Free Will vs. Freedom From Suffering

[Paul of Tarsus]

Many apologists argue that we must suffer in order to have free will. It's a trade off that even God must bow to--we can either be morally free or free of suffering, but we cannot have both. We are told, for example:

...God can create people who are not morally free. Such a person would never harm anyone else, never fail to do good in any setting, and always be a beacon of right behavior. However, that would be more a machine than a person. A machine is neither good nor bad; it just does as it is programed to do. For people to be capable of genuine good deeds they must also be capable of evil deeds.

The implication here is that free will is the greatest good for us; to have free will is better than to be free of suffering. Or to put it another way, free will is so wonderful that it's worth the cost of sadness, fear, hatred, pain, sickness, dying and death, of course.

I'm not so sure, but what is your preference and why? Which would you choose if you could?

A. Free Will Along with the Attendant Suffering
or
B. A Happy and Peaceful World Full of Robotic Beacons of Light
or
C. A Combination of A and B

[nobspeople]

[Replying to JehovahsWitness in post #27]

Great answer, so about that follow up question.

The DECISION : I have decided to kick this puppy.
The CAPACITY : I lack the ability to do what I have decided.

Sounds like a win, doesn't it.

Lol...at least for the puppy. (What kind if sicko decides to kick a puppy?!)

I think this was the entire point. No free will was removed from the person deciding to kick the puppy. Only the actual ability to do so has been taken away. Maybe even the person is allowed to kick towards the puppy, but god moves the puppy at the last second. This gives the god the 'proof of intent' that the person was indeed trying to kick the puppy (though an all knowing god should know this anyways) but removes all harm for the puppy. The god may then proceed to deal with the person as it sees fit.

I think the bigger question is not 'Why does god allow free will', but 'Why does god allow harm to his creation'? God would not be removing any choices from people intent on harm, only foiling them at every attempt. Seems like a better system if there was actually a god in charge, but I guess if there is one, it doesn't mind letting us 'actualize' the harm.

The current system in place let's any god continue hiding or seem like it's not there in the first place.

I think, this 'actualizing harm' is a way (a sick way IMO) to bring people to God.
I was once told, by a fervent believer, that God would allow someone to die (babies included as that was the subject being discussed at the time) in order to bring another person to him.
God allows a person to die - potentially living in hell forever and ever and ever and - in order to gain another 'warrior' in heaven.
Someone earlier asked "What kind of sicko kicks a puppy?"
The same kind that allows one to die in order to bring another one to him.
Sicko indeed

[bluegreenearth]

Many apologists argue that we must suffer in order to have free will. It's a trade off that even God must bow to--we can either be morally free or free of suffering, but we cannot have both. We are told, for example:

...God can create people who are not morally free. Such a person would never harm anyone else, never fail to do good in any setting, and always be a beacon of right behavior. However, that would be more a machine than a person. A machine is neither good nor bad; it just does as it is programed to do. For people to be capable of genuine good deeds they must also be capable of evil deeds.

The implication here is that free will is the greatest good for us; to have free will is better than to be free of suffering. Or to put it another way, free will is so wonderful that it's worth the cost of sadness, fear, hatred, pain, sickness, dying and death, of course.

I'm not so sure, but what is your preference and why? Which would you choose if you could?

A. Free Will Along with the Attendant Suffering
or
B. A Happy and Peaceful World Full of Robotic Beacons of Light
or
C. A Combination of A and B

There is a prolific YouTuber named "TJump" who explains his perspective is that libertarian freewill cannot logically exist because our decisions are either determined by reasons or are randomly determined. If people had a reason for making a decision, then it was the reason that determined the choice and not their freewill. If people had no reason for making a decision, then they did not make a freewill choice but allowed randomness to determine the outcome. This includes the choice of the reason for making particular decision. People either had a reason for selecting a specific reason to make a particular choice or allowed randomness to determine the reason for making a specific choice. If people had a reason for selecting a specific reason, then their choice was determined by a reason. If people had no reason for selecting a specific reason, then they did not make a freewill choice but allowed randomness to determine the outcome. I have tentatively accepted the logic of TJump's perspective on this issue but am open to considering objections to it if anyone has any. The responses I've previously received when this perspective was shared in other threads have not succeeded in demonstrating any flaws in this perspective thus far. Maybe it will be different this time.

[Paul of Tarsus]

There is a prolific YouTuber named "TJump" who explains his perspective is that libertarian freewill cannot logically exist because our decisions are either determined by reasons or are randomly determined. If people had a reason for making a decision, then it was the reason that determined the choice and not their freewill. If people had no reason for making a decision, then they did not make a freewill choice but allowed randomness to determine the outcome. This includes the choice of the reason for making particular decision. People either had a reason for selecting a specific reason to make a particular choice or allowed randomness to determine the reason for making a specific choice. If people had a reason for selecting a specific reason, then their choice was determined by a reason. If people had no reason for selecting a specific reason, then they did not make a freewill choice but allowed randomness to determine the outcome. I have tentatively accepted the logic of TJump's perspective on this issue but am open to considering objections to it if anyone has any. The responses I've previously received when this perspective was shared in other threads have not succeeded in demonstrating any flaws in this perspective thus far. Maybe it will be different this time.

The whole issue of our making choices with some level of freedom versus complete determinism is actually very tough to fully resolve, or at least I've had trouble resolving it. If I appear to make a choice, was it really "I" who made that choice, or did my brain just do something based on its electro-chemistry? Am I my brain, or am I something that's just using my brain like I'm using my hands to type this post? It's hard to wrap my head around such a heady issue.

Anyway, it looks like TJump has ruled out free will. We either make apparent choices by yielding to some compulsive "reason," or the apparent choice was completely random. Most choices we make are not random by definition because when we make a selection, the alternatives are not equally probable. When I shopped for groceries today for instance, all the items available at the supermarket did not have an equal probability of going home with me. The probability of my buying chocolate milk was close to zero, and my buying tomatoes was close to one hundred percent. Now, did I make my choices there with complete lack of compulsion? Not really. I love chocolate milk, but I avoid it because it can cause digestive difficulties for me.

So I can't really agree with Mr. Jump's assessment of free will.

[bluegreenearth]

There is a prolific YouTuber named "TJump" who explains his perspective is that libertarian freewill cannot logically exist because our decisions are either determined by reasons or are randomly determined. If people had a reason for making a decision, then it was the reason that determined the choice and not their freewill. If people had no reason for making a decision, then they did not make a freewill choice but allowed randomness to determine the outcome. This includes the choice of the reason for making particular decision. People either had a reason for selecting a specific reason to make a particular choice or allowed randomness to determine the reason for making a specific choice. If people had a reason for selecting a specific reason, then their choice was determined by a reason. If people had no reason for selecting a specific reason, then they did not make a freewill choice but allowed randomness to determine the outcome. I have tentatively accepted the logic of TJump's perspective on this issue but am open to considering objections to it if anyone has any. The responses I've previously received when this perspective was shared in other threads have not succeeded in demonstrating any flaws in this perspective thus far. Maybe it will be different this time.

The whole issue of our making choices with some level of freedom versus complete determinism is actually very tough to fully resolve, or at least I've had trouble resolving it. If I appear to make a choice, was it really "I" who made that choice, or did my brain just do something based on its electro-chemistry? Am I my brain, or am I something that's just using my brain like I'm using my hands to type this post? It's hard to wrap my head around such a heady issue.

Anyway, it looks like TJump has ruled out free will. We either make apparent choices by yielding to some compulsive "reason," or the apparent choice was completely random. Most choices we make are not random by definition because when we make a selection, the alternatives are not equally probable. When I shopped for groceries today for instance, all the items available at the supermarket did not have an equal probability of going home with me. The probability of my buying chocolate milk was close to zero, and my buying tomatoes was close to one hundred percent. Now, did I make my choices there with complete lack of compulsion? Not really. I love chocolate milk, but I avoid it because it can cause digestive difficulties for me.

So I can't really agree with Mr. Jump's assessment of free will.

It would appear that your decision to not buy chocolate milk was determined by the reason of it causing you digestive difficulties despite your brain's desire for the dopamine hit it would experience if you were to purchase and consume the chocolate milk. If you chose to buy the chocolate milk regardless of the digestive difficulties, then that decision would have been determined by the reason of the anticipated dopamine hit being more persuasive to your brain than the digestive discomfort it anticipates from consuming the chocolate milk. So, the probabilities of the alternative decisions doesn't seem to be relevant, but I could be misunderstanding something.

[brunumb]

Biblically, God has created us with free will*. Period. The limitations are not "partial free will" (a logical impossibility) but limitations on our capacity to do what we may decide. If I decide I wish to be a banana, then I have the capacity to decide (to be a banana). Can I follow through on my decision? No.

I have never thought of becoming a banana. How can I know if that is an imposed limitation on my thinking or not? You can say that God created us with free will, but that is no more than a belief. Until you can demonstrate the reality of that belief, or even the reality of God, you can't claim that we have complete free will. Let me ask again, how can you determine if there are thoughts that you never have because they are imposed limitations on your thinking?

[brunumb]

God would not be removing any choices from people intent on harm, only foiling them at every attempt. Seems like a better system if there was actually a god in charge, but I guess if there is one, it doesn't mind letting us 'actualize' the harm.

And over time people might actually learn not to try to actualise harm to others. The way God works to all intents looks very much the same as no God working at all.

[Paul of Tarsus]

I'm as human as anybody even though I lack what you call free will.

I suppose we are not talking about the same thing since when I say "free will" I am talking about the ability to make decisions which, I dont believe you lack.

I can make some decisions, but I cannot decide to do a lot of other things. I cannot choose to enjoy the odor of feces, and neither can I choose to like the sight of a dead bird rotting on the lawn. Such limitations result from instinctive urges to survive by avoiding dangerous bacteria. All thinking people have such urges conferred on them by our evolution. If we could really freely decide to do whatever we wanted, then our species would have gone extinct.

It sounds like that "gift" to Eve and Adam did them no good.

That would depend on what you mean by "good"; good is a subjective assessment on ones personal worldview and values. What one person calls "good" another might call "bad".

In the context of the human condition "good" is, at least to me, to be free of suffering. When God imposed suffering on us (if we can believe the story), God took away Eve and Adam's will to remain in paradise by forcing them from Eden. His punishing them that way makes a mockery of the very idea of free choice.

Being able to make decisions did them Adam and Eve "good"as long as they made the right decisons. It is a good thing to be able to decide what do do for yourself, it is the difference between being free and being a "slave". Yes, with such an ability come responsibility, but responsibility is not bad if one is capable of shouldering it. But, as you say, ...." what's so bad about that"

Personally, I'd rather be a slave living in my master's mansion wearing nice clothes and eating good food than to be a free man naked and starving in the gutter. So your analogy is inept.

Anyway, Eve and Adam had a good excuse for taking the snake's advice: They knew nothing of good and evil. In particular, they knew nothing or at least had no experience with death. When God told them that the day they ate the forbidden fruit they would die (which turned out to be wrong, by the way), they would have had little idea of what he was talking about. They were as naive and innocent as young children, and like young children, they should have been protected from dangers they didn't understand. And as any good parent knows, children should not be needlessly exposed to hazards in the first place. If they do go near a potential danger, then any good parent will use force to remove them from that danger. God exposed his creations to a danger they didn't understand--a hazard he should have kept them from.

So JW, the story of the fall in Genesis 3 is in away a story of bad parenting. Any parent stupid enough to plant a deadly tree in her backyard with a poisonous snake in it that is fully accessible to her young daughter and son is a poor parent indeed. If her children do eat fruit from that tree and are poisoned, then the authorities will punish her for child endangerment. She did the wrong and not her kids. She should be punished and not they.

Of course, this logic should be applied to the God of the Bible. Why do you avoid doing so?

I don't want to be a robot (naked of otherwise) I want to be able to make decisions for myself, not just be programmed to do what someone else wants. I want to be capable of genuine goodness, creativity and love. Not having that would be bad.

You have a right to your opinion, of course, but I see no need for you to fuss over the will to do good. You can have that will, but let's just take away your will to do evil! Why would you want the will to do what is wicked? I don't want it, and in fact I have no will to do evil.

Maybe God missed me when he doled out the free will.

He may have missed a lot of other people too. Many people lack any will at all due to cognitive impairment. If a person is comatose, for example, that person may not be able to make any choices. Where's that person's free will?

... if people freely will to rape, murder, and wee wee in public, then God can stop them from committing their dirty deeds without violating their free wills.

Yes, that is what laws are for. Laws do not exist only to punish the violator they hopefully deter the violation. To premptively punish or control someone however would violate their rights as free moral agents.

I'm not advocating preemptive punishment, but we do try to control people by preventing them from doing harm. That's why we have burglar alarms, fences, locks, safes, and guard dogs. I see nothing wrong with using them to prevent people from doing harm. Do you?

So the whole concept of free will is simply not logically defensible and has little to do with reality. It's a lame idea cooked up by Christian theologians to try to defeat the charges that a good God would not create a world with suffering in it.

[Paul of Tarsus]

It would appear that your decision to not buy chocolate milk was determined by the reason of it causing you digestive difficulties despite your brain's desire for the dopamine hit it would experience if you were to purchase and consume the chocolate milk. If you chose to buy the chocolate milk regardless of the digestive difficulties, then that decision would have been determined by the reason of the anticipated dopamine hit being more persuasive to your brain than the digestive discomfort it anticipates from consuming the chocolate milk. So, the probabilities of the alternative decisions doesn't seem to be relevant, but I could be misunderstanding something.

We can easily alter the probabilities of alternatives with our conscious decisions. That's why mathematicians define "random" alternatives as alternatives that can happen with equal probability. It is extremely common for people to favor some alternatives over others making those favored alternatives far more likely to be realized than the other alternatives. So TJump's hypothesis that some of our decisions are random is very questionable. My dietary choices, like everybody else's, isn't random at all. I think that goes for any kind of choice.

[bluegreenearth]

It would appear that your decision to not buy chocolate milk was determined by the reason of it causing you digestive difficulties despite your brain's desire for the dopamine hit it would experience if you were to purchase and consume the chocolate milk. If you chose to buy the chocolate milk regardless of the digestive difficulties, then that decision would have been determined by the reason of the anticipated dopamine hit being more persuasive to your brain than the digestive discomfort it anticipates from consuming the chocolate milk. So, the probabilities of the alternative decisions doesn't seem to be relevant, but I could be misunderstanding something.

We can easily alter the probabilities of alternatives with our conscious decisions. That's why mathematicians define "random" alternatives as alternatives that can happen with equal probability. It is extremely common for people to favor some alternatives over others making those favored alternatives far more likely to be realized than the other alternatives. So TJump's hypothesis that some of our decisions are random is very questionable. My dietary choices, like everybody else's, isn't random at all. I think that goes for any kind of choice.

I think I understand where the confusion resides. TJump's hypothesis is not that some of our decisions are random but that our decisions have to be either determined by reasons or randomly determined. If none of our decisions are ever randomly determined, this wouldn't disprove the claim that our decisions are determined by reasons rather than being a libertarian freewill choice.

[JehovahsWitness]

That would depend on what you mean by "good"; good is a subjective assessment on ones personal worldview and values. What one person calls "good" another might call "bad".

In the context of the human condition "good" is, at least to me, to be free of suffering.

My point exactly, " at least to you " (subjective). To me, In the context of the human condition being free of suffering is not "good". And for someone that enjoyed human suffering, it would be "bad" no matter what the context.

1 PETER 3:14 - Aramaic Bible in Plain English

And if you suffer for the sake of righteousness, you are blessed...

Personally, I'd rather .... {snip}

Thanks for sharing you personal opinion.

.... So your analogy is inept.

ditto


JW