The Tanager wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 6:03 pm
Part of the problem (but not an excuse) is that I still don't think we have the right term for what I'm talking about. Perhaps I'm thinking a bit clearer about it now and we need to add a term. I know non-objectivists who say Johnny's action is moral, but that it doesn't match their preference if they were in the same moral dilemma. Neither is it talking about what a rational person would do. I think distinguishing the moral "should" from "this is my preference" would be the easiest fix, but you may see a problem in that which I don't.
That won't do since "this is my preference" does not convey obligation or duty. More importantly, I am not asking you to stop using "should" when referring to the "objective moral should," just don't use it for "probable/expected should."
Let me try to see if I understand you. You believe one can either act on instinct alone (like with food choices and moral choices) or objective truth alone (like with the shape of the Earth). But that the "objective truth alone" can only refer to it being an objective truth that reality is objective on an issue. I say that reality being subjective is also an objective truth one can act on, rather than acting on their specific instinct within that subjective issue. But, to you, those kinds of objective truths don't act like other kinds of objective truths.
No, they act the same. A couple of weeks ago when we first talked about (A) (B) and (C) type reasoning, I thought (A) and (C) alone was enough, since (B) "a feature of reality outside of one's self being subjective" sounded like it was already covered by objective truth (A). I see (B) as just another objective truth. I am only separated them once you clarified that (A) was only supposed to be a subset of all objective truth.
If this is what you mean by an (A), then every single thing has an (A). Of course Susan has a reason why she did X and the reason she has is the reason why she did X. That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about why she had that answer (being okay with it) versus a different answer.
How is "reason why she did X" not the same thing as why she had that answer as opposed to another?
No, it's not. It's not an answer. It's like this: "Why did the Cubs win the World Series in 2016?" "Because the Cubs won the World Series in 2016, i.e., it actually happened."
You presume "because the Cubs won the World Series in 2016" doesn't cover the entirety of the situation. If that was indeed the totality of why the cubs won the World Series, then it
is the correct answer. When you are talking about taste, the
sole reason of why this ice-cream is tasty, is because I like it, that's it, there is nothing else there, "I like it" covers the entirely of the situation. If that does not suffice as an explanation, then there is no explanation, or as I put it before: there is no account for taste and that's just happens to be how I roll.
In short: You have two concepts in your mind, where as I only have one. You are looking for answers to how one concept leads to the other, you won't get any from me because there is only one concept in my mind.
The question isn't: "did the Cubs win the World Series in 2016?"
That can be answered with yes or no. "Because...." is clearly answering a why question.
It doesn't seem the same to me. I know you wouldn't say this to the Cubs question above but, with a (C3)-kind of answer there, one would be at least answering the question of why she thinks the Cubs won...she never heard/read the news anywhere, but her instincts told them the Cubs did win that year.
Her instincts told them the Cubs won and the Cub won because she felt that they won still sound like the same thing to me.
No, we are talking about judgments on other people's actions. It could boil down to pure instincts for some, but it doesn't have to because people can take into account reality outside of themselves.
We spoke about this already, anything outside of ourselves that you take into account, are just extra steps to help you figure out which instincts are most relevant. See my example of environmental policy, there are all sorts of things to take into account, such as the effects on polar bears and the economy, but that still boils down to how much I like polar bears vs money. Anything other than "objective truth alone" can be distilled down to pure instincts.
To clarify, I don't think the bolded part is useless. What I was calling useless was when you say things that are redundant like "my preference is my preference" or "I like X because I like X".
That's still not useless: To someone who does not know that I treat "tasty" as a synonym to "I like the taste," they are gaining new information when I tell them "vanilla is tasty because I like vanilla." You can only reduce that down to "I like vanilla because I like vanilla" with the knowledge that "tasty" means "I like it." In short, "Superman is Clark Kent" is not the same thing as "Superman is Superman." When the time comes where subjectivism is accepted as a trivial truth, then you can say it's redundant.
What I think you mean (in clearer phrasing) is that the reason you like chocolate is that you have a natural "instinct" to like it as opposed to going through some rational consideration and concluding that you like chocolate ice cream.
See polar bear. There is a difference between natural instinct and careful consideration, but it is an insignificant difference, since the latter still boil down to natural instinct.
That harm is subjective is obviously not a (C) because (C)'s take no note of reality outside of one's self. They are just instinct, not based on considering things about the world. To say harm is a subjective notion makes a judgment about reality outside of one's self. The (C) is that "I don't like what I call harm" not that harm is a subjective feature of reality.
Sure, "I don't like what I call harm" is exactly what I meant by "appealing to subjective harm." A non-objectivist/subjectivist (about harm) would be rational to allow personal freedom in food taste by appealing to (a lack of) subjective harm. And you seemed to agree with me that it is a (C).
One who believes that harm is a subjective feature of reality, believes these different spheres exist (as opposed to one sphere in which Susan is right and Johnny wrong about the harm of child abuse) with no sphere a truer/more rational standard to judge the other by.
So far so good.
If one who believes in the subjectivity of harm is rational, then they would be rationally okay with Johnny's action of child abuse, even though it goes against their own emotional view of child abuse.
Why? How does the above premises imply this conclusion? You've never managed to explain to me the rationale behind this claim (and its various variations.) I keep granting you premise after premise, the vital link between premises and conclusion is still missing.
You seem to judge Johnny's following through with his hallucination by your hallucination (i.e., you apply your hallucination to Johnny).
First, explain why judging Johnny's following through with his hallucination by my hallucination equates to me apply my hallucination
to Johnny but judging ice-cream by my hallucination does not equates to me apply my hallucination
to ice-cream.
Then explain the apparent inconsistency between what you said here, that judging Johnny
is applying my hallucination, to what you said before, that saying Johnny is wrong
isn't applying my hallucination, just telling people what my hallucination is.
You are treating Johnny in line with your subjective experience of things, as though it should be objectively applied to everyone and not just yourself.
As thought..., but it isn't that. More below re: superficial similarity between subjectivists and objectivists.
A non-objectivist could, however, judge Johnny's following through with his hallucination by one's belief that hallucinations are all that exist...
Same claim again, "hallucinations are all that exist" therefore allow Johnny freedom... why?
where it is irrational for any hallucination to be judged by another hallucination...
Don't seem to be any less rational than the above, when you can't tell me how you get from premise to conclusion.
Is it any more or less irrational for any hallucination to be judged by another hallucination, than for ice-cream to be judged by hallucination?
It does not make sense to judge known opinions by other known opinions when one believes there is no opinion that should be judge over the others.
Okay, but that's kinda moot since the vast majority of non-objectivist/subjectivist do not believe that no opinion should be judge over the others. You need to explain why "objective truth of the matter is that X is a subjective feature of reality" implies "no opinion that should be judge over the others." i.e. the claim that you've made over and over again in various forms, that I keep asking you to explain. The whole epic discussion really hinges on this one claim.
