Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[Bust Nak]

I'm not asking you about your preference, I'm asking you about your judgment of Johnny's choice. You can choose to judge his choice by your preference, but then that would not be just sharing one's preference, it would also be forming a judgment about the other person. That is not switching back to pure simple subjectivism; it's something in addition to it.

I don't think there is any difference at all between sharing one's preference (on a person) and judgment about that person. How is sharing this preference "vanilla is the best favor" different from forming a judgment about vanilla ice-cream?

It's rational to say people are free to pick for whatever reason they want, but that's different than saying their choice itself was a rational one. Why do you judge people's beliefs about the shape of the Earth by objective scientific evidence instead of your initial instinct, even if those two things agree?

That's where picking the "best" standard comes in. Objective science is the better standard here.

But in the thought experiment we are talking about a specific way (which is a subjective feature of reality) that Johnny's objective death will come about. It seems to me like you are saying that, although you love Johnny and subjectively don't want him to die, you would base your action on how physical reality affects you, knowing that it affects Johnny differently and will lead to his death. But if you don't want him to die, then you should base your action on how physical reality affects him.

But the scenario stipulated that the shape of the Earth is subjective, he would be totally fine according to me, he would only fall off the edge according to him. How can the shape be subjective, yet falling off it isn't? And if somehow physics still give an objective result, then my previous answer would suffice - given that his death is objective, of course I would appeal to an objective reason for stopping him. Do you see any incompatibility with approving his taste while stopping him for objective reasons?

We are talking about your judgment of Johnny's choice, not your ice cream choice.

Doesn't change my answers as they are analogous to me, I know you don't believe that, but my answers are based on the premise that these issues are subjective features of reality.

Are you saying that you think it's rational for Johnny to pick your favorite ice cream? That's what I'm saying is irrational.

No, I am saying it's rational for me to judge Johnny based on my standard, whether it's his ice-cream choice or child abuse; in the exact same sense that it's rational for me to judge ice-cream based on my standard. I have said nothing about what is and isn't rational for Johnny.

[The Tanager]

I don't think there is any difference at all between sharing one's preference (on a person) and judgment about that person. How is sharing this preference "vanilla is the best favor" different from forming a judgment about vanilla ice-cream?

"Vanilla is the best flavor (to me)" is different, however, than "Johnny should eat vanilla ice cream".

That's where picking the "best" standard comes in. Objective science is the better standard here.

What does best/better mean here? And what does it mean when judging Johnny's child abuse?

But the scenario stipulated that the shape of the Earth is subjective, he would be totally fine according to me, he would only fall off the edge according to him. How can the shape be subjective, yet falling off it isn't?

But there is an objective result with subjective features of reality. Tasting pistachio ice cream really does give Johnny pleasure, even from your perspective, because of his taste, not yours. So, why wouldn't Johnny's death in my thought experiment be parallel to that?

And if somehow physics still give an objective result, then my previous answer would suffice - given that his death is objective, of course I would appeal to an objective reason for stopping him. Do you see any incompatibility with approving his taste while stopping him for objective reasons?

But you don't appeal to what objectively happens with Johnny, you appeal to your subjective perceptions that accompany that objective happening.

No, I am saying it's rational for me to judge Johnny based on my standard, whether it's his ice-cream choice or child abuse; in the exact same sense that it's rational for me to judge ice-cream based on my standard. I have said nothing about what is and isn't rational for Johnny.

But that is the useless tautology coming back up. What you are saying here is that it is rational for you to judge Johnny by the standard that you judge Johnny by. Of course that is true. It's not what I am asking you about, however. What is the standard you judge Johnny's choice by? Some objective truth? No. The truth of his subjective situation (what he likes, how something affects him, etc.)? No. Your standard is your subjective feelings, which you believe has no bearing on the truth of his subjective situation.

[Bust Nak]

"Vanilla is the best flavor (to me)" is different, however, than "Johnny should eat vanilla ice cream".

Okay, the "however" here seemed to imply that you accept that sharing the preference "vanilla is the best favor (to me)" is the same as forming a judgment about vanilla ice-cream? And if is the same, then how is sharing my preference on what Johnny, different from judging him?

What does best/better mean here? And what does it mean when judging Johnny's child abuse?

That's up to the judge to decide. With me being the judge, the scientific standard is best meaning that it is most likely to be accurate; and when it comes to judging Johnny's child abuse it means matching my preference.

But there is an objective result with subjective features of reality. Tasting pistachio ice cream really does give Johnny pleasure, even from your perspective, because of his taste, not yours. So, why wouldn't Johnny's death in my thought experiment be parallel to that?

Okay, then why don't we just use this scenario instead?

"There is not an objective best tasting ice-cream, would I apply my preference of vanilla to everyone else and respond to them in that?

Let's say I love Johnny. Vanilla is yuck for Johnny. He decides to eat vanilla ice-cream. He thinks he will get pleasure, but let's say for him would result in disgust. Let's say I don't want Johnny to feel disgusted. Do I continue as though the vanilla is best and judge and respond to Johnny from my perspective, letting him feel disgusted or do I judge and respond to Johnny by his perspective?"

I think this is 1:1 to your subjective Earth shape thought experiment, minus the brain melting idea that it can be subjective.

But you don't appeal to what objectively happens with Johnny, you appeal to your subjective perceptions that accompany that objective happening.

As in "I wouldn't like it if Johnny dies?" Sure. And I wouldn't like it if Johnny is disgusted by vanilla ice-cream. I would judge and respond to Johnny from my perspective, accompanied by an objective happening re: pleasure/disgust.

But that is the useless tautology coming back up. What you are saying here is that it is rational for you to judge Johnny by the standard that you judge Johnny by. Of course that is true. It's not what I am asking you about, however. What is the standard you judge Johnny's choice by? Some objective truth? No. The truth of his subjective situation (what he likes, how something affects him, etc.)? No. Your standard is your subjective feelings, which you believe has no bearing on the truth of his subjective situation.

If you accept that it is rational for me to judge Johnny by my subjective feelings, a standard that has no bearing on the truth of his subjective situation, then what seems to be the problem? I don't understand how that is supposed to be a tautology, while "I judge Johnny by the standard that I judge Johnny by" is a tautology, the affirmation that it is rational to do so is a very different statement.

[The Tanager]

Okay, the "however" here seemed to imply that you accept that sharing the preference "vanilla is the best favor (to me)" is the same as forming a judgment about vanilla ice-cream? And if is the same, then how is sharing my preference on what Johnny, different from judging him?

When we say we prefer vanilla, we aren’t judging vanilla ice cream, we are judging our reaction to it, aren’t we? We are sharing how the nerve endings in our mouth and tongue react to it. Judging vanilla ice cream is talking about it’s health content, etc. When I ask you for a judgment of Johnny’s action, you seem to share how your body and mind react to the action, not his action itself.

I wonder, at times, if you use judge and prefer in a way where they are identical, but at other times in an equivocal sense. I do think “I prefer…” is another way to say “I judge that…”. When one says, “I judge X by my personal preference,” then we either: (1) have a useless comment that is just stating judge and preference are synonyms (the tautology thing) without telling us what the judgment/preference is or (2) these terms pick out different concepts and one is trying to say that he judges the situation by something that subjectively happens within them.

That's up to the judge to decide. With me being the judge, the scientific standard is best meaning that it is most likely to be accurate; and when it comes to judging Johnny's child abuse it means matching my preference.

My point is that it means different things in those different contexts and that difference is important. You judge beliefs about the shape of the Earth by scientific evidence because you believe it accurately describes reality. You don’t think your moral preference accurately describes reality (outside of yourself), yet you still judge things outside of yourself by that preference.

Okay, then why don't we just use this scenario instead?

"There is not an objective best tasting ice-cream, would I apply my preference of vanilla to everyone else and respond to them in that?

Let's say I love Johnny. Vanilla is yuck for Johnny. He decides to eat vanilla ice-cream. He thinks he will get pleasure, but let's say for him would result in disgust. Let's say I don't want Johnny to feel disgusted. Do I continue as though the vanilla is best and judge and respond to Johnny from my perspective, letting him feel disgusted or do I judge and respond to Johnny by his perspective?"

I think this is 1:1 to your subjective Earth shape thought experiment, minus the brain melting idea that it can be subjective.

Perhaps. I’m a little hesitant in using something already viewed as subjective because it may be easy to have some hidden assumptions sneak in, but let’s explore it. I’m assuming you would try to stop him from eating X? You would go against your personal opinion on X, siding with his personal opinion. But in morality you don’t go against your personal opinion on X.

As in "I wouldn't like it if Johnny dies?" Sure. And I wouldn't like it if Johnny is disgusted by vanilla ice-cream. I would judge and respond to Johnny from my perspective, accompanied by an objective happening re: pleasure/disgust.

This sounds like sense (1) above. Why don’t you like it if Johnny dies? Because it causes you disgust. That’s saying the same thing with a different term. I don’t like it. It disgusts me.

If you accept that it is rational for me to judge Johnny by my subjective feelings, a standard that has no bearing on the truth of his subjective situation, then what seems to be the problem?

My problem is not in you doing that, but in you saying that this takes into consideration that reality is subjective. I think it ignores that claim and only focuses on what your subjective reality is.

I don't understand how that is supposed to be a tautology, while "I judge Johnny by the standard that I judge Johnny by" is a tautology, the affirmation that it is rational to do so is a very different statement.

I agree the latter statement is not a tautology; I think it irrational.

[Bust Nak]

When we say we prefer vanilla, we aren’t judging vanilla ice cream, we are judging our reaction to it, aren’t we? We are sharing how the nerve endings in our mouth and tongue react to it. Judging vanilla ice cream is talking about it’s health content, etc. When I ask you for a judgment of Johnny’s action, you seem to share how your body and mind react to the action, not his action itself.

That doesn't sound right. "Judging my reaction" to me would be something along the lines of "it's a good thing that (judging) vanilla is the best favor (my reaction to it)" which has an extra clause to "vanilla is the best favor."

I wonder, at times, if you use judge and prefer in a way where they are identical, but at other times in an equivocal sense. I do think “I prefer…” is another way to say “I judge that…”. When one says, “I judge X by my personal preference,” then we either: (1) have a useless comment that is just stating judge and preference are synonyms (the tautology thing) without telling us what the judgment/preference is or (2) these terms pick out different concepts and one is trying to say that he judges the situation by something that subjectively happens within them.

Given that I can judge X by my personal preference, or we can judge X by some external standard, I am not treating them as synonymous, that I am doing the latter rather than the former is useful information.

It seems you only see the latter (by some external standard) as making a judgment, in that sense, I am not judging Johnny when I say he is immoral for abusing children. Echoing the above, it doesn't sound right at all that calling him out as immoral doesn't qualify as judging him.

My point is that it means different things in those different contexts and that difference is important. You judge beliefs about the shape of the Earth by scientific evidence because you believe it accurately describes reality. You don’t think your moral preference accurately describes reality (outside of yourself), yet you still judge things outside of yourself by that preference.

Okay, not much of a point when the context is different. Of course I would swap from an accuracy based standard to a preference based standard, when the subject matter changes from an objective feature of reality to one of subjective feature of reality. What "best" changes based on the circumstances. Why is that problematic in your view?

Perhaps. I’m a little hesitant in using something already viewed as subjective because it may be easy to have some hidden assumptions sneak in, but let’s explore it. I’m assuming you would try to stop him from eating X? You would go against your personal opinion on X, siding with his personal opinion. But in morality you don’t go against your personal opinion on X.

That's right. Where I have conflicting opinion, I go with which ever I hold on to stronger, no different from "I like vanilla over chocolate" and "I like varieties when it comes to ice-cream" so on occasion where the latter is stronger, I pick chocolate.

This sounds like sense (1) above. Why don’t you like it if Johnny dies? Because it causes you disgust. That’s saying the same thing with a different term. I don’t like it. It disgusts me.

While "I am stopping Johnny because I don't like it" and "I am stopping Johnny because it disgusts me" are saying the same thing, the statement itself is not a tautology, is that not a (2)?

My problem is not in you doing that, but in you saying that this takes into consideration that reality is subjective. I think it ignores that claim and only focuses on what your subjective reality is.

You said that before, in response I said before I wouldn't be judging Johnny by my subjective feelings (a standard that has no bearing on the truth of his subjective situation,) had an objective standard existed to judge Johnny by. I am only focusing on what my subjective reality is, because the topic is a subjective feature of reality. You then asked me more follow up questions which lead to you saying there isn't a problem with what I am doing. So it's not all that clear to me why you still think I haven't taken subjectivism proper into consideration.

I agree the latter statement is not a tautology; I think it irrational.

There seems to be some miscommunication here, didn't you affirmed that it's rational for me to judge Johnny by my subjective feelings in your last post? Here is the sentence which gave me that impression "what you are saying here is that it is rational for you to judge Johnny by the standard that you judge Johnny by. Of course that is true."

[The Tanager]

When we say we prefer vanilla, we aren’t judging vanilla ice cream, we are judging our reaction to it, aren’t we? We are sharing how the nerve endings in our mouth and tongue react to it. Judging vanilla ice cream is talking about it’s health content, etc. When I ask you for a judgment of Johnny’s action, you seem to share how your body and mind react to the action, not his action itself.

That doesn't sound right. "Judging my reaction" to me would be something along the lines of "it's a good thing that (judging) vanilla is the best favor (my reaction to it)" which has an extra clause to "vanilla is the best favor."

Perhaps the wording could be better. When you say vanilla is the best flavor, you aren't telling us an objective truth about vanilla ice cream, rather you are telling us an objective truth about how your taste buds relate to vanilla ice cream, right?

Given that I can judge X by my personal preference, or we can judge X by some external standard, I am not treating them as synonymous, that I am doing the latter rather than the former is useful information.

It seems you only see the latter (by some external standard) as making a judgment, in that sense, I am not judging Johnny when I say he is immoral for abusing children. Echoing the above, it doesn't sound right at all that calling him out as immoral doesn't qualify as judging him.

I actually see three distinct kinds. We can judge people by standards outside or (1) inside of ourselves. If we judge people by a standard outside of ourself, this can be (2) inside of the one we are judging or (3) outside of them as well.

Okay, not much of a point when the context is different. Of course I would swap from an accuracy based standard to a preference based standard, when the subject matter changes from an objective feature of reality to one of subjective feature of reality. What "best" changes based on the circumstances. Why is that problematic in your view?

I don't have a problem with you doing that, I just think that is not only not subjectivism proper, but either ignores or contradicts it. You think that when subjectivism proper is true, you are then rational to switch to a preference based standard rather than an accuracy based standard. I think subjectivism proper is an accuracy based standard. It says no single personal preference is accurate to judge the actions of people by, including my own personal preference. When you then judge the actions of others by your own personal preference, you are going against the truth of subjectivism proper.

... or (2) these terms pick out different concepts and one is trying to say that he judges the situation by something that subjectively happens within them.

While "I am stopping Johnny because I don't like it" and "I am stopping Johnny because it disgusts me" are saying the same thing, the statement itself is not a tautology, is that not a (2)?

Synonyms pick out the same concept, so it can't be a (2).

There seems to be some miscommunication here, didn't you affirmed that it's rational for me to judge Johnny by my subjective feelings in your last post? Here is the sentence which gave me that impression "what you are saying here is that it is rational for you to judge Johnny by the standard that you judge Johnny by. Of course that is true."

I said that is rational because I think it is tautological. It's like saying I like my wife because I like my wife. What I think is irrational is to say that I believe my subjective feelings don't present objective truth about my wife, but I'm still going to judge you by whether you agree with my feelings.

[Bust Nak]

Perhaps the wording could be better. When you say vanilla is the best flavor, you aren't telling us an objective truth about vanilla ice cream, rather you are telling us an objective truth about how your taste buds relate to vanilla ice cream, right?

That's right. In the same sense, when I say Johnny is immoral, I am not telling you an objective truth about Johnny, rather I am telling us an objective truth about how I feel about Johnny.

I actually see three distinct kinds. We can judge people by standards outside or (1) inside of ourselves. If we judge people by a standard outside of ourself, this can be (2) inside of the one we are judging or (3) outside of them as well.

Seems to correspond very neatly to subjectivism, agent relativism and objectivism. Can you confirm that these are indeed instances of judging people, I was under the impression that (1) wasn't judging people from your statement "when we say we prefer vanilla, we aren’t judging vanilla ice cream..."

I don't have a problem with you doing that, I just think that is not only not subjectivism proper, but either ignores or contradicts it. You think that when subjectivism proper is true, you are then rational to switch to a preference based standard rather than an accuracy based standard. I think subjectivism proper is an accuracy based standard. It says no single personal preference is accurate to judge the actions of people by, including my own personal preference.

Can you expand on that? That sounds very odd to me because "ice-cream taste is a subjective feature of reality" tells us nothing about whether ice-cream taste good or bad, and hence not a standard at all. In similar vein, objectivism says "the length of this pen is a objective feature of reality." It isn't a standard as it doesn't tell us how long the pen is, instead a ruler measuring the pen is the standard. So how is subjectivism proper a standard to judge the actions of people by, how can you use that to evaluate the action of Johnny?

When you then judge the actions of others by your own personal preference, you are going against the truth of subjectivism proper.

I think this is the first time in months we've made real progress on explaining why you think this, with this revelation that subjectivism proper is an accuracy based standard.

Synonyms pick out the same concept, so it can't be a (2)...

I said that is rational because I think it is tautological. It's like saying I like my wife because I like my wife.

No, it's not like that at all. My claim is "I am stopping Johnny because I don't like it." Clearly that is not a tautology since "stopping Johnny" and "not liking it" are different concepts. You seemed to have reduced that to "I don't like it because it disgusts me."

What I think is irrational is to say that I believe my subjective feelings don't present objective truth about my wife, but I'm still going to judge you by whether you agree with my feelings.

Yet you believe your subjective feelings don't present objective truth about ice-cream, and you still judge ice-cream by whether its taste agrees with you feelings. Are you being irrational here?

[The Tanager]

That's right. In the same sense, when I say Johnny is immoral, I am not telling you an objective truth about Johnny, rather I am telling us an objective truth about how I feel about Johnny.

Yes! This is simple subjectivism. I asked you to stop going back to simple subjectivism and let’s focus on non-objectivism. And then in explaining non-objectivism you switch back to simple subjectivism. That sounds like I'm chiding you, but I don't mean it that way, I'm trying to just give a summary. I know your feelings related to acts of abuse. I’m not asking about that. I’m asking you to judge Johnny’s action (which is what the objectivism/non-objectivism issue on this subject does). If you don’t judge it, then you cannot be doing non-objectivism on it.

I actually see three distinct kinds. We can judge people by standards outside or (1) inside of ourselves. If we judge people by a standard outside of ourself, this can be (2) inside of the one we are judging or (3) outside of them as well.

Seems to correspond very neatly to subjectivism, agent relativism and objectivism.

It doesn’t seem to correspond to the belief that all there is are opinions on the matter. That belief seems to be a judgment that every person’s feelings/opinion/etc., even one’s own, is objectively inaccurate. Not that inaccuracy doesn't apply here. It is objectively inaccurate to think that your taste buds that love vanilla tell us how everyone ought to act in regard with vanilla ice cream.

Can you confirm that these are indeed instances of judging people, I was under the impression that (1) wasn't judging people from your statement "when we say we prefer vanilla, we aren’t judging vanilla ice cream..."

Saying your body reacts unpleasantly to vanilla isn’t judging ice cream itself. Saying your body reacts unpleasantly to Johnny abusing a child isn’t judging Johnny’s action itself. But if you then say that Johnny should not abuse the child (and the “moral should” is not a synonym for “this is how my body reacts” to where you’d just be repeating what you just said), you are now judging Johnny’s action by an objective (true for everyone in existence because of an objective fact) standard: how that action makes your body react.

Can you expand on that? That sounds very odd to me because "ice-cream taste is a subjective feature of reality" tells us nothing about whether ice-cream taste good or bad, and hence not a standard at all. In similar vein, objectivism says "the length of this pen is a objective feature of reality." It isn't a standard as it doesn't tell us how long the pen is, instead a ruler measuring the pen is the standard. So how is subjectivism proper a standard to judge the actions of people by, how can you use that to evaluate the action of Johnny?

Perhaps I’m trying to say that both make accuracy based claims about the standard(s)? Saying something is an objective or subjective feature does tell us something about that thing. Saying ice cream taste is subjective tells us that the standard for good ice cream is dependent on the person being analyzed. It could be different for different people. Saying ice cream taste is objective would tell us that the standard for good ice cream is the same for all people because of some truth outside of them. Saying that this pen has an objective length is saying that the same standard of measurement holds true for every person because of some truth outside of themselves.

No, it's not like that at all. My claim is "I am stopping Johnny because I don't like it." Clearly that is not a tautology since "stopping Johnny" and "not liking it" are different concepts. You seemed to have reduced that to "I don't like it because it disgusts me."

I was not aware that is what you meant. That is not a tautology. That claim isn’t a moral one, though, is it?

Yet you believe your subjective feelings don't present objective truth about ice-cream, and you still judge ice-cream by whether its taste agrees with you feelings. Are you being irrational here?

What do you mean by ‘judge’ here?

[Bust Nak]

Yes! This is simple subjectivism. I asked you to stop going back to simple subjectivism and let’s focus on non-objectivism. And then in explaining non-objectivism you switch back to simple subjectivism. That sounds like I'm chiding you, but I don't mean it that way, I'm trying to just give a summary. I know your feelings related to acts of abuse. I’m not asking about that. I’m asking you to judge Johnny’s action (which is what the objectivism/non-objectivism issue on this subject does). If you don’t judge it, then you cannot be doing non-objectivism on it.

How does asking me to judge Johnny's action have anything to do with objectivism/non-objectivism debate at all? Judging Johnny would result in response along the lines of "it's fine" or "it's immoral" right? This kinds of responses are fundamentally different from the kind of responses you would expect from the question, "can Johnny's action be judged on a objective basis" which would be something like "yes, morality objective" or "no, it cannot."

It doesn’t seem to correspond to the belief that all there is are opinions on the matter. That belief seems to be a judgment that every person’s feelings/opinion/etc., even one’s own, is objectively inaccurate. Not that inaccuracy doesn't apply here. It is objectively inaccurate to think that your taste buds that love vanilla tell us how everyone ought to act in regard with vanilla ice cream.

How is that objectively inaccurate at all, rather than accuracy does not apply? Can someone be incorrect for liking chocolate over vanilla?

Saying your body reacts unpleasantly to vanilla isn’t judging ice cream itself. Saying your body reacts unpleasantly to Johnny abusing a child isn’t judging Johnny’s action itself. But if you then say that Johnny should not abuse the child (and the “moral should” is not a synonym for “this is how my body reacts” to where you’d just be repeating what you just said), you are now judging Johnny’s action by an objective (true for everyone in existence because of an objective fact) standard: how that action makes your body react.

Well, then I am not judging Johnny at all, according to this stance, but like I said, it doesn't sound right that when I say my body reacts unpleasantly to Johnny doesn't count as judging Johnny the same way it doesn't sound right that my body reacts pleasantly to vanilla isn’t judging ice cream itself. I mean what does "vanilla tastes great" mean, if not my body reacting pleasantly to vanilla?

Perhaps I’m trying to say that both make accuracy based claims about the standard(s)? Saying something is an objective or subjective feature does tell us something about that thing. Saying ice cream taste is subjective tells us that the standard for good ice cream is dependent on the person being analyzed. It could be different for different people. Saying ice cream taste is objective would tell us that the standard for good ice cream is the same for all people because of some truth outside of them. Saying that this pen has an objective length is saying that the same standard of measurement holds true for every person because of some truth outside of themselves.

Absolute, they are claims about the standards, does that mean you accept that they are not standards? And if you do, where does that leave your prior objection on thinking subjectivism proper is true, and then rational to switch to a preference based standard rather than an accuracy based standard?

I was not aware that is what you meant. That is not a tautology. That claim isn’t a moral one, though, is it?

Yes, but please bear in mind moral to me is a synonym for "this is how my body reacts," which you have explicitly denied above. It's also worth refreshing you on my response to your objection re: repeating what I said.

"Johnny is immoral" is the same as "I don't like what Johnny is doing" therefore "Johnny is immoral because I don't like what Johnny is doing" is a tautology, but since many people are do not treat them as synonymous, it's still not useless information, because it informs people that I am treating them as the same thing, I am not like them, this is new information to them.

What do you mean by ‘judge’ here?

Noting how your body reacts to ice-cream, i.e. how good it tastes to you. That you think "judging ice-cream" when it comes to how it tastes, meant anything other than that is mind boggling to me.

[The Tanager]

How does asking me to judge Johnny's action have anything to do with objectivism/non-objectivism debate at all? Judging Johnny would result in response along the lines of "it's fine" or "it's immoral" right? This kinds of responses are fundamentally different from the kind of responses you would expect from the question, "can Johnny's action be judged on a objective basis" which would be something like "yes, morality objective" or "no, it cannot."

The objectivism/non-objectivism debate is about whether the action should be judged objectively or non-objectively. How do you judge Johnny’s action: objectively or non-objectively?

It doesn’t seem to correspond to the belief that all there is are opinions on the matter. That belief seems to be a judgment that every person’s feelings/opinion/etc., even one’s own, is objectively inaccurate. Not that inaccuracy doesn't apply here. It is objectively inaccurate to think that your taste buds that love vanilla tell us how everyone ought to act in regard with vanilla ice cream.

How is that objectively inaccurate at all, rather than accuracy does not apply? Can someone be incorrect for liking chocolate over vanilla?

Does your belief about the shape of the Earth accurately match the truth for everyone? Yes. That’s objective accuracy. Does your taste regarding good ice cream match the truth for everyone? No. That’s objective inaccuracy.

Well, then I am not judging Johnny at all, according to this stance, but like I said, it doesn't sound right that when I say my body reacts unpleasantly to Johnny doesn't count as judging Johnny the same way it doesn't sound right that my body reacts pleasantly to vanilla isn’t judging ice cream itself. I mean what does "vanilla tastes great" mean, if not my body reacting pleasantly to vanilla?

But that’s simple subjectivism and it ignores the objectivism/non-objectivism question which moves beyond statements about yourself.

Absolute, they are claims about the standards, does that mean you accept that they are not standards? And if you do, where does that leave your prior objection on thinking subjectivism proper is true, and then rational to switch to a preference based standard rather than an accuracy based standard?

I’m not sure the language being used is a good language to use. I don’t see sharing one’s preferences as a preference based standard. I think sharing one’s preferences ignores any talk of standards. Yes, technically, saying child abuse is immoral because my body reacts unpleasantly to the act, can be called a preference based standard, but it also, technically, accurately picks out a piece of reality.

Yes, but please bear in mind moral to me is a synonym for "this is how my body reacts," which you have explicitly denied above.

I denied that this is entering the objectivism/non-objectivism debate. I can talk about how my body reacts but I also talk about a second concept (using ‘moral’ to refer to it). Even if you think that second concept is fictional, it is still a different concept and we need some term for it. Many non-objectivists also use that second concept, agreeing with us that child abuse makes their body react unpleasantly, but will say that it is not immoral for Johnny to abuse a child.

But that means you are only doing simple subjectivism and not subjectivism proper.

It's also worth refreshing you on my response to your objection re: repeating what I said.

"Johnny is immoral" is the same as "I don't like what Johnny is doing" therefore "Johnny is immoral because I don't like what Johnny is doing" is a tautology, but since many people are do not treat them as synonymous, it's still not useless information, because it informs people that I am treating them as the same thing, I am not like them, this is new information to them.

Sure, but it’s not new information to me any more.

What do you mean by ‘judge’ here?

Noting how your body reacts to ice-cream, i.e. how good it tastes to you. That you think "judging ice-cream" when it comes to how it tastes, meant anything other than that is mind boggling to me.

I knew that is what you meant there. You are saying it is analogous to judging Johnny’s action, though. It’s not because there are at least two kinds of judgment that can be made: (1) how your body reacts to it and (2) whether Johnny is moral for doing it. You may use the phrasing for (2) as a synonym for (1), but other people use it to refer to two different concepts. Even if you think (2) is a fictional concept, it’s still distinct from the first, whatever phrasing you want to have used for it.

Making the first judgment alone ignores objectivism/non-objectivism, which is talking about the second kind of judgment (even if one bases their answer on (1)).