Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[The Tanager]

Two points:

a) That's why I said you open yourself up for challenged on inconsistency if you provide post hoc justification for why you like caramel. Where as I am only saying I liked butterscotch but not caramel and that's just how I roll, that leaves you no room to challenge my reasoning.

One should be willing to open themselves up to being challenged on their possible inconsistencies.

b) It's not like you are suddenly going to start liking caramel when someone points out that it as the features that you are supposed to like in butterscotch. You would just think of more post hoc justification to differentiate caramel from butterscotch.

Note the emphasis on post hoc justification (is there a term for the opposite? Ex ante?) If the topic is complex enough to warrant careful consideration to figure out how you feel about it, then sure, we should analyse the process of consideration, and problems discovered in the process can lead to opinion changing.

Once again, it's not about changing what you like; it's about being rational. In this case, it would be understanding better why you like one but not the other. That's not that important with ice cream flavors. Ethics might be a different story. One may just find out that they don't really take into consideration the belief that "no opinions are true," which is what subjectivism proper is.

Sure, but that's more of a logical constrain than an obligation. It's logically impossible to like what you don't like, or don't like what you like.

Yes. You say you are taking into account subjectivism proper (or at least my understanding of it), but your response does not take into account subjectivism proper; it disagrees with it. Your ethical statements judge others as though your preference should be applied to them, that your opinion is, in some sense, true.

I am not talking about changing right from wrong or even changing the level of rightness/wrongness. Just the idea that rightness/wrongness exist on a spectrum, rather than a binary state. i.e. they should not have performed action A in situation X, but is it worse than action B in situation X, or worse than action A in situation Y? Whether it is worse or not doesn't change the premise that they should not have performed action A in situation X.

I see more clearly the point you are making now. I'm not sure why I didn't see it sooner. Yes, I do agree with you here. I'm still unsure why you think it is better for the one who says "meh, I feel that child abuse is worse" than one who says something like "child abuse is worse than abusing an adult because of X, Y, and Z differences."

[Bust Nak]

One should be willing to open themselves up to being challenged on their possible inconsistencies.

Not shying away from being challenged is one thing. Tacking on spurious justification for people to challenge is quite another.

Once again, it's not about changing what you like; it's about being rational.

That's a dead end. Instincts and feelings are not based on rationality. Instead they contribute to the body of presumes for one to use reason on to come to a conclusion. By all means question rationality of the bits that come after my preferences.

In this case, it would be understanding better why you like one but not the other. That's not that important with ice cream flavors. Ethics might be a different story. One may just find out that they don't really take into consideration the belief that "no opinions are true," which is what subjectivism proper is.

That has nothing to do with why I have the preferences I do.

Yes. You say you are taking into account subjectivism proper (or at least my understanding of it), but your response does not take into account subjectivism proper; it disagrees with it. Your ethical statements judge others as though your preference should be applied to them, that your opinion is, in some sense, true.

We are going back to this again? I though this was resolved. I thought you have since accepted that I am acting the same way in ethics as both you and I do with music. You originally thought I was not taking subjectivism proper into account when I am simply switching between subjectivism proper and simple subjectivism on the fly; and switching between two different kind preference, (what music I like and what kind of music taste I like) on the fly. You don't take Johnny's taste into account when you judge country music, if that doesn't count as making your opinion is, in some sense, true, then how can you accuse me of that when I am doing the same thing you are?

To carry on the point above, what I said here have no bearing on what my actual preferences are, or how I came to hold such preferences.

I see more clearly the point you are making now. I'm not sure why I didn't see it sooner. Yes, I do agree with you here. I'm still unsure why you think it is better for the one who says "meh, I feel that child abuse is worse" than one who says something like "child abuse is worse than abusing an adult because of X, Y, and Z differences."

If I was appealing to my feelings, then "meh, I feel that child abuse is worse" is the accurate description of my stance. If I have analysed difference kinds of abuse and concluded that one is worse than the other, then "child abuse is worse because X, Y, Z" would be the accurate description. Accurate is better than inaccurate.

I am appealing to my feelings, as such any X Y Z I can think of would be post hoc justification, and would be what I was referring to as spurious in my first paragraph above.

[The Tanager]

Not shying away from being challenged is one thing. Tacking on spurious justification for people to challenge is quite another.

I agree. I'm not asking you to tack on spurious justification. You were okay in breaking down musical tastes more deeply (into liking certain rhythms, sounds, etc.). I'm asking that we do that with moral tastes.

That's a dead end. Instincts and feelings are not based on rationality. Instead they contribute to the body of presumes for one to use reason on to come to a conclusion. By all means question rationality of the bits that come after my preferences.

I am questioning that which comes after.

In this case, it would be understanding better why you like one but not the other. That's not that important with ice cream flavors. Ethics might be a different story. One may just find out that they don't really take into consideration the belief that "no opinions are true," which is what subjectivism proper is.

That has nothing to do with why I have the preferences I do.

You say your preferences here amount to subjectivism proper. I'm questioning that.

We are going back to this again? I though this was resolved. I thought you have since accepted that I am acting the same way in ethics as both you and I do with music.

No, I've been questioning that this whole time.

You originally thought I was not taking subjectivism proper into account when I am simply switching between subjectivism proper and simple subjectivism on the fly; and switching between two different kind preference, (what music I like and what kind of music taste I like) on the fly.

You say you are switching between the two, but I still do not currently think you are.

You don't take Johnny's taste into account when you judge country music, if that doesn't count as making your opinion is, in some sense, true, then how can you accuse me of that when I am doing the same thing you are?

I don't think you are doing the same thing. Yes, I don't take Johnny's taste into account when I judge country music (i.e., my taste on country music). Yes, you do that when talking about your moral preference.

That's not the issue I have, though. I don't take Johnny's taste/natural preference or my own taste/natural preference into account when I judge morality. Note that taste/natural preference here is distinct from my opinion on the issue. My opinion on the morality of something may contradict my taste/natural preference on the matter. However, you do take your own taste/natural preference into account. You raise it above all other opinions. You judge other people's actions by your taste/natural preference. That is not "no opinions are true," i.e., subjectivism proper.

I am appealing to my feelings, as such any X Y Z I can think of would be post hoc justification, and would be what I was referring to as spurious in my first paragraph above.

Then I don't think you are espousing subjectivism proper. Subjectivism proper goes beyond one's own personal feelings and asserts that "no opinions are true."

[Bust Nak]

I agree. I'm not asking you to tack on spurious justification. You were okay in breaking down musical tastes more deeply (into liking certain rhythms, sounds, etc.). I'm asking that we do that with moral tastes.

Okay, I like certain actions, ways of thinking.

I am questioning that which comes after.

That's not all you are doing though, you are also questioning the bit that comes before.

You say your preferences here amount to subjectivism proper. I'm questioning that.

Not sure how that addressing my point - That still has nothing to do with why I have the preferences I do.

You say you are switching between the two, but I still do not currently think you are.

Let go a few more rounds then.

I don't take Johnny's taste/natural preference or my own taste/natural preference into account when I judge morality. Note that taste/natural preference here is distinct from my opinion on the issue. My opinion on the morality of something may contradict my taste/natural preference on the matter.

Is that you speaking for yourself as an objectivist, or hypothesize what you would be doing if you were a subjectivist? If it is the former then it's not all that relevant here, I am trying to compare how I act on subjective issues and how you act on subjective issues.

If it is the latter, then that sounded a bit like "I love pizza but I am not going to eat it every meal;" I assuming you are saying whether you like the pizza is the taste/natural preference bit, and not eating it is the opinion bit?

However, you do take your own taste/natural preference into account. You raise it above all other opinions. You judge other people's actions by your taste/natural preference. That is not "no opinions are true," i.e., subjectivism proper.

Correct, that's just simple subjectivism. I am merely evaluating things (morality or music) by my own taste/natural preference, which does not say one way or the other whether any opinion is true or not.

Then I don't think you are espousing subjectivism proper. Subjectivism proper goes beyond one's own personal feelings and asserts that "no opinions are true."

That's right, and now let me switch back to subjectivism proper and state that "no opinions are true."

We've already established that one is free to switch between simple and proper subjectivism on the fly, did we not? How is what I said here different from you saying you hate country music in the same breath that no opinion on music are true?

[The Tanager]

I agree. I'm not asking you to tack on spurious justification. You were okay in breaking down musical tastes more deeply (into liking certain rhythms, sounds, etc.). I'm asking that we do that with moral tastes.

Okay, I like certain actions, ways of thinking.

Person A: I like allowing freedom in aesthetics; I dislike allowing freedom in ethics.
Person B: Let's break that difference down more deeply.
Person A: Okay, I like certain actions, ways of thinking.

That's not deeper analysis.

Person A: I like hip hop music, but not classical.
Person B: Let's break that difference down more deeply.
Person A: Okay, I dislike the smooth sound violins make and really like the harsher sound of beatboxing.

That's a deeper analysis.

I am questioning that which comes after.

That's not all you are doing though, you are also questioning the bit that comes before.

I am not questioning that you have certain natural preferences (say, against net harm being done or something like that). I'm not questioning that you prefer to judge people by your natural preferences. I'm questioning that this judgment takes as true "there are no true opinions on the matter."

You say your preferences here amount to subjectivism proper. I'm questioning that.

Not sure how that addressing my point - That still has nothing to do with why I have the preferences I do.

In what sense do you mean "why I have the preferences I do." I love folk music. Why do I love folk music? In one sense because I just naturally love the sounds, rhythms, etc. associated with the genre. In another sense because folk music is made of those particular sounds, rhythms, etc. which I have a natural affinity for.

If you mean the former sense, then I have always agreed with you there. If the latter, then it does not appear that your moral judgments involve the particular belief defined as subjectivism proper ("there are no true opinions.")

Is that you speaking for yourself as an objectivist, or hypothesize what you would be doing if you were a subjectivist? If it is the former then it's not all that relevant here, I am trying to compare how I act on subjective issues and how you act on subjective issues.

Let me try again with a better understanding of your point, then.

A1. I dislike country music.
A2. When it comes to the aesthetic value of country music, opinions are all there is; there is no truth.
A3. Taking into account that opinion is all there is, I think it is good for Johnny to listen to country music even though it doesn't match my preference.

B1. I dislike child abuse.
B2. When it comes to the ethical value of child abuse, opinions are all there is; there is no truth.
B3. Taking into account that opinion is all there is, I think it is bad for Johnny to abuse the child precisely because it doesn't match my preference.

I think these are different.

However, you do take your own taste/natural preference into account. You raise it above all other opinions. You judge other people's actions by your taste/natural preference. That is not "no opinions are true," i.e., subjectivism proper.

Correct, that's just simple subjectivism. I am merely evaluating things (morality or music) by my own taste/natural preference, which does not say one way or the other whether any opinion is true or not.

Then I don't think you are espousing subjectivism proper. Subjectivism proper goes beyond one's own personal feelings and asserts that "no opinions are true."

That's right, and now let me switch back to subjectivism proper and state that "no opinions are true."

We've already established that one is free to switch between simple and proper subjectivism on the fly, did we not? How is what I said here different from you saying you hate country music in the same breath that no opinion on music are true?

Yes. Now staying within proper subjectivism and not switching back to simple subjectivism what do you mean when you state "no opinions are true"? We are judging Johnny's abuse of a child. How is your subjectivism proper response different than simple subjectivism?

To me, this is the difference between the two things:

Simple subjectivism = Johnny's choice is different than mine is and I don't like his choice.

Subjectivism proper = Even though Johnny's choice is different than mine and I don't like his choice, because the truth of the matter is subjective, I think it is good for Johnny to abuse that child.

[Bust Nak]

That's not deeper analysis.

Neither was "I like certain sounds and rhythm." Child abuse is already at the base level, a children in pain should invoke raw emotional response as would rhythm and melody.

I am not questioning that you have certain natural preferences (say, against net harm being done or something like that). I'm not questioning that you prefer to judge people by your natural preferences.

Then what do you call asking me about why I like allowing freedom in aesthetics but not in ethics, if not questioning my natural preferences?

In what sense do you mean "why I have the preferences I do." I love folk music. Why do I love folk music? In one sense because I just naturally love the sounds, rhythms, etc. associated with the genre. In another sense because folk music is made of those particular sounds, rhythms, etc. which I have a natural affinity for.

If you mean the former sense, then I have always agreed with you there. If the latter, then it does not appear that your moral judgments involve the particular belief defined as subjectivism proper ("there are no true opinions.")

I don't think there are two senses, because I like the sounds in this music and because it contains the sounds that I like, sounds like the same thing to me. As for your last point, of course my moral judgments does not involve the particular belief defined as subjectivism proper ("there are no true opinions.") There are two different issues. The first is simple subjectivism and does not inform my view on subjectivism proper; the latter is subjectivism proper and does not inform my simple subjectivism AKA my preferences.

A1. I dislike country music.
A2. When it comes to the aesthetic value of country music, opinions are all there is; there is no truth.
A3. Taking into account that opinion is all there is, I think it is good for Johnny to listen to country music even though it doesn't match my preference.

B1. I dislike child abuse.
B2. When it comes to the ethical value of child abuse, opinions are all there is; there is no truth.
B3. Taking into account that opinion is all there is, I think it is bad for Johnny to abuse the child precisely because it doesn't match my preference.

I think these are different.

The two clause 3 are problematic. "Taking into account that opinion is all there is" is one thing, but you are saying more than that, you are saying the fact that opinion is all there is, implies it's good for Johnny to do to listen to country music. I disagree that there is such an implication. Also, the preference that is relevant in clause 3, is not the preference referred to in clause 1. Preference on music is different to preference on people's choice of music; Preference on child abuse is different to preference on people's choice on child abuse.

Yes. Now staying within proper subjectivism and not switching back to simple subjectivism what do you mean when you state "no opinions are true"? We are judging Johnny's abuse of a child. How is your subjectivism proper response different than simple subjectivism?

It's not different. Whether opinions are true or not, have zero bearing on what I like and what I dislike. I am not suddenly gonna start liking child abuse if Johnny's opinion is true.

To me, this is the difference between the two things:

Simple subjectivism = Johnny's choice is different than mine is and I don't like his choice.

Subjectivism proper = Even though Johnny's choice is different than mine and I don't like his choice, because the truth of the matter is subjective, I think it is good for Johnny to abuse that child.

You said that before, I asked you why would the premise "no opinion are true" inform your opinion as to whether it's good or bad for Johnny to abuse that child/listen to country music. You said it was something that is true by definition to you, in response I said I don't operate under that definition and gave you this argument for examination:

1) To judge someone's choice, a standard is required.
2) Aesthetic value/morality is subjective (i.e., opinion is all there is); there is no one objective standard to judge someone's choice by.
3) Without an objective standard to judge something as true or false, the only alternative is to judge it by someone's likes and dislikes.
4) At the simple subjectivism level, the only logical possibility is for someone to like what they like.
5) Therefore my personal preference is the only standard that enter into my judgment of Johnny's choice of aesthetic value/morality.

Care to look over it again?

[The Tanager]

Then what do you call asking me about why I like allowing freedom in aesthetics but not in ethics, if not questioning my natural preferences?

I'm not questioning that you have those preferences, but trying to figure out what goes in to you having those preferences. It does not seem to me to include a belief that "no opinions are true."

In what sense do you mean "why I have the preferences I do." I love folk music. Why do I love folk music? In one sense because I just naturally love the sounds, rhythms, etc. associated with the genre. In another sense because folk music is made of those particular sounds, rhythms, etc. which I have a natural affinity for.

I don't think there are two senses, because I like the sounds in this music and because it contains the sounds that I like, sounds like the same thing to me.

In the first, the emphasis is on my nature. Why do I prefer folk music? Because I was made that way. I don't choose folk music even though In the second, the emphasis is on the nature of folk music. Why do I prefer folk music? Because folk music has elements in it that I like.

It's the difference between saying that I dislike child abuse because I was made that way and that I dislike child abuse because the damage mars the intrinsic worth of a human being.

As for your last point, of course my moral judgments does not involve the particular belief defined as subjectivism proper ("there are no true opinions.") There are two different issues. The first is simple subjectivism and does not inform my view on subjectivism proper; the latter is subjectivism proper and does not inform my simple subjectivism AKA my preferences.

Simple subjectivism: I believe that it is objectively wrong to objectify women's bodies. That claim is informed by my belief that the following opinion is true: objectifying women's bodies mars the intrinsic worth of human beings. If subjectivism proper does not inform one's views (simple subjectivism), then one does not believe subjectivism proper is true.

A1. I dislike country music.
A2. When it comes to the aesthetic value of country music, opinions are all there is; there is no truth.
A3. Taking into account that opinion is all there is, I think it is good for Johnny to listen to country music even though it doesn't match my preference.

B1. I dislike child abuse.
B2. When it comes to the ethical value of child abuse, opinions are all there is; there is no truth.
B3. Taking into account that opinion is all there is, I think it is bad for Johnny to abuse the child precisely because it doesn't match my preference.

I think these are different.

The two clause 3 are problematic. "Taking into account that opinion is all there is" is one thing, but you are saying more than that, you are saying the fact that opinion is all there is, implies it's good for Johnny to do to listen to country music. I disagree that there is such an implication. Also, the preference that is relevant in clause 3, is not the preference referred to in clause 1. Preference on music is different to preference on people's choice of music; Preference on child abuse is different to preference on people's choice on child abuse.

B3 is attempting to explain the preference of not allowing freedom in ethical choices. Your rendering makes the comment tautalogical: "Taking into account that opinion is all there is, I think it is bad for Johnny to abuse the child precisely because it doesn't match my preference that I think it is bad for Johnny to abuse the child." This rendering does not take into account that opinion is all there is, at all. By erasing "opinion is all there is" from it you are not a subjectivist proper. You aren't both a simple subjectivist and a subjectivist proper, switching between the two. You are just a simple subjectivist. I may be wrong about the implication of "opinion is all there is," but you don't even have an implication.

You said that before, I asked you why would the premise "no opinion are true" inform your opinion as to whether it's good or bad for Johnny to abuse that child/listen to country music. You said it was something that is true by definition to you,

That's one of the things I said. I also said that for the same reason that "no opinions are true" concerning the shape of the universe would inform my opinion as to whether it's good or bad for Johnny to believe in a flat earth. If the shape of the earth were subjective, then I would judge based on Johnny's subjective preferences.

1) To judge someone's choice, a standard is required.
2) Aesthetic value/morality is subjective (i.e., opinion is all there is); there is no one objective standard to judge someone's choice by.
3) Without an objective standard to judge something as true or false, the only alternative is to judge it by someone's likes and dislikes.
4) At the simple subjectivism level, the only logical possibility is for someone to like what they like.
5) Therefore my personal preference is the only standard that enter into my judgment of Johnny's choice of aesthetic value/morality.

As I've been saying, going back to "at the simple subjectivism level" in premise 4 is not subjectivism proper but ignoring both objectivism and subjectivism proper. Not switching back and forth, because we've left the simple subjectivism behind at this point and are addressing a different issue.

At premise 3 we can judge by our own preference (i.e., act as though our preference is true for others, that we should apply our preference in judgment of the actions of others) or we can judge by their own preference (i.e., act as though no one opinion, even our own, is true for everyone, that we should apply people's subjective preferences to their own actions). You do the former. The latter, I think, is subjectivism proper.

The latter is how we both act in regard to music. You will say that you don't. That in music you aren't applying people's subjective preferences, but applying your own love of allowing freedom to others. That explanation is tautalogical and useless. You are saying "I believe what I believe." It's not a deep enough analysis of your preference for the issue we are addressing.

[Bust Nak]

I'm not questioning that you have those preferences, but trying to figure out what goes in to you having those preferences. It does not seem to me to include a belief that "no opinions are true."

Of course it's not there. While I believe that, it's not a preference, nor is it a factor that goes into my preference.

In the first, the emphasis is on my nature. Why do I prefer folk music? Because I was made that way. I don't choose folk music even though In the second, the emphasis is on the nature of folk music. Why do I prefer folk music? Because folk music has elements in it that I like.

It's the difference between saying that I dislike child abuse because I was made that way and that I dislike child abuse because the damage mars the intrinsic worth of a human being.

Okay, I dislike child abuse because I was made that way, I dislike child abuse because it has an element that I don't like, abused children.

Simple subjectivism: I believe that it is objectively wrong to objectify women's bodies. That claim is informed by my belief that the following opinion is true: objectifying women's bodies mars the intrinsic worth of human beings. If subjectivism proper does not inform one's views (simple subjectivism), then one does not believe subjectivism proper is true.

That much is a given, I believe that there is no such thing as objectively wrong, which informed my belief that "objectifying women's bodies is wrong" means the same thing as I personally disapprove of objectifying women's bodies.

But that wasn't what you were challenging me on before, you suggested (are still suggesting) subjectivism proper must somehow inform my preferences else I don't really believe subjectivism proper is true. It doesn't inform my preferences - I would disapprove of such objectification regardless of whether opinion on this issue can be true or not.

While we are here, I find it odd that "I believe that it is objectively wrong to objectify women's bodies" would qualify as a simple subjectivism statement, it's not about what your preference.

B3 is attempting to explain the preference of not allowing freedom in ethical choices. Your rendering makes the comment tautalogical: "Taking into account that opinion is all there is, I think it is bad for Johnny to abuse the child precisely because it doesn't match my preference that I think it is bad for Johnny to abuse the child." This rendering does not take into account that opinion is all there is, at all. By erasing "opinion is all there is" from it you are not a subjectivist proper. You aren't both a simple subjectivist and a subjectivist proper, switching between the two. You are just a simple subjectivist. I may be wrong about the implication of "opinion is all there is," but you don't even have an implication.

That's because there is none, it has zero bearing on my preferences. It's not clear why you think it would influence ones preference. It doesn't influence yours, as far as I can tell. Clause 3 is just about my preference, that part is 100% simple subjectivism. Clause 2 is 100% subjectivism proper. You were looking for the switch from simple subjectivist and a subjectivist proper in clause 3, you failed to find it because the switch happened between 2 and 3, not in clause 3.

That's one of the things I said. I also said that for the same reason that "no opinions are true" concerning the shape of the universe would inform my opinion as to whether it's good or bad for Johnny to believe in a flat earth. If the shape of the earth were subjective, then I would judge based on Johnny's subjective preferences.

Why his and not anyone else's? It's just something you treat as definitionally true.

As I've been saying, going back to "at the simple subjectivism level" in premise 4 is not subjectivism proper but ignoring both objectivism and subjectivism proper. Not switching back and forth, because we've left the simple subjectivism behind at this point and are addressing a different issue.

What's the difference between "going back to simple subjectivism and ignoring subjectivism proper," and "switching from subjectivism proper to simple subjectivism?" What's the difference between "leaving simple subjectivism behind and addressing a different issue" and "switching from simple subjectivism to subjectivism proper?"

Going back to simple subjectivism and ignoring objectivism vs subjectivism proper, then leaving simple subjectivism behind and addressing a different issue sounds a lot like "switching between subjectivism proper and simple subjectivism" to me.

At premise 3 we can judge by our own preference (i.e., act as though our preference is true for others, that we should apply our preference in judgment of the actions of others) or we can judge by their own preference (i.e., act as though no one opinion, even our own, is true for everyone, that we should apply people's subjective preferences to their own actions). You do the former. The latter, I think, is subjectivism proper.

Right, but only because you are operating under some definition that says judging others by one own preference (as opposed to theirs) equates to making one's preference true. I don't operate under that presumption. That I have different definitions than you do, doesn't make my position self-contradictory, just different to yours.

The latter is how we both act in regard to music. You will say that you don't. That in music you aren't applying people's subjective preferences, but applying your own love of allowing freedom to others. That explanation is tautalogical and useless.

The fact that what I said is true, regardless of how useless it is, is enough to sink the suggestion that I apply people's subjective preferences to their own actions, no?

You are saying "I believe what I believe." It's not a deep enough analysis of your preference for the issue we are addressing.

We can explore why I love allowing freedom to others in one case but not another, unlike child abuse, it's doesn't invoke a raw emotional response. Not seeing how a fully explored chain along the lines of "I believe A because of B; I believe B because of C... and I believe N because that's I was made that way, it is what I believe" is gonna help make it any less true that I am applying my own love of allowing freedom to others.

I love allowing freedom when it comes to music because it typically doesn't involve me listening to music that I don't like.

[The Tanager]

That's one of the things I said. I also said that for the same reason that "no opinions are true" concerning the shape of the universe would inform my opinion as to whether it's good or bad for Johnny to believe in a flat earth. If the shape of the earth were subjective, then I would judge based on Johnny's subjective preferences.

Why his and not anyone else's? It's just something you treat as definitionally true.

What does it mean for ice cream taste to be subjective, to you? Does your personal preference enter into that answer?

[Bust Nak]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #499]

It means there is no objective standard to measure ice-cream by, there is no correct answer to "how nice does this ice-cream taste?" My personal preference does not enter into this answer.