Does Objective Morality Require the Existence of God?

[wiploc]

The Peanut Gallery is here:
viewtopic.php?t=33976

Those who wish to comment on this discussion may do so there. Once this thread is closed, Tanager and wiploc may post there too. In the meantime, we may respond here to comments made there.

Topic: Does Objective Morality Require the Existence of God?

Tanager's position -- if I understand it -- is that objective morality is possible if a god exists, but not possible otherwise.

My own position is this prejudice: If objective morality is possible with a god, then it is also possible without a god; if it is not possible without a god, then it is also not possible with a god.

I invite Tanager to expound on his position.

[wiploc]

Second, how is this different from my saying "god is good"? God means something more than just goodness (it also includes omnipotence, omniscience, self-existence, etc.). Goodness picks out certain things (justice, love, mercy, etc.). So, it tells us something specific about god to say "god is good." It means "god is just, loving, merciful, etc." Just like you could say "Wiploc is good." In your view, this means "Wiploc causes a feeling of happiness in someone."

I just don't think you're being consistent.

Sometimes you use what I'll call the "street definition," like you just did here. You consult our moral intuitions, and then declare that various terms appealing to those instincts are good. (But when I do that, you protest, saying something like, "Who decides that those things are good?")

Other times, you try to anchor morality in gods, saying, perhaps very roughly (and for no reason that I can see), that objective morality has to come from a galaxy far far away. And your god happens to be far away, so he is the source of morality.

Other times, you say your god just happens to comply with some third and unarticulated standard. Or maybe he just happens to comply with the street definition?

Other times, like when you say we'd be obligated (for no reason I can see) to obey a scorpion god, you say morality consists of obeying a creator god even if he flouts the street definition.

Four moral theories, and you jump from one to another whenever you find it convenient.

This is convenient for you, because you can always find one of those theories that lets you call atheist morality subjective, and another one that lets you call your morality objective.

It's convenient, but it's not persuasive. Your argument is based on equivocation, on dancing back and forth between incompatible definitions.

But the phrase I'm finding fault with is "good is the source of happiness". Don't I also say "god is the source of goodness"? Well, what I mean there is that god is what makes it so that we have (if we are working correctly) a subjective like of things like justice, mercy, love, etc. God created us to like and thrive on liking those kinds of things, because god likes those kinds of things. God determines what becomes called 'good' by humans. Your equivalent statement there, it seems to me, is that feelings of happiness determine what becomes called 'good'. So, in that sense, happiness is the source of goodness for you.

You're putting the cart before the horse. Happiness is the desirable thing. Anything which causes the desirable thing is, by definition, good. Integrity, love, stuff like that are good because happiness results from them.

I pick up on two things there. One is the word "tend." Genocide has a strong tendency to reduce happiness, but if we posit an instance of genocide that nobody minded--not even the victims--then that particular instance of genocide wouldn't be evil.

If X causes unhappiness, it is evil. If, generally speaking, X's tend to cause unhappiness, then we'll probably regard X's as evil, but a particular X that happens not to cause unhappiness won't actually be evil.

I hope I'm being clear here. This may be a nitpick to ignore.

That seems clear to me, but I may be misunderstanding you. The problem is that this looks like subjective morality to me. Genocide is actually evil only when enough people are bothered by it. The standard of judgment is the (collective) subjective responses to the actual action. Morality changes with the subjects' thoughts/responses, it's not true independent of their (collective) feelings.

It's not virtue ethics, that's true. Virtue ethics would say that lying is always wrong, regardless of circumstances. Or killing is always wrong, even in self defense. Even when your god does it.

But you are equally vulnerable to the charge of subjectivity. You say our obligation depends on what gods' desires are. If he's a scorpion god, we're obliged to let him sting us. What could be more subjective than that.

(I apologize in advance to any virtue ethics people who think I screwed that up. )

Let's take your genocide example. Suppose everybody of one race contracted a painful, fatal, lingering, incurable disease--Dutch elm disease, we can call it. And suppose they all wanted to die, and everybody understood that.

Then, in that instance, genocide actually would be good. And any god who forbade ending their suffering would be evil.

Happiness is a feeling, right, so any happiness is felt, and no happiness can be true without being felt.

Let's look at a former rapist. In the past that rapist felt happy about raping their victim. But now they have changed their mind. They regret that they ever felt happy over that. They believe they should not have felt happy over that action and would not feel happy over it now. So, I'm making a distinction between how we react to certain things and how we should react to certain things. We often feel happy about something we shouldn't feel happy about. Perhaps a better term could be used then "true happiness," I don't know. Highest possible felt happiness? I'm open to suggestions, for sure.

We should definitely keep an eye out for things like the no true Scotsman fallacy. I'm not sure it will come into play here because I'm not arguing for specific things, but making a general point. I don't know if this cleared anything up for you.

I'm suspecting a signpost god argument. A signpost god doesn't cause good and evil, but rather infallibly identifies them. Human judgement can be wrong about whether, say, premarital sex is good; but god always knows. So the moral thing to do is just follow the god's instructions.

There are two problems with signpost god arguments.

First, they make good and evil exist independently of gods. Objective good and evil (or subjective, whatever, but the same for both of us) exists even if gods don't; gods just point to them.

Second, they effectively concede that god looks evil. "Well, yes, it seems like god's rules are wrong. The evidence points that way. But you have to trust that god is right by following the commandments of my church even when they seem perverse." In other words, faith and reason lead in opposite directions, and the signpost god argument is a plea to abandon reason.

...
3. "Everyone should desire to increase net happiness" is a statement that is true for everyone. Why? The creator made humans to desire such a thing because it desires such a thing.

Now, once again, your position should be called subjective (according to one of your tests) because it is tied to someone's subjective desires. And, once again, I don't see any appeal in going along with that person's desires.

And you can't give a reason. Sometimes you say it's because obeying gods would make us happy; other times (scorpion god) you say our obligation is independent of that.

Consider the song "Cows with Guns."
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyqDvojqxc8
Were those cows supposed to volunteer to be slaughtered because that's what we bred them for? Why can't they rise morally above the "purpose" that we assign them?

If a god wanted us to sting each other to death, and we preferred to live in peaceful cooperation, what rule requires us to obey the god? It can't be a rule made by a good god.

[wiploc]

It's logically possible that we're wrong about how much a given act will ultimately increase or decrease happiness. If that's all you're saying, then I agree with you.

I'm saying we can be wrong that a given act increases/decreases the net felt happiness of everyone involved and that we can also be wrong that a given act increases/decreases the net highest possible felt happiness of everyone involved.

Let's say the Nazis won WWII. They have taken over the world and brainwashed most people that the Holocaust was a moral thing. The last Jewish person is discovered by the Nazi authorities and everything is televised for the world to see. In this world the net felt happiness of the people will actually be increased by that person's death. We aren't wrong if we say that. But they are settling for less happiness than they could have had and should have had. There would have been an actual higher level of personal and net felt happiness if they weren't Nazis. As it stands, they are happy about a bad thing. Evil would be the source of net felt happiness.

My reaction to that is, I believe, the same as yours. People would be happier without that prejudice and hatred. They shouldn't want that last Jew to die. Our willingness to pick scapegoats and be mean to them leaves us at a lower level of happiness than if we were nice to each other.

[wiploc]

But not only that, it actually is part of making you as happy as you can truly be, whether you feel like that is true or not.

See, your theory is utilitarian at bottom. There's no point in arguing against a position that you yourself adopt.

Yes. But I'm arguing for an objective kind of utilitarianism vs. what appears to me to be a subjective utilitarianism.

First, you're only utilitarian when it suits you. When I bring up the scorpion god, you abandon that position.

Second, your basis for designating things as objective and subjective shifts also. Dare I say that it's not objective?

Humans are happiest when we're nice to each other. You can believe that that's because gods designed us that way; I can believe it results from materialist evolution. I'm not sure we even have a disagreement.

Materialist evolution has led to two kinds of humans: those that want other people to be happy and those that don't care if other people are happy.

From your point of view, it is god's will that we have those two kinds of people.

Those both come out of materialist evolution in the same way; both have survived.

They both came out of god's will the same way. Plantinga says that since god is omniscient, at the beginning of time, god knew of everything that would ever happen in every possible world (and, according to Plantinga, in every impossible world). Being omnipotent, he could choose to create any one of those possible worlds (exception: god couldn't create godless worlds, because that would be a contradiction, which would make it an impossible world.) Out of the infinity of possible worlds, and knowing everything that would ever happen in it, god willed this world into existence.

If two kinds of people exist in this world, then they exist because that is god's will. If it hadn't been god's will that we have sociopaths, then they wouldn't exist.

If god is omnipotent and omniscient, that conclusion seems inescapable. Is that the kind of god we're talking about?

You have been saying "if you want to make people happy, then you should be moral." So, materialist evolution leads the first kind of human to act moral, but not the second kind. There is no moral obligation.

You've been saying that we should follow god's dictates. So theism leads theists to do that, but not atheists. By that test, if there's no objective morality under materialist evolution, then there's also no objective morality under theism.

[wiploc]

Or, if you want to say there is obligation, then it is a subjective obligation based on how one feels about making other people happy. It's not objective.

Under your system, it depends on how you feel about going along with the dictates of gods. Which means that if my way isn't objective, then your way isn't either.

God's design of humanity is for them to find happiness about good things (i.e., justice, love, etc.). That means that when humans do not, there is a defect. They aren't acting like they should. This is an objective moral obligation placed upon them by their creator. Whether they follow through or not is a different question.

So chickens should be happy in their chicken-meat factories? That's how they are intended to live by their creators, so being unhappy about it is a defect?

Why should we care about a creator's intent? How does that intent get authority over us? From my point of view, your point of view seems like a personal whim, completely subjective. People with an affinity for hierarchy may see the appeal of your system--if you can somehow persuade them that gods are above us in a hierarchy.

But let's create a hypothetical conflict. Say that Joe lives in a universe where gods' will conflicts with utilitarianism. Obeying gods will make people miserable. Then, it seems to me, that it would be wrong for Joe to obey gods.

I see no point--if it doesn't increase happiness--for people to obey gods. Can you offer any reason?

You may say it's categorical, we're supposed to obey gods for no reason. I just don't understand that claim. Why should we obey gods if there is no reason to obey gods. The way you seem to be using the word, "categorical" could be a synonym for "irrational."

What do you mean "wrong"? You seem to define wrong as "make miserable".

I'm okay with that as a first approximation. Benevolence is right, and malevolence is wrong.

So, you've answered the question as soon as you've asked it by how you define things. If gods' will conflicted with the best possible net felt happiness, then I think we would still be morally obligated to follow gods' will (as our creator), but not be motivated to do so. Just like I can place an obligation on my children, even though they may not be motivated to fulfill that obligation.

However, I believe that God's will does not conflict with the best possible net felt happiness. And so we have moral obligation and moral motivation (since God designed us in God's image and God cares about humans having the best possible net felt happiness).

And there's the two-step. In once sentence, we are to obey gods because they are creators. In the next, we are to obey for utilitarian reasons.

Clearly, you think the first reason dominates. We should obey even if gods were malevolent, but, as it happens, we should also obey because gods are benevolent and know what is best for us and have made rules for our benefit.

The authoritarian reason is arbitrary. Arbitrary rules aren't objective, right? I could say that everybody has to punch the person to the left, and that would be objective by some tests (it has no exceptions) but it would be subjective by others (it's just one person's or gods' opinion). My rule about punching is exactly as arbitrary as your rule about following gods.

Your other rule is just utilitarianism, so it is no more objective than my utilitarianism.

Materialist evolution does not give us moral obligation (it gives us hypothetical obligation based on our desires) and it has given some people a motivation to make others happy and some people a motivation to not care about that.

I agree. I'm not at all impressed by arguments that ground morality in evolution.

By definition. That's what we're talking about when we talk about morality.

Then you are begging the question by your definition. I wouldn't define morality in terms of causing feelings of happiness (or in terms of God). Morality is judging between right/wrong or good/bad behavior.

Right or wrong for what? Good or bad in what way. I at least give some justification. You on the other hand, think things are right or wrong for no reason.

I assume you'll object to that, but I don't know why. You protest that my giving a reason makes my morality subjective, and then you call yours "categorical" because it doesn't have a reason. You are supposed to behave according to gods' rules without reason.

Did I get that right? If I didn't get it right, I'd like you to explain, to straighten me out, to relieve me of my confusion. But if I did get it right, then "objective" morality is overtly irrational, calling for us to do things without reason.

There can be subjective morality, objective morality, and I think objective morality is grounded in God, but God isn't a part of the definition of morality itself.

But you are unable to defend the claim. You can't explain why your morality is better or more objective than mine.

The closest you come to defending your morality, to showing why someone might want to be moral, is when you claim that it just incidentally happens to be utilitarian. That's the essence of my morality, but it's just a bit of accidental icing on yours. To the extent that it makes your morality appealing, it makes mine much more so.

[The Tanager]

I've tried my best to organize our discussion in a coherent way. So please correct any mistakes of interpretation by me and bring to my attention any thought of yours I've seemed to completely ignore.

Two of the key terms of this discussion are objective and subjective. Objective means "independent of one's opinions, feelings, thoughts, reactions." Subjective means "based on one's opinions, feelings, thoughts, reactions."

Another key term is goodness and we need to take a closer look at this. At times, I think you have used (something like) this definition of goodness: "the quality of causing a feeling of happiness in someone." A rape is a mix of goodness and badness for you (because it causes happiness and unhappiness in different individuals). You think rape is wrong because it generally causes a net-bad (or it's synonym: net-unhappiness) for those in the world.

If this is how we should define goodness, then what does it lead to? Subjective morality. What we ought to do, as humans, is based on (collective) human reactions or feelings. The problem is that this definition of goodness begs the question in favor of utilitarianism. We need a more neutral definition of goodness. I think you have provided us with a start in this direction when you write:

But in normal speech, that's simply not what we mean by "good." "Good" means things like acceptable, satisfactory, nice, pleasing, ship shape, up to snuff, worthy, and admirable. None of those means "god" or "godlike."

This definition does not beg the question in favor of utilitarianism or in favor of god or other moral groundings. But it does make goodness a relative term. Something is good because it is acceptable to someone or something or up to snuff of some standard. The question then becomes what the standard is and, for our purposes, whether that standard is objective or subjective in relation to humans.

But before we look at those, however, let me have a chance to respond to your charge of inconsistency towards my use of 'goodness.' You say I move back and forth between four moral theories as it suits my needs. I think the problem is that you are conflating at least six questions there. I'm going to try to distinguish those and will return to addressing them in relation to our two views in the following posts.

Sometimes you use what I'll call the "street definition," like you just did here. You consult our moral intuitions, and then declare that various terms appealing to those instincts are good. (But when I do that, you protest, saying something like, "Who decides that those things are good?")

(1) This "street definition" isn't (a) a definition of goodness; they are (b) examples of things that are called good. You and I and everyone put certain actions in the category of 'good,' however we define the term. And the protest is addressing a further question of (c) whether our standard of goodness is subjective or objective to humans.

Other times, you try to anchor morality in gods, saying, perhaps very roughly (and for no reason that I can see), that objective morality has to come from a galaxy far far away. And your god happens to be far away, so he is the source of morality.

(2) Here, again, we are talking about (c) whether our standard of goodness is subjective or objective to humans. It has nothing to do with being far away. Is the standard independent of human feelings or based on human feelings? The moral theory that says goodness is reducible to physical properties is not far away, but is still (if true) an objective source of goodness for humanity.

Other times, you say your god just happens to comply with some third and unarticulated standard. Or maybe he just happens to comply with the street definition?

(3) I have definitely not meant that and am not sure why you think I have said that. (Or the whole signpost god argument, for that matter). Perhaps this is getting at the question of (d) whether or not our human desires (or what humans typically place in the category of 'good actions') matches up with God's desires?

Other times, like when you say we'd be obligated (for no reason I can see) to obey a scorpion god, you say morality consists of obeying a creator god even if he flouts the street definition.

(4) Here I think you are getting at (d) again and the questions of (e) whether being an authority gives one the ability to place obligations on those they have authority over and (f) whether those under that authority would be motivated to fulfill those obligations.

So, I think there are at least six questions being asked here that can shape our analysis of our two moral theories:

(a) definition of goodness
(b) examples of good actions
(c) whether the standard of goodness is objective or subjective
(d) whether our human desires match up with this standard's 'desires'
(e) the nature of obligation
(f) the nature of motivation

Of the six questions I see being asked in our conversation, I have already talked about (a) above. I think the second definition of goodness "acceptable (up to snuff, etc.) to some standard" is a non question begging (tentative) definition that fits both of our uses. Obviously feel free to disagree and explain why. I think that both of our views would be able to provide (b) examples of good actions (and we would probably largely agree on what those are), but this isn't pertinent to the intent of our discussion. So, the first difference really comes at (c). Let's look at that in the next post.

[The Tanager]

(c) Whether the standard of goodness (assuming it is true) is objective or subjective:

(1) Your standard of goodness is net-happiness for everyone in the world. An action is good if it creates the highest net-happiness. Net-happiness involves what humans actually feel happy about. This standard is saying that human morality is based on what humans actually feel happy about. Therefore, it is clearly a subjective morality. Subjective means "based on one's opinions, feelings, thoughts, reactions."

The subjectivity can be seen through the thought experiment about Nazis winning WWII. If the Nazis won the war and changed the balance of human feelings concerning Jews (through extermination, brainwashing, etc.) to where more humans actually feel happier (i.e., more utils are actually created) about a Jew being executed, then executing the Jew is the good/right thing to do on your theory. The Holocaust is subjectively evil, dependent upon how the humans in existence actually feel about it.

(2) An action is good if it reduces to certain physical properties (call it property X) that a human has or doesn't have. If such a view were true, then human morality is not based on one's opinions or feelings; it's based on having certain physical properties. Just like our eye color is an objective fact about us, goodness would be an objective fact about us. Even in the Nazi scenario above, the Holocaust would still be evil.

(3) Another standard used by some is atheistic moral platonism. An action is good if it participates in the form "Goodness" that truly exists in some non-physical way. If such a view were true, then human morality is not based on our opinions or feelings. Even in the Nazi scenario above, the Holocaust would still be evil.

But now let's look at the relationship between the form 'Goodness' and a good action like protecting the Jews from Nazis. The goodness of the action is subjectively related to the form 'Goodness' and, yet, the goodness of the action is still objectively related to humans. Human morality is objective.

(4) In my view the standard is God's desires. An action is good if it is up to snuff of God's desires. If this view is true, then human morality is not based on our opinions or feelings. But they are dependent upon God's opinions or feelings. So, human morality is subjectively related to God, but objectively related to humans. Even in the Nazi scenario above, the Holocaust would still be evil (if God's desires are that it is evil, of course).

This is not equivocating between two meanings of objective. It's not bait and switch. This whole time we've been asking what is our human relationship to goodness. If your view is true, then that relationship is subjective. If my view is true (or the views of the moral platonist or the physical reductionist), then that relationship is objective regardless of the standard's relationship to goodness. Of course the standard of gooodness' relationship to goodness is going to be one of identity (for you: causing net-happiness IS goodness itself; for me: god IS goodness itself) whatever theory we look at.

[The Tanager]

(d) Whether our human desires match up with this standard's 'desires':

(1) Of course it matches in your view because human desires (collectively considered) are the standard itself. Hopefully human desires won't change and more utils be created by actions like rape or genocide, etc. There's nothing guaranteeing that it won't, however, because there is no pattern, no way humans are supposed to be on your view. Or if there are, then what is responsible for that pattern?

(4a) In the scorpion god view, our human desires (a subjective standard) do not match up with the objective standard (the creator's desires). For whatever reason, scorpion god made us with the opposite desires than it has. In this view the 'street' use of good/evil is a subjective use. Scorpion god is 'evil' in the subjective sense of "going against our human desires."

(4b) In my theistic view, our human desires are designed to match up with the creator's desires. But the creator also grants us free will, so that our desires may not match up with the creator's desires. Some of us do match up and some don't. God is 'evil' in the subjective sense of "going against our human desires," but is 'good' in the objective sense.

This leads into the next question, however...

[The Tanager]

(e) The nature of obligation

(4) In both the scorpion god view and my theistic view, I'm saying we have a morally objective obligation to our creator. If a random person (or a sea turtle) were to tell you to pull your car over, you have no obligation to obey. But if a police officer tells you to, you are legally obliged to obey. The difference lies in the authority of the one issuing the command.

So, back to the Nazi WWII scenario. We have a legal obligation to turn in the Jew. This is an obligation imposed upon us. We are legally obligated to turn the Jew in, but that doesn't mean we want to or will do it. We can ignore the obligation. It's still an obligation placed on us. I'm not saying we should always obey the obligations placed on us, and that gets more into the next section about moral motivations.

(1) Now on your view, you are saying we are obligated to act morally, if we want to seek net-happiness. That's a different kind of obligation than obligations from authorities. We aren't obligated to pull over only if we want to obey the laws. We are obligated to follow the laws and we can choose to fulfill that obligation or not. There will be consequences. Now, if you had something that obligates us to want to seek net-happiness, we'd have to look at that more closely, but you have admitted you don't see anything.

The authoritarian reason is arbitrary. Arbitrary rules aren't objective, right? I could say that everybody has to punch the person to the left, and that would be objective by some tests (it has no exceptions) but it would be subjective by others (it's just one person's or gods' opinion). My rule about punching is exactly as arbitrary as your rule about following gods.

I don't see why arbitrary rules couldn't be objective. It's not the arbitrariness of your rule that makes it subjective; it's that we are both humans with different desires and you are trying to say the standard of right/wrong for all humans is your desires and not mine. Why yours? Where does your authority over humans come from?

If you say your rule has no exceptions, that's not what objective means. If you mean it applies to everyone, I would probably use the term 'universal.' Under that general understanding I am a moral universalist; morality applies to all humans. If you mean something like 'stealing is always wrong,' I would probably use the term 'absolute.' I am not a moral absolutist.

Also, what do you mean by 'arbitrary'? Goodness is not random if it comes from the type of god I've been talking about. It comes from god's essential nature. It's not like this kind of god is just picking actions out of a hat and calling those 'good'. It's not without reason if it comes from the type of god I've been talking about. It comes because that kind of god cares about the happiness of its creatures. It desires it's creatures to be happy. Why do you call your rule to punch the person to your left arbitrary? Is it random or without reason? Do you mean something else?

[The Tanager]

(f) The nature of motivation

We have a legal obligation to pull over for the police officer. We may not be motivated to do it. And we may choose not to do it (we have a free will). The question becomes what our motivation is. Are we trying to avoid some bad consequences (maybe we have pot in the car)? Do we think the police officer is being unfair (we think we are following every traffic obligation and that maybe the officer is racially profiling us)? Are we trying to win a power struggle (we think the law should not apply to us or to anyone)?

(1) In your view, some of us are motivated to seek net-happiness and some are not.

(4a) In the scorpion god view (I'm trying to fill in the gaps of what you are saying with that scenario, so correct me where I'm wrong) we have a god who wants us to be stung. This scorpion god made us with desires to want to not be stung. And created us such that we would be less happy if we are stung. And then the scorpion god places an obligation on us to allow ourselves to be stung. The obligation does not match up with our designed desires and what will make us as happy as we possibly can be. The scorpion god gives a self-centered obligation to creatures he designs to be motivated by utilitarian concerns that directly oppose the obligation. We could say such an obligation is unfair.

(4b) In my view we have a god who wants us to be as happy as we can be (flourishing). God made us with a desire to flourish. God created us in a certain way where we actually will be flourishing as a human by doing things like seeking the good of others. And then God places an obligation ('commands') on us to do things like seeking the good of others. The obligation matches up with our designed desires and what will make us as happy as we possibly can be. This God gives an other-centered obligation to creatures it designs to be motivated by utilitarian concerns that are in direct agreement with the obligation provided. The obligation seems fair to me.

Let's look at the Nazi scenario again concerning my view and yours. In that scenario, given the worldview of the majority of people in existence, it seems that turning the Jew in to the authorities to be executed (or whatever) will raise the number of utils, say, from 5000 to 6000. And that seems to include everything that happens in the future. Fast forward to the end of the world, it's still seized by a Nazi idealogy. All humans have died. At that moment, it's true that turning the Jew in to the authorities actually caused an net-increase in utils.

I think you might respond that, although the number of utils was actually increased by that action, the world missed out on, say, experiencing 8000 utils. If everyone would have disobeyed the Nazi authorities, thrown off the Nazi idealogy we would have gotten to a higher total of utils in the history ledger of the world by not turning in the Jews we were hiding. Perhaps the utils go down for 25 years and then eventually raise back up as society has changed their desires.

If you would say that, then the question is why is that the case? This argument assumes that not having the Nazi idealogy actually will cause more utils than having a Nazi idealogy. I don't know what standard you are using to judge that. Having an intuition that it will isn't a rational standard. Nazis have a different intuition than us.

Unless we are saying there is an actual way humans are supposed to be or are created to be. Well what accounts for that for (1) you? If it is materialist evolution (I think you said you don't think it is, but maybe I misunderstood you), there is no intention or oughtness to what humans should be. Humans that survive just are because whatever they are helped them survive. Natural selection results in some people who care about net happiness and some who don't. On materialist evolution, neither kind is defective or wrong. (2) Physical processes work on whatever the physical properties are there, so it wouldn't judge one property as better than another; there is nothing about this that would necessitate humans caring about others (and other examples of 'good'). (3) A platonic form has no intentions and, therefore, would not account for that. (4) A personal creator has intentions and would definitely account for that. I don't see any thing within an atheistic worldview that will account for this.

They both came out of god's will the same way. Plantinga says that since god is omniscient, at the beginning of time, god knew of everything that would ever happen in every possible world (and, according to Plantinga, in every impossible world). Being omnipotent, he could choose to create any one of those possible worlds (exception: god couldn't create godless worlds, because that would be a contradiction, which would make it an impossible world.) Out of the infinity of possible worlds, and knowing everything that would ever happen in it, god willed this world into existence.

If two kinds of people exist in this world, then they exist because that is god's will. If it hadn't been god's will that we have sociopaths, then they wouldn't exist.

If god is omnipotent and omniscient, that conclusion seems inescapable. Is that the kind of god we're talking about?

I'm not a compatibilist. I think the view you talk about here would negate free will. My view of God is that God values free will in humans more so than God values humans having moral behavior. Giving humans a free will logically brings with it the possibility of immoral behavior. It doesn't bring with it the necessity of people with immoral behavior. God wills people with free will to exist and God wills them to be people who pursue good actions. God doesn't will them to be people who pursue harmful actions; but God allows it.

[wiploc]

Great posts!

I'm going to be short this time, addressing just three items. I can be longer after getting responses to these.

The question then becomes what the standard is and, for our purposes, whether that standard is objective or subjective in relation to humans.

I don't understand what, "objective in relation to," means. Are you saying that something can be objective to you and subjective to me? I don't know what you're saying here, and, because it keeps coming up, it seems to be key.

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I don't know where the ought comes from in your system. Is it magic? Do gods magically put moral obligations on us? What is it about being intended by a scorpion god to behave in a certain manner causes us to actually ought to behave in that manner?

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I think the view you talk about here would negate free will. My view of God is that God values free will in humans more so than God values humans having moral behavior. Giving humans a free will logically brings with it the possibility of immoral behavior. It doesn't bring with it the necessity of people with immoral behavior. God wills people with free will to exist and God wills them to be people who pursue good actions. God doesn't will them to be people who pursue harmful actions; but God allows it.

Plantinga agrees with you. But if we lose freewill in a god-made goodworld, then we also lose it in a god-made badworld. And if we have freewill in a god-made badworld, then we also have it in a god-made goodworld.

A benevolent god would choose a goodworld without free will over a badworld without free will. And he would also choose a goodworld with free will over a badworld with free will. So, either way, he wouldn't create this would.

If god knows at the beginning everything that will ever happen in every possible world, and--knowing that--he creates one of those worlds, I don't see how that meaningfully interferes with free will. But if it did, it would interfere equally in good worlds and bad.

To make it simple, let's have a world with only one decision: In this world, two people pop into existence at the beginning of time, and one of them gets to decide whether to be nice or mean to the other one. And then, before anything else can happen, the world ends.

So, only one decision ever.

In World1, Joe decides to be nice to Sara.

In World2, Joe decides to be mean to Sara.

Plantinga's position (and your position, if I understand you) is that gods cannot create World1, because that would rob Joe of free will. God, by choosing to create World1, would have effectively predetermined Joe's choice, effectively robbing Joe of the ability to make the wrong choice, and would thereby have denied Joe free will.

First, and irrelevantly, I don't like that argument. I think that kind of free will is worthless. I wouldn't give a penny for it. If I could cure cancer at the price of having gods know I was going to do so in advance, I wouldn't hesitate for a microsecond. What possible benefit could the ignorance of gods be to me? I still get to do what I want; they just know what that is going to be.

Plantinga can style that as loss of free will, but that kind of free will is pointless, useless, without value.

But set that aside. My real point is that the argument is exactly as strong when applied to World2. If god creates World2, knowing in advance that Joe will choose to be mean, then he has effectively denied Joe the choice to be nice.

If, by creating the world while having foreknowledge, god denies free will in one case, then he also denies it in the other. And if he doesn't deny free will by creating World2, then he also doesn't deny it by creating World1.