The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Chat viewable by general public

Moderator: Moderators

Mattman
Student
Posts: 31
Joined: Sun Feb 06, 2022 2:07 pm
Has thanked: 1 time
Been thanked: 3 times

The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #1

Post by Mattman »

Hello!

I love discussing/debating arguments related to God's existence and Christianity, and I have a voice chat group I'm putting together to do that. Send me a PM if you're interested.

Below is a brief summarized version of an argument. I'd love to hear your thoughts!
____
CLAIM: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

DEFINITIONS: I'll refer to the proponent of this argument as the "non-Theist" and the defender as the "Theist."

PRESUPPOSITIONS:
The problem of evil is an *internal* challenge to God's existence. As such, it assumes the worldview it challenges and attempts to point out some internal contradiction in the tenets of the worldview. In particular, the problem of evil makes the case that the concept of God as omnibenevolent and omnipotent is incompatible with the existence of evil.

BRIEF:
We all have some awareness of horrendous evils.

Child human trafficking is a prime example. If God were all-good, he seems to want to prevent such evils, and God could stop such evils if he were all-powerful. Since such evils do exist, it follows that an all-good and omnipotent God does not exist.

The properties of goodness and power are essential to God. So if there is no being that is all-good and omnipotent, there is no God.

We don't have to run this argument in absolutist terms. It needn't be the case that God's existence and the existence of horrendous evil is *literally* impossible. It need only be the case that the two are unlikely to coexist for the argument to provide some reason to reject God's existence.
-----
RESPONSE: The problem of evil argument assumes more than is justified.

For horrendous evil to be a challenge to God's existence, it must be the case that God lacks morally sufficient reasons to permit them. If God has morally sufficient reasons to allow evil, evil is no challenge to his goodness, and neither is evil a challenge to God's power since he could prevent it.

Remember that the burden for this argument is on the non-Theist. He is the one contending that such evils and God cannot coexist. Therefore, it is his burden to show that God lacks morally sufficient reasons. He cannot simply appeal to our ignorance of such reasons; he needs to give us some positive reason to think that God lacks these reasons.

The non-Theist typically supports his argument by appealing to moral intuition (which he may call a "common sense" appeal). The non-Theist will say that we should consider horrendous evils and realize that no one could be justified in permitting them. If no one could be justified to allow the evil, that includes God.

This move, however, is a misstep on the part of the non-Theist.

The non-Theist asks his faculties to provide more information than they can. Notice that all of our faculties are ego-centric. You only see what you see; you don't see what others see. You only remember your past; you don't remember anyone else's past. If you survey any of your faculties, you will find the same. All your faculties only deliver information from your own subjective experience. The information may be objective (objects are there when you see them), but the information is ego-centric (from your perspective).

I've pointed out that the non-Theist supports his claim that God lacks morally sufficient reasons by appealing to moral intuition. I've pointed out that our faculties (including moral intuition) deliver only ego-centric information. The next thing to consider is whether the state of God's moral justification is within the ego-centric information available to the non-Theist.

It seems very clear that it is not. The non-Theist's moral intuition can tell him only his justification (that the *non-Theist* would be unjustified in permitting evil). Perhaps the non-Theist could go further and say he could *never* be justified in allowing evil. At best, this intuition can tell the non-Theist that if *the non-Theist* were God, then *he* would be unjustified in permitting horrendous evils (all other things being equal). None of this gives us any reason to think that *God* is unjustified in allowing evil. Since the state of God's moral justification is not within the ego-centric information available to the non-Theist, he cannot say God lacks moral justification. Moral intuition cannot support the problem of evil; the non-Theist must provide alternative reasons.

REBUTTAL: We infer the state of other people's moral justifications all the time in criminal law.

We certainly do, but such inferences are from ego-centric information. We reflect on the state of *our* justification if we were in the accused's circumstances. We picture ourselves in their circumstances and ask, "Would it be reasonable to act as they did?" Such a maneuver requires that we are similar to the accused in relevant ways and sufficiently understand their circumstances.

There are plenty of cases where we don't make these inferences. For example, we do not infer moral justifications in the animal kingdom. Lions brutally kill and eat gazelle all the time, and we make no inferences about the morality of the lions. We recognize that we are different from lions and cannot expect lions to behave like us. This principle also works in reverse. If a murderer tried to justify his crimes by an appeal to lions, we'd rightly respond, "But you're not a lion!"

On the point that we sufficiently understand the accused's circumstances, such information seems crucial to our moral reasoning. Consider the question, "Is it OK to lie?" Well, it depends. If someone is in Nazi Germany and lies to the Gestapo to protect Jews, then we'd probably recognize the lie as morally permissible. If someone is lying to the police to help a friend get away with murder, we'd probably recognize it as impermissible. On reflection, it should be evident that one's circumstances impact one's justification.

We've seen two requirements to make inferences about someone's justification: we must be similar to the accused and understand their circumstances. Are we similar enough to God to infer his moral justifications from our own? Are we familiar enough with God's circumstances? At first blush, it certainly seems like a "no" on both accounts.

Remember that the non-Theist has the burden of proof since they put forward the argument.

The non-Theist needs to show that we *probably are* similar enough to God and know enough of his circumstances to make these judgments. Without this, we are left unable to make inferences about God's moral justifications and therefore cannot say that God is unjustified in permitting evil.

User avatar
Difflugia
Prodigy
Posts: 3017
Joined: Wed Jun 12, 2019 10:25 am
Location: Michigan
Has thanked: 3247 times
Been thanked: 1997 times

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #11

Post by Difflugia »

Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 6:42 pm
But your argument in the OP is that despite all of the apparent evil in the world, there's a possibility, however slim, that there's still a way for God to be good
It's not a slim possibility, it's a certainty. It is impossible that God lacks morally sufficient reasons.
Ah. So it is a Cornelius van Til, circular-arguments-are-OK thing.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 6:42 pmRemember that the non-theist is assuming the theistic worldview in order to put forward his argument.
"Remember?" No, I don't assume, nor do I need to assume a theistic worldview for any argument.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 6:42 pm
The apologist then inverts the statements to create a position that's easier to defend: God might be good.
This is not the position I'm taking. God is necessarily good. It is essential to God that he is good, so if God exists then God is good.
You haven't established any of this. If you're claiming these as assumptions, then your argument is circular and logically invalid because they're what you are trying to demonstrate. If you're instead expecting me to prove that God's not good and I don't, then the best you can establish is that you might not be wrong and God might be good.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 6:42 pmI'm not, that's how internal challenges work.
That's the part you're making up.
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 6:42 pmIf you're not asserting that God is unjustified in permitting evil, then what are we disagreeing about? We both agree that there's horrendous evil and we agree that God is morally justified in permitting it.
I'm asserting that the reason there's evil might be that whatever gods exist are evil. It's much more likely that there are simply no gods, but other possibilities are that evil is actually good or whatever gods exist are evil.
My pronouns are he, him, and his.

cms

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #12

Post by cms »

Miles wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 7:34 pm Personally, I don't regard evil

e·vil
/ˈēvəl/
adjective: evil
profoundly immoral and wicked.
source: Oxford Languages Dictionary

as ever being permissible. Now, if you believe we should allow the profoundly immoral and wicked to exist because god has "morally sufficient reason," just what do you believe this "morally sufficient reason" to be? If you don't know, then why assert it? Just because god likes evil?
If there is no god,there is no such thing as evil or good. The minute you declare a difference between good and evil you have set up a god ( an authority).

User avatar
POI
Prodigy
Posts: 3278
Joined: Fri Jul 30, 2021 5:22 pm
Has thanked: 1545 times
Been thanked: 1051 times

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #13

Post by POI »

cms wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 7:55 pm
Miles wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 7:34 pm Personally, I don't regard evil

e·vil
/ˈēvəl/
adjective: evil
profoundly immoral and wicked.
source: Oxford Languages Dictionary

as ever being permissible. Now, if you believe we should allow the profoundly immoral and wicked to exist because god has "morally sufficient reason," just what do you believe this "morally sufficient reason" to be? If you don't know, then why assert it? Just because god likes evil?
If there is no god,there is no such thing as evil or good. The minute you declare a difference between good and evil you have set up a god ( an authority).
Not if you state 'morals' are subjective. "Good' and 'evil' are mere labels to associate/contrast and/or make distinctions...

Seems as though we have (4) topics, for which we can 'ground' our 'morals':

1. Personal opinion
2. Consensus
3. Consequentialism
4. God

Okay, you opted for option #4. Now all you need to do is prove this 'God' exists, and we immediately can go from there, to the next exciting topic... (i.e.) the "Euthyphro dilemma"....
Last edited by POI on Mon Feb 07, 2022 9:32 pm, edited 1 time in total.
In case anyone is wondering... The avatar quote states the following:

"I asked God for a bike, but I know God doesn't work that way. So I stole a bike and asked for forgiveness."

User avatar
Diagoras
Guru
Posts: 1392
Joined: Fri Jun 21, 2019 12:47 am
Has thanked: 170 times
Been thanked: 579 times

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #14

Post by Diagoras »

Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 1:43 pmRemember that the burden for this argument is on the non-Theist.
I'm not seeing how a non-Theist is making the claim though - it's being defended by the theist position.

If it's instead stated as "The Problem of Evil justifies disbelief in God's existence", then a non-theist could fairly construct an argument from either logic or evidence to support this as a truth claim. But to have to somehow prove that God 'lacks' something is - as has been pointed out already - a very different kind of argument.

Leprechauns and orbiting teapots aside, the problem of evil is a fascinating one. I've seen arguments attempting to solve the 'natural evil' problem, for example, that postulate the existence of Satan (or other agencies), but this merely adds yet another unprovable layer to the claim that God allows natural evil to exist.

I've enjoyed this YouTube video on the subject, and if you haven't seen it, it's worth the (ten minutes) time.

User avatar
Miles
Savant
Posts: 5179
Joined: Fri Aug 28, 2009 4:19 pm
Has thanked: 434 times
Been thanked: 1614 times

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #15

Post by Miles »

cms wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 7:55 pm
Miles wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 7:34 pm Personally, I don't regard evil

e·vil
/ˈēvəl/
adjective: evil
profoundly immoral and wicked.
source: Oxford Languages Dictionary

as ever being permissible. Now, if you believe we should allow the profoundly immoral and wicked to exist because god has "morally sufficient reason," just what do you believe this "morally sufficient reason" to be? If you don't know, then why assert it? Just because god likes evil?
If there is no god,there is no such thing as evil or good. The minute you declare a difference between good and evil you have set up a god ( an authority).
Not that this is the silliest thing I've heard in a while, but it comes close.

1. Why is god necessary for good and evil to exist?

2. Why does declaring a difference between good and evil set up a god?


.

User avatar
alexxcJRO
Guru
Posts: 1624
Joined: Wed Jun 29, 2016 4:54 am
Location: Cluj, Romania
Has thanked: 66 times
Been thanked: 215 times
Contact:

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #16

Post by alexxcJRO »

Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 1:43 pm Hello!

I love discussing/debating arguments related to God's existence and Christianity, and I have a voice chat group I'm putting together to do that. Send me a PM if you're interested.

Below is a brief summarized version of an argument. I'd love to hear your thoughts!
____
CLAIM: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

DEFINITIONS: I'll refer to the proponent of this argument as the "non-Theist" and the defender as the "Theist."

PRESUPPOSITIONS:
The problem of evil is an *internal* challenge to God's existence. As such, it assumes the worldview it challenges and attempts to point out some internal contradiction in the tenets of the worldview. In particular, the problem of evil makes the case that the concept of God as omnibenevolent and omnipotent is incompatible with the existence of evil.

BRIEF:
We all have some awareness of horrendous evils.

Child human trafficking is a prime example. If God were all-good, he seems to want to prevent such evils, and God could stop such evils if he were all-powerful. Since such evils do exist, it follows that an all-good and omnipotent God does not exist.

The properties of goodness and power are essential to God. So if there is no being that is all-good and omnipotent, there is no God.

We don't have to run this argument in absolutist terms. It needn't be the case that God's existence and the existence of horrendous evil is *literally* impossible. It need only be the case that the two are unlikely to coexist for the argument to provide some reason to reject God's existence.
-----
RESPONSE: The problem of evil argument assumes more than is justified.

For horrendous evil to be a challenge to God's existence, it must be the case that God lacks morally sufficient reasons to permit them. If God has morally sufficient reasons to allow evil, evil is no challenge to his goodness, and neither is evil a challenge to God's power since he could prevent it.

Remember that the burden for this argument is on the non-Theist. He is the one contending that such evils and God cannot coexist. Therefore, it is his burden to show that God lacks morally sufficient reasons. He cannot simply appeal to our ignorance of such reasons; he needs to give us some positive reason to think that God lacks these reasons.

The non-Theist typically supports his argument by appealing to moral intuition (which he may call a "common sense" appeal). The non-Theist will say that we should consider horrendous evils and realize that no one could be justified in permitting them. If no one could be justified to allow the evil, that includes God.

This move, however, is a misstep on the part of the non-Theist.

The non-Theist asks his faculties to provide more information than they can. Notice that all of our faculties are ego-centric. You only see what you see; you don't see what others see. You only remember your past; you don't remember anyone else's past. If you survey any of your faculties, you will find the same. All your faculties only deliver information from your own subjective experience. The information may be objective (objects are there when you see them), but the information is ego-centric (from your perspective).

I've pointed out that the non-Theist supports his claim that God lacks morally sufficient reasons by appealing to moral intuition. I've pointed out that our faculties (including moral intuition) deliver only ego-centric information. The next thing to consider is whether the state of God's moral justification is within the ego-centric information available to the non-Theist.

It seems very clear that it is not. The non-Theist's moral intuition can tell him only his justification (that the *non-Theist* would be unjustified in permitting evil). Perhaps the non-Theist could go further and say he could *never* be justified in allowing evil. At best, this intuition can tell the non-Theist that if *the non-Theist* were God, then *he* would be unjustified in permitting horrendous evils (all other things being equal). None of this gives us any reason to think that *God* is unjustified in allowing evil. Since the state of God's moral justification is not within the ego-centric information available to the non-Theist, he cannot say God lacks moral justification. Moral intuition cannot support the problem of evil; the non-Theist must provide alternative reasons.

REBUTTAL: We infer the state of other people's moral justifications all the time in criminal law.

We certainly do, but such inferences are from ego-centric information. We reflect on the state of *our* justification if we were in the accused's circumstances. We picture ourselves in their circumstances and ask, "Would it be reasonable to act as they did?" Such a maneuver requires that we are similar to the accused in relevant ways and sufficiently understand their circumstances.

There are plenty of cases where we don't make these inferences. For example, we do not infer moral justifications in the animal kingdom. Lions brutally kill and eat gazelle all the time, and we make no inferences about the morality of the lions. We recognize that we are different from lions and cannot expect lions to behave like us. This principle also works in reverse. If a murderer tried to justify his crimes by an appeal to lions, we'd rightly respond, "But you're not a lion!"

On the point that we sufficiently understand the accused's circumstances, such information seems crucial to our moral reasoning. Consider the question, "Is it OK to lie?" Well, it depends. If someone is in Nazi Germany and lies to the Gestapo to protect Jews, then we'd probably recognize the lie as morally permissible. If someone is lying to the police to help a friend get away with murder, we'd probably recognize it as impermissible. On reflection, it should be evident that one's circumstances impact one's justification.

We've seen two requirements to make inferences about someone's justification: we must be similar to the accused and understand their circumstances. Are we similar enough to God to infer his moral justifications from our own? Are we familiar enough with God's circumstances? At first blush, it certainly seems like a "no" on both accounts.

Remember that the non-Theist has the burden of proof since they put forward the argument.

The non-Theist needs to show that we *probably are* similar enough to God and know enough of his circumstances to make these judgments. Without this, we are left unable to make inferences about God's moral justifications and therefore cannot say that God is unjustified in permitting evil.
Let's show the monotheistic personal god does not exist for example.

Notation:
G = God: on omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being-perfectly good being who wants me to believe in him and a personal relationship with me based on trust, love.
B = My sincere belief that G does not exist.
P = People born with psychopathy.
E = Instances where gratuitous evils, gratuitous suffering happen -> the innocent-non-moral agents(non-human animals and/or infants and severely mentally impaired) suffer indiscriminately because of non-moral/natural evils(cancer, genetic diseases, earthquakes, hurricanes, asteroids, natural forest fires).
C = Instances where Christians/Islamists/Israelites are confused what G wants(existence of mutual exclusive claims), how to achieve salvation, unconditional election vs conditional election, many denominations, schisms and evident quarrel, hell as a forever punishment or just separation from G, Jesus just a prophet/exalted prophet/son of G/G himself/Trinity, Christians committing genocides in the bible in the name of G, Christians holy wars(crusades), mass killing of women-“witches”-Christian inquisition, Islam holly war, Islamists killing in the name of G and saying Allahu Akbar: G is great, gay intolerance and other kinds of intolerances “because of what god said”.

Definitions:
Omnipotent being = a being that can do anything
(Matthew 19:26, Job 42:1-2, Luke 1:37, Jeremiah 32:27)

Omniscient being = a being that knows everything, has perfect knowledge
(Psalm 147:5, Psalm 139:4, Hebrews 4:13, 1 John 3:20, Job 37:16)

Omnibenevolent-perfectly good being = a being that will do only good as oppose to evil all the time, a being that is morally perfect, perfectly just, benevolent towards all, cares and loves all equally.
(Deuteronomy 32:4, 2 Samuel 22:31, Matthew 5:48, Psalm 100:5, Psalm 145:17, 1 John 4:16, 1 John 1:5, Heb. 6:18, Romans 5:8, 1 John 4:8)
(1 John 4:15, John 3:16-17, Matthew 22:36-38, Exodus 20)

Observations:
Psychopaths can’t feel and experience love, trust, bond(psychopaths don't process oxytocin like neurotypicals do), have a problem with their affective empathy.
(https://modlab.yale.edu/news/my-life-psychopath-cut, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/16/heal ... index.html)
For the most part these E happened there were not Homo Sapiens Sapiens on the planet.


Argument from genuine disbelief/non-belief

Logical deduction by reduction ad absurdum:

P1. G exists.
P2. An omniscient being knows of a way to stop B.
P3. An omnipotent being who knows a way to stop B has the power to do so.
P4. A being who knows of a way to stop B, has the power to do so, and who wants to do so, would do it.
P5. If there exists G then B would not exist.
P6. Because G exists then B does not exist.
P7. B exists.(Logical contradiction)
C: Therefore G does not exist.

Problem of gratuitous evils, gratuitous suffering

Logical deduction by reduction ad absurdum:

P1. G exists.
P2. An omniscient being knows of a way to stop E.
P3. An omnipotent being who knows a way to stop E has the power to do so.
P4. A being who knows of a way to stop E, has the power to do so, and who wants to do so, would do it.
P5. If there exists G then E would not exist.
P6. Because G exists then E does not exist.
P7. E exists.(Logical contradiction)
C: Therefore G does not exist.

Problem of psychopathy

Logical deduction by reduction ad absurdum:
P1. G exists.
P2. An omniscient being knows of a way to stop P.
P3. An omnipotent being who knows a way to stop P has the power to do so.
P4. A being who knows of a way to stop P, has the power to do so, and who wants to do so, would do it.
P5. If there exists G then P would not exist.
P6. Because G exists then P does not exist.
P7. P exists.(Logical contradiction)
C: Therefore G does not exist.

Problem of confusion
Logical deduction by reduction ad absurdum:
P1. G exists.
P2. An omniscient being knows of a way to stop C.
P3. An omnipotent being who knows a way to stop C has the power to do so.
P4. A being who knows of a way to stop C, has the power to do so, and who wants to do so, would do it.
P5. If there exists G then C would not exist.
P6. Because G exists then C does not exist.
P7. C exists.(Logical contradiction)
C: Therefore G does not exist.

Also we have:
G saying:
-kills gays just for being gays,
-kill a fortuneteller just for practicing fortunetelling,
-kill the sons for the sins of the fathers,
-“Go, now but kill men and women, children and infants, oxen and sheep, camels and asses”( infants, oxen and sheep, camels and asses being non-moral agents, inocents)
-“I will stir up the Medes against Babylon… They will have no mercy on helpless babies and will show no compassion for the children.”
-“when a man strikes his male or female slave with a rod so hard that the slave dies under his hand, he shall be punished. If, however, the slave survives for a day or two, he is not to be punished, since the slave is his own property”
-“If a man is caught in the act of raping a young woman who is not engaged, he must pay fifty pieces of silver to her father. then he must marry the young woman because he violated her, and he will never be allowed to divorce her”

Enjoy! 8-)
Last edited by alexxcJRO on Tue Feb 08, 2022 4:23 am, edited 1 time in total.
"It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets."
"Properly read, the Bible is the most potent force for atheism ever conceived."
"God is a insignificant nobody. He is so unimportant that no one would even know he exists if evolution had not made possible for animals capable of abstract thought to exist and invent him"
"Two hands working can do more than a thousand clasped in prayer."

Bust Nak
Savant
Posts: 9855
Joined: Mon Feb 27, 2012 6:03 am
Location: Planet Earth
Has thanked: 189 times
Been thanked: 266 times

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #17

Post by Bust Nak »

I've seen this exact argument on Reddit from a "mattbilyeu." Here is a copy of my response:
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 1:43 pm He is the one contending that such evils and God cannot coexist. Therefore, it is his burden to show that God lacks morally sufficient reasons.
First the easy part: Morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil implies there is a compromise between moral goodness and moral evil. Such evil cannot coexist with God because an omnipotent being does not have to compromise, he can achieve the same moral goodness end goal without allowing evil, assuming it's not a logical contradiction. (Sometimes this last bit isn't necessary, for those theists who proposes that God, as the author of logic, is not bounded such laws as the law of non-contradiction.)

The harder part: For specific religions that proposes some sort of a heavenly state (i.e. maximum good without evil,) we can trivially conclude that the same goodness can exist without evil; thereby showing that there is no logical contradiction. For other theists, I would have to find out what else they believe to formulate a bespoke argument for the logical consistency of maximum good existing without evil.

Mattman
Student
Posts: 31
Joined: Sun Feb 06, 2022 2:07 pm
Has thanked: 1 time
Been thanked: 3 times

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #18

Post by Mattman »

[Replying to Miles in post #10]

First, in the dialectic it is up to the non-theist to say that God is unjustified in permitting evil. It isn't up to the theist to justify God, it is up to the non-theist to show that God has no such justification.

Second, it seems we make these sorts of calculations all the time in our daily lives. We allow, for example, free speech even though there are people who will use that speech in evil ways. We allow for freedom of association even though some people will use that freedom to be racist and separate from others. So, in principle, it seems that one can be justified in permitting evil. The non-theist needs to show that *, in fact,* God is unjustified.

User avatar
alexxcJRO
Guru
Posts: 1624
Joined: Wed Jun 29, 2016 4:54 am
Location: Cluj, Romania
Has thanked: 66 times
Been thanked: 215 times
Contact:

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #19

Post by alexxcJRO »

Mattman wrote: Tue Feb 08, 2022 9:41 am [Replying to Miles in post #10]

First, in the dialectic it is up to the non-theist to say that God is unjustified in permitting evil. It isn't up to the theist to justify God, it is up to the non-theist to show that God has no such justification.

Second, it seems we make these sorts of calculations all the time in our daily lives. We allow, for example, free speech even though there are people who will use that speech in evil ways. We allow for freedom of association even though some people will use that freedom to be racist and separate from others. So, in principle, it seems that one can be justified in permitting evil. The non-theist needs to show that *, in fact,* God is unjustified.
Let's not ignore shall we.

Let's show the monotheistic personal god does not exist for example.

Notation:
G = God: on omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being-perfectly good being who wants me to believe in him and a personal relationship with me based on trust, love.
B = My sincere belief that G does not exist.
P = People born with psychopathy.
E = Instances where gratuitous evils, gratuitous suffering happen -> the innocent-non-moral agents(non-human animals and/or infants and severely mentally impaired) suffer indiscriminately because of non-moral/natural evils(cancer, genetic diseases, earthquakes, hurricanes, asteroids, natural forest fires).
C = Instances where Christians/Islamists/Israelites are confused what G wants(existence of mutual exclusive claims), how to achieve salvation, unconditional election vs conditional election, many denominations, schisms and evident quarrel, hell as a forever punishment or just separation from G, Jesus just a prophet/exalted prophet/son of G/G himself/Trinity, Christians committing genocides in the bible in the name of G, Christians holy wars(crusades), mass killing of women-“witches”-Christian inquisition, Islam holly war, Islamists killing in the name of G and saying Allahu Akbar: G is great, gay intolerance and other kinds of intolerances “because of what god said”.

Definitions:
Omnipotent being = a being that can do anything
(Matthew 19:26, Job 42:1-2, Luke 1:37, Jeremiah 32:27)

Omniscient being = a being that knows everything, has perfect knowledge
(Psalm 147:5, Psalm 139:4, Hebrews 4:13, 1 John 3:20, Job 37:16)

Omnibenevolent-perfectly good being = a being that will do only good as oppose to evil all the time, a being that is morally perfect, perfectly just, benevolent towards all, cares and loves all equally.
(Deuteronomy 32:4, 2 Samuel 22:31, Matthew 5:48, Psalm 100:5, Psalm 145:17, 1 John 4:16, 1 John 1:5, Heb. 6:18, Romans 5:8, 1 John 4:8)
(1 John 4:15, John 3:16-17, Matthew 22:36-38, Exodus 20)

Observations:
Psychopaths can’t feel and experience love, trust, bond(psychopaths don't process oxytocin like neurotypicals do), have a problem with their affective empathy.
(https://modlab.yale.edu/news/my-life-psychopath-cut, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/16/heal ... index.html)
For the most part these E happened there were not Homo Sapiens Sapiens on the planet.


Argument from genuine disbelief/non-belief

Logical deduction by reduction ad absurdum:

P1. G exists.
P2. An omniscient being knows of a way to stop B.
P3. An omnipotent being who knows a way to stop B has the power to do so.
P4. A being who knows of a way to stop B, has the power to do so, and who wants to do so, would do it.
P5. If there exists G then B would not exist.
P6. Because G exists then B does not exist.
P7. B exists.(Logical contradiction)
C: Therefore G does not exist.

Problem of gratuitous evils, gratuitous suffering

Logical deduction by reduction ad absurdum:

P1. G exists.
P2. An omniscient being knows of a way to stop E.
P3. An omnipotent being who knows a way to stop E has the power to do so.
P4. A being who knows of a way to stop E, has the power to do so, and who wants to do so, would do it.
P5. If there exists G then E would not exist.
P6. Because G exists then E does not exist.
P7. E exists.(Logical contradiction)
C: Therefore G does not exist.

Problem of psychopathy

Logical deduction by reduction ad absurdum:
P1. G exists.
P2. An omniscient being knows of a way to stop P.
P3. An omnipotent being who knows a way to stop P has the power to do so.
P4. A being who knows of a way to stop P, has the power to do so, and who wants to do so, would do it.
P5. If there exists G then P would not exist.
P6. Because G exists then P does not exist.
P7. P exists.(Logical contradiction)
C: Therefore G does not exist.

Problem of confusion
Logical deduction by reduction ad absurdum:
P1. G exists.
P2. An omniscient being knows of a way to stop C.
P3. An omnipotent being who knows a way to stop C has the power to do so.
P4. A being who knows of a way to stop C, has the power to do so, and who wants to do so, would do it.
P5. If there exists G then C would not exist.
P6. Because G exists then C does not exist.
P7. C exists.(Logical contradiction)
C: Therefore G does not exist.

Also we have:
G saying:
-kills gays just for being gays,
-kill a fortuneteller just for practicing fortunetelling,
-kill the sons for the sins of the fathers,
-“Go, now but kill men and women, children and infants, oxen and sheep, camels and asses”( infants, oxen and sheep, camels and asses being non-moral agents, inocents)
-“I will stir up the Medes against Babylon… They will have no mercy on helpless babies and will show no compassion for the children.”
-“when a man strikes his male or female slave with a rod so hard that the slave dies under his hand, he shall be punished. If, however, the slave survives for a day or two, he is not to be punished, since the slave is his own property”
-“If a man is caught in the act of raping a young woman who is not engaged, he must pay fifty pieces of silver to her father. then he must marry the young woman because he violated her, and he will never be allowed to divorce her”

Enjoy! 8-)
"It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets."
"Properly read, the Bible is the most potent force for atheism ever conceived."
"God is a insignificant nobody. He is so unimportant that no one would even know he exists if evolution had not made possible for animals capable of abstract thought to exist and invent him"
"Two hands working can do more than a thousand clasped in prayer."

Mattman
Student
Posts: 31
Joined: Sun Feb 06, 2022 2:07 pm
Has thanked: 1 time
Been thanked: 3 times

Re: The Problem of Evil does not justify disbelief in God's existence.

Post #20

Post by Mattman »

Bust Nak wrote: Tue Feb 08, 2022 4:16 am I've seen this exact argument on Reddit from a "mattbilyeu." Here is a copy of my response:
Mattman wrote: Mon Feb 07, 2022 1:43 pm He is the one contending that such evils and God cannot coexist. Therefore, it is his burden to show that God lacks morally sufficient reasons.
First the easy part: Morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil implies there is a compromise between moral goodness and moral evil. Such evil cannot coexist with God because an omnipotent being does not have to compromise, he can achieve the same moral goodness end goal without allowing evil, assuming it's not a logical contradiction. (Sometimes this last bit isn't necessary, for those theists who proposes that God, as the author of logic, is not bounded such laws as the law of non-contradiction.)
It seems like you have the answer in your own comment. There are some goods that God can only bring about if evil exists, and to say otherwise is to imply a contradiction. Consider that the entire human population has been born to parents who had sinful natures (they have a tendency to do wrong things). Since our origin is essential to us, God cannot bring about our existence without bringing about a state of affairs where our sinful parents exist and conceive us. If you want to say that God can create us through other means we wind up with contradictions resulting (stemming from violations of the law of necessity of identity and the transitive relations).
The harder part: For specific religions that proposes some sort of a heavenly state (i.e. maximum good without evil,) we can trivially conclude that the same goodness can exist without evil; thereby showing that there is no logical contradiction. For other theists, I would have to find out what else they believe to formulate a bespoke argument for the logical consistency of maximum good existing without evil.
This answer is simply another version of your objection above. You're making an unjustified assertion that God can get to a state of affairs without following the path that leads there. What people are meant to exist in this state of affairs? It couldn't be you or I (or anyone else in our world) since none of us could exist if evil did not exist.

Post Reply