rather than a true-omnipotent (can do anything) god.

First, I don't see causes preceding effects as being in the same category as squares having to be square.

Within the context I've maintained, the categories being spoken of are whether the term itself is logical or illogical. I would put both (1) causes preceding effects and (2) squares being square in the logical category. Wouldn't you?

Second, I don't see how you can void the rule when you want (so that causes can be simultaneous with effects) but not let me void the rule when I want (so that causes can follow effects). That seems to me just arbitrary. Special pleading.

Third, if you're going to do the special pleading in order to throw out the rule when it's inconvenient for you, then I don't see why you come back to reinstate the rule by claiming it so inviolable that even gods can't defeat it.

What rule am I voiding? The rule I've applied to all three possible temporal cause-effect relationships is the same: for an effect to occur, the cause must be currently present. This is so because if a cause doesn't exist, it can do anything; nothing means an absence of all things, all actions. So, to put the rule the other way round: If a cause does not yet exist, then it can't cause anything (i.e., have an effect). Cause temporally preceding effect does not break this rule. Cause and effect existing simultaneously does not break this rule. Effect preceding cause does.

[The Tanager]

The problem with this (as I noted from my interactions with For_The_Kingdom) is that each argument therefore doesn't stand on its own, it requires other arguments to support it. FtK inserted Kalam as a fait accompli in his argument with myself on the Modal Ontological Argument (and with you, if I recall correctly, wiploc?). And then Modal (and other arguments I presume) need Kalam. So we then end up in an endless circle of arguments needing other arguments needing the original argument we started with, and my response is to repeat the computer from the movie Wargames
"The winning move is not to play"

The arguments build upon each other; they aren't circular with each relying on the other.

[wiploc]

If the rocks aren't touching each other, then they can't stabilize each other, so they will start moving.

Gravity. Possibly electrical attraction or repulsion, but definitely gravity.

I'm trying to understand how this is self-causation.

I'm guessing, then, that you think of gravity and mass as separate things. If so, you can think of gravity as making the rocks move rather than thinking of the rocks as making each other/themselves move.

Okay, let's assume a punk-omnipotent (can do anything except violate logic) god rather than a true-omnipotent (can do anything) god.

First, I don't see causes preceding effects as being in the same category as squares having to be square.

Within the context I've maintained, the categories being spoken of are whether the term itself is logical or illogical. I would put both (1) causes preceding effects and (2) squares being square in the logical category. Wouldn't you?

If they are in the same category, and if nothing--not even gods--can change the rule about squares having to be square, then nothing--not even gods--can change the rule about causes preceding effects.

In which case, you cannot have a cause of time. And if time is part of the universe, you cannot have a cause of the universe.

This is true regardless of how one defines "universe."

[The Tanager]

I'm guessing, then, that you think of gravity and mass as separate things. If so, you can think of gravity as making the rocks move rather than thinking of the rocks as making each other/themselves move.

I was not thinking of gravity and mass as separate things, although I do not pretend to have an expert knowledge of gravity, either. I was just trying to gather some more info to see if I was missing any detail that would change any of the following:

If the rocks were stopped relative to each other and then began to move, then whatever stopped holding them back is the first cause of the series of them moving, however gravity and mass are related and responsible for their specific changes in location. If the rocks are eternal and there is nothing "holding them back" ever, then their motion is eternal and uncaused. To be self-caused these rocks would have to be holding themselves back and then be the explanation of why they then begin exerting force on each other.

If they are in the same category, and if nothing--not even gods--can change the rule about squares having to be square, then nothing--not even gods--can change the rule about causes preceding effects.

In which case, you cannot have a cause of time. And if time is part of the universe, you cannot have a cause of the universe.

This is true regardless of how one defines "universe."

But what is the rule? It seems like you think it is a rule that temporal causation is the only kind of causation possible. If so, then where is the argument for that rule? The Kalam leaves open the question of whether temporal causation is the only kind of causation; it does not beg the question either way.

The proponent of the Kalam asks us to start with something we know about: that things that begin to exist have a cause for that existence. Then, in thinking scientifically and philosophically about our spatio-temporal universe the proponent says that we have good reason to believe our universe began to exist at some point. Not only that, but that time itself began to exist, rather than being an eternal feature of reality. But things that begin to exist have a cause, so time itself must have a cause. The cause obviously cannot be temporally prior to time since that would require time to pre-exist the beginning of time, which is clearly illogical. Therefore, one conclusion in the Kalam is that temporal causation cannot be the only kind of causation, no matter our human failure to find the right terms to speak of this non-temporal prior-ness.

[wiploc]

I'm guessing, then, that you think of gravity and mass as separate things. If so, you can think of gravity as making the rocks move rather than thinking of the rocks as making each other/themselves move.

I was not thinking of gravity and mass as separate things, although I do not pretend to have an expert knowledge of gravity, either. I was just trying to gather some more info to see if I was missing any detail that would change any of the following:

If the rocks were stopped relative to each other and then began to move, then whatever stopped holding them back is the first cause of the series of them moving, however gravity and mass are related and responsible for their specific changes in location.

Let's say that a universe pops into existence uncaused, as uncaused as your god. The universe consists entirely of two rocks. The rocks begin moving themselves (or each other, if you prefer) because they are material.

If the rocks are eternal

According to the first cause argument as I understand it, nothing can be eternal, but your god is anyway. Not even a magic-throwing god could make that true.

and there is nothing "holding them back" ever, then their motion is eternal and uncaused.

I don't know why you get to pick what has causes.

...

If they are in the same category, and if nothing--not even gods--can change the rule about squares having to be square, then nothing--not even gods--can change the rule about causes preceding effects.

In which case, you cannot have a cause of time. And if time is part of the universe, you cannot have a cause of the universe.

This is true regardless of how one defines "universe."

But what is the rule?

The rule is that causes precede effects. This is what we observe.

It's like the rule that things have causes in P1 of Kalam. We see it happening, so we at-least-tentatively call it a rule.

In Kalam, we restrict the rule to things that begin. That seems to me arbitrary, like saying that causes precede effects on Wednesdays. We have no observations that justify the exception.

But the idea of looking at the world, seeing that causes precede effects, and calling that a tentative rule is reasonable.

It seems like you think it is a rule that temporal causation is the only kind of causation possible.

Right. We observe temporal causation. So we posit a rule that causation is temporal. If you see exceptions, something like, "Causation is not temporal on Thursdays," then we can posit an exception to the rule. But only because we see exceptions, not because you need the exception for your argument.

If so, then where is the argument for that rule?

Where is the argument for P1? We see things that are caused, so we posit the rule. We also see causes preceding effects, so we posit that rule.

The Kalam leaves open the question of whether temporal causation is the only kind of causation; it does not beg the question either way.

If you want an exception, you have to justify it.

The proponent of the Kalam asks us to start with something we know about: that things that begin to exist have a cause for that existence.

Causes preceding effects isn't something we know about?

Then, in thinking scientifically and philosophically about our spatio-temporal universe the proponent says that we have good reason to believe our universe began to exist at some point.

I don't know of that reason. Christians insist that science claims the universe began at the big bang, but I can't get scientists to confirm that. I am unaware of any scientific consensus to that effect.

Not only that, but that time itself began to exist, rather than being an eternal feature of reality. But things that begin to exist have a cause, so time itself must have a cause.

What we observe is that things that things with causes come after those causes.

The cause obviously cannot be temporally prior to time since that would require time to pre-exist the beginning of time, which is clearly illogical.

Agreed.

Therefore, one conclusion in the Kalam is that temporal causation cannot be the only kind of causation, no matter our human failure to find the right terms to speak of this non-temporal prior-ness.

That seems arbitrary, unproven.

[The Tanager]

Let's say that a universe pops into existence uncaused, as uncaused as your god. The universe consists entirely of two rocks. The rocks begin moving themselves (or each other, if you prefer) because they are material.

Well, sure, if something can pop into existence (i.e., begin to exist) uncaused, then the Kalam fails because this would directly contradict the first premise. That critique would be on point. One would have to weigh the evidences. I don't see why one should think things just pop into existence uncaused, though.

According to the first cause argument as I understand it, nothing can be eternal, but your god is anyway. Not even a magic-throwing god could make that true.

What makes you think that is what the first cause argument says? I don't see how any of the versions say that.

and there is nothing "holding them back" ever, then their motion is eternal and uncaused.

I don't know why you get to pick what has causes.

I did not write that to clearly reflect what I meant. I should have said:

"If the rocks are eternal and there is nothing "holding them back" ever, then their motion is eternal and the rocks are uncaused."

I think perhaps we understand different things about the concept of self-causation used here. Self-causation says that the effect is the same as the cause. The effect your scenario is talking about is the movement of the rocks. So, self-causation is to say that the movement of the rocks is caused by the movement of the rocks. It says that before the rocks were moving, the movement of those rocks caused the rocks to move. That's nonsense--saying the rocks were both moving and not-moving. It's like saying a bachelor is also married.

Now, you are probably saying that in this scenario the rock is responsible for its own movement, rather than some outside factor. That's fine, but it's not self-causation in the way the arguments seem to mean self-causation. What is responsible for the change of location in the rocks? Self-causation means the change of location is responsible. That's what I'm saying is nonsense. If we say the internal features of the rocks (gravity/mass/whatever), then the cause is different than the effect. We then ask: what is responsible for the internal features of the rocks? In your scenario I think we say nothing is, the rocks have just eternally been that way; they don't have a prior cause. I call that being uncaused.

The rule is that causes precede effects. This is what we observe.

It's like the rule that things have causes in P1 of Kalam. We see it happening, so we at-least-tentatively call it a rule.

In Kalam, we restrict the rule to things that begin. That seems to me arbitrary, like saying that causes precede effects on Wednesdays. We have no observations that justify the exception.

How does the Kalam restrict that rule? Premise 1 says that things that begin to exist (things we have experience with) have causes. By contraposition, this also means that uncaused things (if they exist at all) would have to be beginningless. Neither of these restrict our tentative rule.

Right. We observe temporal causation. So we posit a rule that causation is temporal. If you see exceptions, something like, "Causation is not temporal on Thursdays," then we can posit an exception to the rule. But only because we see exceptions, not because you need the exception for your argument.

The Kalam leads to the exception through reasoning, not assumption. We know that effects need causes. The spatio-temporal universe is shown to be an effect, something that came into existence. The universe needs a cause. If time came into existence, it needs a cause to precede it. The cause of time cannot itself be temporal. This provides us with a necessary exception to our tentative rule.

I don't know of that reason. Christians insist that science claims the universe began at the big bang, but I can't get scientists to confirm that. I am unaware of any scientific consensus to that effect.

The best presentation is probably Craig and Sinclair in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. They spend somewhere near 60 pages looking over various scientific models and how they impact the Kalam. I think the stronger support comes from philosophy, however. Proponents often give two arguments. I'm not convinced by the first one (although I haven't looked at Craig and Sinclair's defense in that book yet), but I do think the second shows that time must have a beginning.

1. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite.
2. The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition.
3. Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.

If time is eternal, it would have to be an actual infinite, which the above (in specific relation to time, not actual infinites in general) shows is flawed. If this argument is sound, time began to exist, which means it needs a cause (as far as our tentative rule about cause and effect goes), which means we have our exception to temporal causation. Now, of course, these can be supported, and I'm willing to talk about any part, just let me know how you disagree with it or what you don't understand about its claims.

[wiploc]

Let's say that a universe pops into existence uncaused, as uncaused as your god. The universe consists entirely of two rocks. The rocks begin moving themselves (or each other, if you prefer) because they are material.

Well, sure, if something can pop into existence (i.e., begin to exist) uncaused, then the Kalam fails because this would directly contradict the first premise. That critique would be on point. One would have to weigh the evidences. I don't see why one should think things just pop into existence uncaused, though.

Your god popped into existence uncaused, didn't he? He didn't exist before time, and then, poof, he did exist.

Christians argue that the beginning of time--the fact that nothing existed before time--means that the partaverse (everything but gods) began. But they don't apply the same logic to gods. Gods didn't exist before time either, but they are supposed to be unbegun and uncaused.

The difference seems to be entirely a matter of convenience rather than logic. Special pleading.

Science tells us virtual particles begin without cause.

According to the first cause argument as I understand it, nothing can be eternal, but your god is anyway. Not even a magic-throwing god could make that true.

What makes you think that is what the first cause argument says? I don't see how any of the versions say that.

I don't know what part you disagree with. P2 of Kalam says that nothing is eternal. And the conclusion, the point, the reason for making the argument, is to prove that an eternal god exists.

You'll say, I believe, that the Kalam argument itself doesn't go that far, that Kalam is just part of the argument that establishes the existence of an eternal god. But the conflict remains.

In Kalam, we restrict the rule to things that begin. That seems to me arbitrary, like saying that causes precede effects on Wednesdays. We have no observations that justify the exception.

How does the Kalam restrict that rule? Premise 1 says that things that begin to exist (things we have experience with) have causes. By contraposition, this also means that uncaused things (if they exist at all) would have to be beginningless. Neither of these restrict our tentative rule.

You were arguing for simultaneous causation. You don't want gods to have to exist before time, which would be a contradiction, but you also want time to have a cause. Your solution is to have a cause simultaneous with effect. God causes time, and time begins at the same time as the cause.

According to proponents of Kalam, time began. The obvious conclusion is that the universe is uncaused, because you can't have a cause before time. Kalam proponents therefore make a new rule that causes do not precede effects. That way, they get to have both a cause and a beginning.

But when I point out that, if causes needn't precede effects, then the cause of the big bang may be yet to happen, there you arbitrarily draw the line.

The Kalam leads to the exception through reasoning, not assumption. We know that effects need causes.

Effects have causes by definition. And effect is something that has a cause. If it doesn't have a cause, it isn't an effect. That's just a truism.

The spatio-temporal universe is shown to be an effect, something that came into existence.

If, for the sake of argument, we grant that the universe began, that doesn't make it an effect. Having a cause would make it an effect, regardless of whether it came into existence. Not having a cause would prevent it from being an effect, regardless of whether it came into existence.

The universe needs a cause.

I don't know of any reason to believe that.

If time came into existence, it needs a cause to precede it.

Nothing precedes time. Sometimes you are against contradiction; at other times you indulge.

The cause of time cannot itself be temporal. This provides us with a necessary exception to our tentative rule.

You said the rule was like squares being square. Not even gods could change that. And now you want to change it based on an equivocation between having a beginning and being caused. Semantics is greater than magic?

I don't know of that reason. Christians insist that science claims the universe began at the big bang, but I can't get scientists to confirm that. I am unaware of any scientific consensus to that effect.

The best presentation is probably Craig and Sinclair in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.

I look on Craig as dishonest, a mountebank, a flamboyant charlatan.

They spend somewhere near 60 pages looking over various scientific models and how they impact the Kalam. I think the stronger support comes from philosophy, however. Proponents often give two arguments. I'm not convinced by the first one (although I haven't looked at Craig and Sinclair's defense in that book yet), but I do think the second shows that time must have a beginning.

1. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite.
2. The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition.
3. Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.

It's an argument. It's not a compelling argument. The alternative to infinite regress is the abandonment of causation. We would have to have an uncaused beginning. I don't see how one of those is easier to swallow than the other. Therefore, neither can be considered persuasive.

Christians like to claim that infinities, eternalities, are impossible, but that their god is eternal anyway. That's self contradiction. Why would you argue against eternalities in the attempt to establish an eternal god?

... If this argument is sound, time began to exist, which means it needs a cause (as far as our tentative rule about cause and effect goes),

That's just not true. Causes precede effects. If time began, it cannot have had a cause. (As far as our tentative rule about cause and effect goes.)

which means we have our exception to temporal causation.

Based entirely on the semantic equivocation between "begun" and "caused."