The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

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Mattman
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The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #1

Post by Mattman »

Hello!

I love discussing/debating arguments related to God's existence and Christianity, and I have a voice chat group I'm putting together to do that. Send me a PM if you're interested.

Below is a brief summarized version of an argument. I'd love to hear your thoughts!
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CLAIM: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

DEFINITIONS: I'll refer to the proponent of this argument as the "non-Theist" and the defender as the "Theist."

PRESUPPOSITIONS:
The problem of evil is an *internal* challenge to God's existence. As such, it assumes the worldview it challenges and attempts to point out some internal contradiction in the tenets of the worldview. In particular, the problem of evil makes the case that the concept of God as omnibenevolent and omnipotent is incompatible with the existence of evil.

BRIEF:
We all have some awareness of horrendous evils.

Child human trafficking is a prime example. If God were all-good, he seems to want to prevent such evils, and God could stop such evils if he were all-powerful. Since such evils do exist, it follows that an all-good and omnipotent God does not exist.

The properties of goodness and power are essential to God. So if there is no being that is all-good and omnipotent, there is no God.

We don't have to run this argument in absolutist terms. It needn't be the case that God's existence and the existence of horrendous evil is *literally* impossible. It need only be the case that the two are unlikely to coexist for the argument to provide some reason to reject God's existence.
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RESPONSE: The problem of evil argument assumes more than is justified.

For horrendous evil to be a challenge to God's existence, it must be the case that God lacks morally sufficient reasons to permit them. If God has morally sufficient reasons to allow evil, evil is no challenge to his goodness, and neither is evil a challenge to God's power since he could prevent it.

Remember that the burden for this argument is on the non-Theist. He is the one contending that such evils and God cannot coexist. Therefore, it is his burden to show that God lacks morally sufficient reasons. He cannot simply appeal to our ignorance of such reasons; he needs to give us some positive reason to think that God lacks these reasons.

The non-Theist typically supports his argument by appealing to moral intuition (which he may call a "common sense" appeal). The non-Theist will say that we should consider horrendous evils and realize that no one could be justified in permitting them. If no one could be justified to allow the evil, that includes God.

This move, however, is a misstep on the part of the non-Theist.

The non-Theist asks his faculties to provide more information than they can. Notice that all of our faculties are ego-centric. You only see what you see; you don't see what others see. You only remember your past; you don't remember anyone else's past. If you survey any of your faculties, you will find the same. All your faculties only deliver information from your own subjective experience. The information may be objective (objects are there when you see them), but the information is ego-centric (from your perspective).

I've pointed out that the non-Theist supports his claim that God lacks morally sufficient reasons by appealing to moral intuition. I've pointed out that our faculties (including moral intuition) deliver only ego-centric information. The next thing to consider is whether the state of God's moral justification is within the ego-centric information available to the non-Theist.

It seems very clear that it is not. The non-Theist's moral intuition can tell him only his justification (that the *non-Theist* would be unjustified in permitting evil). Perhaps the non-Theist could go further and say he could *never* be justified in allowing evil. At best, this intuition can tell the non-Theist that if *the non-Theist* were God, then *he* would be unjustified in permitting horrendous evils (all other things being equal). None of this gives us any reason to think that *God* is unjustified in allowing evil. Since the state of God's moral justification is not within the ego-centric information available to the non-Theist, he cannot say God lacks moral justification. Moral intuition cannot support the problem of evil; the non-Theist must provide alternative reasons.

REBUTTAL: We infer the state of other people's moral justifications all the time in criminal law.

We certainly do, but such inferences are from ego-centric information. We reflect on the state of *our* justification if we were in the accused's circumstances. We picture ourselves in their circumstances and ask, "Would it be reasonable to act as they did?" Such a maneuver requires that we are similar to the accused in relevant ways and sufficiently understand their circumstances.

There are plenty of cases where we don't make these inferences. For example, we do not infer moral justifications in the animal kingdom. Lions brutally kill and eat gazelle all the time, and we make no inferences about the morality of the lions. We recognize that we are different from lions and cannot expect lions to behave like us. This principle also works in reverse. If a murderer tried to justify his crimes by an appeal to lions, we'd rightly respond, "But you're not a lion!"

On the point that we sufficiently understand the accused's circumstances, such information seems crucial to our moral reasoning. Consider the question, "Is it OK to lie?" Well, it depends. If someone is in Nazi Germany and lies to the Gestapo to protect Jews, then we'd probably recognize the lie as morally permissible. If someone is lying to the police to help a friend get away with murder, we'd probably recognize it as impermissible. On reflection, it should be evident that one's circumstances impact one's justification.

We've seen two requirements to make inferences about someone's justification: we must be similar to the accused and understand their circumstances. Are we similar enough to God to infer his moral justifications from our own? Are we familiar enough with God's circumstances? At first blush, it certainly seems like a "no" on both accounts.

Remember that the non-Theist has the burden of proof since they put forward the argument.

The non-Theist needs to show that we *probably are* similar enough to God and know enough of his circumstances to make these judgments. Without this, we are left unable to make inferences about God's moral justifications and therefore cannot say that God is unjustified in permitting evil.

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Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #2

Post by Difflugia »

Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 1:43 pmBelow is a brief summarized version of an argument. I'd love to hear your thoughts!
You and I define "brief" differently.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 1:43 pmTherefore, it is his burden to show that God lacks morally sufficient reasons. He cannot simply appeal to our ignorance of such reasons; he needs to give us some positive reason to think that God lacks these reasons.
As far as I can tell, your post is a long-winded way of responding to, "a good god wouldn't allow evil," with, "maybe she would, tho."

You've gone to a lot of effort to set up a question such that "it's possible" is a winning answer for your side. That's the mainstay of apologetic arguments to help Christians sleep at night. They're not particularly interesting, but they're comforting.
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Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #3

Post by Mattman »

[Replying to Difflugia in post #2]
You and I define "brief" differently.
Maybe so!
You've gone to a lot of effort to set up a question such that "it's possible" is a winning answer for your side.
I think here you may not appreciate the place in the dialectic. The burden of proof is on the one who puts forward the argument. In other words, it's up to the non-theist to say that God lacks morally sufficient reasons to permit evil. That's true regardless of what I say.

Usually, the non-theist does this by an appeal to moral intuition. The non-theist says that, through our moral intuition, we can perceive unjustifiable evils. My response in the OP shows why this move is illegitimate. The non-theist will need to appeal to something else in order to make her case. If the non-theist has nothing else, then the problem of evil remains unjustified as an argument.

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Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #4

Post by Difflugia »

Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 3:00 pm
You've gone to a lot of effort to set up a question such that "it's possible" is a winning answer for your side.
I think here you may not appreciate the place in the dialectic.
Yeah, probably not.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 3:00 pmThe burden of proof is on the one who puts forward the argument. In other words, it's up to the non-theist to say that God lacks morally sufficient reasons to permit evil. That's true regardless of what I say.
Which is why it's important to frame the question as a logical syllogism such that your opponent is making the affirmative statement, yet the statement is itself framed as a negative; "a good god does not allow evil."

Since the goal is to "give an answer to everyone who asks you a reason concerning the hope that is in you," perhaps "a good god does allow apparent evil" might be more appropriate to your hope. Unless, of course, your hope actually is based entirely on "it's possible."
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 3:00 pmUsually, the non-theist does this by an appeal to moral intuition. The non-theist says that, through our moral intuition, we can perceive unjustifiable evils.
That's because most "non-theists" are used to people making statements that are rhetorically stronger, like "my god is good" rather than a rhetorically weaker, but easier to defend, "my god is not not good." The skill of apologetics is presenting the rhetorically weaker argument in a way that allows a unskilled hearer to have the impression that the argument is actually the stronger one.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 3:00 pmMy response in the OP shows why this move is illegitimate.
And my response to your response shows why the theist stance is all but meaningless. I mean, Yahweh might be good. We can't prove He's not, despite the obvious presence of evil and the inability of theists to positively justify that. Similarly, leprechauns might put pots of gold at the ends of rainbows. We can't prove they don't, despite scientific explanations of rainbows and our inability to find the gold.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 3:00 pmThe non-theist will need to appeal to something else in order to make her case. If the non-theist has nothing else, then the problem of evil remains unjustified as an argument.
At least as long as you frame the argument as us having to prove that your god's inordinate fondness of guinea worms is necessarily not good. Maybe those children only appear to be in agony and are in a divinely blissful state. Your god then creates the screams to prepare the rest of us for the eternal joy of heaven, right? It's possible.
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Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #5

Post by Mattman »

[Replying to Difflugia in post #4]
And my response to your response shows why the theist stance is all but meaningless.
In order to defeat the argument I put in the OP you would need to show either:

1) Information about God's moral circumstances is found within the ego-centric information delivered by our moral intuition.
2) Information about God's moral circumstances can be inferred from information found within the ego-centric information delivered by intuition.

I haven't seen how you have done either of these two things.
Yahweh might be good.
When the non-theist puts forward the Problem of Evil, the non-theist assumes that God is good. It is a presupposition of their argument. This is what one does when they pose an internal challenge. When putting forward an internal challenge, you assume the truth of the worldview you are critiquing. In this case, the non-theist critiques the theistic worldview in which God is good.

The last paragraph in your response merely points to a horrendous evil. Again, it would be the non-theist's burden to show God is unjustified in permitting guinea worms to exist. As far as I can tell, you're just offering your unjustified assertions that God is unjustified. Do you have a reason to say he's unjustified?

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Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #6

Post by Miles »

Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 3:00 pm The burden of proof is on the one who puts forward the argument.
Actually, the burden of proof speaks to the claim, no matter what form it takes, argument or otherwise.
In other words, it's up to the non-theist to say that God lacks morally sufficient reasons to permit evil.
And lacking any known sufficient reason I would agree. Of course, if you have sufficien reason for god morally not only permitting evil, but creating it as well, I'm all ears.



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Last edited by Miles on Mon Feb 07, 2022 4:57 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #7

Post by Difflugia »

Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 4:07 pm
And my response to your response shows why the theist stance is all but meaningless.
In order to defeat the argument I put in the OP you would need to show either:

1) Information about God's moral circumstances is found within the ego-centric information delivered by our moral intuition.
2) Information about God's moral circumstances can be inferred from information found within the ego-centric information delivered by intuition.

I haven't seen how you have done either of these two things.
I haven't. But your argument in the OP is that despite all of the apparent evil in the world, there's a possibility, however slim, that there's still a way for God to be good, even if nobody's thought of it yet. I have no counter to that argument. It's all but meaningless, but I can't prove that it's wrong.

Say "hi" to the leprechauns for me, by the way.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 4:07 pm
Yahweh might be good.
When the non-theist puts forward the Problem of Evil, the non-theist assumes that God is good.
In practice, the theist affirmatively claims that God is good and the non-theist points out things like tsetse flies and guinea worms. The apologist then inverts the statements to create a position that's easier to defend: God might be good.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 4:07 pmIt is a presupposition of their argument. This is what one does when they pose an internal challenge. When putting forward an internal challenge, you assume the truth of the worldview you are critiquing. In this case, the non-theist critiques the theistic worldview in which God is good.
Now you're just making things up, right? Is this some Cornelius van Til, circular-arguments-are-OK thing?
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 4:07 pmThe last paragraph in your response merely points to a horrendous evil.
Yes.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 4:07 pmAgain, it would be the non-theist's burden to show God is unjustified in permitting guinea worms to exist.
Unless you're affirmatively asserting that God is good. If you're not, then we have no quarrel and I simply agree that there's no basis for asserting such.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 4:07 pmAs far as I can tell, you're just offering your unjustified assertions that God is unjustified.
I haven't actually asserted that, now, have I? Come on, you should know how this works.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 4:07 pmDo you have a reason to say he's unjustified?
No. In fact I admitted that it's possible that apparent evil actually is good, remember?
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Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #8

Post by Mattman »

[Replying to Miles in post #6]
And lacking any known sufficient reason I would agree. Of course, if you have sufficien reason for god morally not only permitting evil, but creating it as well, I'm all ears.
It seems you're misplacing the burden of proof here. If you have some reason to think God lacks morally sufficient reasons to permit evil, I'm all ears. It isn't up to the theist to provide God's morally sufficient reasons, it's up to the non-theist to provide them. It doesn't follow from our ignorance of his reasons that he lacks them.

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Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #9

Post by Mattman »

[Replying to Difflugia in post #7]
But your argument in the OP is that despite all of the apparent evil in the world, there's a possibility, however slim, that there's still a way for God to be good
It's not a slim possibility, it's a certainty. It is impossible that God lacks morally sufficient reasons.

1) If God exists, then God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting all he permits.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore, God has morally sufficient reasons for all he permits.

Remember that the non-theist is assuming the theistic worldview in order to put forward his argument. If he thinks God must have morally sufficient reasons, then he should think it follows from God's existence that he *does* have morally sufficient reasons.
The apologist then inverts the statements to create a position that's easier to defend: God might be good.
This is not the position I'm taking. God is necessarily good. It is essential to God that he is good, so if God exists then God is good.
Now you're just making things up, right? Is this some Cornelius van Til, circular-arguments-are-OK thing?
I'm not, that's how internal challenges work. The problem of evil doesn't work at all as an external challenge since the Christian worldview doesn't claim that there's no evil in the world.
I haven't actually asserted that, now, have I?
If you're not asserting that God is unjustified in permitting evil, then what are we disagreeing about? We both agree that there's horrendous evil and we agree that God is morally justified in permitting it.

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Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #10

Post by Miles »

Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 6:36 pm [Replying to Miles in post #6]
And lacking any known sufficient reason I would agree. Of course, if you have sufficien reason for god morally not only permitting evil, but creating it as well, I'm all ears.
It seems you're misplacing the burden of proof here. If you have some reason to think God lacks morally sufficient reasons to permit evil, I'm all ears.
Personally, I don't regard evil

e·vil
/ˈēvəl/
adjective: evil
profoundly immoral and wicked.
source: Oxford Languages Dictionary

as ever being permissible. Now, if you believe we should allow the profoundly immoral and wicked to exist because god has "morally sufficient reason," just what do you believe this "morally sufficient reason" to be? If you don't know, then why assert it? Just because god likes evil?



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Last edited by Miles on Mon Feb 07, 2022 7:40 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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