The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

[John J. Bannan]

THE FOURTEEN COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
By John J. Bannan (5/24/2020)

“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” Genesis 1:1. God is the creator of the cosmos. The cosmological arguments prove the existence of God by demonstrating the necessity of a Creator for the cosmos. The cosmological arguments offer good reason through circumstantial evidence taken from the nature of the cosmos itself to believe in God. The following is a listing and explanation of all the known cosmological arguments for the existence of God:

I. THE DICHOTOMY OF EXISTENCE
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The dichotomy of existence proves the existence of God by demonstrating the necessity of an uncaused Creator with the power to create any or all of the infinite potentials for physical reality to the fullest extent logically possible under everythingness. In terms of the uncaused, there are only two possibilities. The first is the uncaused reason for the existence of all physical reality. The second is the uncaused absence of any reality called absolute nothingness. These two are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of all logical possibilities forming an abstract metaphysical dichotomy of existence. Because each side of the dichotomy is uncaused, there can be no cause for either of the two being real. Rather, one side is real and the other is not real without reason or necessity. Moreover, an uncaused thing does not have parts, because it would otherwise be caused by those parts. Because an uncaused thing does not have parts, an uncaused thing cannot be destroyed because destruction demands the disassociation of parts. As a result, the side of the dichotomy that is real can never be destroyed, and the other side that is not real can never become real.

Because physical reality can differ in the most minute way logically possible from another potential physical reality, there is no good reason to believe that the uncaused reason for the existence of all physical reality could not also create that potential physical reality. Because this uncaused reason can create this potential physical reality, then it can also create another potential physical reality differing from the former potential physical reality in the most minute way logically possible. Repeating this ad infinitum, this uncaused reason must be capable of creating any or all of the infinite logically possible physical realities called everythingness. Because potential physical realities can be created, there must be a reason for the existence of physical reality and the creation of any or all infinite potential physical realities. This reason must be uncaused, because the creation of any or all physical realities is contingent on this reason which leaves this reason without anything else to cause it.

Because the creation of less than everything that is logically possible is itself a logical possibility falling within everythingness, then this uncaused reason must necessarily be able to decide what to create out of the infinite possibilities for physical reality. This uncaused reason must have knowledge of all the infinite potentials for physical reality, the power to create any or all of these potentials, and a presence to control, sustain, alter or destroy any such creation. Moreover, this uncaused reason must have the greatest decision-making ability logically possible in order to be able to create up to the fullest extent of everythingness. We call this uncaused real side of the dichotomy of existence God.

II. THE FIRST CAUSE ARGUMENT
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The first cause argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that all causes and effects in the cosmos must ultimately derive from a very first cause we call God. In the cosmos, we observe that for every cause, there is an effect. We also observe that every effect is itself a cause for a subsequent effect. Like a line of falling dominos, the first falling domino causes the fall of the second domino, and the second falling domino causes the fall of the third domino. The cosmos unfolds as a series of causes and effects over time.

Because an infinite regress in time of causes and effects is impossible, there must be a very first cause of the cosmic series of causes and effects. We observe that cause and effect in the cosmos follows an order where A causes B, and B causes C, whether the intermediate cause B is only a single cause or several causes. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there is no cause A, there will be no ultimate cause C, nor any intermediate cause B. But, if an infinite regress in time of causes and effects were possible, there would not be a first cause, and so neither would there be an ultimate cause, nor any intermediate cause. Therefore, the existence of the series of causes and effects over time in the cosmos necessitates a very first cause for the beginning of the series.

The very first cause in the beginning of the cosmic series of causes and effects over time must not itself be caused. If it were caused, then regress would continue backward in time infinitely, which is impossible. Moreover, the very first cause cannot be self-created. It is impossible for a thing to cause itself, because it would have to exist prior to itself. Therefore, the very first cause must itself be uncaused. We call this uncaused first cause God.

Because God is uncaused, God cannot be made of parts. A thing that is made of parts is caused by those parts. God being uncaused cannot Himself be caused by parts. We call this principle that God is not made of parts – divine simplicity. Divine simplicity is a mystery, because we cannot imagine a thing without parts. However, because we know a very first cause is necessary for the cosmos to be created, and we know that this very first cause cannot be made of parts, we know that divine simplicity is real. An ancient classical philosophical truth known as “ex nihilo nihil fit” states that nothing comes from nothing – or that you can’t get something from nothing. Because nothingness cannot create the cosmos, an uncaused very first cause of the cosmos is necessary to which we give the name God.

III. THE FIRST ORDER ARGUMENT
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The first order argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the cosmos must have had an initial order created by an uncaused orderless cause we call God. We observe from the cosmos that everything has an order. This order is the relative position or arrangement of things in physical reality at any given moment in time. We observe that this order is caused by an antecedent order, and that this antecedent order is caused by an earlier antecedent order. Because an infinite regress in time of antecedent orders is impossible, there must be a very first order.

We observe that order in the cosmos follows a pattern where order A causes order B, and order B causes order C, whether the intermediate order B is only a single order or a series of consecutive orders. Now to take away order A is to take away order B. Therefore, if there is no order A, there will be no ultimate order C, nor any intermediate order B. But, if an infinite regress in time of consecutive orders were possible, there would not be a first order, and so neither would there be an ultimate order, nor any intermediate order. Therefore, the existence of the series of consecutive orders over time in the cosmos necessitates a very first order for the beginning of the series. This first order requires an orderless cause, because a first order cannot come from nothing. A cause without order is a cause without parts, and therefore must be uncaused because otherwise its parts would be its cause. Because all physical realities possess an order, this orderless cause cannot be any sort of physical reality. We call this uncaused orderless immaterial cause of first order God.

IV. THE BEGINNINGLESS TIME PARADOX
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The beginningless time paradox proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the beginning of time itself must have an uncaused timeless cause we call God. If time in the cosmos had no beginning, then there would be an infinity of prior moments in time before the arrival of the present moment. An infinity of prior moments of time could never be fully traversed, because there would always be a prior moment in time that had not yet been traversed because infinity is unending. If all prior moments in time are not fully traversed, then paradoxically the present moment in time could never arrive. Because the present moment in time does arrive, then time in the cosmos must have had a beginning. Because time must have had a beginning, then time must have been caused to begin from something besides nothing because nothing cannot cause anything.

The cause of the beginning of time not having time for its own cause must therefore be uncaused. Moreover, the cause of time itself cannot be something subject to time, because the existence of anything subject to time is contingent on the existence of time. The beginning of time itself cannot have a physical explanation, because all physical explanations would be subject to time. Accordingly, there must be an uncaused immaterial explanation for the beginning of time itself we call God.

V. THE BEGINNINGLESS CAUSATION PARADOX
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The beginningless causation paradox proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the beginning of causation itself must have an uncaused immaterial cause we call God. If causation in the cosmos had no beginning, then there would be an infinite regression of causation exhausting all possible causes. However, if causation were infinite, then causation could not become exhausted. Therefore, causation cannot be infinite, but must have had a beginning.

The cause of the beginning of causation not having a cause for its own beginning must therefore be uncaused. The beginning of causation itself cannot be a physical explanation, because all physical explanations would be caused. Accordingly, there must be an uncaused immaterial cause for the beginning of causation we call God.

VI. THE PRIME MOVER ARGUMENT
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The prime mover argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that all motion in the cosmos must ultimately be derived from an unmoved mover we call God. We observe that in the cosmos some things are in motion. Now whatever is moved is moved by another. Things move when potential for motion becomes actual motion. Only an actual motion can convert a potential for motion into an actual motion. Nothing can be in both potentiality and actuality in the same respect simultaneously. If both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another respect. Therefore, nothing can move itself.

Each thing in motion is moved by something else. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also needs to be moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go onto infinity, because then there would be no first mover. Without a first mover, there would be no movement at all, because all subsequent movers move only inasmuch that they are moved by the first mover. For example, the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this we call God.

VII. THE NECESSARY BEING ARGUMENT
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The necessary being argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that there must be some being we call God that exists out of His own necessity in order for contingent beings to exist in the cosmos. We observe that in the cosmos things come and go into being called contingent beings. Every being is a contingent being, because objects in the cosmos come into being and pass away. Indeed, it is possible for those objects to exist or for those objects not to exist at any given time. For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist. Therefore, it is impossible for these always to exist. Consequently, there could have been a time when no things existed.

If there were a time when no things existed, there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing contingent beings into existence. Therefore, nothing would be in existence now. Such an absurd result undermines the assumption that all beings are contingent. Therefore, not every being is a contingent being. There must be some being which exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them. We call this necessary being God.

VIII. THE ARGUMENT FROM COMPOSITE PARTS
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The argument from composite parts proves the existence of God by demonstrating that an uncaused singular non-composite we call God is necessary for the existence of all composites in the cosmos. We observe from the cosmos that all composites are caused by their parts. Causation itself is the formation of a composite from parts in physical reality. The cosmos itself is a composite made of parts consisting of each moment in time with its physical reality. We also observe that composites themselves are made of composites. However, a composite cannot be made without parts, and because more than one part is a composite, a single part which causes all composites must be real because composites cannot come from nothing. That single part which causes all composites must be an uncaused non-composite, because parts would otherwise cause it to be a composite. Because all physical reality forms a composite with spacetime, then the single uncaused non-composite cannot be any sort of physical reality. We call this single uncaused immaterial non-composite God.

IX. THE ARGUMENT FROM TIME
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The argument from time proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the existence of time requires an uncaused timeless cause we call God. Time is the creation, destruction and re-creation of physical reality at the smallest scale at relative rates. Because nothing comes from nothing, the cause of time cannot be nothing. Rather, the cause of time must have a cause outside of time. This cause of time must also remember the prior order, placement and time flow of physical reality in order to re-create physical reality at every moment in time. This cause of time not having time for its own cause must therefore be uncaused. However, the cause of time itself cannot be something subject to time, because the existence of anything subject to time is contingent on the existence of time. There are no physical explanations for the beginning of time itself, because all physical explanations would be subject to time. We call this uncaused timeless immaterial cause of time God.

X. THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
(BY WILLIAM LANE CRAIG)
The Kalam cosmological argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the cosmos had a beginning caused by a personal agent that transcends spacetime we call God. We observe from the cosmos that everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence. The cosmos began to exist. Therefore, the cosmos has a cause for its existence. The cosmos began to exist, because an actual infinite cannot exist. A beginningless temporal series of events is an actual infinite. Therefore, a beginningless temporal series of events cannot exist.

Actual infinities that neither increase or decrease in the number of members they contain would result in absurd consequences, if they were to exist in reality. For example, a library with an infinite number of books would not be reduced in size at all by the removal of a specific number of books (short of all of them). Or, before the present event could occur the event immediately prior to it would have to occur. But, before that event could occur, the event immediately prior to it would have to occur; and so on ad infinitum. One gets driven back and back into the infinite past, making it impossible for any event to occur. Thus, if the series of past events were beginningless, the present event could not have occurred, which is absurd.

The collection of historical events is formed by successively adding events, one following another. The events are not temporally simultaneous, but occur over a period of time as the series continues to acquire new members. Even if an actual infinite were possible, it could not be realized by successive addition. In adding to the series, no matter how much this is done, even to infinity, the series remains finite and only potentially infinite. One can neither count to nor traverse the infinite.

If something has a finite past, its existence has a cause. The cosmos has a finite past. Therefore, the cosmos has a cause of its existence. Because spacetime originated with the cosmos and therefore has a finite past, the cause of the existence of the cosmos must transcend spacetime. Because the cause of the cosmos’ existence transcends spacetime, no scientific explanation in terms of physical laws can provide a causal account of the origin of the cosmos. Because no scientific explanation can provide a causal account of the origin of the cosmos, then the cause must be a personal agent. If the cause were an eternal, nonpersonal, mechanically operating set of conditions, then the cosmos would exist from eternity. Because the cosmos has not existed from eternity, the cause must be a personal agent we call God who chooses freely to create an effect in time.

XI. THE ARGUMENT FROM SUFFICIENT REASON
(BY GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ)
The argument from sufficient reason proves the existence of God by demonstrating that an explanation for the existence of the cosmos is necessary, which must be a transcendent God who has within His own nature the necessity of existence. We observe from the cosmos that there must be an explanation, or sufficient reason, for anything that exists. The explanation for whatever exists must lie either in the necessity of its own nature or in a cause external to itself. A sufficient reason for the existence of the cosmos cannot be another contingent thing (and on into infinity), because to explain the existence of any contingent thing by another contingent thing lacks a sufficient reason why any contingent thing exists. The explanation of the existence of the cosmos must lie in a transcendent God, because the cosmos does not have within its own nature the necessity of existence and God does.

XII. THE ARGUMENT FROM ABDUCTION
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The argument from abduction demonstrates that something must be uncaused and the best explanation is an uncaused metaphysical reality we call God. We observe that in the cosmos something has got to be uncaused, otherwise there would be nothing. It is impossible that physical reality is uncaused. Any aspect of physical reality claimed to be uncaused can be eliminated as impossible or ultimately caused, including but not limited to infinite regress, actual infinities, self-creation, time travel, eternality in time, timelessness, and acausal physics. Therefore, the best explanation that remains is an uncaused metaphysical reality we call God.

XIII. THE ARGUMENT FROM GRADATION OF BEING
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The argument from gradation of being proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the existence of all things requires as their cause a maximum being we call God. We observe from the cosmos that there is a gradation to be found in physical reality. Some physical things are better or worse than others. Predications of degree require reference to the uttermost case. For example, a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest. The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus. Therefore, there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection. We call this God.

XIV. THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The argument from design proves the existence of God by demonstrating that non-intelligent natural things must be directed in their purposes by a supernatural intelligent being we call God. We observe from the cosmos that natural bodies work toward some goal, and do not do so by chance. Most natural things lack knowledge. But, as an arrow reaches its target because it is directed by an archer, what lacks intelligence achieves goals by being directed by something intelligent. Therefore, some intelligent being is real by whom all natural things are directed to their end. We call this intelligent being God.

[bluegreenearth]

I don't see this premise as making that distinction. Even though the fundamental particles were already in existence, the chair begins to exist. Logically, things can begin to exist in (at least) two ways: ex nihilo and as reconfigurations of more fundamental particles. This premise isn't specifying one of those two ways.

One of your objections is that we don't even know if ex nihilo beginnings can actually occur. I don't see how this is relevant to this premise. If the first premise was claiming that such beginnings do actually occur, then this would be relevant, but the first premise isn't claiming that. Or if you could prove such beginnings can't happen, then that would be relevant.

The other possible objection you may be making is that even if an ex nihilo beginning could happen, it is logically possible that causation works differently with them than with re-configuration beginnings. But, as you've rightly said, logical possibilities aren't enough. Therefore, to uphold your objection here you need to support why it is more rational to believe they would act differently in regards to causation. All of our empirical observations are that existing material does not re-configure without a cause of some kind. Why is it more rational to think that when we take the existing material away, that absolute nothingness, which has no actual characteristics at all, might be able to pop into existence without any cause of some kind? If anything, it seems that already existing material would be more likely to reconfigure without a cause then that nothing would become something without a cause because at least there is something there to be re-configured randomly.

I wasn't making any objections so much as I was asking some critical thinking questions and seeking clarification. In any case, I'm not claiming that it is more rational or less rational to believe causation works differently for ex nihilo beginnings than for reconfigured beginnings. If I was making any point at all, it was that the concept of "begins to exist" only applies to our subjective labeling of things comprised of reconfigured fundamental particles. Therefore, the "everything" referred to in the premise may not include the fundamental components of the universe. If this is the case, then premise 2 doesn't necessary follow from premise 1.

As for proving ex nihilo beginnings can't happen, I wouldn't be so bold as to make an attempt at accomplishing that task with any level of confidence. All I can do is acknowledge the logical possibility that there is no such reality where a philosophical "nothing" exists, ever existed, or ever could exist. The idea of taking away all the existing material to leave a philosophical "nothing" may only be an abstract concept that doesn't correspond to reality. In other words, to propose that nothing "existed" is to make a logically contradictory statement because a philosophical "nothing" is equivalent to non-existence. As such, it doesn't make logical sense to claim that non-existence existed. Therefore, if it is possible for ex nihilo beginnings to happen, then I have no clue how we could ever identify the cause because it would have to be something that contradicts itself by existing in non-existence for it to have caused existence to come out of non-existence. Of course, if you have a way to resolve this paradox, I'm open to considering it.

[The Tanager]

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

If I was making any point at all, it was that the concept of "begins to exist" only applies to our subjective labeling of things comprised of reconfigured fundamental particles. Therefore, the "everything" referred to in the premise may not include the fundamental components of the universe. If this is the case, then premise 2 doesn't necessary follow from premise 1.

If I understand you correctly, then I would say that the 'universe' in premise 2 includes the fundamental components of the current state of the universe should there have been any state prior to the "Big Bang". Craig, for instance, has said that Occam's Razor is in favor of no prior state currently, but responds to theories that don't assume no prior state, providing a more encompassing definition of 'universe' in this argument.

As for proving ex nihilo beginnings can't happen, I wouldn't be so bold as to make an attempt at accomplishing that task with any level of confidence. All I can do is acknowledge the logical possibility that there is no such reality where a philosophical "nothing" exists, ever existed, or ever could exist. The idea of taking away all the existing material to leave a philosophical "nothing" may only be an abstract concept that doesn't correspond to reality. In other words, to propose that nothing "existed" is to make a logically contradictory statement because a philosophical "nothing" is equivalent to non-existence. As such, it doesn't make logical sense to claim that non-existence existed. Therefore, if it is possible for ex nihilo beginnings to happen, then I have no clue how we could ever identify the cause because it would have to be something that contradicts itself by existing in non-existence for it to have caused existence to come out of non-existence. Of course, if you have a way to resolve this paradox, I'm open to considering it.

No one is saying that nothing existed. They are saying that it is possible at this point in the argument (and later that it must have been so) that nothing existed materially, but that something immaterial did exist. That concept is not logically contradictory.

[bluegreenearth]

If I understand you correctly, then I would say that the 'universe' in premise 2 includes the fundamental components of the current state of the universe should there have been any state prior to the "Big Bang". Craig, for instance, has said that Occam's Razor is in favor of no prior state currently, but responds to theories that don't assume no prior state, providing a more encompassing definition of 'universe' in this argument.

So, is Craig's argument actually attempting to identify the cause of the Big Bang rather than the cause of the universe given that the universe could have possibly existed prior to the Big Bang in some more fundamental quantum form than its current state?

No one is saying that nothing existed. They are saying that it is possible at this point in the argument (and later that it must have been so) that nothing existed materially, but that something immaterial did exist. That concept is not logically contradictory.

What is the justification for dismissing the possibility that the universe could have existed prior to the Big Bang in some more fundamental quantum form than its current state?

[The Tanager]

So, is Craig's argument actually attempting to identify the cause of the Big Bang rather than the cause of the universe given that the universe could have possibly existed prior to the Big Bang in some more fundamental quantum form than its current state?

I think it's attempting to identify the first cause, whether that is the direct cause of the Big Bang or something prior to that.

What is the justification for dismissing the possibility that the universe could have existed prior to the Big Bang in some more fundamental quantum form than its current state?

It isn't just dismissed. There are reasonings that our best science and Occam's razor points to nothing materially existing prior to the Big Bang. There are scientific reasonings against other scientific theories. There are reasonings about how there must be a beginning, even if there are prior states. There are philosophical arguments about an ultimate beginning point whether that is the Big Bang or something prior.

[bluegreenearth]

I think it's attempting to identify the first cause, whether that is the direct cause of the Big Bang or something prior to that.

If it is possible for the universe to have existed in some fundamental quantum state prior to the Big Bang, then wouldn't there only be a first cause for the Big Bang? If so, what is the justification for presuming the cause of the Big Bang could only be a personal God?

It isn't just dismissed. There are reasonings that our best science and Occam's razor points to nothing materially existing prior to the Big Bang. There are scientific reasonings against other scientific theories. There are reasonings about how there must be a beginning, even if there are prior states. There are philosophical arguments about an ultimate beginning point whether that is the Big Bang or something prior.

Yes, there are a potential infinite number of unfalsifiable explanations that could be reasonably proposed. However, I'm wondering how theists managed to rule-out all but the one unfalsifiable explanation that just happened to be consistent with their worldview when professional cosmologists and physicists who have the expertise in this area are unable to accomplish that objective. Do you have any insight there or is that privileged information?

[The Tanager]

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

If it is possible for the universe to have existed in some fundamental quantum state prior to the Big Bang, then wouldn't there only be a first cause for the Big Bang? If so, what is the justification for presuming the cause of the Big Bang could only be a personal God?

That sounds like an objection of premise 4, but I really believe a methodical look at any argument is the most productive. I think we need to come to an agreement (even if for the sake of argument) on each premise before moving on to the next. This is my summary so far:

Premise 1 is not claiming ex nihilo beginnings actually occur. Logic cannot rule them out, either. In light of that, it is more rational to think that, if ex nihilo beginnings do occur, that they would need a cause than that they could be uncaused (for reasons I gave in post 10).


2. The universe began to exist.

What is the justification for dismissing the possibility that the universe could have existed prior to the Big Bang in some more fundamental quantum form than its current state?

It isn't just dismissed. There are reasonings that our best science and Occam's razor points to nothing materially existing prior to the Big Bang. There are scientific reasonings against other scientific theories. There are reasonings about how there must be a beginning, even if there are prior states. There are philosophical arguments about an ultimate beginning point whether that is the Big Bang or something prior.

Yes, there are a potential infinite number of unfalsifiable explanations that could be reasonably proposed. However, I'm wondering how theists managed to rule-out all but the one unfalsifiable explanation that just happened to be consistent with their worldview when professional cosmologists and physicists who have the expertise in this area are unable to accomplish that objective. Do you have any insight there or is that privileged information?

Let me make sure I'm understanding your point. Ultimately, the concept 'universe' includes any spatio-temporal state. So, there isn't really a need to argue for the Big Bang being the first state. The need is to argue that space-time itself (whatever states have existed) had a beginning. If that is where your questioning is going, then I will gladly share the reasoning to get there.

[bluegreenearth]

Premise 1 is not claiming ex nihilo beginnings actually occur. Logic cannot rule them out, either. In light of that, it is more rational to think that, if ex nihilo beginnings do occur, that they would need a cause than that they could be uncaused (for reasons I gave in post 10).

I've been thinking again about whether logic cannot rule out ex nihilo beginnings. I'll concede on the outset that I'm not entirely confident in the following analysis but must keep it on the table unless there is a justification to rule it out:

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy indicates that classical logic "consists of a formal or informal language together with a deductive system and/or a model-theoretic semantics. The language has components that correspond to a part of a natural language like English or Greek. The deductive system is to capture, codify, or simply record arguments that are valid for the given language, and the semantics is to capture, codify, or record the meanings, or truth-conditions for at least part of the language." So, logic is the language used to describe what we have deduced to be true. For instance, we have consistently observed that something is always identical with itself (Law of Identity), that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time (Law of Non-Contradiction), and that any given proposition is either true or its negation is true (Law of Excluded Middle). So, a thing that began to exist ex nihilo from a cause other than itself requires another thing (whether material or immaterial) to exist intra nihilo for it to have served as the cause. However, the concept of nihilo necessarily and literally means "no thing," and it would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction for a thing (material or immaterial) to exist where "no thing" exists. Meanwhile, if a thing caused itself to begin existing, it couldn't have begun to exist ex nihilo either because that would require it to have previously existed intra nihilo as the necessary cause and violate the Law of Non-Contradiction for existing before it existed and for being a thing that existed where "no thing" exists. Even an uncaused thing cannot begin to exist ex nihilo or in any other context because the concept of "cause" is inherent to the concept of "begin," and that would seem to violate the Law of Identity.

Once again, I do not claim to be an expert in logic and suspect my analysis has fundamental flaws in it. So, by all means, I welcome your constructive feedback.

Let me make sure I'm understanding your point. Ultimately, the concept 'universe' includes any spatio-temporal state. So, there isn't really a need to argue for the Big Bang being the first state. The need is to argue that space-time itself (whatever states have existed) had a beginning. If that is where your questioning is going, then I will gladly share the reasoning to get there.

We already know with a high degree of confidence that the space-time in our universe began at the moment of the Big Bang. If there was space-time that existed prior to the Big Bang (whether it continues to exist outside our universe or not), it became obsolete the moment the space-time of our universe emerged. However, it is my understanding that the possible fundamental quantum state which could have theoretically existed just prior to the Big Bang did not require the existence of a space-time for itself to exist. As such, that possible fundamental quantum state would not need a beginning.

[The Tanager]

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

So, logic is the language used to describe what we have deduced to be true. For instance, we have consistently observed that something is always identical with itself (Law of Identity), that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time (Law of Non-Contradiction), and that any given proposition is either true or its negation is true (Law of Excluded Middle).

Are you saying these laws arose from physical observations? These laws are required to make sense out of our observations; the logic is prior and necessary to observation. They are the fundamental principles by which thought can occur.

So, a thing that began to exist ex nihilo from a cause other than itself requires another thing (whether material or immaterial) to exist intra nihilo for it to have served as the cause. However, the concept of nihilo necessarily and literally means "no thing," and it would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction for a thing (material or immaterial) to exist where "no thing" exists.

The phrase ex nihilo, as historically used, is an alternative to matter being eternal. It refers to material beginning to exist at some point, where material did not exist 'before'. It does not mean that no thing, material or immaterial, existed at that moment; the nihilo is specific, not all-encompassing. There is no logical contradiction here.

So, I would continue to say that it is more rational to think that, if ex nihilo beginnings do occur, that they would also need a cause than that they would be uncaused. Therefore, I think premise 1 should be accepted as true.


2. The universe began to exist.

We already know with a high degree of confidence that the space-time in our universe began at the moment of the Big Bang. If there was space-time that existed prior to the Big Bang (whether it continues to exist outside our universe or not), it became obsolete the moment the space-time of our universe emerged. However, it is my understanding that the possible fundamental quantum state which could have theoretically existed just prior to the Big Bang did not require the existence of a space-time for itself to exist. As such, that possible fundamental quantum state would not need a beginning.

Are you saying that the quantum state may be immaterial and timeless? or a different kind of matter and time than our universe? Something else?

[bluegreenearth]

Are you saying these laws arose from physical observations? These laws are required to make sense out of our observations; the logic is prior and necessary to observation. They are the fundamental principles by which thought can occur.

I'm not a professional philosopher or logician, but the vast majority who are experts in this field define Logic as a type of language. No language is ever prescriptive of anything but describes what has been defined or deduced to be true about the reality we observe. Reality is the only thing that is prescriptive. So, when I describe the object outside my window as a "tree," it is not like that precise object wouldn't be what it is in reality if I didn't have the label "tree" or a different label like "oak" to describe it. The same is true for the Laws of Logic. The properties and principles described by the language of logic would still be what they are in reality regardless of the language we use to describe them. Reality precedes the language of logic that describes observations of it.

The phrase ex nihilo, as historically used, is an alternative to matter being eternal. It refers to material beginning to exist at some point, where material did not exist 'before'. It does not mean that no thing, material or immaterial, existed at that moment; the nihilo is specific, not all-encompassing. There is no logical contradiction here.

So, I would continue to say that it is more rational to think that, if ex nihilo beginnings do occur, that they would also need a cause than that they would be uncaused. Therefore, I think premise 1 should be accepted as true.

I'm willing to accept that premise 1 is reasonably true regardless of whether ex nihilo beginnings are logically possible or not. It is just an interesting question to ponder. However, I would still like to know the justification for believing some immaterial "thing" could exist prior the existence of a material thing when we have no example of such a thing unless we classify a fundamental quantum field as an immaterial thing. My understanding is that a fundamental quantum field would be classified as a material thing, but I could very easily be wrong about that. Would you classifying a fundamental quantum field as a material thing or an immaterial thing? If a fundamental quantum field is a material thing, then there is no reason to worry about ex nihilo beginnings in that scenario because it wouldn't be necessary. If the fundamental quantum field that theoretically existed prior to the Big Bang is considered to be immaterial, then we can claim a material thing emerged from an immaterial thing.

Are you saying that the quantum state may be immaterial and timeless? or a different kind of matter and time than our universe? Something else?

As previously indicated, I tend to think it would be a material thing. However, I'm not aware of anything in quantum physics that claims it couldn't be immaterial and timeless or a different kind of matter and time than our universe.

[The Tanager]

I'm not a professional philosopher or logician, but the vast majority who are experts in this field define Logic as a type of language. No language is ever prescriptive of anything but describes what has been defined or deduced to be true about the reality we observe. Reality is the only thing that is prescriptive.

I don't think the vast majority of experts say logic is just a type of language. They say there is a language of logic. Logic is prescriptive, while the language of logic is descriptive of that reality. The language of logic concerns observations that aren't physical observations.


1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

I'm willing to accept that premise 1 is reasonably true regardless of whether ex nihilo beginnings are logically possible or not. It is just an interesting question to ponder. However, I would still like to know the justification for believing some immaterial "thing" could exist prior the existence of a material thing when we have no example of such a thing unless we classify a fundamental quantum field as an immaterial thing.

We don't need an example of such a thing prior to an argument for its existence. Either the argument shows it's probable existence or it doesn't. We didn't need an example of an electron existing prior to the experiments scientists use to argue for the existence of the electron. An argument like Craig's is the argument for the existence of an immaterial being (premise 4 carries that weight and we'll get to it). Are you expecting physical evidence of an immaterial being?


2. The universe began to exist.

My understanding is that a fundamental quantum field would be classified as a material thing, but I could very easily be wrong about that. Would you classifying a fundamental quantum field as a material thing or an immaterial thing?

That is my understanding as well. I know of no one claiming the quantum field is immaterial or timeless.

If a fundamental quantum field is a material thing, then there is no reason to worry about ex nihilo beginnings in that scenario because it wouldn't be necessary. If the fundamental quantum field that theoretically existed prior to the Big Bang is considered to be immaterial, then we can claim a material thing emerged from an immaterial thing.

Craig's formulation, as I understand it, is not primarily about a cause of the Big Bang, but of matter itself. Assume a quantum field actually existed prior to the Big Bang and the argument still goes through the same.