The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

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The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

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THE FOURTEEN COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

By John J. Bannan (5/24/2020)

“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” Genesis 1:1. God is the creator of the cosmos. The cosmological arguments prove the existence of God by demonstrating the necessity of a Creator for the cosmos. The cosmological arguments offer good reason through circumstantial evidence taken from the nature of the cosmos itself to believe in God. The following is a listing and explanation of all the known cosmological arguments for the existence of God:

I. THE DICHOTOMY OF EXISTENCE
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The dichotomy of existence proves the existence of God by demonstrating the necessity of an uncaused Creator with the power to create any or all of the infinite potentials for physical reality to the fullest extent logically possible under everythingness. In terms of the uncaused, there are only two possibilities. The first is the uncaused reason for the existence of all physical reality. The second is the uncaused absence of any reality called absolute nothingness. These two are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of all logical possibilities forming an abstract metaphysical dichotomy of existence. Because each side of the dichotomy is uncaused, there can be no cause for either of the two being real. Rather, one side is real and the other is not real without reason or necessity. Moreover, an uncaused thing does not have parts, because it would otherwise be caused by those parts. Because an uncaused thing does not have parts, an uncaused thing cannot be destroyed because destruction demands the disassociation of parts. As a result, the side of the dichotomy that is real can never be destroyed, and the other side that is not real can never become real.

Because physical reality can differ in the most minute way logically possible from another potential physical reality, there is no good reason to believe that the uncaused reason for the existence of all physical reality could not also create that potential physical reality. Because this uncaused reason can create this potential physical reality, then it can also create another potential physical reality differing from the former potential physical reality in the most minute way logically possible. Repeating this ad infinitum, this uncaused reason must be capable of creating any or all of the infinite logically possible physical realities called everythingness. Because potential physical realities can be created, there must be a reason for the existence of physical reality and the creation of any or all infinite potential physical realities. This reason must be uncaused, because the creation of any or all physical realities is contingent on this reason which leaves this reason without anything else to cause it.

Because the creation of less than everything that is logically possible is itself a logical possibility falling within everythingness, then this uncaused reason must necessarily be able to decide what to create out of the infinite possibilities for physical reality. This uncaused reason must have knowledge of all the infinite potentials for physical reality, the power to create any or all of these potentials, and a presence to control, sustain, alter or destroy any such creation. Moreover, this uncaused reason must have the greatest decision-making ability logically possible in order to be able to create up to the fullest extent of everythingness. We call this uncaused real side of the dichotomy of existence God.

II. THE FIRST CAUSE ARGUMENT
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The first cause argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that all causes and effects in the cosmos must ultimately derive from a very first cause we call God. In the cosmos, we observe that for every cause, there is an effect. We also observe that every effect is itself a cause for a subsequent effect. Like a line of falling dominos, the first falling domino causes the fall of the second domino, and the second falling domino causes the fall of the third domino. The cosmos unfolds as a series of causes and effects over time.

Because an infinite regress in time of causes and effects is impossible, there must be a very first cause of the cosmic series of causes and effects. We observe that cause and effect in the cosmos follows an order where A causes B, and B causes C, whether the intermediate cause B is only a single cause or several causes. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there is no cause A, there will be no ultimate cause C, nor any intermediate cause B. But, if an infinite regress in time of causes and effects were possible, there would not be a first cause, and so neither would there be an ultimate cause, nor any intermediate cause. Therefore, the existence of the series of causes and effects over time in the cosmos necessitates a very first cause for the beginning of the series.

The very first cause in the beginning of the cosmic series of causes and effects over time must not itself be caused. If it were caused, then regress would continue backward in time infinitely, which is impossible. Moreover, the very first cause cannot be self-created. It is impossible for a thing to cause itself, because it would have to exist prior to itself. Therefore, the very first cause must itself be uncaused. We call this uncaused first cause God.

Because God is uncaused, God cannot be made of parts. A thing that is made of parts is caused by those parts. God being uncaused cannot Himself be caused by parts. We call this principle that God is not made of parts – divine simplicity. Divine simplicity is a mystery, because we cannot imagine a thing without parts. However, because we know a very first cause is necessary for the cosmos to be created, and we know that this very first cause cannot be made of parts, we know that divine simplicity is real. An ancient classical philosophical truth known as “ex nihilo nihil fit” states that nothing comes from nothing – or that you can’t get something from nothing. Because nothingness cannot create the cosmos, an uncaused very first cause of the cosmos is necessary to which we give the name God.

III. THE FIRST ORDER ARGUMENT
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The first order argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the cosmos must have had an initial order created by an uncaused orderless cause we call God. We observe from the cosmos that everything has an order. This order is the relative position or arrangement of things in physical reality at any given moment in time. We observe that this order is caused by an antecedent order, and that this antecedent order is caused by an earlier antecedent order. Because an infinite regress in time of antecedent orders is impossible, there must be a very first order.

We observe that order in the cosmos follows a pattern where order A causes order B, and order B causes order C, whether the intermediate order B is only a single order or a series of consecutive orders. Now to take away order A is to take away order B. Therefore, if there is no order A, there will be no ultimate order C, nor any intermediate order B. But, if an infinite regress in time of consecutive orders were possible, there would not be a first order, and so neither would there be an ultimate order, nor any intermediate order. Therefore, the existence of the series of consecutive orders over time in the cosmos necessitates a very first order for the beginning of the series. This first order requires an orderless cause, because a first order cannot come from nothing. A cause without order is a cause without parts, and therefore must be uncaused because otherwise its parts would be its cause. Because all physical realities possess an order, this orderless cause cannot be any sort of physical reality. We call this uncaused orderless immaterial cause of first order God.

IV. THE BEGINNINGLESS TIME PARADOX
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The beginningless time paradox proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the beginning of time itself must have an uncaused timeless cause we call God. If time in the cosmos had no beginning, then there would be an infinity of prior moments in time before the arrival of the present moment. An infinity of prior moments of time could never be fully traversed, because there would always be a prior moment in time that had not yet been traversed because infinity is unending. If all prior moments in time are not fully traversed, then paradoxically the present moment in time could never arrive. Because the present moment in time does arrive, then time in the cosmos must have had a beginning. Because time must have had a beginning, then time must have been caused to begin from something besides nothing because nothing cannot cause anything.

The cause of the beginning of time not having time for its own cause must therefore be uncaused. Moreover, the cause of time itself cannot be something subject to time, because the existence of anything subject to time is contingent on the existence of time. The beginning of time itself cannot have a physical explanation, because all physical explanations would be subject to time. Accordingly, there must be an uncaused immaterial explanation for the beginning of time itself we call God.

V. THE BEGINNINGLESS CAUSATION PARADOX
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The beginningless causation paradox proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the beginning of causation itself must have an uncaused immaterial cause we call God. If causation in the cosmos had no beginning, then there would be an infinite regression of causation exhausting all possible causes. However, if causation were infinite, then causation could not become exhausted. Therefore, causation cannot be infinite, but must have had a beginning.

The cause of the beginning of causation not having a cause for its own beginning must therefore be uncaused. The beginning of causation itself cannot be a physical explanation, because all physical explanations would be caused. Accordingly, there must be an uncaused immaterial cause for the beginning of causation we call God.

VI. THE PRIME MOVER ARGUMENT
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The prime mover argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that all motion in the cosmos must ultimately be derived from an unmoved mover we call God. We observe that in the cosmos some things are in motion. Now whatever is moved is moved by another. Things move when potential for motion becomes actual motion. Only an actual motion can convert a potential for motion into an actual motion. Nothing can be in both potentiality and actuality in the same respect simultaneously. If both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another respect. Therefore, nothing can move itself.

Each thing in motion is moved by something else. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also needs to be moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go onto infinity, because then there would be no first mover. Without a first mover, there would be no movement at all, because all subsequent movers move only inasmuch that they are moved by the first mover. For example, the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this we call God.

VII. THE NECESSARY BEING ARGUMENT
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The necessary being argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that there must be some being we call God that exists out of His own necessity in order for contingent beings to exist in the cosmos. We observe that in the cosmos things come and go into being called contingent beings. Every being is a contingent being, because objects in the cosmos come into being and pass away. Indeed, it is possible for those objects to exist or for those objects not to exist at any given time. For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist. Therefore, it is impossible for these always to exist. Consequently, there could have been a time when no things existed.

If there were a time when no things existed, there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing contingent beings into existence. Therefore, nothing would be in existence now. Such an absurd result undermines the assumption that all beings are contingent. Therefore, not every being is a contingent being. There must be some being which exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them. We call this necessary being God.

VIII. THE ARGUMENT FROM COMPOSITE PARTS
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The argument from composite parts proves the existence of God by demonstrating that an uncaused singular non-composite we call God is necessary for the existence of all composites in the cosmos. We observe from the cosmos that all composites are caused by their parts. Causation itself is the formation of a composite from parts in physical reality. The cosmos itself is a composite made of parts consisting of each moment in time with its physical reality. We also observe that composites themselves are made of composites. However, a composite cannot be made without parts, and because more than one part is a composite, a single part which causes all composites must be real because composites cannot come from nothing. That single part which causes all composites must be an uncaused non-composite, because parts would otherwise cause it to be a composite. Because all physical reality forms a composite with spacetime, then the single uncaused non-composite cannot be any sort of physical reality. We call this single uncaused immaterial non-composite God.

IX. THE ARGUMENT FROM TIME
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The argument from time proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the existence of time requires an uncaused timeless cause we call God. Time is the creation, destruction and re-creation of physical reality at the smallest scale at relative rates. Because nothing comes from nothing, the cause of time cannot be nothing. Rather, the cause of time must have a cause outside of time. This cause of time must also remember the prior order, placement and time flow of physical reality in order to re-create physical reality at every moment in time. This cause of time not having time for its own cause must therefore be uncaused. However, the cause of time itself cannot be something subject to time, because the existence of anything subject to time is contingent on the existence of time. There are no physical explanations for the beginning of time itself, because all physical explanations would be subject to time. We call this uncaused timeless immaterial cause of time God.

X. THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
(BY WILLIAM LANE CRAIG)
The Kalam cosmological argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the cosmos had a beginning caused by a personal agent that transcends spacetime we call God. We observe from the cosmos that everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence. The cosmos began to exist. Therefore, the cosmos has a cause for its existence. The cosmos began to exist, because an actual infinite cannot exist. A beginningless temporal series of events is an actual infinite. Therefore, a beginningless temporal series of events cannot exist.

Actual infinities that neither increase or decrease in the number of members they contain would result in absurd consequences, if they were to exist in reality. For example, a library with an infinite number of books would not be reduced in size at all by the removal of a specific number of books (short of all of them). Or, before the present event could occur the event immediately prior to it would have to occur. But, before that event could occur, the event immediately prior to it would have to occur; and so on ad infinitum. One gets driven back and back into the infinite past, making it impossible for any event to occur. Thus, if the series of past events were beginningless, the present event could not have occurred, which is absurd.

The collection of historical events is formed by successively adding events, one following another. The events are not temporally simultaneous, but occur over a period of time as the series continues to acquire new members. Even if an actual infinite were possible, it could not be realized by successive addition. In adding to the series, no matter how much this is done, even to infinity, the series remains finite and only potentially infinite. One can neither count to nor traverse the infinite.

If something has a finite past, its existence has a cause. The cosmos has a finite past. Therefore, the cosmos has a cause of its existence. Because spacetime originated with the cosmos and therefore has a finite past, the cause of the existence of the cosmos must transcend spacetime. Because the cause of the cosmos’ existence transcends spacetime, no scientific explanation in terms of physical laws can provide a causal account of the origin of the cosmos. Because no scientific explanation can provide a causal account of the origin of the cosmos, then the cause must be a personal agent. If the cause were an eternal, nonpersonal, mechanically operating set of conditions, then the cosmos would exist from eternity. Because the cosmos has not existed from eternity, the cause must be a personal agent we call God who chooses freely to create an effect in time.

XI. THE ARGUMENT FROM SUFFICIENT REASON
(BY GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ)
The argument from sufficient reason proves the existence of God by demonstrating that an explanation for the existence of the cosmos is necessary, which must be a transcendent God who has within His own nature the necessity of existence. We observe from the cosmos that there must be an explanation, or sufficient reason, for anything that exists. The explanation for whatever exists must lie either in the necessity of its own nature or in a cause external to itself. A sufficient reason for the existence of the cosmos cannot be another contingent thing (and on into infinity), because to explain the existence of any contingent thing by another contingent thing lacks a sufficient reason why any contingent thing exists. The explanation of the existence of the cosmos must lie in a transcendent God, because the cosmos does not have within its own nature the necessity of existence and God does.

XII. THE ARGUMENT FROM ABDUCTION
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The argument from abduction demonstrates that something must be uncaused and the best explanation is an uncaused metaphysical reality we call God. We observe that in the cosmos something has got to be uncaused, otherwise there would be nothing. It is impossible that physical reality is uncaused. Any aspect of physical reality claimed to be uncaused can be eliminated as impossible or ultimately caused, including but not limited to infinite regress, actual infinities, self-creation, time travel, eternality in time, timelessness, and acausal physics. Therefore, the best explanation that remains is an uncaused metaphysical reality we call God.

XIII. THE ARGUMENT FROM GRADATION OF BEING
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The argument from gradation of being proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the existence of all things requires as their cause a maximum being we call God. We observe from the cosmos that there is a gradation to be found in physical reality. Some physical things are better or worse than others. Predications of degree require reference to the uttermost case. For example, a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest. The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus. Therefore, there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection. We call this God.

XIV. THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The argument from design proves the existence of God by demonstrating that non-intelligent natural things must be directed in their purposes by a supernatural intelligent being we call God. We observe from the cosmos that natural bodies work toward some goal, and do not do so by chance. Most natural things lack knowledge. But, as an arrow reaches its target because it is directed by an archer, what lacks intelligence achieves goals by being directed by something intelligent. Therefore, some intelligent being is real by whom all natural things are directed to their end. We call this intelligent being God.

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

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Post by The Tanager »

Argument 1: Scientific or Personal Explanations
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmRegardless, science is the method those disciplines use to acquire knowledge.
Yes, knowledge of the natural world.
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmI'm not particularly concerned with how the non-spatio-temporal quantum state explanation is classified as long as it is logically possible.
But the argument we are discussing does not claim that a third kind of explanation is logically impossible. It's abductive, looking at which theory makes the most sense, given the evidences.
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmIf logic is not time-dependent, then the law of non-contradiction would not apply because something that does not exist in one moment and then begins to exist in the next moment would both exist and not exist when observed from a timeless state.
No it wouldn't. A timeless existence does not mean having no knowledge of temporal relations; it's about how a being experiences objects. It doesn't experience a passing of time, but could still know how things are temporally related to each other.


Argument 2: Abstract Object or Unembodied Mind
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pm
Why do you think abstract objects cannot exist outside the mind?
It is true by definition. Abstract objects are defined as things that only exist as ideas inside the minds of sentient beings.
Then why this definition? Plato would be defeated by merely defining things in a certain way to ensure victory. Now, I'm not a Platonist, but I don't think this is the way to do things.
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmUntil abstract objects can be demonstrated to exist outside the mind, what would be a justified reason to believe they can?
I'm with you here. But you are arguing for a third category based on abstract objects not existing outside of the mind by defining things that way. That seems to beg the question. Why is the quantum state a non-abstract object rather than an abstract object that exists outside of a mind? Because you define the latter out of the equation?


Argument 3: Eternal cause/Temporal effect

P1. If the changeless cause can account for a first temporal effect (i.e., the universe), then it must do so through agent causation.
P2. The non-spatio-temporal quantum state does not account for the universe through agent causation.
C. Therefore, the non-spatio-temporal quantum state is not the changeless cause of the universe.

bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmWhat is the justification for presuming a changeless cause must be an agent?
Here is the one paragraph summary from post 43:

Only personal, free agency can account for a first temporal effect from a changeless cause. If the necessary and sufficient conditions for the production of the effect are eternal, then the effect would be eternal. How can all the causal conditions sufficient for the production of the effect be changelessly existent and yet the effect not also be existent along with the cause. How could the cause exist without the effect? The best way out of this dilemma is agent causation. In this, the agent freely brings about some event in the absence of prior determining conditions, initiating new effects by choice. In agent causation, the agent-cause could be eternal and the effect temporal.
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmWhat is the justification for presuming a non-spatio-temporal quantum state cannot cause the universe?
That's where I talked about such a thing seeming logically possible (although it seems more of a stretch that a non-conscious, non-material object could affect material objects), but having nothing beyond that to commend it (post 45). It seems to work off of one (of various) possible interpretations of quantum physics (which I don't think is the strongest interpretation) to be true and then to assume that the same thing takes place in immaterial, non-conscious states.
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmThe problem is that both an unembodied mind and a non-spatio-temporal quantum state both serve as explanations for the universe because they both claim to fit the evidence.
But are they equal explanations? I'm not sure where you stand on the mind, but I think it more rational to believe that our immaterial minds affect matter (e.g., I can move my arm with my mind). I can understand one saying minds are nothing more than our brains and then concluding here that an unembodied mind doesn't make sense. But there are many people who believe, for well-thought out reasons, that minds are immaterial. So, even if you think the mind is material, the case for the existence of immaterial minds far exceeds any evidence or case for a non-spatio-temporal, unconscious state.
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmIn this case, I mean "faith" is the act of placing unjustified trust in one unfalsifiable logical explanation over any other equally unfalsfiable logical explanation for some arbitrary or biased reason.
I have a problem with such a "faith" position. I don't think this argument employs such "faith" in its reasoning.
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmThe problem with purely philosophical arguments is that they can never demonstrate the existence of anything in reality. Therefore, it is a category error to presume a philosophical argument is sufficient to demonstrate the "real" cause of the universe.
What can demonstrate the existence of anything in reality? Science?

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

Post #52

Post by bluegreenearth »

The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pm Argument 1: Scientific or Personal Explanations
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmRegardless, science is the method those disciplines use to acquire knowledge.
Yes, knowledge of the natural world.
I'm not understanding the justification for believing the proposed dichotomy of the explanation having to be scientific or personal. If a logically possible non-spatio-temporal quantum state does not satisfy the criteria for being labeled as a scientific explanation or a personal explanation, then wouldn't it have to be a third type of explanation?
The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmI'm not particularly concerned with how the non-spatio-temporal quantum state explanation is classified as long as it is logically possible.
But the argument we are discussing does not claim that a third kind of explanation is logically impossible. It's abductive, looking at which theory makes the most sense, given the evidences.
If I'm remembering correctly, you already agreed that there is nothing logically impossible about a non-spatio-temporal quantum state. Therefore, wouldn't the argument we are discussing be insufficient if it is unable to account for a logically possible non-spatio-temporal quantum state?
The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmIf logic is not time-dependent, then the law of non-contradiction would not apply because something that does not exist in one moment and then begins to exist in the next moment would both exist and not exist when observed from a timeless state.
No it wouldn't. A timeless existence does not mean having no knowledge of temporal relations; it's about how a being experiences objects. It doesn't experience a passing of time, but could still know how things are temporally related to each other.
If it doesn't experience the passage of time, then how does it experience anything when the concept of experience entails the passage of time? Otherwise, the concept of experiencing something in no time is illogical to me.
The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pm Argument 2: Abstract Object or Unembodied Mind
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pm
Why do you think abstract objects cannot exist outside the mind?
It is true by definition. Abstract objects are defined as things that only exist as ideas inside the minds of sentient beings.
Then why this definition? Plato would be defeated by merely defining things in a certain way to ensure victory. Now, I'm not a Platonist, but I don't think this is the way to do things.
It is not an arbitrary definition because it describes the reality of how we experience abstract objects. We only ever experience abstract objects as mental concepts produced by our brains.
The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmUntil abstract objects can be demonstrated to exist outside the mind, what would be a justified reason to believe they can?
I'm with you here. But you are arguing for a third category based on abstract objects not existing outside of the mind by defining things that way. That seems to beg the question. Why is the quantum state a non-abstract object rather than an abstract object that exists outside of a mind? Because you define the latter out of the equation?
Because we don't observe abstract objects existing as anything other than mental concepts produced by our brains, what is the justification for presuming an abstract object can exist in our external reality? Meanwhile, we know that various quantum states have been demonstrated to exist in our external space-time reality. Is there a logical reason to presume a quantum state could not also exist in the absence of space and time?
The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pmArgument 3: Eternal cause/Temporal effect

P1. If the changeless cause can account for a first temporal effect (i.e., the universe), then it must do so through agent causation.
P2. The non-spatio-temporal quantum state does not account for the universe through agent causation.
C. Therefore, the non-spatio-temporal quantum state is not the changeless cause of the universe.

bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmWhat is the justification for presuming a changeless cause must be an agent?
Here is the one paragraph summary from post 43:

Only personal, free agency can account for a first temporal effect from a changeless cause. If the necessary and sufficient conditions for the production of the effect are eternal, then the effect would be eternal. How can all the causal conditions sufficient for the production of the effect be changelessly existent and yet the effect not also be existent along with the cause. How could the cause exist without the effect? The best way out of this dilemma is agent causation. In this, the agent freely brings about some event in the absence of prior determining conditions, initiating new effects by choice. In agent causation, the agent-cause could be eternal and the effect temporal.
How is a fluctuation in the non-spatio-temporal quantum state not logically possible as a cause?
The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmWhat is the justification for presuming a non-spatio-temporal quantum state cannot cause the universe?
That's where I talked about such a thing seeming logically possible (although it seems more of a stretch that a non-conscious, non-material object could affect material objects), but having nothing beyond that to commend it (post 45). It seems to work off of one (of various) possible interpretations of quantum physics (which I don't think is the strongest interpretation) to be true and then to assume that the same thing takes place in immaterial, non-conscious states.
An unembodied mind existing outside of space-time is equally speculative.
The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmThe problem is that both an unembodied mind and a non-spatio-temporal quantum state both serve as explanations for the universe because they both claim to fit the evidence.
But are they equal explanations? I'm not sure where you stand on the mind, but I think it more rational to believe that our immaterial minds affect matter (e.g., I can move my arm with my mind). I can understand one saying minds are nothing more than our brains and then concluding here that an unembodied mind doesn't make sense. But there are many people who believe, for well-thought out reasons, that minds are immaterial. So, even if you think the mind is material, the case for the existence of immaterial minds far exceeds any evidence or case for a non-spatio-temporal, unconscious state.
Yes, they are equally speculative explanations.
The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmIn this case, I mean "faith" is the act of placing unjustified trust in one unfalsifiable logical explanation over any other equally unfalsfiable logical explanation for some arbitrary or biased reason.
I have a problem with such a "faith" position. I don't think this argument employs such "faith" in its reasoning.
Then what do you label the faith it is employing?
The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 4:31 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Aug 17, 2020 4:05 pmThe problem with purely philosophical arguments is that they can never demonstrate the existence of anything in reality. Therefore, it is a category error to presume a philosophical argument is sufficient to demonstrate the "real" cause of the universe.
What can demonstrate the existence of anything in reality? Science?
Ignoring the possibility of solipsism for the moment, what would be more reliable than the scientific method in consistently demonstrating the existence of things in our perceived external empirical reality?

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

Post #53

Post by The Tanager »

Argument 1: Scientific or Personal Explanations
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmI'm not understanding the justification for believing the proposed dichotomy of the explanation having to be scientific or personal. If a logically possible non-spatio-temporal quantum state does not satisfy the criteria for being labeled as a scientific explanation or a personal explanation, then wouldn't it have to be a third type of explanation?
The justification is that all evidence points to those two types of explanation and no others, as far as I know. Sure, there could be a third one. It is pure speculation right now that such a third type of explanation exists. The non-spatio-temporal quantum state requires a third type of explanation to exist. Those are big ifs. The God answer has a leg up here because we already have good reasons to believe personal kinds of explanations exist.
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmIf I'm remembering correctly, you already agreed that there is nothing logically impossible about a non-spatio-temporal quantum state. Therefore, wouldn't the argument we are discussing be insufficient if it is unable to account for a logically possible non-spatio-temporal quantum state?
I don't think that follows. Abductive arguments do not have to disprove all other logically possible explanations before being rational. If that was the case, then where would science and any knowledge outside pure mathematics be?
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmIf it doesn't experience the passage of time, then how does it experience anything when the concept of experience entails the passage of time? Otherwise, the concept of experiencing something in no time is illogical to me.
The concept of experience does not entail the passage of time. That's begging the question against timelessness.


Argument 2: Abstract Object or Unembodied Mind
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmIt is not an arbitrary definition because it describes the reality of how we experience abstract objects. We only ever experience abstract objects as mental concepts produced by our brains.
That's begging the question. Platonists disagree and offer reasons to go against our common experience. Again, I agree with you, but I don't get there through defining words a particular way.
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmBecause we don't observe abstract objects existing as anything other than mental concepts produced by our brains, what is the justification for presuming an abstract object can exist in our external reality? Meanwhile, we know that various quantum states have been demonstrated to exist in our external space-time reality. Is there a logical reason to presume a quantum state could not also exist in the absence of space and time?
This non-spatio-temporal quantum state is being defined to go with are experience of reality at times and to go directly against it at other times in order to fit the arguments offered. If I was arguing that such an explanation was illogical that would be fine. I'm not, though.


Argument 3: Eternal cause/Temporal effect

P1. It is most plausibly true that if the changeless cause can account for a first temporal effect (i.e., the universe), then it does so through agent causation.
P2. The non-spatio-temporal quantum state does not account for the universe through agent causation.
C. Therefore, it is most plausibly true that the non-spatio-temporal quantum state is not the changeless cause of the universe.

bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmHow is a fluctuation in the non-spatio-temporal quantum state not logically possible as a cause?
I rephrased the premises above to better reflect my thought, although I'm sure I could do so better.
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pm
But are they equal explanations? I'm not sure where you stand on the mind, but I think it more rational to believe that our immaterial minds affect matter (e.g., I can move my arm with my mind). I can understand one saying minds are nothing more than our brains and then concluding here that an unembodied mind doesn't make sense. But there are many people who believe, for well-thought out reasons, that minds are immaterial. So, even if you think the mind is material, the case for the existence of immaterial minds far exceeds any evidence or case for a non-spatio-temporal, unconscious state.
Yes, they are equally speculative explanations.
Any reasons that go against what I said in support of them not being equally speculative or that go towards support of your claim?
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmThen what do you label the faith it is employing?
To me faith is something like trusting in someone or something in something unknown because you have good previous reasons to do. So, I'm not sure it makes sense to say one has this kind of faith an argument. Either one thinks an argument has good support for it or not.
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmIgnoring the possibility of solipsism for the moment, what would be more reliable than the scientific method in consistently demonstrating the existence of things in our perceived external empirical reality?
I certainly think science is reliable in giving us truth of reality. And I don't think it's just by ignoring the alternative possibilities. I think this is more reasonable than the alternatives, philosophically speaking. My point is that science depends on prior philosophical positions to be truly reliable. If we throw out philosophical arguments, we throw out everything else. That doesn't mean I'm saying these arguments are certain; they are not. Nothing is certain. I'm not saying these arguments are more certain than that I'm actually typing these words on a computer. I do think this argument, as far as I can tell now, is the best explanation (and a good one) of the data we are considering, though.

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

Post #54

Post by bluegreenearth »

The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 19, 2020 9:10 pm Argument 1: Scientific or Personal Explanations
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmI'm not understanding the justification for believing the proposed dichotomy of the explanation having to be scientific or personal. If a logically possible non-spatio-temporal quantum state does not satisfy the criteria for being labeled as a scientific explanation or a personal explanation, then wouldn't it have to be a third type of explanation?
The justification is that all evidence points to those two types of explanation and no others, as far as I know. Sure, there could be a third one. It is pure speculation right now that such a third type of explanation exists. The non-spatio-temporal quantum state requires a third type of explanation to exist. Those are big ifs. The God answer has a leg up here because we already have good reasons to believe personal kinds of explanations exist.
A personal explanation requires the existence of a person. I'm unaware of anyone having demonstrated that a person can exist as a non-spatio-temporal agent. Therefore, the God answer cannot be one of the two explanations either and is arguably another third or fourth type of explanation just like the non-spatio-temporal quantum state.
The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 19, 2020 9:10 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmIf I'm remembering correctly, you already agreed that there is nothing logically impossible about a non-spatio-temporal quantum state. Therefore, wouldn't the argument we are discussing be insufficient if it is unable to account for a logically possible non-spatio-temporal quantum state?
I don't think that follows. Abductive arguments do not have to disprove all other logically possible explanations before being rational. If that was the case, then where would science and any knowledge outside pure mathematics be?
I apologize for giving you that impression because my intent was to ask you how to proceed given the logical possibility of a non-spatio-temporal quantum state. So, how do you proceed?
The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 19, 2020 9:10 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmIf it doesn't experience the passage of time, then how does it experience anything when the concept of experience entails the passage of time? Otherwise, the concept of experiencing something in no time is illogical to me.
The concept of experience does not entail the passage of time. That's begging the question against timelessness.
I don't understand how experience doesn't entail the passage of time or how that is begging the question. Please demonstrate an experience that doesn't require the passage of time to support your claim.
The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 19, 2020 9:10 pmArgument 2: Abstract Object or Unembodied Mind
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmIt is not an arbitrary definition because it describes the reality of how we experience abstract objects. We only ever experience abstract objects as mental concepts produced by our brains.
That's begging the question. Platonists disagree and offer reasons to go against our common experience. Again, I agree with you, but I don't get there through defining words a particular way.
Once again, I don't understand how my perspective is begging the question. I don't know about your epistemology, but my epistemology doesn't permit me to accept claims that cannot be demonstrated or fail to make novel testable predictions. If I am to accept that abstract objects can exist outside the conceptual realm and in our external reality, then I will have to accept that any imagined thing must be seriously considered as possibly existing somewhere. Am I to start taking claims of imagined leprechauns and imagined magical fairies seriously now because they haven't been demonstrated to not exist? How do you justify your rejection of Platonism?
The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 19, 2020 9:10 pmArgument 3: Eternal cause/Temporal effect

P1. It is most plausibly true that if the changeless cause can account for a first temporal effect (i.e., the universe), then it does so through agent causation.
P2. The non-spatio-temporal quantum state does not account for the universe through agent causation.
C. Therefore, it is most plausibly true that the non-spatio-temporal quantum state is not the changeless cause of the universe.

bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmHow is a fluctuation in the non-spatio-temporal quantum state not logically possible as a cause?
I rephrased the premises above to better reflect my thought, although I'm sure I could do so better.
How is P1 supported?

If the non-spatio-temporal quantum state can account for the universe without having to invoke agent causation, then how is P2 relevant?
The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 19, 2020 9:10 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pm
But are they equal explanations? I'm not sure where you stand on the mind, but I think it more rational to believe that our immaterial minds affect matter (e.g., I can move my arm with my mind). I can understand one saying minds are nothing more than our brains and then concluding here that an unembodied mind doesn't make sense. But there are many people who believe, for well-thought out reasons, that minds are immaterial. So, even if you think the mind is material, the case for the existence of immaterial minds far exceeds any evidence or case for a non-spatio-temporal, unconscious state.
Yes, they are equally speculative explanations.
Any reasons that go against what I said in support of them not being equally speculative or that go towards support of your claim?
Both claims function as explanations for the universe and both are entirely speculative in that they propose logically possible causes that cannot be demonstrated to exist.
The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 19, 2020 9:10 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmThen what do you label the faith it is employing?
To me faith is something like trusting in someone or something in something unknown because you have good previous reasons to do. So, I'm not sure it makes sense to say one has this kind of faith an argument. Either one thinks an argument has good support for it or not.
Yes, but we are considering two logically possible causes where neither can be demonstrated to be more plausible or better supported than the other at this point. You haven't yet succeeded in demonstrating that an unembodied mind is better supported than a non-spatio-temporal quantum state. So, if not faith, how do you describe your preference for belief in an unembodied mind over belief in a non-spatio-temporal quantum state as the cause of the universe?
The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 19, 2020 9:10 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 18, 2020 7:17 pmIgnoring the possibility of solipsism for the moment, what would be more reliable than the scientific method in consistently demonstrating the existence of things in our perceived external empirical reality?
I certainly think science is reliable in giving us truth of reality. And I don't think it's just by ignoring the alternative possibilities. I think this is more reasonable than the alternatives, philosophically speaking. My point is that science depends on prior philosophical positions to be truly reliable. If we throw out philosophical arguments, we throw out everything else. That doesn't mean I'm saying these arguments are certain; they are not. Nothing is certain. I'm not saying these arguments are more certain than that I'm actually typing these words on a computer. I do think this argument, as far as I can tell now, is the best explanation (and a good one) of the data we are considering, though.
Even when I give your argument thus far my most charitable consideration, I'm still at a loss to find a logical justification for preferring the unembodied mind explanation over any other unfalsifiable explanation. However, I'll continue to wait patiently while you continue to try and convince me.

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

Post #55

Post by The Tanager »

Argument 1: Scientific or Personal Explanations
bluegreenearth wrote: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:45 pmA personal explanation requires the existence of a person. I'm unaware of anyone having demonstrated that a person can exist as a non-spatio-temporal agent. Therefore, the God answer cannot be one of the two explanations either and is arguably another third or fourth type of explanation just like the non-spatio-temporal quantum state.
You are defining 'person' to include a material body unless evidence can prove you wrong. That's not how good definitions work. That's begging the question. Something should go into the definition only if there is evidence for it to go in. I am aware of no evidence for a person requiring matter or temporality. While, the concept of God has the other elements we mean by something having personality. In comparison, the "quantum state" has no positive elements to put it in a third category.
bluegreenearth wrote: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:45 pmI apologize for giving you that impression because my intent was to ask you how to proceed given the logical possibility of a non-spatio-temporal quantum state. So, how do you proceed?
Perhaps I'm still not following. We see if there is any evidence that moves it beyond just being a logical possibility. If there is, then there is more reason to believe it as a real possibility. Then we compare it against the other candidates and see which theory is good and makes the most sense of all the data.
bluegreenearth wrote: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:45 pmI don't understand how experience doesn't entail the passage of time or how that is begging the question. Please demonstrate an experience that doesn't require the passage of time to support your claim.
In the same way you defined 'person' above: narrowing the definition with no positive evidence for doing so and then requiring the opponent to give counter evidence to change the definition. By "positive evidence" I mean evidence for saying that this should be the definition. Evidence that experience can be had by temporal things is just that; it shouldn't affect the definition of 'experience.'

As for the demonstration, this argument built off the Kalam is the demonstration for the existence of an entity that experiences reality in a timeless way. To ask for a demonstration of the existence outside of this demonstration before we could consider this demonstration seems unreasonable to me.


Argument 2: Abstract Object or Unembodied Mind
bluegreenearth wrote: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:45 pm
That's begging the question. Platonists disagree and offer reasons to go against our common experience. Again, I agree with you, but I don't get there through defining words a particular way.
Once again, I don't understand how my perspective is begging the question.
In the same way as 'person' and 'experience' above. You define 'abstract' as mental concepts produced by our brains without positive evidence for doing so. Yes, we experience abstract objects as mental concepts, but it doesn't logically follow that this should be the definition of an abstract object.

The problem is not that you believe abstract objects are concepts in our minds, but that you use this as the definition for abstract in a different argument so that there must be a third category as a way to defeat the argument. Your evidence for a third category is (1) a bad definition and (2) that the concept isn't logically impossible. I don't find that evidence strong in the least.
bluegreenearth wrote: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:45 pmI don't know about your epistemology, but my epistemology doesn't permit me to accept claims that cannot be demonstrated or fail to make novel testable predictions.
The argument is the proposed demonstration. You reject that demonstration by using a definition (based on no positive evidence for the conclusion) that defeats the argument and then requiring the opponent to prove that definition is wrong. My epistemology doesn't permit me to do such a thing.
bluegreenearth wrote: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:45 pmIf I am to accept that abstract objects can exist outside the conceptual realm and in our external reality, then I will have to accept that any imagined thing must be seriously considered as possibly existing somewhere. Am I to start taking claims of imagined leprechauns and imagined magical fairies seriously now because they haven't been demonstrated to not exist? How do you justify your rejection of Platonism?
What's wrong with seriously considering people's claims? If someone wants to offer an argument for leprechauns and fairies, why not listen? If it's bunk, then you'll be able to see it and rationally point it out quite quickly. The truth of leprechauns has nothing to do with the truth of Platonism, however. Take each on its own merit. I reject Platonism because of my assessment of the merits for and against.


Argument 3: Eternal cause/Temporal effect

P1. It is most plausibly true that if the changeless cause can account for a first temporal effect (i.e., the universe), then it does so through agent causation.
P2. The non-spatio-temporal quantum state does not account for the universe through agent causation.
C. Therefore, it is most plausibly true that the non-spatio-temporal quantum state is not the changeless cause of the universe.

bluegreenearth wrote: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:45 pmHow is P1 supported?
The summary again from posts 43 and 52:

Only personal, free agency can account for a first temporal effect from a changeless cause. If the necessary and sufficient conditions for the production of the effect are eternal, then the effect would be eternal. How can all the causal conditions sufficient for the production of the effect be changelessly existent and yet the effect not also be existent along with the cause. How could the cause exist without the effect? The best way out of this dilemma is agent causation. In this, the agent freely brings about some event in the absence of prior determining conditions, initiating new effects by choice. In agent causation, the agent-cause could be eternal and the effect temporal.
bluegreenearth wrote: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:45 pmIf the non-spatio-temporal quantum state can account for the universe without having to invoke agent causation, then how is P2 relevant?
But what you have is a mere logical possibility that rests on defining terms in a specific way to avoid the conclusions of the prior arguments with no positive evidence for those being false dilemmas. If you had positive evidence, then it would be a different story.
bluegreenearth wrote: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:45 pm
But are they equal explanations? I'm not sure where you stand on the mind, but I think it more rational to believe that our immaterial minds affect matter (e.g., I can move my arm with my mind). I can understand one saying minds are nothing more than our brains and then concluding here that an unembodied mind doesn't make sense. But there are many people who believe, for well-thought out reasons, that minds are immaterial. So, even if you think the mind is material, the case for the existence of immaterial minds far exceeds any evidence or case for a non-spatio-temporal, unconscious state.
Yes, they are equally speculative explanations.
Any reasons that go against what I said in support of them not being equally speculative or that go towards support of your claim?
Both claims function as explanations for the universe and both are entirely speculative in that they propose logically possible causes that cannot be demonstrated to exist.
That's just restating that that you think they are equal. I gave reasons why I think they are unequal [quoted above]. What do you have to say against my reasons? Is there anything extra that you have to say in favor of your claim of equality in speculation?

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

Post #56

Post by bluegreenearth »

The Tanager wrote: Tue Aug 25, 2020 6:56 pmYou are defining 'person' to include a material body unless evidence can prove you wrong. That's not how good definitions work. That's begging the question. Something should go into the definition only if there is evidence for it to go in. I am aware of no evidence for a person requiring matter or temporality. While, the concept of God has the other elements we mean by something having personality. In comparison, the "quantum state" has no positive elements to put it in a third category.
We are not going to agree on this point. I don't understand where you are observing a begging the question fallacy. Unless I'm mistaken, this disagreement is more likely resulting from a difference in epistemology rather than a logical fallacy or a problem with definitions. As such, there doesn't seem to be much point in continuing this debate because all we are doing is talking past each other. All I can say is that I'm agnostic to claims about the cause of the universe because neither the Kalam nor Craig's version of the cosmological argument is sufficiently convincing to move me towards belief in the theistic explanation. For whatever reason, your epistemology has guided you towards theism as an acceptable explanation for the universe where my epistemology has guided me towards agnosticism. Unless we agree to use the same epistemology, this disagreement will not be resolvable.

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

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Post by The Tanager »

bluegreenearth wrote: Tue Aug 25, 2020 8:35 pmWe are not going to agree on this point. I don't understand where you are observing a begging the question fallacy. Unless I'm mistaken, this disagreement is more likely resulting from a difference in epistemology rather than a logical fallacy or a problem with definitions. As such, there doesn't seem to be much point in continuing this debate because all we are doing is talking past each other. All I can say is that I'm agnostic to claims about the cause of the universe because neither the Kalam nor Craig's version of the cosmological argument is sufficiently convincing to move me towards belief in the theistic explanation. For whatever reason, your epistemology has guided you towards theism as an acceptable explanation for the universe where my epistemology has guided me towards agnosticism. Unless we agree to use the same epistemology, this disagreement will not be resolvable.
I'm fine ending this discussion any time. I'm also fine just focusing on epistemology. If you want to discuss that here, then I'd love to hear your thoughts to the next two paragraphs. Earlier you said you cannot accept claims that cannot be demonstrated or fail to make novel testable predictions.

(1) I said the Kalam-plus is the demonstration. At one point, you rejected that demonstration by using a definition that rules out (by definition) the conclusion the Kalam-plus argues for. That definition was not positively supported. You gave a definition that matches your worldview and shift the burden to me to prove that definition wrong to save my argument. You are begging your conclusion not based on the evidence, but based on a definition that assumes your worldview is true.

(2) As for this part of "fail to make novel testable predictions," I'm not entirely sure what you mean. It makes sense to me to use this epistemology about scientific questions. Novel testable predictions are important in physical things. But what does this have to do with philosophical questions?

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

Post #58

Post by bluegreenearth »

The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 26, 2020 2:33 pmI'm fine ending this discussion any time. I'm also fine just focusing on epistemology. If you want to discuss that here, then I'd love to hear your thoughts to the next two paragraphs. Earlier you said you cannot accept claims that cannot be demonstrated or fail to make novel testable predictions.

(1) I said the Kalam-plus is the demonstration. At one point, you rejected that demonstration by using a definition that rules out (by definition) the conclusion the Kalam-plus argues for. That definition was not positively supported. You gave a definition that matches your worldview and shift the burden to me to prove that definition wrong to save my argument. You are begging your conclusion not based on the evidence, but based on a definition that assumes your worldview is true.

(2) As for this part of "fail to make novel testable predictions," I'm not entirely sure what you mean. It makes sense to me to use this epistemology about scientific questions. Novel testable predictions are important in physical things. But what does this have to do with philosophical questions?
(1) I rejected the claim that the Kalam-plus argument is a demonstration of God's metaphysical existence because it is based on pure philosophical speculation, and no philosophical argument can ever demonstrate the metaphysical existence of anything in reality. At best, all a philosophical argument does is attempt to justify a proposed logical possibility. In other words, the problem with the Kalam-plus argument is that it overstates its case by making the category error of asserting the potential logical possibility of God's existence as a demonstration of God's metaphysical existence in reality.

(2) I only mentioned "novel testable predictions" in addition to "demonstrable" for the sake of being thorough. I agree that predictions are not necessarily applicable to all philosophical questions.

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

Post #59

Post by The Tanager »

bluegreenearth wrote: Wed Aug 26, 2020 6:10 pm(1) I rejected the claim that the Kalam-plus argument is a demonstration of God's metaphysical existence because it is based on pure philosophical speculation, and no philosophical argument can ever demonstrate the metaphysical existence of anything in reality. At best, all a philosophical argument does is attempt to justify a proposed logical possibility. In other words, the problem with the Kalam-plus argument is that it overstates its case by making the category error of asserting the potential logical possibility of God's existence as a demonstration of God's metaphysical existence in reality.
I don't see why you think this. The Kalam-plus includes causality, the reality of our spatio-temporal universe, and the laws of logic applied to the nature of these things. It looks at live candidates and uses the same kind of abductive reasoning with the available evidence and laws of logic that scientific theories are built upon to come to its conclusion. This is a demonstration going beyond mere logical possibility.

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Re: The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

Post #60

Post by bluegreenearth »

The Tanager wrote: Wed Aug 26, 2020 8:14 pm
bluegreenearth wrote: Wed Aug 26, 2020 6:10 pm(1) I rejected the claim that the Kalam-plus argument is a demonstration of God's metaphysical existence because it is based on pure philosophical speculation, and no philosophical argument can ever demonstrate the metaphysical existence of anything in reality. At best, all a philosophical argument does is attempt to justify a proposed logical possibility. In other words, the problem with the Kalam-plus argument is that it overstates its case by making the category error of asserting the potential logical possibility of God's existence as a demonstration of God's metaphysical existence in reality.
I don't see why you think this. The Kalam-plus includes causality, the reality of our spatio-temporal universe, and the laws of logic applied to the nature of these things. It looks at live candidates and uses the same kind of abductive reasoning with the available evidence and laws of logic that scientific theories are built upon to come to its conclusion. This is a demonstration going beyond mere logical possibility.
Scientific theories are built upon demonstrable and falsifiable hypotheses. The kalam-plus is not falsifiable and neither demonstrates the metaphysical existence of God nor rules-out any other logically possible cause of the universe. As such, it is overstating its case.

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