The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

[John J. Bannan]

THE FOURTEEN COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
By John J. Bannan (5/24/2020)

“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” Genesis 1:1. God is the creator of the cosmos. The cosmological arguments prove the existence of God by demonstrating the necessity of a Creator for the cosmos. The cosmological arguments offer good reason through circumstantial evidence taken from the nature of the cosmos itself to believe in God. The following is a listing and explanation of all the known cosmological arguments for the existence of God:

I. THE DICHOTOMY OF EXISTENCE
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The dichotomy of existence proves the existence of God by demonstrating the necessity of an uncaused Creator with the power to create any or all of the infinite potentials for physical reality to the fullest extent logically possible under everythingness. In terms of the uncaused, there are only two possibilities. The first is the uncaused reason for the existence of all physical reality. The second is the uncaused absence of any reality called absolute nothingness. These two are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of all logical possibilities forming an abstract metaphysical dichotomy of existence. Because each side of the dichotomy is uncaused, there can be no cause for either of the two being real. Rather, one side is real and the other is not real without reason or necessity. Moreover, an uncaused thing does not have parts, because it would otherwise be caused by those parts. Because an uncaused thing does not have parts, an uncaused thing cannot be destroyed because destruction demands the disassociation of parts. As a result, the side of the dichotomy that is real can never be destroyed, and the other side that is not real can never become real.

Because physical reality can differ in the most minute way logically possible from another potential physical reality, there is no good reason to believe that the uncaused reason for the existence of all physical reality could not also create that potential physical reality. Because this uncaused reason can create this potential physical reality, then it can also create another potential physical reality differing from the former potential physical reality in the most minute way logically possible. Repeating this ad infinitum, this uncaused reason must be capable of creating any or all of the infinite logically possible physical realities called everythingness. Because potential physical realities can be created, there must be a reason for the existence of physical reality and the creation of any or all infinite potential physical realities. This reason must be uncaused, because the creation of any or all physical realities is contingent on this reason which leaves this reason without anything else to cause it.

Because the creation of less than everything that is logically possible is itself a logical possibility falling within everythingness, then this uncaused reason must necessarily be able to decide what to create out of the infinite possibilities for physical reality. This uncaused reason must have knowledge of all the infinite potentials for physical reality, the power to create any or all of these potentials, and a presence to control, sustain, alter or destroy any such creation. Moreover, this uncaused reason must have the greatest decision-making ability logically possible in order to be able to create up to the fullest extent of everythingness. We call this uncaused real side of the dichotomy of existence God.

II. THE FIRST CAUSE ARGUMENT
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The first cause argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that all causes and effects in the cosmos must ultimately derive from a very first cause we call God. In the cosmos, we observe that for every cause, there is an effect. We also observe that every effect is itself a cause for a subsequent effect. Like a line of falling dominos, the first falling domino causes the fall of the second domino, and the second falling domino causes the fall of the third domino. The cosmos unfolds as a series of causes and effects over time.

Because an infinite regress in time of causes and effects is impossible, there must be a very first cause of the cosmic series of causes and effects. We observe that cause and effect in the cosmos follows an order where A causes B, and B causes C, whether the intermediate cause B is only a single cause or several causes. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there is no cause A, there will be no ultimate cause C, nor any intermediate cause B. But, if an infinite regress in time of causes and effects were possible, there would not be a first cause, and so neither would there be an ultimate cause, nor any intermediate cause. Therefore, the existence of the series of causes and effects over time in the cosmos necessitates a very first cause for the beginning of the series.

The very first cause in the beginning of the cosmic series of causes and effects over time must not itself be caused. If it were caused, then regress would continue backward in time infinitely, which is impossible. Moreover, the very first cause cannot be self-created. It is impossible for a thing to cause itself, because it would have to exist prior to itself. Therefore, the very first cause must itself be uncaused. We call this uncaused first cause God.

Because God is uncaused, God cannot be made of parts. A thing that is made of parts is caused by those parts. God being uncaused cannot Himself be caused by parts. We call this principle that God is not made of parts – divine simplicity. Divine simplicity is a mystery, because we cannot imagine a thing without parts. However, because we know a very first cause is necessary for the cosmos to be created, and we know that this very first cause cannot be made of parts, we know that divine simplicity is real. An ancient classical philosophical truth known as “ex nihilo nihil fit” states that nothing comes from nothing – or that you can’t get something from nothing. Because nothingness cannot create the cosmos, an uncaused very first cause of the cosmos is necessary to which we give the name God.

III. THE FIRST ORDER ARGUMENT
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The first order argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the cosmos must have had an initial order created by an uncaused orderless cause we call God. We observe from the cosmos that everything has an order. This order is the relative position or arrangement of things in physical reality at any given moment in time. We observe that this order is caused by an antecedent order, and that this antecedent order is caused by an earlier antecedent order. Because an infinite regress in time of antecedent orders is impossible, there must be a very first order.

We observe that order in the cosmos follows a pattern where order A causes order B, and order B causes order C, whether the intermediate order B is only a single order or a series of consecutive orders. Now to take away order A is to take away order B. Therefore, if there is no order A, there will be no ultimate order C, nor any intermediate order B. But, if an infinite regress in time of consecutive orders were possible, there would not be a first order, and so neither would there be an ultimate order, nor any intermediate order. Therefore, the existence of the series of consecutive orders over time in the cosmos necessitates a very first order for the beginning of the series. This first order requires an orderless cause, because a first order cannot come from nothing. A cause without order is a cause without parts, and therefore must be uncaused because otherwise its parts would be its cause. Because all physical realities possess an order, this orderless cause cannot be any sort of physical reality. We call this uncaused orderless immaterial cause of first order God.

IV. THE BEGINNINGLESS TIME PARADOX
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The beginningless time paradox proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the beginning of time itself must have an uncaused timeless cause we call God. If time in the cosmos had no beginning, then there would be an infinity of prior moments in time before the arrival of the present moment. An infinity of prior moments of time could never be fully traversed, because there would always be a prior moment in time that had not yet been traversed because infinity is unending. If all prior moments in time are not fully traversed, then paradoxically the present moment in time could never arrive. Because the present moment in time does arrive, then time in the cosmos must have had a beginning. Because time must have had a beginning, then time must have been caused to begin from something besides nothing because nothing cannot cause anything.

The cause of the beginning of time not having time for its own cause must therefore be uncaused. Moreover, the cause of time itself cannot be something subject to time, because the existence of anything subject to time is contingent on the existence of time. The beginning of time itself cannot have a physical explanation, because all physical explanations would be subject to time. Accordingly, there must be an uncaused immaterial explanation for the beginning of time itself we call God.

V. THE BEGINNINGLESS CAUSATION PARADOX
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The beginningless causation paradox proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the beginning of causation itself must have an uncaused immaterial cause we call God. If causation in the cosmos had no beginning, then there would be an infinite regression of causation exhausting all possible causes. However, if causation were infinite, then causation could not become exhausted. Therefore, causation cannot be infinite, but must have had a beginning.

The cause of the beginning of causation not having a cause for its own beginning must therefore be uncaused. The beginning of causation itself cannot be a physical explanation, because all physical explanations would be caused. Accordingly, there must be an uncaused immaterial cause for the beginning of causation we call God.

VI. THE PRIME MOVER ARGUMENT
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The prime mover argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that all motion in the cosmos must ultimately be derived from an unmoved mover we call God. We observe that in the cosmos some things are in motion. Now whatever is moved is moved by another. Things move when potential for motion becomes actual motion. Only an actual motion can convert a potential for motion into an actual motion. Nothing can be in both potentiality and actuality in the same respect simultaneously. If both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another respect. Therefore, nothing can move itself.

Each thing in motion is moved by something else. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also needs to be moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go onto infinity, because then there would be no first mover. Without a first mover, there would be no movement at all, because all subsequent movers move only inasmuch that they are moved by the first mover. For example, the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this we call God.

VII. THE NECESSARY BEING ARGUMENT
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The necessary being argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that there must be some being we call God that exists out of His own necessity in order for contingent beings to exist in the cosmos. We observe that in the cosmos things come and go into being called contingent beings. Every being is a contingent being, because objects in the cosmos come into being and pass away. Indeed, it is possible for those objects to exist or for those objects not to exist at any given time. For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist. Therefore, it is impossible for these always to exist. Consequently, there could have been a time when no things existed.

If there were a time when no things existed, there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing contingent beings into existence. Therefore, nothing would be in existence now. Such an absurd result undermines the assumption that all beings are contingent. Therefore, not every being is a contingent being. There must be some being which exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them. We call this necessary being God.

VIII. THE ARGUMENT FROM COMPOSITE PARTS
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The argument from composite parts proves the existence of God by demonstrating that an uncaused singular non-composite we call God is necessary for the existence of all composites in the cosmos. We observe from the cosmos that all composites are caused by their parts. Causation itself is the formation of a composite from parts in physical reality. The cosmos itself is a composite made of parts consisting of each moment in time with its physical reality. We also observe that composites themselves are made of composites. However, a composite cannot be made without parts, and because more than one part is a composite, a single part which causes all composites must be real because composites cannot come from nothing. That single part which causes all composites must be an uncaused non-composite, because parts would otherwise cause it to be a composite. Because all physical reality forms a composite with spacetime, then the single uncaused non-composite cannot be any sort of physical reality. We call this single uncaused immaterial non-composite God.

IX. THE ARGUMENT FROM TIME
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The argument from time proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the existence of time requires an uncaused timeless cause we call God. Time is the creation, destruction and re-creation of physical reality at the smallest scale at relative rates. Because nothing comes from nothing, the cause of time cannot be nothing. Rather, the cause of time must have a cause outside of time. This cause of time must also remember the prior order, placement and time flow of physical reality in order to re-create physical reality at every moment in time. This cause of time not having time for its own cause must therefore be uncaused. However, the cause of time itself cannot be something subject to time, because the existence of anything subject to time is contingent on the existence of time. There are no physical explanations for the beginning of time itself, because all physical explanations would be subject to time. We call this uncaused timeless immaterial cause of time God.

X. THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
(BY WILLIAM LANE CRAIG)
The Kalam cosmological argument proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the cosmos had a beginning caused by a personal agent that transcends spacetime we call God. We observe from the cosmos that everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence. The cosmos began to exist. Therefore, the cosmos has a cause for its existence. The cosmos began to exist, because an actual infinite cannot exist. A beginningless temporal series of events is an actual infinite. Therefore, a beginningless temporal series of events cannot exist.

Actual infinities that neither increase or decrease in the number of members they contain would result in absurd consequences, if they were to exist in reality. For example, a library with an infinite number of books would not be reduced in size at all by the removal of a specific number of books (short of all of them). Or, before the present event could occur the event immediately prior to it would have to occur. But, before that event could occur, the event immediately prior to it would have to occur; and so on ad infinitum. One gets driven back and back into the infinite past, making it impossible for any event to occur. Thus, if the series of past events were beginningless, the present event could not have occurred, which is absurd.

The collection of historical events is formed by successively adding events, one following another. The events are not temporally simultaneous, but occur over a period of time as the series continues to acquire new members. Even if an actual infinite were possible, it could not be realized by successive addition. In adding to the series, no matter how much this is done, even to infinity, the series remains finite and only potentially infinite. One can neither count to nor traverse the infinite.

If something has a finite past, its existence has a cause. The cosmos has a finite past. Therefore, the cosmos has a cause of its existence. Because spacetime originated with the cosmos and therefore has a finite past, the cause of the existence of the cosmos must transcend spacetime. Because the cause of the cosmos’ existence transcends spacetime, no scientific explanation in terms of physical laws can provide a causal account of the origin of the cosmos. Because no scientific explanation can provide a causal account of the origin of the cosmos, then the cause must be a personal agent. If the cause were an eternal, nonpersonal, mechanically operating set of conditions, then the cosmos would exist from eternity. Because the cosmos has not existed from eternity, the cause must be a personal agent we call God who chooses freely to create an effect in time.

XI. THE ARGUMENT FROM SUFFICIENT REASON
(BY GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ)
The argument from sufficient reason proves the existence of God by demonstrating that an explanation for the existence of the cosmos is necessary, which must be a transcendent God who has within His own nature the necessity of existence. We observe from the cosmos that there must be an explanation, or sufficient reason, for anything that exists. The explanation for whatever exists must lie either in the necessity of its own nature or in a cause external to itself. A sufficient reason for the existence of the cosmos cannot be another contingent thing (and on into infinity), because to explain the existence of any contingent thing by another contingent thing lacks a sufficient reason why any contingent thing exists. The explanation of the existence of the cosmos must lie in a transcendent God, because the cosmos does not have within its own nature the necessity of existence and God does.

XII. THE ARGUMENT FROM ABDUCTION
(BY JOHN J. BANNAN)
The argument from abduction demonstrates that something must be uncaused and the best explanation is an uncaused metaphysical reality we call God. We observe that in the cosmos something has got to be uncaused, otherwise there would be nothing. It is impossible that physical reality is uncaused. Any aspect of physical reality claimed to be uncaused can be eliminated as impossible or ultimately caused, including but not limited to infinite regress, actual infinities, self-creation, time travel, eternality in time, timelessness, and acausal physics. Therefore, the best explanation that remains is an uncaused metaphysical reality we call God.

XIII. THE ARGUMENT FROM GRADATION OF BEING
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The argument from gradation of being proves the existence of God by demonstrating that the existence of all things requires as their cause a maximum being we call God. We observe from the cosmos that there is a gradation to be found in physical reality. Some physical things are better or worse than others. Predications of degree require reference to the uttermost case. For example, a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest. The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus. Therefore, there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection. We call this God.

XIV. THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN
(BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS)
The argument from design proves the existence of God by demonstrating that non-intelligent natural things must be directed in their purposes by a supernatural intelligent being we call God. We observe from the cosmos that natural bodies work toward some goal, and do not do so by chance. Most natural things lack knowledge. But, as an arrow reaches its target because it is directed by an archer, what lacks intelligence achieves goals by being directed by something intelligent. Therefore, some intelligent being is real by whom all natural things are directed to their end. We call this intelligent being God.

[bluegreenearth]

I don't think the vast majority of experts say logic is just a type of language. They say there is a language of logic. Logic is prescriptive, while the language of logic is descriptive of that reality. The language of logic concerns observations that aren't physical observations.

I think you are describing the same thing as what I've described. The only difference is that you label reality as "Logic." For the record, though, there are multiple types of logic such as "Fuzzy Logic" and "Many-Valued Logic" where none are any more logical than any other. We just traditionally use classical logic.

We don't need an example of such a thing prior to an argument for its existence. Either the argument shows it's probable existence or it doesn't. We didn't need an example of an electron existing prior to the experiments scientists use to argue for the existence of the electron. An argument like Craig's is the argument for the existence of an immaterial being (premise 4 carries that weight and we'll get to it). Are you expecting physical evidence of an immaterial being?

In the case of Craig's argument, we do need an example of such a thing because the 2nd premise claims all fundamental material things began to exist at the moment of the Big Bang which assumes without evidence that only immaterial things could have existed prior to the Big Bang. We can't justify that assumption by smuggling the conclusion of Craig's argument into the 2nd premise. Because the 2nd premise is an empirical claim, the only way to justify that underlying assumption is by providing an example of an immaterial thing that can be demonstrated to exist in the absence of any material thing.

Note: The argument for the existence of electrons was not what justified belief in their existence. The justification for belief in the existence of electrons was not obtained until after electrons were demonstrated to exist through experimentation.

That is my understanding as well. I know of no one claiming the quantum field is immaterial or timeless.

Don't ask me to explain the following example because it is far beyond my understanding, but the "Amplituhedron" by Nima Arkani-Hamed and Jaroslav Trnka is claimed to be a possible quantum field that has no spacetime dependent material components: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amplituhedron

Craig's formulation, as I understand it, is not primarily about a cause of the Big Bang, but of matter itself. Assume a quantum field actually existed prior to the Big Bang and the argument still goes through the same.

I don't understand how the argument would be the same because I'm unaware of a reason to presume that a fundamental quantum field had a beginning if it existed prior to the Big Bang. The only reason we accept that our observable spacetime material universe had a beginning is because it can be traced back to the moment of the Big Bang. What reason is there to presume a fundamental quantum field had its own separate "Big Bang" event where it began to exist prior to the moment of the known Big Bang event at the beginning of our observable spacetime material universe?

[The Tanager]

2. The universe began to exist.

We don't need an example of such a thing prior to an argument for its existence. Either the argument shows it's probable existence or it doesn't. We didn't need an example of an electron existing prior to the experiments scientists use to argue for the existence of the electron.

Note: The argument for the existence of electrons was not what justified belief in their existence. The justification for belief in the existence of electrons was not obtained until after electrons were demonstrated to exist through experimentation.

The "argument for the existence of electrons" is "the demonstration through experimentation"; they are two ways to say the same thing. That kind of demonstration is fitting for physical things. It is not fitting for immaterial things. My point is that Craig's argument is meant as a demonstration of an immaterial being existing. You seem to be saying that we need to have an example of an immaterial being existing before Craig's argument should be considered. That's analogical to asking the scientist to prove the electron exists before demonstrating through experimentation. I think that is an unreasonable ask.

Don't ask me to explain the following example because it is far beyond my understanding, but the "Amplituhedron" by Nima Arkani-Hamed and Jaroslav Trnka is claimed to be a possible quantum field that has no spacetime dependent material components: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amplituhedron

I don't pretend to understand the theory itself but, from the article you linked to, it still seems to be describing material things. Yes, it challenges locality and unitarity, but what are those concepts? Locality apparently refers to being directly influenced by one's immediate surroundings. Unitarity seems to refer to when one adds up the probabilities of finding a particle in a specified space, that we'd get 1. One article I found says that non-unitarity could include things like a particle being in two different universes. [https://sureshemre.wordpress.com/2014/0 ... mechanics/]. Neither of those things counter the quantum field being material.

In the case of Craig's argument, we do need an example of such a thing because the 2nd premise claims all fundamental material things began to exist at the moment of the Big Bang which assumes without evidence that only immaterial things could have existed prior to the Big Bang. We can't justify that assumption by smuggling the conclusion of Craig's argument into the 2nd premise. Because the 2nd premise is an empirical claim, the only way to justify that underlying assumption is by providing an example of an immaterial thing that can be demonstrated to exist in the absence of any material thing.

The premise does not claim that. Craig has argued that, scientifically speaking, the Big Bang is most likely the beginning of all material, but he does not limit his argument to that being true. One can assume that material existed prior to the Big Bang and the argument does not change.

I don't understand how the argument would be the same because I'm unaware of a reason to presume that a fundamental quantum field had a beginning if it existed prior to the Big Bang. The only reason we accept that our observable spacetime material universe had a beginning is because it can be traced back to the moment of the Big Bang. What reason is there to presume a fundamental quantum field had its own separate "Big Bang" event where it began to exist prior to the moment of the known Big Bang event at the beginning of our observable spacetime material universe?

The strongest argument, I think, is the "argument from the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition." Here is how Craig formulates it:

1. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite.
2. The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition.
3. Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.

If an actual infinite can't be formed by successive addition, then the series of past events (whether that extends to the Big Bang or to a previous material state) must be finite. I don't want to presume you understand it or don't understand it, so I'll pause here for questions or thoughts.

[bluegreenearth]

The "argument for the existence of electrons" is "the demonstration through experimentation"; they are two ways to say the same thing. That kind of demonstration is fitting for physical things. It is not fitting for immaterial things. My point is that Craig's argument is meant as a demonstration of an immaterial being existing. You seem to be saying that we need to have an example of an immaterial being existing before Craig's argument should be considered. That's analogical to asking the scientist to prove the electron exists before demonstrating through experimentation. I think that is an unreasonable ask.

In the case of electrons, there was an observable physical phenomenon that scientists were attempting to understand. They were speculating that the fundamental components of the observable physical phenomenon were electrons. So, to be analogous, it would be like asking the scientists to prove the observable physical phenomenon exists before demonstrating it is comprised of electrons. Nevertheless, the main point was that the conclusion of Craig's argument seems to be smuggled into the 2nd premise because it assumes without evidence that only immaterial things could have existed prior to the Big Bang.

I don't pretend to understand the theory itself but, from the article you linked to, it still seems to be describing material things. Yes, it challenges locality and unitarity, but what are those concepts? Locality apparently refers to being directly influenced by one's immediate surroundings. Unitarity seems to refer to when one adds up the probabilities of finding a particle in a specified space, that we'd get 1. One article I found says that non-unitarity could include things like a particle being in two different universes. [https://sureshemre.wordpress.com/2014/0 ... mechanics/]. Neither of those things counter the quantum field being material.

From the linked description:
"While amplituhedron theory provides an underlying geometric model, the geometrical space is not physical spacetime and is also best understood as abstract."

Unless you are suggesting that abstract things are material things, then the Amplituhedron Theory would appear to be demonstrating the possibility of an immaterial quantum field.

The premise does not claim that. Craig has argued that, scientifically speaking, the Big Bang is most likely the beginning of all material, but he does not limit his argument to that being true. One can assume that material existed prior to the Big Bang and the argument does not change.

Once again, I don't understand how the argument doesn't change if there is no justification to presume any material thing that existed prior to the Big Bang had its own beginning from a separate Big Bang. If Craig wants to assert that any material thing existing prior to the Big Bang must have also begun to exist by some cause, where is his supporting argument? We have no justifiable reason to believe, just because material things in our universe began to exist at the moment of the Big Bang, that any material thing existing prior to the Big Bang also began to exist.

The strongest argument, I think, is the "argument from the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition." Here is how Craig formulates it:

1. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite.
2. The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition.
3. Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.

If an actual infinite can't be formed by successive addition, then the series of past events (whether that extends to the Big Bang or to a previous material state) must be finite. I don't want to presume you understand it or don't understand it, so I'll pause here for questions or thoughts.

The argument is conditional to a temporal series of events formed by successive addition that would extend to the "time" before the Big Bang. However, what reason is there to presume a temporal series of events formed by successive addition would or should extend to a fundamental quantum field that could possibly exist without a spacetime component?

[The Tanager]

2. The universe began to exist.

Nevertheless, the main point was that the conclusion of Craig's argument seems to be smuggled into the 2nd premise because it assumes without evidence that only immaterial things could have existed prior to the Big Bang.

Where does it do that? The 'universe' seems to me to cover all spatio-temporal matter. Assuming material things existed prior to the Big Bang does not change the argument.

From the linked description:
"While amplituhedron theory provides an underlying geometric model, the geometrical space is not physical spacetime and is also best understood as abstract."

Unless you are suggesting that abstract things are material things, then the Amplituhedron Theory would appear to be demonstrating the possibility of an immaterial quantum field.

I have a very limited understanding of this, but from a quick search the amplituhedron seems to be abstract in that it's not a thing, but a way to model the interactions between physical particles that makes calculations easier for physicists and they hope it will help with quantum gravity. But if it is an immaterial thing, I don't see how this affects the argument. The next quote/response continues this line of thought.

The argument is conditional to a temporal series of events formed by successive addition that would extend to the "time" before the Big Bang. However, what reason is there to presume a temporal series of events formed by successive addition would or should extend to a fundamental quantum field that could possibly exist without a spacetime component?

If the Big Bang was the start, then t=1 (the Big Bang itself) would be that first event. If this quantum field existed prior to it, it is either eternal or an event that should be called t=1, where t=2 would be the Big Bang. We could assume it is immaterial either way and the argument isn't affected. Craig's argument says there must be an immaterial personal cause in premise 4. It is there that he offers support that would rule out an immaterial quantum field, which would be impersonal. Before getting to that, I want to make sure we fully cover possible snags at premise 2 (and premise 3, although that seems to logically follow from 1 and 2 to me).

[bluegreenearth]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #24]

I'm not convinced that premise 2 is sufficiently supported. So, we can't proceed further until you can convince me that the universe (including a potential non-spatio-temporal quantum field that pre-existed the Big Bang) began to exist.

[The Tanager]

2. The universe began to exist.

I'm not convinced that premise 2 is sufficiently supported. So, we can't proceed further until you can convince me that the universe (including a potential non-spatio-temporal quantum field that pre-existed the Big Bang) began to exist.

I'm not exactly sure what you see as the problem for premise 2. The "universe" refers to all spatio-temporal matter. The non-spatio-temporal quantum field (if there is such a thing) would not be included in that term. At this stage of the argument, it would be a candidate for the cause of the "universe". Are you thinking that the argument is using "universe" as an antonym of "God," or something like that?

[bluegreenearth]

I'm not exactly sure what you see as the problem for premise 2. The "universe" refers to all spatio-temporal matter. The non-spatio-temporal quantum field (if there is such a thing) would not be included in that term. At this stage of the argument, it would be a candidate for the cause of the "universe". Are you thinking that the argument is using "universe" as an antonym of "God," or something like that?

I had the impression you were arguing that a fundamental non-spatio-temporal quantum field must have a begun to exist prior to the Big Bang and would not be accepted as a candidate.

[The Tanager]

I had the impression you were arguing that a fundamental non-spatio-temporal quantum field must have a begun to exist prior to the Big Bang and would not be accepted as a candidate.

I apologize for giving that impression. With this clarification, do you have further disagreements on premise 2? Or the inference to premise 3?

[bluegreenearth]

I apologize for giving that impression. With this clarification, do you have further disagreements on premise 2? Or the inference to premise 3?

I need another clarification. It is my understanding that the inference to premise 3 refers to the "universe" as everything back to the moment of the Big Bang. Is that correct?

[The Tanager]

I need another clarification. It is my understanding that the inference to premise 3 refers to the "universe" as everything back to the moment of the Big Bang. Is that correct?

That is not my understanding. I mean, it could, if the Big Bang is the actual start of all spatio-temporal matter, but it does not have to be as far as the argument is concerned.