Arguments and evidence for deism, theism, and miracles

[otseng]

We have agreed to debate the following:

Is there sufficient evidence to conclude the existence of a deistic God?

And if so, is there sufficient evidence to conclude a theistic worldview whereby this God intervenes in human affairs? Specifically, is there evidentiary justification for concluding that some claims of intervention are authentic whereas others aren't.

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A thread has been created for followers of this debate to post comments:
http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... hp?t=24538

[no evidence no belief]

The problem is what can account for the apparent fine-tuning.

I don't think you've established that this apparent fine tuning is something that needs to be accounted for.

If the universe were made entirely of liquid hydrogen, would it be necessary to "account" for that? Would we have to look for any kind of explanation beyond this:

The universe was either going to exist or not exist and if it was going to exist it would either be pure hydrogen or not.

Why is there no necessity for "accounting" for pure hydrogen vs not pure hydrogen, but there is a necessity for "accounting" for life vs non-life?

Can you please present the argument without skipping any premises? I'd love to see something like this:

1) Premise
2) Premise
3) Premise
4) Premise
5) Therefore it is not necessary to account for physical constants resulting in X rather than not-X, EXCEPT when X is life, in which case an accounting of that IS necessary.

[no evidence no belief]

Oliver, let me put it this way:

Assume that life was in no way preferable to non-life. It was not objectively preferable, it was not subjectively preferable. It was not preferable to entities subsequent to the physical constants being created, it was not preferable to entities antecedent to the physical constants being created. It was not preferable in practicality, it was not preferable in the abstract. It was not preferable intrinsically, it was not preferable contextually.

It. Just. Was. Not. Preferable.

Ok?

Imagine that, just for a second.

If life was not preferable to non-life, would there be "more to the argument from fine tuning" than just the fact that life is different from non life?

If the universe was conducive to life, but life was in no way whatsoever preferable to non-life, then the argument from fine-tuning would be dead in the water. Would you agree?

If so, the concept of "preference" is at the heart of your argument.

If you agree with the above, could you please talk a little more about what "preferable" means to you? Preferable intrinsically, all the time, no matter what, or preferable depending on the context? Preferable objectively, or preferable subjectively? If subjectively, then preferable to who? Preferable in the abstract or in practicality?

Once you've defined what "preferable" means to you and to the argument from fine-tuning, I'd love to see an argument that looks like this:

1) Premise
2) Premise
3) Therefore life is preferable to non-life as per the definition of preferable outlined above

Once you've successfully made that argument, I'd love to see something like this:

1) If the universe wasn't the way it is, it would be different
2) But there is "more to it than that" because a universe the way it is (conducive to life) is better than the way it isnt.
3) Other premise
4) Other premise
5) Therefore God exists.

Would you agree that this is approximately the road ahead of us?

[otseng]

If life was not preferable to non-life, would there be "more to the argument from fine tuning" than just the fact that life is different from non life?

Yes, I would agree with this. Life being more preferable to non-life would be an implicit assumption for fine-tuning. If that's not true, nobody would even be discussing fine-tuning, yet scientists do (like Richard Feynman and many other scientists). Would you agree that Feynman assumes that life is preferable to non-life?

If hitting the the center of a target would get you the same number of points as hitting anywhere else on the target, then there's no need for an explanation of an arrow in the bullseye.

I think life being more preferable to non-life is a a properly basic belief. It is something that is intuitively true. People like Feynman aren't even raising this as an issue.

Even in terms of human life, we feel that it is true that human life is preferable to non-human life. I don't think it's something we need to justify to hold this belief.

Thinking about it more, I don't think the burden is on me to prove that life is preferable to non-life. Anyone who raises the issue of fine-tuning (like Feynman again) assumes this to be true. Even if you don't believe it to be true, those who raise the issue do believe it to be true.

So, I want to bring it back to the question I've raised all along, which is the heart of the matter, what can account for the appearance of fine-tuning?

[no evidence no belief]

If life was not preferable to non-life, would there be "more to the argument from fine tuning" than just the fact that life is different from non life?

Yes, I would agree with this. Life being more preferable to non-life would be an implicit assumption for fine-tuning. If that's not true, nobody would even be discussing fine-tuning, yet scientists do (like Richard Feynman and many other scientists). Would you agree that Feynman assumes that life is preferable to non-life?

If hitting the the center of a target would get you the same number of points as hitting anywhere else on the target, then there's no need for an explanation of an arrow in the bullseye.

I think life being more preferable to non-life is a a properly basic belief. It is something that is intuitively true. People like Feynman aren't even raising this as an issue.

Even in terms of human life, we feel that it is true that human life is preferable to non-human life. I don't think it's something we need to justify to hold this belief.

Thinking about it more, I don't think the burden is on me to prove that life is preferable to non-life. Anyone who raises the issue of fine-tuning (like Feynman again) assumes this to be true. Even if you don't believe it to be true, those who raise the issue do believe it to be true.

So, I want to bring it back to the question I've raised all along, which is the heart of the matter, what can account for the appearance of fine-tuning?

Ok, very good. So we agree that the concept of preference is a necessary presupposition of fine-tuning, and that an entity capable of having a preference is a necessary presupposition of preference.

I also agree that life is preferable to non-life... TO LIVING PEOPLE. Life is subjectively preferable, not intrinsically objectively preferable.

To illustrate my next point, I would like to expand on, and slightly modify the analogy of the archer.

Imagine there was a long room. On one wall there were hundreds of colored tiles, and one of them is red, all the others are several different colors. There is a rock on the floor near that wall, and the red tile is cracked. Clearly the rock flew from the other side of the room and hit the red tile.

There are two possible explanations for the rock having hit the red tile. It was either 1) a random event (for example there was an explosion which propelled the rock against the tiled wall of the room, or a monkey just threw the rock at random and it happened to hit the red tile), or 2) the rock was thrown by somebody deliberately at the red tile, which would take a lot of skill/intelligence.

Before we can even begin to argue the merits of explanation 2), there are two things we have to presuppose. First we must presuppose that an intelligent entity with preference existed at the time the rock hit the tile. Secondly, we must presuppose that this intelligent entity's preference was the red tile specifically. If both of these presuppositions are demonstrated to be true, we can begin to debate whether this intelligent entity with a preference for hitting the red tile did indeed use his skill and preference to fine-tune the rock to hit the red tile. If these presuppositions are not both demonstrated to be true, then fine-tuning is dead in the water.

Completely separate from this event of the rock hitting the tile, several years later (lets say 7 billion years later) other intelligent entities walk into the room and they observe that several years earlier the rock had hit the red tile, and they are very very happy about it. They prefer that the rock hit the red tile.

Irrespective of the preference of the subsequent observers many years later, the rock either hit the red tile at random, or it was thrown by a person with intentionality, preference and skill.

The intelligence and preference of subsequent observers is completely irrelevant. In order to entertain fine-tuning, you MUST presuppose that an intelligent entity with preference existed at the time the rock was thrown and hit the red tile.

The subsequent observers are completely irrelevant. I don't see how this is anything less than completely obvious.

If those subsequent observers didn't walk into the room, didn't see the rock and the red tile, and didn't express a preference for that state of affairs, it could STILL be possible that the rock either hit the red tile at random, or it was thrown by an intelligent entity with preference.

Those subsequent observers might have preferred if the rock had hit the orange tile rather than the red tile. But STILL, that has no bearing whatsoever on the fact that the rock hit the red tile, and that it did so either at random, or as per the preference of an intelligent entity.

Do you understand? Fine-tuning of necessity must presuppose that an intelligent entity with preference existed at the time the rock hit the red tile. Subsequent preferences of subsequent intelligent entities have no bearing on that whatsoever. An intelligent entity with preference either existed or did not exist at the time the rock hit the red tile. If it did not exist, then fine-tuning is IMPOSSIBLE, no matter the preference of subsequent intelligent entities.

By definition, if the only intelligent entities with preference that exist, appear 7 billion years after the rock hit the red tile, then AN INTELLIGENT ENTITY WITH PREFERENCE DIDN'T EXIST AT THE TIME THE ROCK HIT THE RED TILE, AND THEREFORE FINE_TUNING WAS IMPOSSIBLE.

Let me give you another analogy.
I was born in 1980 AD.
Julius Caesar died in 44BC.

Caesar's death was either the result of random events such as a heart attack, or he was killed by intelligent entities with a preference for his death (an assassination).

I prefer that Caesar had been assassinated. Can that in any way change the fact that Caesar was either assassinated or he was not?

Of necessity, to entertain the notion that Caesar was assassinated, we MUST presuppose the existence of intelligent entities capable of preferring Caesar to be dead... AT THE TIME CAESAR DIED. If intelligent people who prefer Caesar's death existed when Caesar died, it's still possible that Caesar had a heart attack. Historians would have to debate that. But if we cannot reasonably presuppose that people who wanted Caesar dead existed at the time he died, THEN THE NOTION THAT HE WAS ASSASSINATED IS IMPOSSIBLE.

My preference for Caesar's assassination has no bearing whatsoever.

If I prefer assassination, Caesar was STILL either assassinated or NOT.

If I prefer death by natural causes, Caesar was STILL either assassinated or NOT.

If I have no preference whatsoever, Caesar was STILL either assassinated or NOT.

If I exist, Caesar was STILL either assassinated or NOT.

If I don't exist, Caesar was STILL either assassinated or NOT.

If my existence is directly caused by Caesar's death (because had he lived, he would have killed my ancestor), Caesar was STILL either assassinated or NOT.


To postulate an assassination, assassins must be present AT THE TIME OF THE ASSASSINATION. Otherwise the assassination is IMPOSSIBLE.

To postulate a fine-tuning of the physical constants, an intelligent entity with preference must be present AT THE TIME OF THE FINE-TUNING. Otherwise the fine-tuning is IMPOSSIBLE.

Fine-tuning must presuppose the existence of a fine-tuner. Please tell me you understand.

[no evidence no belief]

[Replying to post 141 by otseng]

Presuppose that assassins existed in the year 44BC.

Given this presupposition, is it possible for you to argue that Caesar was assassinated? I say it is, do you agree?

Presuppose that assassins did not exist until the year 1980. Presuppose, for the sake of argument, that until 1980 the concept of killing another human being was inconceivable to any person ever.

Given this presupposition, is it possible for you to argue that Caesar was assassinated? I say it's impossible.

If no assassins exist at the time that somebody dies, then the notion that that person was assassinated is IMPOSSIBLE.

Do you agree?

[otseng]

I also agree that life is preferable to non-life... TO LIVING PEOPLE. Life is subjectively preferable, not intrinsically objectively preferable.

Aren't all statements that we make relative to people? What would it mean to make a statement that is relative to something else, particularly if it can't even think and generate a thought? Certainly a star or a planet cannot even hold the position that life is not preferable to non-life. A dead person also cannot hold the position that non-life is preferable to life; it cannot even think. What can hold the position that non-life is preferable to life if it is not a sentient being?

To illustrate my next point, I would like to expand on, and slightly modify the analogy of the archer.

Imagine there was a long room. On one wall there were hundreds of colored tiles, and one of them is red, all the others are several different colors. There is a rock on the floor near that wall, and the red tile is cracked. Clearly the rock flew from the other side of the room and hit the red tile.

There are two possible explanations for the rock having hit the red tile. It was either 1) a random event (for example there was an explosion which propelled the rock against the tiled wall of the room, or a monkey just threw the rock at random and it happened to hit the red tile), or 2) the rock was thrown by somebody deliberately at the red tile, which would take a lot of skill/intelligence.

Before we can even begin to argue the merits of explanation 2), there are two things we have to presuppose. First we must presuppose that an intelligent entity with preference existed at the time the rock hit the tile. Secondly, we must presuppose that this intelligent entity's preference was the red tile specifically. If both of these presuppositions are demonstrated to be true, we can begin to debate whether this intelligent entity with a preference for hitting the red tile did indeed use his skill and preference to fine-tune the rock to hit the red tile. If these presuppositions are not both demonstrated to be true, then fine-tuning is dead in the water.

We've already talked about this, many times.

Even in your example above it does not prove your point. If it was a random event (an explosion), why would it presuppose an intelligent entity existed at the time of the explosion? Only in the second case, where the rock was thrown to hit the red tile would it presuppose an intelligent agent. In the first case, an intelligent agent is not even in the picture.

To postulate a fine-tuning of the physical constants, an intelligent entity with preference must be present AT THE TIME OF THE FINE-TUNING. Otherwise the fine-tuning is IMPOSSIBLE.

Fine-tuning must presuppose the existence of a fine-tuner. Please tell me you understand.

I think it's a semantics issue.

If one says the universe actually is fine-tuned, then yes, I agree that the logical conclusion is that there was a a fine-tuner. But, if one says the universe appears to be fine-tuned or exhibits fine-tuning, then it does not require a fine-tuner, but can be attributed to chance.

This is similar to Dawkins saying that life appears to be designed. "Biology is the study of complex things that appear to have been designed for a purpose." Dawkins certainly does not believe that life was the result of a designer, but attributes the appearance of design to natural processes. Dawkins does not presuppose the existence of a designer to say that life appears to have been designed.

[no evidence no belief]

I also agree that life is preferable to non-life... TO LIVING PEOPLE. Life is subjectively preferable, not intrinsically objectively preferable.

Aren't all statements that we make relative to people?

No

A is A and is not ~A

2 + 2 = 4

Water is two parts hydrogen one part oxygen

The universe is expanding.


Above are all examples of statements which are NOT contingent on the existence of people. If every living organism died out, or had never existed, the Law of Identity would still be true. 2 + 2 would still be 4, water would still be H2O and the universe would still be expanding.

These empirical facts do NOT require the preference, or the existence for that matter, of intelligent beings.

On the other hand, concepts such as "I prefer apples to oranges", "I prefer winter to summer" or " I prefer life to non-life" are completely and utterly meaningless in the absence of a subject capable of preference. Concepts relating to "preference" are contingent upon a sentient "preferer".

What can hold the position that non-life is preferable to life if it is not a sentient being?

Right, so if life was preferable at the time the the physical constants were fine-tuned, a sentient being must be presupposed to have existed at that time.

God exists, therefore fine-tuning happened, therefore God exists.

To illustrate my next point, I would like to expand on, and slightly modify the analogy of the archer.

Imagine there was a long room. On one wall there were hundreds of colored tiles, and one of them is red, all the others are several different colors. There is a rock on the floor near that wall, and the red tile is cracked. Clearly the rock flew from the other side of the room and hit the red tile.

There are two possible explanations for the rock having hit the red tile. It was either 1) a random event (for example there was an explosion which propelled the rock against the tiled wall of the room, or a monkey just threw the rock at random and it happened to hit the red tile), or 2) the rock was thrown by somebody deliberately at the red tile, which would take a lot of skill/intelligence.

Before we can even begin to argue the merits of explanation 2), there are two things we have to presuppose. First we must presuppose that an intelligent entity with preference existed at the time the rock hit the tile. Secondly, we must presuppose that this intelligent entity's preference was the red tile specifically. If both of these presuppositions are demonstrated to be true, we can begin to debate whether this intelligent entity with a preference for hitting the red tile did indeed use his skill and preference to fine-tune the rock to hit the red tile. If these presuppositions are not both demonstrated to be true, then fine-tuning is dead in the water.

We've already talked about this, many times.

Even in your example above it does not prove your point. If it was a random event (an explosion), why would it presuppose an intelligent entity existed at the time of the explosion? Only in the second case, where the rock was thrown to hit the red tile would it presuppose an intelligent agent. In the first case, an intelligent agent is not even in the picture.

You must be misunderstanding me. I COMPLETELY agree with what you just said.

You are absolutely right that if the physical constants being the way they are is the result of random chance, then WE DON'T NEED TO presuppose an intelligent being at the moment the physical constants were set.

On the other hand, if we wish to even just entertain the notion that the physical constants were NOT set randomly, but instead fine-tuned as per a preference.... then we must presuppose an entity capable of having a preference to exist at the time the physical constants were fine tuned.

God exists, therefore fine tuning happened, therefore God exists.

To postulate a fine-tuning of the physical constants, an intelligent entity with preference must be present AT THE TIME OF THE FINE-TUNING. Otherwise the fine-tuning is IMPOSSIBLE.

Fine-tuning must presuppose the existence of a fine-tuner. Please tell me you understand.

I think it's a semantics issue.

If one says the universe actually is fine-tuned, then yes, I agree that the logical conclusion is that there was a a fine-tuner.

It's not just the conclusion. It's also the implicit premise. That's my point.

The concept of something being fine tuned PRESUPPOSES the existence of a fine-tuner, much like the notion that somebody was assassinated presupposes the existence of assassins.

Once the existence of assassins at the time of death has been established, the concept of an assassination goes from being impossible to being possible. At that point, logic and evidence can be used to establish whether this possible assassination happened or not. But if we don't presuppose that an assassin existed at the time of the death, the whole things falls like a castle of cards.

Similarly, once the existence of an intelligent entity with preference at the time of big bang has been established, the concept of fine-tuning goes from being impossible to being possible. At that point, logic and evidence can be used to establish whether this possible fine tuning happened or not. But if we don't presuppose that an intelligent entity with preference existed at the time of the big bang, then the whole thing falls like a castle of cards.

But, if one says the universe appears to be fine-tuned then it does not require a fine-tuner, but can be attributed to chance.

Well of course. If the universe ISN'T ACTUALLY fine tuned, it just APPEARS to be, then..... the universe isn't fine tuned. In which case, of course, we don't need to presuppose a fine-tuner.

Caesar may "appear" to have been assassinated. That's irrelevant. Either he WAS assassinated or he was NOT. Before we can entertain the notion that he was assassinated, we must make the necessary antecedent implicit assumption that assassins existed in 44BC.

The universe may "appear" to have bene fine tuned. That's irrelevant. Either it WAS fine tuned or it was NOT. Before we can entertain the notion that it was fine tuned, we must make the necessary antecedent implicit assumption that sentient beings with preference existed at the time of the big bang.

Caesar's assassination cannot be used as an argument for the existence of assassins in 44BC, because the existence of assassins in 44BC is an IMPLICIT PREMISE of Caesar being assassinated.

The fine tuning of the universe cannot be used as an argument for the existence of an intelligent being at the big bang, because the existence of an intelligent being at the big bang is an IMPLICIT PREMISE of fine tuning.

[no evidence no belief]

1) Argument: As yet unspecified
2) Conclusion A: Therefore the universe is fine tuned
3) Conclusion B: Therefore God exists.

Please provide the "as yet unspecified argument" above.

Remember, in constructing the premises to your argument you may NOT infer or imply that life is preferable to non-life, because the concept of something being preferable is based on the implicit premise that an entity capable of a preference exists at the time the universe began to exist.

You may not use your conclusion as an implicit premise of your argument.

In other words, please demonstrate the universe is fine-tuned without relying on the assumption that life is preferable to non-life.

While you're at it, please demonstrate that an archer is skilled without relying on the assumption that hitting the bullseye is preferable to not hitting it.

[no evidence no belief]

Can you demonstrate fine-tuning is possible WITHOUT first assuming something is preferable to something else? No. So the notion of something being preferable must be a premise to fine-tuning being possible.

Can you demonstrate something was preferable at the big bang WITHOUT first assuming a sentient entity capable of preference existed at that time? No. So the existence of a sentient entity at the big bang must be a premise to the concept of something being preferable.

1) A sentient entity capable of having a preference existed at the time the physical constants were set.
2) Therefore it's possible that the physical constants as they are, were considered preferable to alternatives, at the time they were set (without a sentient entity, "preference" would be impossible).
3) Therefore it's possible that the universe was fine-tuned (without preference, fine-tuning would be impossible).
4) [various other arguments showing that fine tuning isn't just possible, but actually supported by more evidence and logic than alternatives]
5) Therefore it's not just possible fine-tuning happened, it's actually reasonable to believe that it did happen
6) Therefore it's reasonable to believe a sentient entity capable of having a preference existed at the time the physical constants were set

Note similarity between premise 1 and conclusion 6. I know this is not the argument you wanted to make, but can you deny that it's the argument you're required to make, because of the implicit premises you've admitted fine-tuning depends on?

[otseng]

On the other hand, concepts such as "I prefer apples to oranges", "I prefer winter to summer" or " I prefer life to non-life" are completely and utterly meaningless in the absence of a subject capable of preference. Concepts relating to "preference" are contingent upon a sentient "preferer".

Right, that's what I'm referring to. Your statement "I also agree that life is preferable to non-life" is meaningless outside of a sentient mind. To qualify that with "TO LIVING PEOPLE" adds no value.

It's not just the conclusion. It's also the implicit premise. That's my point.

It's a premise for one of the possible explanations, but not for all the possible explanations.

Well of course. If the universe ISN'T ACTUALLY fine tuned, it just APPEARS to be, then..... the universe isn't fine tuned. In which case, of course, we don't need to presuppose a fine-tuner.

You'll then need to explain why the universe only appears to be fine-tuned, but is actually not.

[Replying to post 146 by no evidence no belief]

Instead of discussing another rabbit trail, I think we should discuss the statement that you have agreed to:

[Replying to otseng]
I don't object to using the definition you provided:

"The fine-tuned Universe is the proposition that the conditions that allow life in the Universe can only occur when certain universal fundamental physical constants lie within a very narrow range, so that if any of several fundamental constants were only slightly different, the Universe would be unlikely to be conducive to the establishment and development of matter, astronomical structures, elemental diversity, or life as it is understood."

The question is what can account for (the appearance of) fine-tuning?