Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[The Tanager]

I think it' rather odd that a statement saying "A is an X" doesn't qualify as addressing the same thing as a statement saying "A isn't an X" in your book. Both are talking about the nature of A, seems straight forward to me.

That part is. What I find odd is that you say you believe "A isn't an X", but that this belief doesn't change anything about what you think about the situation we are talking about. So, I've been trying to better understand that.

That doesn't explain why I must be the one to change my vocabulary. Why don't you stop using wrong if you meant something other than dislike?

What term do you propose? You keep talking about terms that you view as synonyms to like. Let's play it out with just one concept:

1. Bust Nak dislikes/disapproves/thinks it wrong/etc. child abuse.
2. Bust Nak dislikes/disapproves/thinks it wrong/etc. when people who like child abuse abuse a child.

On the surface, this gives the appearance of subjectivism. But I think that is the result of only using one concept. Using only one kind of concept also commits you to say this:

3. Bust Nak dislikes/disapproves/thinks it wrong/etc. when people assert the Earth is flat.

In this one-concept categorization, this statement is as much subjectivism as your statement on disliking Johnny's attempt at child abuse. But you call yourself an objectivist concerning the shape of the Earth.

[Bust Nak]

That part is.

Then why did you say my suggested C, isn't a C type statement but an A type? My C doesn't just say people have preferences, it says right and wrong is not distinct from preferences.

What I find odd is that you say you believe "A isn't an X", but that this belief doesn't change anything about what you think about the situation we are talking about. So, I've been trying to better understand that.

Earlier I said there wouldn't be any changes because I had always been treating the situation A as if it isn't an X, but you said that wasn't what you meant. Then I pointed out that it does change what I think in the sense that that I understand a subjective situation differently to an objective one, but that doesn't seem to be what you meant either. Finally I understood you are questioning why I don't change my preference based on whether we are looking at a subjective matter or an objective one. I don't have an explanation for that because I really don't get why it would change - you operate under an definition of subjectivism where you change from judging by one's own preference to judging by Johnny's preferences. I don't operate under that definition. You then called my definition (re: treating Johnny's freedom in music as my own preference for personal freedom as opposed to Johnny's subjective preferences) a tautology. If my definition is trivially true, then what more explanation do I need than the rhetorical question: why would I?

What term do you propose?

Easy, you already have the terms for that - "correct" and "incorrect." There is no mistaking these with preferences, both sides accept these terms as reserved for factual matters. For objectivists, child abuse isn't wrong per se, just incorrect.

You keep talking about terms that you view as synonyms to like. Let's play it out with just one concept:

1. Bust Nak dislikes/disapproves/thinks it wrong/etc. child abuse.
2. Bust Nak dislikes/disapproves/thinks it wrong/etc. when people who like child abuse abuse a child.

On the surface, this gives the appearance of subjectivism. But I think that is the result of only using one concept. Using only one kind of concept also commits you to say this:

3. Bust Nak dislikes/disapproves/thinks it wrong/etc. when people assert the Earth is flat.

In this one-concept categorization, this statement is as much subjectivism as your statement on disliking Johnny's attempt at child abuse. But you call yourself an objectivist concerning the shape of the Earth.

Bust Nak thinks those people who assert the Earth is flat are incorrect, there is zero ambiguity whether I am speaking as a subjectivist or an objectivist here.

[The Tanager]

Then why did you say my suggested C, isn't a C type statement but an A type? My C doesn't just say people have preferences, it says right and wrong is not distinct from preferences.

Those are identical statements to you, aren't they? People have preferences (including preferences that are different than mine). People are wrong preferences (i.e., have different preferences than me). Those say the same thing.

Saying something is "wrong" and saying something is "disliked" mean the same thing to you. That's the same kind of statement.

Earlier I said there wouldn't be any changes because I had always been treating the situation A as if it isn't an X, but you said that wasn't what you meant. Then I pointed out that it does change what I think in the sense that that I understand a subjective situation differently to an objective one, but that doesn't seem to be what you meant either. Finally I understood you are questioning why I don't change my preference based on whether we are looking at a subjective matter or an objective one. I don't have an explanation for that because I really don't get why it would change - you operate under an definition of subjectivism where you change from judging by one's own preference to judging by Johnny's preferences. I don't operate under that definition. You then called my definition (re: treating Johnny's freedom in music as my own preference for personal freedom as opposed to Johnny's subjective preferences) a tautology. If my definition is trivially true, then what more explanation do I need than the rhetorical question: why would I?

There are two issues: (1) what you think about an issue and (2) whether you think that issue has an objectively right/wrong answer. It's not about you changing your answer to (1) based on whether we are looking at a subjective matter or an objective one, but why you answer (2) the way you do and the logical consequences of saying that.

Bust Nak thinks those people who assert the Earth is flat are incorrect, there is zero ambiguity whether I am speaking as a subjectivist or an objectivist here.

So, with these terms, would you say the following is true or false?

1. Bust Nak thinks those people who assert that child abuse is wrong are incorrect.

What follows from 'child abuse being wrong is incorrect' for you, if anything? What would follow from 'child abuse being right is correct,' if one believed it were true? Not would it change what Bust Nak thinks about child abuse, but what would follow from it's truth?

And how would you interpret/answer these questions?

2. Should one be okay with Flat Earth theory?
3. Should one be okay with people liking pistachio ice cream (assuming you dislike the flavor)?
4. Should one be okay with people liking child abuse?

[Bust Nak]

Those are identical statements to you, aren't they? People have preferences (including preferences that are different than mine). People are wrong preferences (i.e., have different preferences than me). Those say the same thing.

Saying something is "wrong" and saying something is "disliked" mean the same thing to you. That's the same kind of statement.

No, while "something is wrong" and "something is disliked" mean the same thing, the statement "People have preferences that are different than mine" does not mean the same thing as "people have (you meant 'have,' instead of 'are,' right?) wrong preferences." Perhaps more to the point "People have wrong preferences" does not mean the same thing as "people have different preferences than me." It's different does not mean the same thing as I dislike it - people have different preference when it comes to music and I like it; while people have different preference when it comes to moral and I don't like it.

There are two issues: (1) what you think about an issue and (2) whether you think that issue has an objectively right/wrong answer. It's not about you changing your answer to (1) based on whether we are looking at a subjective matter or an objective one, but why you answer (2) the way you do and the logical consequences of saying that.

Okay, I thought you were talking about changing my answer to (1) since you spoke of switching from judging music by your own preference to judging music taste by Johnny's preference.

There are two reasons I answer (2) the way I do. First of all moral subjectivism is intuitive to me, from the moment I understood the concept of right and wrong to the level beyond "mum and dad told me to behave," I've thought of it as a matter of preference - beauty is in the eye of the beholder, you cannot have value without an evaluation, there is no worth without someone wanting something, all these seem trivially true to me. The second reason I come up with after exploring the topic in more detail much later on: subjectivism is both internally and externally consistent, is sufficient to explain our moral experiences, has fewer unknowns than objectivism so should be preferred according to the principle of parsimony.

The logical consequences of treating morality as a subjective issue are the same as those of treating food taste as a subjective issue: I cannot invoke the concept of correctness; I ultimately cannot change anyone's preference by arguments nor facts, given that taste at its most basic level is not rational; disagreement over subjective issue is impossible in the sense that "I like this" and "you don't like this" are not contrary statements.

I think these are the main, non-trivial, implications.

So, with these terms, would you say the following is true or false?

1. Bust Nak thinks those people who assert that child abuse is wrong are incorrect.

False. "Bust Nak thinks those people who assert that child abuse is wrong are correct" is also false. Correctness isn't a thing in subjective matters, or as you put it, it does not make sense to say our personal preferences are objectively wrong or right when talking about a manner different from factual statements about those personal preferences.

What follows from 'child abuse being wrong is incorrect' for you, if anything? What would follow from 'child abuse being right is correct,' if one believed it were true? Not would it change what Bust Nak thinks about child abuse, but what would follow from it's truth?

The inverse of the above, correctness is now in play, arguments and facts can now be use to decide if child abuse is right or wrong, disagreement is now possible, and one side would be correct and the other incorrect.

2. Should one be okay with Flat Earth theory?

That means do I like it if (should...) people are (one be) okay with Flat Earth theory - the answer is no.

3. Should one be okay with people liking pistachio ice cream (assuming you dislike the flavor)?

That means do I like it if people are okay with people liking pistachio ice cream (assuming I dislike the flavor) - The answer is yes. Did you meant for there to be an extra layer of indirection, i.e. two mentions of "people?"

4. Should one be okay with people liking child abuse?

That means do I like it if people are okay with people liking child abuse - the answer is no. Same commentary as above re: layers of indirection.

[The Tanager]

2. Should one be okay with Flat Earth theory?

That means do I like it if (should...) people are (one be) okay with Flat Earth theory - the answer is no.

Or do you like people believing/teaching/etc. Flat Earth theory? I think your answer is probably no with that phrasing as well. If so, then why not?

3. Should one be okay with people liking pistachio ice cream (assuming you dislike the flavor)?

That means do I like it if people are okay with people liking pistachio ice cream (assuming I dislike the flavor) - The answer is yes. Did you meant for there to be an extra layer of indirection, i.e. two mentions of "people?"

Or do you like people liking pistachio ice cream? I think your answer is still yes. If so, then why?

4. Should one be okay with people liking child abuse?

That means do I like it if people are okay with people liking child abuse - the answer is no. Same commentary as above re: layers of indirection.

Or do you like people liking child abuse? I think your answer is still no. If so, then why not?

[Bust Nak]

Or do you like people believing/teaching/etc. Flat Earth theory? I think your answer is probably no with that phrasing as well. If so, then why not?

I do not like people believing or teaching Flat Earth theory because I don't like people believing or teaching falsehood.

Or do you like people liking pistachio ice cream? I think your answer is still yes. If so, then why?

I like it because I don't care that much about other people's taste in ice cream and that it brings them joy, which I like, pushes it from a mere "meh" to a yes.

Or do you like people liking child abuse? I think your answer is still no. If so, then why not?

I don't like it because they might indulge in actual child abuse and I don't like it when children are abused.

These are all (1) what I think about an issue type questions. Weren't you more interested in the implications of me thinking that these issues (2) not having an objectively right/wrong answer? My answers to (1) doesn't change based on (2).

[The Tanager]

These are all (1) what I think about an issue type questions. Weren't you more interested in the implications of me thinking that these issues (2) not having an objectively right/wrong answer? My answers to (1) doesn't change based on (2).

I do not like people believing or teaching Flat Earth theory because I don't like people believing or teaching falsehood.

From this it seems like your dislike of people believing or teaching Flat Earth theory (1) does depend on (2). Because you believe Flat Earth theory is a falsehood, you don't like people believing or teaching it. That seems to imply that if you thought it were true, then you'd like people believing or teaching Flat Earth theory.

I like it because I don't care that much about other people's taste in ice cream and that it brings them joy, which I like, pushes it from a mere "meh" to a yes.

I don't like it because they might indulge in actual child abuse and I don't like it when children are abused.

But what's the difference here? In both, the other person's actions are bringing them joy. Why don't you care much about ice cream taste, but do care about children being abused?

[Bust Nak]

From this it seems like your dislike of people believing or teaching Flat Earth theory (1) does depend on (2). Because you believe Flat Earth theory is a falsehood, you don't like people believing or teaching it. That seems to imply that if you thought it were true, then you'd like people believing or teaching Flat Earth theory.

You are getting two different things mixed up here. Whether "is the Earth flat?" has an objectively true answer or not, is a very different question to whether "is it right to teach/believe Flat Earth" has an objectively true answer or not.

But what's the difference here? In both, the other person's actions are bringing them joy. Why don't you care much about ice cream taste, but do care about children being abused?

Simple, what ice-cream people eat doesn't affect me, while child abuse does.

[The Tanager]

These are all (1) what I think about an issue type questions. Weren't you more interested in the implications of me thinking that these issues (2) not having an objectively right/wrong answer? My answers to (1) doesn't change based on (2).

You are getting two different things mixed up here. Whether "is the Earth flat?" has an objectively true answer or not, is a very different question to whether "is it right to teach/believe Flat Earth" has an objectively true answer or not.

I agree those are different questions, but I don't see how that matters for my point. You subjectively feel the way you do about the latter because you believe the former has an objectively correct answer. That seems to be a (2) kind of answer affecting a (1) kind of statement. To me, if subjectivism is addressing the issue objectivism does, then the subjective kind of (2) should also affect one's (1) kind of statement.

But what's the difference here? In both, the other person's actions are bringing them joy. Why don't you care much about ice cream taste, but do care about children being abused?

Simple, what ice-cream people eat doesn't affect me, while child abuse does.

That's just telling me that it affects you differently; I am asking you why it affects you differently. Upon reflection, what is it about child abuse that you don't like?

[Bust Nak]

I agree those are different questions, but I don't see how that matters for my point. You subjectively feel the way you do about the latter because you believe the former has an objectively correct answer. That seems to be a (2) kind of answer affecting a (1) kind of statement.

Earlier you said there are two issues: (1) what you think about an issue and (2) whether you think that issue has an objectively right/wrong answer. It's seems quite explicit that the (2) is referring specifically to the latter question by the phrase "that issue" (i.e. teaching of flat Earth) instead of any old related issues (e.g. whether the Earth is flat or not.)

Perhaps more to the point, you also said that this wasn't about me changing my answer to (1) based on whether we are looking at a subjective matter or an objective one, but here you are talking about changing my answer to (1) based on whether (2) has an objective answer or not. Why?

But, okay, whatever it takes to help you to understand my stance: some (2) kind of answers can affect some (1) kind of statements.

To me, if subjectivism is addressing the issue objectivism does, then the subjective kind of (2) should also affect one's (1) kind of statement.

If some ice-cream favor is objectively more tasty than some other favor, would that change which ice-cream favor you personally prefer?

That's just telling me that it affects you differently; I am asking you why it affects you differently. Upon reflection, what is it about child abuse that you don't like?

There is no reflection possible, I keep telling you, child abuse invoke raw emotions, I simply don't like children getting abused. A reminder: Instincts and feelings are not based on rationality. Instead they contribute to the body of presumes for one to use reason on to come to a conclusion. You were supposed to be questioning the rationality of the bits that come after my preferences, and not question the rationality of my preferences themselves.