Why 'Free Will' is Logically Impossible

[Rational Atheist]

Here is a simple, yet powerful, argument against the idea that we 'freely' choose our actions.

1. Our thoughts determine our choices.

2. We do not freely choose our thoughts.

3. Therefore, our choices cannot be free.

I don't think anyone would object to premise 1, especially those who believe in free will, since by definition, a "free" choice, if it could exist, requires a person to consciously make it, which by definition involves thought. Premise 2 may be controversial to some, but with a simple thought experiment, it can be proven to be true. If a person could freely choose their thoughts, then they would have to be able to consciously choose what they were going to think before actually thinking it. In other words, there would have to be a time before a person thinks a thought that that thought was consciously chosen by a person, which literally entails the necessity of being able to think a thought before one thinks it. This, of course, is a logical contradiction. Ergo, free will does not exist.

[mgb]

This is something I wrote a few years ago-

Extreme determinsts maintain that the physical universe is just an outworking of the laws of nature and everything is predetermined by these laws. It is even argued that our brains are determined by neurological processes etc that are physically deterministic.

There seems to be a way around this determinism. It involves making a list of possible actions and making a choice from that list in such a way that the choice is not determined by either neurological states or any physical state in the world.

Here is how it works. Make a list of ordinary events and label them 0 to 9.

0. Read a book
1. Go to the library
2. Play tennis
3. Drive your car
4. Go to the cinema
5. Go to the supermarket
6. Listen to the radio
7. ...
8. ...
9. ...

Next get the decimal expansion of an irrational number such as the square root of 11
or 1/23.

Let us take the square root of 11

The square root of 11 is 3.3166247903554

Now take the first digit in the decimal expansion, 3
and go to your list;

3 = Drive your car

the next is 1

1 = Go to the library

6 = Listen to the radio

etc.

Now our choice is not determined by any physical or neurological state. It is determined by purely non physical mathematical entities. So we seem to have broken with any previous determinism by letting digits make our choice for us. If we are in the library, for example, we are engaged with a series of physical activities that, as a set, cannot be traced back to any previous physical state because the digit intervened and determined what set of physical events we would enter into.

[bluegreenearth]

In any case, and in short, the question then arises about how one's thoughts and actions arise. Why did you think or do A instead of B? If one claims it's simply a matter of choice the problem is hardly resolved, but shifted to another issue begging explanation: Why choose A instead of B? If it's all a mater of pure randomness then it's not a choice or an operation of a will at all. So you have to have some reason driving your choice, say reason X, but just where did this reason come from? It really doesn't matter, because whatever it is it didn't prompt reason Y or Z or . . . to materialize. So one is left at the mercy of reason X (or some other reason that would prompt A instead of B). Therefore, thought or action A was inevitable: the will was not free to do other than what was directed to do. In fact, there was no actual choosing at all. Choice and choosing remain fictions of the imagination.

But why is that reason(s) judged to be a good reason?

Please pardon me for intruding into your discussion, but I would like to make an attempt at answering this question:

To ask why a reason is judged to be a good reason is equivalent to asking for the reason why that particular reason was chosen as the good reason for choosing X over Y. Any answer someone gives for why reason A was chosen over reason B as the good reason for choosing X over Y must be added to the list of determining factors which ultimately compelled the choice at the end of that list. This list of determining factors never terminates at libertarian freewill because the concept fails to demonstrate a detectable third option for facilitating a choice which is neither ultimately determined by a compulsory reason nor randomly determined. Furthermore, an attempt to describe the concept of libertarian freewill as the compulsory reason or the randomness from which a choice was determined will be to affirm a logical contradiction because a choice cannot be both "free" and simultaneously determined. Therefore, the concept of libertarian freewill is logically incoherent because it is our direct experience of reality that any choice we could possibly perceive as a "freewill" choice including the choice between reason A and reason B as the reason for choosing X over Y will be either ultimately determined by another more compelling reason or randomly determined. We do not directly experience a third option for decision making which is neither ultimately determined by a compulsory reason nor randomly determined.

One of the failed counter-examples I've been provided in the past on this topic is the direct experience of having the ability to resist the compulsion to choose the more compelling reason over the less compelling reasons for choosing X over Y. This does not describe a libertarian freewill decision because the reason to choose a less compelling reason over the more compelling reason for choosing X over Y was determined by another more compelling reason. Therefore, in this scenario, the decision is ultimately determined by an inability to resist the compulsory reason to resist choosing the more compelling reason for choosing X over Y.

Another failed counter-example is the decision to randomly choose X over Y. This does not describe a libertarian freewill decision because the reason for the decision to randomly choose X over Y was the determining factor. In other words, a compulsory reason ultimately determined the decision to randomly choose X over Y. Even if the reason for the decision to randomly choose X over Y was also the outcome of a random choice between various reasons, there must have either been a compulsory reason for that decision or it was also randomly determined. No matter how far down you go in the chain of reasons for choosing X over Y, the choice between reasons was either determined by a compulsory reason or randomly determined. There is no identifiable third option.

As always, I'm open to the possibility of being mistaken and invite anyone to provide me with an example of a "freewill" choice which was neither determined by a compulsory reason nor randomly determined.

[bluegreenearth]

This is something I wrote a few years ago-

Extreme determinsts maintain that the physical universe is just an outworking of the laws of nature and everything is predetermined by these laws. It is even argued that our brains are determined by neurological processes etc that are physically deterministic.

There seems to be a way around this determinism. It involves making a list of possible actions and making a choice from that list in such a way that the choice is not determined by either neurological states or any physical state in the world.

Here is how it works. Make a list of ordinary events and label them 0 to 9.

0. Read a book
1. Go to the library
2. Play tennis
3. Drive your car
4. Go to the cinema
5. Go to the supermarket
6. Listen to the radio
7. ...
8. ...
9. ...

Next get the decimal expansion of an irrational number such as the square root of 11
or 1/23.

Let us take the square root of 11

The square root of 11 is 3.3166247903554

Now take the first digit in the decimal expansion, 3
and go to your list;

3 = Drive your car

the next is 1

1 = Go to the library

6 = Listen to the radio

etc.

Now our choice is not determined by any physical or neurological state. It is determined by purely non physical mathematical entities. So we seem to have broken with any previous determinism by letting digits make our choice for us. If we are in the library, for example, we are engaged with a series of physical activities that, as a set, cannot be traced back to any previous physical state because the digit intervened and determined what set of physical events we would enter into.

Was the decision to allow the choices to be randomly determined in this way randomly determined or determined by a reason?

Was the decision to list this particular set of events in that particular order randomly determined or determined by a reason?

Was the decision to take the square root of 11 as opposed to taking the square root of different irrational number randomly determined or determined by a reason?

Was the decision to assign the the first digit in the decimal expansion as the determining factor of the first choice from the list of events randomly determined or determined by a reason?

[Purple Knight]

Now our choice is not determined by any physical or neurological state. It is determined by purely non physical mathematical entities. So we seem to have broken with any previous determinism by letting digits make our choice for us.

A while ago I addressed something perfectly similar to this by saying that by a certain definition of free will, Two-Face has free will and the rest of us don't.

But that's almost insane. By letting coin flips make his choices for him, he doesn't have any sort of free will anybody would want.

If he can figure out a way to make the coin flips truly random, he can be doing something different in Universe A vs in Universe B. But is that really all free will is? The claim to being able to act randomly?

Was the decision to list this particular set of events in that particular order randomly determined or determined by a reason?

Absolutely not, if I use his list.

But I don't think free will can be reduced to the claim to being able to act randomly.

[Miles]

In any case, and in short, the question then arises about how one's thoughts and actions arise. Why did you think or do A instead of B? If one claims it's simply a matter of choice the problem is hardly resolved, but shifted to another issue begging explanation: Why choose A instead of B? If it's all a mater of pure randomness then it's not a choice or an operation of a will at all. So you have to have some reason driving your choice, say reason X, but just where did this reason come from? It really doesn't matter, because whatever it is it didn't prompt reason Y or Z or . . . to materialize. So one is left at the mercy of reason X (or some other reason that would prompt A instead of B). Therefore, thought or action A was inevitable: the will was not free to do other than what was directed to do. In fact, there was no actual choosing at all. Choice and choosing remain fictions of the imagination.

But why is that reason(s) judged to be a good reason?

I see no other reasonable one. If you have a reason for A other than causation I'm ready to listen.



.

[bluegreenearth]

Now our choice is not determined by any physical or neurological state. It is determined by purely non physical mathematical entities. So we seem to have broken with any previous determinism by letting digits make our choice for us.

A while ago I addressed something perfectly similar to this by saying that by a certain definition of free will, Two-Face has free will and the rest of us don't.

But that's almost insane. By letting coin flips make his choices for him, he doesn't have any sort of free will anybody would want.

If he can figure out a way to make the coin flips truly random, he can be doing something different in Universe A vs in Universe B. But is that really all free will is? The claim to being able to act randomly?

In her/his/their defense, mgb's argument did not appear to be intended as support for the concept of libertarian freewill but to offer the possibility of a random decision as a refutation against the claim that it is impossible for a decision to be anything but determined. However, the argument seems to fail when we recognize how randomness functions as the determining factor in that decision making process. Of course, I could be mistaken in my interpretation.

[Purple Knight]

In her/his/their defense, mgb's argument did not appear to be intended as support for the concept of libertarian freewill but as a refutation against the claim that it is impossible for a decision to be randomly determined. Of course, I could be mistaken in my interpretation.

No, I think you're right. In a way I'm on MGB's side. I'm also standing against the idea he seems to be refuting but in another way. I don't think a concept of free will that says Two-Face has more free will than the rest of us, is very useful, or very descriptive of what people are seeking when they seek after free will, saying that they do or don't have it.

So when a determinist says we can't have free will because our actions can't be randomly determined, and MGB says yes they can, I say the claim to being able to act randomly shouldn't be something free will hinges upon.

[bluegreenearth]

In her/his/their defense, mgb's argument did not appear to be intended as support for the concept of libertarian freewill but as a refutation against the claim that it is impossible for a decision to be randomly determined. Of course, I could be mistaken in my interpretation.

No, I think you're right. In a way I'm on MGB's side. I'm also standing against the idea he seems to be refuting but in another way. I don't think a concept of free will that says Two-Face has more free will than the rest of us, is very useful, or very descriptive of what people are seeking when they seek after free will, saying that they do or don't have it.

So when a determinist says we can't have free will because our actions can't be randomly determined, and MGB says yes they can, I say the claim to being able to act randomly shouldn't be something free will hinges upon.

I don't understand how the ability to act randomly negates the concept of determinism because a random choice is still randomly determined. Furthermore, the decision to act randomly must have either been ultimately determined by a compulsory reason or was also randomly determined. I'm unaware of a detectable third option in reality which can facilitate a decision without it being either determined by a compulsory reason or randomly determined.

[Purple Knight]

I don't understand how the ability to act randomly negates the concept of determinism

I don't think it does, at least in the vein of determinism versus free will. We might be doing something different in Universe A than we are in Universe B, but that doesn't give us free will. I also don't think the lack of claim to randomness would serve as proof of determinism (again, in the vein of determinism versus free will).

I don't think anyone is claiming that a random number generator hooked up to the decay of a radioactive isotope has free will.

[mgb]

Was the decision to allow the choices to be randomly determined in this way randomly determined or determined by a reason?

I don't think it matters. It is not that the actions are random, it is that the choice is non physical. The item that is selected from the list is not determined by any physical event, it is determined by a digit and the value of that digit is outside physical determinism. It is mathematically determined.

So when a determinist says we can't have free will because our actions can't be randomly determined, and MGB says yes they can, I say the claim to being able to act randomly shouldn't be something free will hinges upon.

Yes, my only purpose is to defeat the idea that everything is physically determined. The choice of items from the list is made by an abstract, eternal truth, not by any physical means. This means the universe is not necessarily physically determined. And if mind is non physical, physical determinism goes out the window.