Understanding the Kalam Cosmological Argument

[The Tanager]

My desire in this thread is to discuss what the Kalam Cosmological Argument actually claims rather than assessing the truth of the conclusion. That's why I've put it in the philosophy section rather than the apologetic section, but maybe I'm wrong there. I've been reading Dan's Barker book godless and believe that he does not have a good grasp on what the argument says. You don't need to have read his chapter on it (chapter 8) to discuss the ideas he brings up, and the topic does not need to stay on Barker's understanding alone.

First (group of) question(s) for discussion: Do you agree with Barker that the "old" cosmological argument claimed that everything has a cause and, seeing that this fails, theists have changed the argument to try to "get God off the hook"? The attempt he then focuses on (while quickly speaking of two others) is the Kalam's addition of "that begins to exist" to make the key phrase everything that begins to exist has a cause. If you agree with him, what source(s) does this more "primitive" version of the argument come from?

[The Tanager]

Your god popped into existence uncaused, didn't he? He didn't exist before time, and then, poof, he did exist.

No, God didn't pop into existence; God is eternal, never not existing. If time began with our universe (or even prior to our universe but still began), then the cause of that would have to exist before time, whether we later connect that cause to God or something else.

Christians argue that the beginning of time--the fact that nothing existed before time--means that the partaverse (everything but gods) began. But they don't apply the same logic to gods. Gods didn't exist before time either, but they are supposed to be unbegun and uncaused.

Proponents of the Kalam argue that the space-time universe began. Then they see what the cause of the space-time universe would need to be like. Once they get those characteristics, they note that we have the core of the classical view of God (an uncaused, Creator of the universe who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and at least enormously powerful (if not omnipotent), while other possible causes have been eliminated.

The difference seems to be entirely a matter of convenience rather than logic. Special pleading.

What I summarized above is following logic not convenience.

Science tells us virtual particles begin without cause.

This critique is on point. Whether it is true or not is another matter and probably ultimately hinges on what is meant by "cause." You are speaking of cause in a more narrow way than the Kalam does. The quantum vacuum, for instance, is a necessary cause of the existence of virtual particles (an effect).

I don't know what part you disagree with. P2 of Kalam says that nothing is eternal. And the conclusion, the point, the reason for making the argument, is to prove that an eternal god exists.

You'll say, I believe, that the Kalam argument itself doesn't go that far, that Kalam is just part of the argument that establishes the existence of an eternal god. But the conflict remains.

I don't understand when people (not just you) think an argument made by smart people makes an obvious mistake like claiming nothing is eternal and then, from that, reaches a conclusion that something (God) is eternal. When the mistake seems that obvious it should raise a red flag that you are possibly misunderstanding something about the argument's claims. To just stop there, you'd have to assume that the other side is just idiotic. Now, you can do that, but if you do you are out of touch with the reality of worldviews (even though you may be in touch with some members of those worldviews). There are very smart people who are theists and very smart people who are atheists and they all are deep thinkers and seeking to make real sense of the world. We need to not so quickly dismiss arguments from either side.

P2 of the Kalam does not say that nothing is eternal. The universe is not equivalent to "all things" in the phrasing of that premise. To define the universe as "the set of all things" is to beg the question in favor of materialism. To define the universe as "the set of all natural things" is to leave the question of whether the natural universe is all that exists open.

You were arguing for simultaneous causation. You don't want gods to have to exist before time, which would be a contradiction, but you also want time to have a cause. Your solution is to have a cause simultaneous with effect. God causes time, and time begins at the same time as the cause.

It is not a known contradiction for something to exist prior to time, it is a contradiction for something to exist temporally prior to time. To say otherwise requires one to believe temporal existence is the only kind of existence one can have. Do you have an argument for that or are you merely assuming that is true? To say something like "but our experience of existence is constrained by time" is not an argument that this is the only experience of existence that can be had. Or to point to our use of temporal language (like my belief that God existed non-temporally "prior" to time) is not an argument for it either, it's just a limitation of our experience.

I talked about simultaneous causation in talking about the beginning of time because at that moment the cause first exists within time at the same exact moment the effect begins to exist. I still think the cause of the universe existed "when" time did not, but I'm saying if you want to call this simultaneous causation, go ahead.

According to proponents of Kalam, time began. The obvious conclusion is that the universe is uncaused, because you can't have a cause before time. Kalam proponents therefore make a new rule that causes do not precede effects. That way, they get to have both a cause and a beginning.

That is not the obvious conclusion unless you have an argument for (or are simply assuming) that all experiences of existence must be temporal. I won't assume that and I know of no argument that shows it must be the case. The Kalam starts with something more established: things that begin to exist always have prior causes. Whether this prior-ness must be temporal or can be non-temporal is left open. It is still open when we get that the spatio-temporal universe must have a cause. At that point we must logically conclude that causes can exist non-temporally.

But when I point out that, if causes needn't precede effects, then the cause of the big bang may be yet to happen, there you arbitrarily draw the line.

You equate self-causation with a more general statement that causes don't need to precede effects, but those are not the same thing. Saying that an effect cannot precede its cause does not rule out that an effect can exist simultaneously with its cause. I'm saying that we can comfortably rule out effects existing prior to their causes (by the definitions). I don't think we can do that with self-causation. I am unaware of a different argument to rule out self-causation along with effects preceding causes.

I don't draw the line arbitrarily. Self-causation is conceptually different than effects preceding causes. We cannot reject self-causation simply because we reject effects preceding causes.

If, for the sake of argument, we grant that the universe began, that doesn't make it an effect. Having a cause would make it an effect, regardless of whether it came into existence. Not having a cause would prevent it from being an effect, regardless of whether it came into existence.

I was using "begin to exist" and "effect" interchangeably. You are disagreeing that things that begin to exist have causes, then (i.e. disagreeing with the first premise), for whatever reason. That's an on point disagreement, even if I think you are wrong to do so.

You said the rule was like squares being square. Not even gods could change that. And now you want to change it based on an equivocation between having a beginning and being caused. Semantics is greater than magic?

I said that "causes preceding effects" and "squares being squares" are both logical. Notice that I did not say that "causes must temporally precede effects" is logical in the same way.

I look on Craig as dishonest, a mountebank, a flamboyant charlatan.

If you can point out the dishonesties in his arguments, then you are onto something. To reject an argument because of your impression of the one making it is the genetic fallacy.

It's an argument. It's not a compelling argument. The alternative to infinite regress is the abandonment of causation. We would have to have an uncaused beginning. I don't see how one of those is easier to swallow than the other. Therefore, neither can be considered persuasive.

I'm not claiming that the Kalam is 100%, but hardly anything is 100%. I think abandoning causation is much harder to swallow. Abandoning causation means abandoning much (if not all) of science.

Christians like to claim that infinities, eternalities, are impossible, but that their god is eternal anyway. That's self contradiction. Why would you argue against eternalities in the attempt to establish an eternal god?

Hopefully you are seeing that proponents of the Kalam do not claim eternalities and all infinities are impossible.