Where am I?

[bernee51]

In a recent book Douglas Hofstader (of Godel, Escher, Bach fame) posed this philosophical problem.

Suppose that I am to be teleported to another planet. In the process of reducing my body to data it is physically destroyed. The data is then sent to, say Mars, and reassembled from local atoms and molecules. Somebody thinks it would be fun to send me to Venus as well.

So here I am, on Mars and Venus.

Where am I?

[QED]

What's the problem? Continuity of consciousness is often lost for different lengths of time. I can imagine losing consciousness and then waking on Mars. I can imagine losing consciousness and waking on Venus. I go where my atoms go so there are now two Me's in the solar system. So, we both happen to look and think alike and share the exact same memories -- just like any close siblings can. I see no problem in that.

[McCulloch]

In a recent book Douglas Hofstader (of Godel, Escher, Bach fame) posed this philosophical problem.

Suppose that I am to be teleported to another planet. In the process of reducing my body to data it is physically destroyed. The data is then sent to, say Mars, and reassembled from local atoms and molecules. Somebody thinks it would be fun to send me to Venus as well.

So here I am, on Mars and Venus.

Where am I?

Let's change the thought experiment to something more suitable for Debating Christianity.

Suppose that the child of a Christian as a baby was be teleduplicated to another culture. The data is then sent to, say Afghanistan, and reassembled from local atoms and molecules. There she is raised as a Muslim and never given a chance to learn the Christian religion. The original baby is raised by True Christians™ and becomes born again. One soul or two? Lost or saved?

[Confused]

In a recent book Douglas Hofstader (of Godel, Escher, Bach fame) posed this philosophical problem.

Suppose that I am to be teleported to another planet. In the process of reducing my body to data it is physically destroyed. The data is then sent to, say Mars, and reassembled from local atoms and molecules. Somebody thinks it would be fun to send me to Venus as well.

So here I am, on Mars and Venus.

Where am I?

Let's change the thought experiment to something more suitable for Debating Christianity.

Suppose that the child of a Christian as a baby was be teleduplicated to another culture. The data is then sent to, say Afghanistan, and reassembled from local atoms and molecules. There she is raised as a Muslim and never given a chance to learn the Christian religion. The original baby is raised by True Christians™ and becomes born again. One soul or two? Lost or saved?

The movie "The Illusionist" did just that for his "magician tricks". I would have to say that though we are dealing with two copies of one, I think if a soul existed, each would now be independent of the other. We may have started each copy with the same knowledge/data etc.. but each copy then went on to develop a new set of unique experiences/concepts/beliefs. It makes them two distinct copies now. As such, their ultimate fates would be dependent on which faith is the "right" faith.

However, I think that an argument could be made that the duplicate is an abomination of Gods creation (the original baby) therefore damned from the start. (Wait a minute, all are damned to begin with anyways, so perhaps the "copy" could still be saved if it only finds Christianity first).

[Furrowed Brow]

What's the problem? Continuity of consciousness is often lost for different lengths of time. I can imagine losing consciousness and then waking on Mars. I can imagine losing consciousness and waking on Venus. I go where my atoms go so there are now two Me's in the solar system. So, we both happen to look and think alike and share the exact same memories -- just like any close siblings can. I see no problem in that.

You may come to terms with it QED. But what about mum, dad, wife and kids back on earth.

If two yous get back to Earth. Who gets the kids during the week, and who gets them at the weekend?

Changing the conditions slightly. Lets assume one copy is a perfect rendition of you. The second copy is nearly perfect except this one just happens to be just a tad wittier, more charming and caring.

Now which copy do you wife and kids want back?

[QED]

You may come to terms with it QED. But what about mum, dad, wife and kids back on earth.

If two yous get back to Earth. Who gets the kids during the week, and who gets them at the weekend?

Changing the conditions slightly. Lets assume one copy is a perfect rendition of you. The second copy is nearly perfect except this one just happens to be just a tad wittier, more charming and caring.

Now which copy do you wife and kids want back?

Oh but those are all psychological problems for people. I was wondering if the thought-experiment was meant to be useful in understanding the nature of consciousness -- perhaps by showing a problem with the monist take on the mind-body problem.

[Goat]

What's the problem? Continuity of consciousness is often lost for different lengths of time. I can imagine losing consciousness and then waking on Mars. I can imagine losing consciousness and waking on Venus. I go where my atoms go so there are now two Me's in the solar system. So, we both happen to look and think alike and share the exact same memories -- just like any close siblings can. I see no problem in that.

You may come to terms with it QED. But what about mum, dad, wife and kids back on earth.

If two yous get back to Earth. Who gets the kids during the week, and who gets them at the weekend?

Changing the conditions slightly. Lets assume one copy is a perfect rendition of you. The second copy is nearly perfect except this one just happens to be just a tad wittier, more charming and caring.

Now which copy do you wife and kids want back?

Ha. I know a few that would look at it as an opportuinity to collect child support from TWO instead of one.

[Furrowed Brow]

You may come to terms with it QED. But what about mum, dad, wife and kids back on earth.

If two yous get back to Earth. Who gets the kids during the week, and who gets them at the weekend?

Changing the conditions slightly. Lets assume one copy is a perfect rendition of you. The second copy is nearly perfect except this one just happens to be just a tad wittier, more charming and caring.

Now which copy do you wife and kids want back?

Oh but those are all psychological problems for people. I was wondering if the thought-experiment was meant to be useful in understanding the nature of consciousness -- perhaps by showing a problem with the monist take on the mind-body problem.

We've visited this argument before I remember. You're right it is a psychological problem. Ethical one too. I think the thought experiment is really about identity.

Lets consider the problem from that perspective. Say the machine that transmits a copy of you to Mars is just a duplication machine. You remain in tact here on earth whilst a perfect copy of you is assembled from another collection of atoms on mars. As soon as he appears on mars the You 2 gets homesick and jumps on the first ship home. And one year later turns up on your door step.

Now you are you and have never left earth, and as much as you can agree the other you is an excellent copy, he is only ever a copy.

The obvious point is that you 1 is not you 2 and vice versa.

Just because you 2 believes himself to be you, don't make it so. All the memories that make you you, school, college, first kiss etc happened on Earth. You 1 has never left earth, and until ten minutes ago you 2 had never been to earth, despite thinking he has.

So the subjective point of view which includes stuff like memories is insufficient to make a claim that you know who you are. If I remember being Napoleon, and by strange coincidence my memories are accurate reproductions of Napoleons life that still does not make me Napoleon.

[QED]

Have you ever passed out (lost consciousness)? I have several times. I can't say it's really any different to falling asleep - except it's far more likely that you'll wake up somewhere completely unexpected The point is I can't see how, on regaining consciousness, one would know if one had been duplicated and was either the original or the copy.

Certainly if I were to remain conscious while a duplicator scanned me and watched as another "me" emerged from a vat of bubbling fluid -- I would be keeping track and know, despite the protestations of the wet "me" (who recalls watching the scanner being set in motion -- then suddenly jumping to a new position in the room, climbing out from the vat) that I'm the real McCoy. I might even be able to convince the other me through the obvious difference in our conditions (one dry, one wet) that he was the copy. Quite how he would handle this psychologically is an interesting question.

[Furrowed Brow]

Have you ever passed out (lost consciousness)? I have several times. I can't say it's really any different to falling asleep - except it's far more likely that you'll wake up somewhere completely unexpected The point is I can't see how, on regaining consciousness, one would know if one had been duplicated and was either the original or the copy.

Certainly if I were to remain conscious while a duplicator scanned me and watched as another "me" emerged from a vat of bubbling fluid -- I would be keeping track and know, despite the protestations of the wet "me" (who recalls watching the scanner being set in motion -- then suddenly jumping to a new position in the room, climbing out from the vat) that I'm the real McCoy. I might even be able to convince the other me through the obvious difference in our conditions (one dry, one wet) that he was the copy. Quite how he would handle this psychologically is an interesting question.

I was knocked out for a full ten minutes during a game of Rugby. Strangely I have never felt the same since.

When I did begin to gain my sense which was a full 24 hours later, I did not know I was a father. Seeing my son had only been born the Sunday before, this was quite something to forget.