Is Nature Omnipotent?

[Don Mc]

One of the common criticisms of theism is that omnipotence seems like a meaningless escape clause. The basic idea is that whenever Christian theists like me run up against a logical challenge such as an argument from evil, say, or a critique of the shrouded ontology of the Trinity, we can always handily resolve the dilemma by a blanket appeal to God's "mysterious ways" and thereby escape the burden of having to make sense of apparent contradictions. Though I think answers are available to such dilemmas beyond simply "God's mysterious ways," I do think the objection is a fair one on its face.

But I also think the kind of scientific-naturalistic view of the world shared so by many atheists faces a similar criticism. On scientific naturalism, nature, much like God, is credited with creating the universe from nothing (or else existing eternally), creating life from nonliving chemical constituents (the "dust of the earth"), and bestowing humanity with intelligence, an appreciation for beauty, and a sense of morality – among other seeming miracles. I've heard serious naturalist philosophers propose that even if it could be verified that Jesus rose from the dead, that would not mean there could not be a naturalistic explanation for it (and I think they're right). And the paradoxes of general relativity or quantum mechanics seem no less confounding than the Trinity or the Incarnation of Christ. It appears that as understood by advocates of scientific naturalism, nature, no less than God, can do (and explain) anything.

Questions for debate/dialogue:

1. In principle, can nature do anything God can do?
2. If so, does it require a metaphysical assumption of some sort to believe nature can do anything God can do?
3. If not, what limits does nature face that God does not?

[brunumb]

[Replying to Don Mc in post #60]

The theistic argument concerning fine tuning assumes that the universe was designed to accommodate life. That assumption is not justified. There is no observable evidence that the universe was specifically fine tuned for life, just as there is no reason to believe that the lotto barrel was fine tuned to allow the Jones family to win the jackpot.

[bluegreenearth]

That's simply wrong. "Fine-tuning" is commonly used shorthand for a rather large set of individual physical constants and quantities, each of which must fall within a tiny specified range of values (relative to the total range of values those constants and quantities could have taken) in order for life to flourish – none of which in itself says anything one way or another about God or theism. Like most authorities on the subject, the Stanford Encyclopedia seems to agree:

Philosophical debates in which “fine-tuning” appears are often about the universe’s fine-tuning for life: according to many physicists, the fact that the universe is able to support life depends delicately on various of its fundamental characteristics, notably on the form of the laws of nature, on the values of some constants of nature, and on aspects of the universe’s conditions in its very early stages. Various reactions to the universe’s fine-tuning for life have been proposed: that it is a lucky coincidence which we have to accept as a primitive given; that it will be avoided by future best theories of fundamental physics; that the universe was created by some divine designer who established life-friendly conditions; and that fine-tuning for life indicates the existence of multiple other universes with conditions very different from those in our own universe.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fine-tuning

see also:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmology/#FineTuni

Notice that in each of the above articles, of four possible explanations for the phenomenon widely known as fine-tuning, only one postulates design or a designer. Use of the phrase "fine-tuning" by theists to describe the phenomenon in question therefore requires no tautologies, circular definitions, question-begging, confirmation bias or intellectual dishonesty...though it might require some intellectual honesty to go ahead and concede this point.

The problem is that non-theists perceive the concept of "fine-tuning" with something like the puddle analogy in mind, whereas theists have their God in mind. When you begin with the presumption that God exists, the "fine-tuning" seems to confirm the existence of a fine tuner. However, that is an effect of confirmation bias. When you don't begin with that presumption, the "fine-tuning" is easily understood as an anthropomorphic representation of a natural phenomenon.

That is all extremely muddled, probably because you have this idea that teleological arguments are inherently circular or tautologous or whatever. Specifiable complexity does not directly entail a given conscious "specifier" any more than fine-tuning entails a conscious "fine-tuner." The question is who or what is responsible for the observable phenomena of specifiable complexity and fine-tuning, not whether entities in nature objectively fitting those descriptions exist. They do.

There are no confirmed examples of complex biological features that have been specified in advance anywhere in the natural world. What theists perceive as "specifiable complexity" is just another example of anthropomorphism as a function of confirmation bias.

As I shared earlier, I first learned the concept of specifiable complexity from an atheist, Richard Dawkins, who explained in some impressive detail that what he called "complicated things" have the particular quality of a complex function (like vision or echolocation) that is specifiable in advance quite regardless of who or what is doing the specifying. Dawkins thought natural selection (the "blind watchmaker") was a sufficient specifier of the complexity, which should tell you that there is no theistic bias in the concept itself. Note also that Dawkins defined "biology" as "the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose" – which suggests that complicated biological functions that are specifiable in advance are at least prima facie evidence for theism.

Once again, biologically complex things like vision or echolocation need not have been specified in advance. To suggest they are examples of "specified complexity" only demonstrates a lack of understanding for how those complex features evolved through the process of natural selection. In other words, there is no need for anyone to have specified anything in advance.

And for some reason you keep confusing evidence with the inferences drawn from it. Discovery of a fine-tuner busy about the task of fine-tuning various universes would not be required to have "evidence for fine-tuning," because the fine-tuner is inferred from the evidence of fine-tuning we already have. In other words such a discovery would eliminate any need for evidence on the question whatsoever. Rather, fine-tuning is the evidence – in the context of teleological arguments in particular, it's evidence for God being the "fine-tuner." Similarly, if we were to discover Tiktaalik specimens evolving from fish in real time, we would need no evidence for (no need to infer) an evolutionary process (an "evolver"). It would be confusing, if not methodologically incoherent, to ask for real-time observations of the "evolver" before allowing ourselves to accept Tiktaalik as evidence for evolution.

Here's what I suggest is a more coherent and schema. Certain facts or observations are more consistent with specific implications and/or predictions of a belief or theory than other beliefs or theories, and thus count as confirming evidence:

Belief/theory > implication/prediction > observation (evidence) > confirmation

On the above essentially inductive schema,

Theism > intelligent design > fine-tuned constants and quantities > confirmation of theism

and

Evolution > descent with modification > Tiktaalik and other transitional fossils > confirmation of evolution

where ">" means roughly that the previous concept either implies or suggests the high probability of the next.

Notice that in each case only the observation in question is empirically verifiable. No one can see God, or evolution, or intelligent design, or descent with modification. Thus the "equivalent evidence" for Tiktaalik is not God himself but the empirical phenomenon known as fine-tuning.

One drawback to the above inductive approach is that the evidence is not always specifically predicted. Sometimes (as in the case of fine-tuning) we run across evidence that few expected or predicted and then infer the best explanation for it. In that case the schema runs in the other direction:

Observation (explanandum) + assessment of relative probabilities of possible explanations (explanans) = selection of best explanation

So on the abductive schema,

Fine-tuning + fine-tuning more probable on theism than naturalism = theism as best explanation

and

Tiktaalik + Tiktaalik more probable on evolution than creationism = evolution as best explanation

I should add that in neither of the above basic approaches does the evidence "prove" anything. It's possible, then, that a particular finding like Tiktaalik rightly counts as evidence for evolution even while the theory of evolution is still false in light of the total evidence – which is what I believe, in fact.

I will stop there, simply because most of the remainder of your post seems to involve these same basic confusions over definitions. That said, please let me know if there's any particular point you'd still like me to address. Otherwise I respectfully bow out of this exchange. Thanks.

We do have real-time evidence of "evolvers." Every biological organism that is a slightly modified version of their parents is an evolver. The fact of evolution is described as descent with modification in this way. The Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection is inferred from the fact that we observe biological organisms producing offspring which are slightly modified versions of themselves (an "evolver") and other evidence such as DNA and fossils like Tiktaalik. Thus, the rest of your argument is invalid.

[Icey]

One of the common criticisms of theism is that omnipotence seems like a meaningless escape clause. The basic idea is that whenever Christian theists like me run up against a logical challenge such as an argument from evil, say, or a critique of the shrouded ontology of the Trinity, we can always handily resolve the dilemma by a blanket appeal to God's "mysterious ways" and thereby escape the burden of having to make sense of apparent contradictions. Though I think answers are available to such dilemmas beyond simply "God's mysterious ways," I do think the objection is a fair one on its face.

But I also think the kind of scientific-naturalistic view of the world shared so by many atheists faces a similar criticism. On scientific naturalism, nature, much like God, is credited with creating the universe from nothing (or else existing eternally), creating life from nonliving chemical constituents (the "dust of the earth"), and bestowing humanity with intelligence, an appreciation for beauty, and a sense of morality – among other seeming miracles. I've heard serious naturalist philosophers propose that even if it could be verified that Jesus rose from the dead, that would not mean there could not be a naturalistic explanation for it (and I think they're right). And the paradoxes of general relativity or quantum mechanics seem no less confounding than the Trinity or the Incarnation of Christ. It appears that as understood by advocates of scientific naturalism, nature, no less than God, can do (and explain) anything.

Questions for debate/dialogue:

1. In principle, can nature do anything God can do?
2. If so, does it require a metaphysical assumption of some sort to believe nature can do anything God can do?
3. If not, what limits does nature face that God does not?

I'd say gods were created as a way to answer what nature has done. So in that idea, nature is god, so whatever power god can be attributed to also applies to nature.
This is, of course, assuming nature also includes things not on the planet, and go beyond the biological and physical attributes currently understood.