Is Nature Omnipotent?

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Don Mc
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Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #1

Post by Don Mc »

One of the common criticisms of theism is that omnipotence seems like a meaningless escape clause. The basic idea is that whenever Christian theists like me run up against a logical challenge such as an argument from evil, say, or a critique of the shrouded ontology of the Trinity, we can always handily resolve the dilemma by a blanket appeal to God's "mysterious ways" and thereby escape the burden of having to make sense of apparent contradictions. Though I think answers are available to such dilemmas beyond simply "God's mysterious ways," I do think the objection is a fair one on its face.

But I also think the kind of scientific-naturalistic view of the world shared so by many atheists faces a similar criticism. On scientific naturalism, nature, much like God, is credited with creating the universe from nothing (or else existing eternally), creating life from nonliving chemical constituents (the "dust of the earth"), and bestowing humanity with intelligence, an appreciation for beauty, and a sense of morality – among other seeming miracles. I've heard serious naturalist philosophers propose that even if it could be verified that Jesus rose from the dead, that would not mean there could not be a naturalistic explanation for it (and I think they're right). And the paradoxes of general relativity or quantum mechanics seem no less confounding than the Trinity or the Incarnation of Christ. It appears that as understood by advocates of scientific naturalism, nature, no less than God, can do (and explain) anything.

Questions for debate/dialogue:

1. In principle, can nature do anything God can do?
2. If so, does it require a metaphysical assumption of some sort to believe nature can do anything God can do?
3. If not, what limits does nature face that God does not?
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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #51

Post by Don Mc »

bluegreenearth wrote: Sat Jun 20, 2020 11:19 pm The Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection is a conclusion that is routinely demonstrated through experiments such as the prediction and subsequent discovery of transitional fossils such as tiktaalik, the prediction and direct observation of shared genetic traits between species, the prediction and direct observation of speciation in a variety of organisms, the prediction and direct observation of pesticide resistant insects, the prediction and direct observation of drug resistant bacteria, the prediction and subsequent discovery of the gene for teeth in birds, and hundreds of other experiments which made equally accurate predictions.
I've conceded before that there is considerable evidence for evolution, and will happily acknowledge it again here. But any given set of facts will be compatible with any number of theories, and some of the facts you cited would be unsurprising on a creationist view of things. For instance, drug- and pesticide-resistance, or adaptability generally, could be considered biological versions of what engineers would call "robust design;" while shared genetic traits and shared body plans would be roughly analogous to "modular design." Note also the many species (humans, for example) that remain in "species stasis" and thus fail to evolve no matter how long they are observed or how many times they reproduce. With roughly 26 working definitions of "species" in play among biologists, meanwhile, it's hard to say where one species of, say, bacteria ends and another begins, and thus hard to say when (or whether) speciation occurs at all. And it's worth noting that a new species of bacteria emerging from an original population doesn't even begin to explain the evolution of novel structures like appendages or specifiably complex structures like eyes in mammals.

In short, there are many ways to interpret a set of facts. And some facts do not fit evolutionary theory nearly as well as others. Ignoring those facts is what Paul Draper has called "the fallacy of understated evidence," basically a failure to account for total relevant evidence. I already mentioned horizontal gene transfer, which falsified the tree of life phylogenetic model that was derived from evolutionary theory. There are other problems as well, like clear selection limits faced by most breeding animals, or the many coincidences of "convergent evolution."

Basically, it is a fact that evolution has occurred and continues to occur. We don't need to directly observe the microscopic genetic mechanism of evolution to observe that "decent with modification" occurs. Meanwhile, the routinely successful predictions achieved through the Theory of Evolution demonstrates where it provides the most reliable explanation for how evolution occurred and continues to occur through the natural selection process. So, even if some of the details regarding the precise natural mechanism driving evolution are still debated, there is absolutely no legitimate debate about the fact that evolution occurred and still occurs. In other words, no professional scientists denies that "descent with modification" is directly observable. However, the exact genetic mechanism controlling how those modifications come about remains open for further investigation (at least as far as I'm aware).
That's still backwards. One does not "directly observe" millions of years of macroevolution from an unidentified common ancestor, which is what is normally meant by "descent with modification" (it's certainly what Darwin meant by it). One may, however, directly observe purported mechanisms like natural selection. Failure to identify, test and confirm just how those various mechanisms act upon organisms to produce new structures, systems, or body plans altogether (as opposed to populations of fruit flies and finches giving rise to, well, more fruit flies and finches) suggests that evolution is not quite as well supported as you claim.

Now, before someone accuses me of dogmatically defending the Theory of Evolution as though it were a religious belief, I am open to the possibility of it being false.
Sorry, but to assert that there is "absolutely no legitimate debate" about the truth of evolution is to also reject the possibility of it being false. Again it appears you're trying to walk an impossibly fine line here. Besides, you could always say that you're waiting for confirmation of a better theory, a theory which is "impossible" by virtue of its being not yet confirmed. Lol

If someone were to provide demonstrable evidence falsifying the Theory of Evolution, I would be compelled by intellectually honesty to encourage and support new scientific research into other falsifiable candidate explanations for biodiversity. However, proving the Theory of Evolution false would in no way support any unfalsifiable Intelligent Design (i.e. Creationist) explanation for biodiversity. Intelligent Design is still required to demonstrate its reliability as an explanation by conducting experiments that succeed at making novel testable predictions. Unfortunately for Intelligent Design proponents, the only thing it does is offer post-hoc and ad-hoc rationalizations with no ability to succeed in making novel testable predictions.
In a sense that's right. If creationism is true, then it would not make many testable predictions. That's because it's not a scientific theory proper. Of course, the same could be said of the "post hoc rationalization" that Napoleon was defeated at the Battle of Waterloo.

Mathematics and Logic are considered "conceptual truths" because they are mental concepts in much the same way that language is a mental concept. In fact, both mathematics and logic are defined as formal languages in Philosophy. This is because they function as abstract representations of the reality we experience. For instance, the mathematical expression 1 + 1 = 2 is defined as the abstract representation of the observation that combining an existing real thing into a set with another existing real thing results in a real thing and another real thing existing together as a set in reality. Therefore, the mathematical expression 1 + 1 = 2 is the agreed upon conceptual language we use to describe an observed property of reality, and the actual observed property of reality is the "empirical" truth. So, 1 + 1 = 2 is conceptually true by definition and the observed property of reality is the empirical truth.

The same applies to Logic. The logical expression "A equals A" was defined as the abstract representation of the observation that each observed thing in reality is identical with itself. Therefore, the logical expression "A equals A" abstractly represents an agreed upon description of an observed property of reality, and the observed property itself is the "empirical" truth. So, "A equals A" is conceptually true by definition and the observed property of reality is the empirical truth.
No, most of the breakthroughs in electromagnetism, quantum theory and general relativity were not the results of simple empirical observations, but largely the fruit of applied mathematics. Differential equations did not come to us through observations of physical reality, though they do come in handy for describing and predicting certain aspects of physical reality that never would have been discovered, understood or appreciated apart from the equations.

Consequently, you are making a category error by claiming "conceptually" demonstrable truths and "empirically" demonstrable truths are equally justifiable.
More precisely, I am claiming that the two types of demonstrable truths are...demonstrably true. I'd say that's not a category error but a truism, kind of like "A equals A." While I don't know if it's a category error per se for you to suggest that there is some important categorical distinction to be made between propositions that are demonstrably true and those that are justifiable, I also don't see a reason for making that distinction here other than creating an opportunity to accuse me of a fallacy. You've admitted yourself that a sound epistemology depends upon certain working assumptions (conceptually demonstrable truths) that are not themselves scientifically verifiable. Why then would you turn around and argue that scientifically supported beliefs are more justifiable than the foundational beliefs upon which a scientific epistemology rests? As the foundation goes, so goes the whole structure.

Firstly, quantum mechanics wasn't false but unfalsifiable prior to the twentieth century. Given the counter-intuitive concepts inherent to the idea of quantum mechanics, scientists were highly skeptical of the hypothesis but didn't have the technology to test if it was false. Alternatively, the "Theory of Spontaneous Generation" was not necessarily accepted as "true" (at least not in the sense you've implied) but as the most reasonable explanation given the evidence available prior to the nineteenth century. Secondly, while the scientific method has been demonstrated to be the most reliable means for acquiring a functional knowledge base, I would be open to another method if one can be demonstrated as more reliable. However, to date, there doesn't appear to be a more reliable method.
Neither of us thinks that quantum theory was actually false prior to the twentieth century, or that spontaneous generation was actually true prior to the nineteenth. But that's just the point. According to a scientific epistemology in which knowledge is a function of confirmation or falsifiability, q.m. was at one time false and spontaneous generation was at one time true. So it is that a purely scientific-empiricist epistemology leads to a reductio ad absurdum: if empirical science is truth-functional, then truths can become false and falsehoods can become true. But since that's nonsensical, there's something wrong with a scientific epistemology.

Einstein wasn't claiming a magic leprechaun was responsible for slowing down or speeding up time. All the components of Einstein's hypothesis were previously demonstrated to exist. Gravity, light, and time were all known to be possible because they were all observable, even if the precise influences they have on each other wasn't yet demonstrable. The same is true for the claim that the World Trade Center in New York was under attack. Every component of that hypothesis describes something that was known to possibly exist independently, even though you hadn't yet observed their particular interaction with each other. The World Trade Center is known to exist in New York which is also known to exist, airplanes are known to exist, and the ability for terrorists to hijack a plane was known to exist. It is not like someone claimed a giant invisible dragon was attacking a building made entirely of pudding somewhere in Narnia. No component of that hypothesis is known to exist in realty for it to be possible.
I think you're missing the point again, namely that propositions demonstrated to be probable are at the same time possible, by definition. Equating "possibility" with empirical confirmation defies what it means for something to be possible. Even the great scientific empiricist Hume would tell you that much. You have mentioned predictions of findings such as Tiktaalik, yet a finding – again by definition – is something previously not known to exist in reality, which means, at least by your reasoning above, that the existence of Tiktaalik went from impossible to confirmed in the time it took to unearth the fossil. And before the first fossil was discovered, the existence of any fossils was impossible. And before life existed on earth, life on earth was impossible. And so forth, as far back as you please. Besides playing fast and loose with commonly accepted definitions, one of many problems with this sort of extreme empiricism or positivism is that there is no way to confirm it empirically, which makes it self-defeating. And there appears to be no logical rationale behind it either, which may explain why it leads to the sorts of incoherence and inconsistency I've been trying to point out. From everything I can tell an empiricist epistemology is little more than an arbitrary assertion grounded in an arbitrary preference for empiricism.

All for today. I may try to answer some of your objections to the fine-tuning argument, and then I will probably wrap up my participation in this thread. If I don't get to it, let me say thanks now for your contributions to the discussion.
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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #52

Post by bluegreenearth »

Don Mc wrote: Wed Jun 24, 2020 10:00 pmI've conceded before that there is considerable evidence for evolution, and will happily acknowledge it again here. But any given set of facts will be compatible with any number of theories, and some of the facts you cited would be unsurprising on a creationist view of things. For instance, drug- and pesticide-resistance, or adaptability generally, could be considered biological versions of what engineers would call "robust design;" while shared genetic traits and shared body plans would be roughly analogous to "modular design." Note also the many species (humans, for example) that remain in "species stasis" and thus fail to evolve no matter how long they are observed or how many times they reproduce. With roughly 26 working definitions of "species" in play among biologists, meanwhile, it's hard to say where one species of, say, bacteria ends and another begins, and thus hard to say when (or whether) speciation occurs at all. And it's worth noting that a new species of bacteria emerging from an original population doesn't even begin to explain the evolution of novel structures like appendages or specifiably complex structures like eyes in mammals.

In short, there are many ways to interpret a set of facts. And some facts do not fit evolutionary theory nearly as well as others. Ignoring those facts is what Paul Draper has called "the fallacy of understated evidence," basically a failure to account for total relevant evidence. I already mentioned horizontal gene transfer, which falsified the tree of life phylogenetic model that was derived from evolutionary theory. There are other problems as well, like clear selection limits faced by most breeding animals, or the many coincidences of "convergent evolution."
Evolution makes successful predictions; intelligent design is a post hoc rationalization that makes no novel testable predictions. Nothing else matters.
Don Mc wrote: Wed Jun 24, 2020 10:00 pmThat's still backwards. One does not "directly observe" millions of years of macroevolution from an unidentified common ancestor, which is what is normally meant by "descent with modification" (it's certainly what Darwin meant by it). One may, however, directly observe purported mechanisms like natural selection. Failure to identify, test and confirm just how those various mechanisms act upon organisms to produce new structures, systems, or body plans altogether (as opposed to populations of fruit flies and finches giving rise to, well, more fruit flies and finches) suggests that evolution is not quite as well supported as you claim.
Intelligent design begins with a conclusion, uses confirmation bias to acquire and interpret the evidence, doesn't make novel testable predictions, and offers criticisms of evolution that equally applies to itself. There is nothing else to discuss here.
Don Mc wrote: Wed Jun 24, 2020 10:00 pmSorry, but to assert that there is "absolutely no legitimate debate" about the truth of evolution is to also reject the possibility of it being false. Again it appears you're trying to walk an impossibly fine line here. Besides, you could always say that you're waiting for confirmation of a better theory, a theory which is "impossible" by virtue of its being not yet confirmed. Lol
It doesn't follow that the lack of legitimate debate about the acceptance of evolution is also to reject the possibility of it being false. You've already been provided with numerous examples of how evolution could be falsified in the future. There is nothing more to discuss here.
Don Mc wrote: Wed Jun 24, 2020 10:00 pmIn a sense that's right. If creationism is true, then it would not make many testable predictions. That's because it's not a scientific theory proper. Of course, the same could be said of the "post hoc rationalization" that Napoleon was defeated at the Battle of Waterloo.
Believe it or not, the claim that Napoleon was defeated at the Battle of Waterloo is falsifiable and makes testable predictions. For example, if Napoleon was not defeated, then we should expect to find historical evidence indicating that two Seventh Coalition armies, an Anglo-allied army, and a Prussian army were defeated at the Battle of Waterloo.
Don Mc wrote: Wed Jun 24, 2020 10:00 pmNo, most of the breakthroughs in electromagnetism, quantum theory and general relativity were not the results of simple empirical observations, but largely the fruit of applied mathematics. Differential equations did not come to us through observations of physical reality, though they do come in handy for describing and predicting certain aspects of physical reality that never would have been discovered, understood or appreciated apart from the equations.
It doesn't follow that the functionality of mathematics in helping us to discover properties of reality indicates that those properties are prescribed. Mathematics is used as tool of discovery in the same way we use a microscope or a telescope. We don't claim the microscope prescribes the existence of bacteria or that the telescope prescribes the existence of distant galaxies. There is nothing more to discuss here.
Don Mc wrote: Wed Jun 24, 2020 10:00 pmMore precisely, I am claiming that the two types of demonstrable truths are...demonstrably true. I'd say that's not a category error but a truism, kind of like "A equals A." While I don't know if it's a category error per se for you to suggest that there is some important categorical distinction to be made between propositions that are demonstrably true and those that are justifiable, I also don't see a reason for making that distinction here other than creating an opportunity to accuse me of a fallacy. You've admitted yourself that a sound epistemology depends upon certain working assumptions (conceptually demonstrable truths) that are not themselves scientifically verifiable. Why then would you turn around and argue that scientifically supported beliefs are more justifiable than the foundational beliefs upon which a scientific epistemology rests? As the foundation goes, so goes the whole structure.
You are conflating ontology with epistemology.
Don Mc wrote: Wed Jun 24, 2020 10:00 pmNeither of us thinks that quantum theory was actually false prior to the twentieth century, or that spontaneous generation was actually true prior to the nineteenth. But that's just the point. According to a scientific epistemology in which knowledge is a function of confirmation or falsifiability, q.m. was at one time false and spontaneous generation was at one time true. So it is that a purely scientific-empiricist epistemology leads to a reductio ad absurdum: if empirical science is truth-functional, then truths can become false and falsehoods can become true. But since that's nonsensical, there's something wrong with a scientific epistemology.
I don't recall claiming that knowledge is a function of confirmation because that would be a failure to mitigate for confirmation bias. The principle of falsifiability doesn't declare untested claims to be false or untestable claims to be true. Your criticism applies more to empiricism or logical positivism. The epistemology I use doesn't function in the way you've described. Therefore, it would appear that you have unintentionally argued against a straw-man.
Don Mc wrote: Wed Jun 24, 2020 10:00 pmI think you're missing the point again, namely that propositions demonstrated to be probable are at the same time possible, by definition. Equating "possibility" with empirical confirmation defies what it means for something to be possible. Even the great scientific empiricist Hume would tell you that much. You have mentioned predictions of findings such as Tiktaalik, yet a finding – again by definition – is something previously not known to exist in reality, which means, at least by your reasoning above, that the existence of Tiktaalik went from impossible to confirmed in the time it took to unearth the fossil. And before the first fossil was discovered, the existence of any fossils was impossible. And before life existed on earth, life on earth was impossible. And so forth, as far back as you please. Besides playing fast and loose with commonly accepted definitions, one of many problems with this sort of extreme empiricism or positivism is that there is no way to confirm it empirically, which makes it self-defeating. And there appears to be no logical rationale behind it either, which may explain why it leads to the sorts of incoherence and inconsistency I've been trying to point out. From everything I can tell an empiricist epistemology is little more than an arbitrary assertion grounded in an arbitrary preference for empiricism.
A claim only has to be "implicitly" empirical to be possible; not directly empirically confirmed. The claim that Tiktaalik would be found was considered possible because it described something that had an "implicit empirical" basis. Your criticism applies more to an empiricist or a logical positivist, but I'm neither of those. Once again, you may have unintentionally argued against a straw-man.

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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #53

Post by Don Mc »

bluegreenearth wrote: Sun Jun 21, 2020 1:09 am [Replying to Don Mc in post #48]
Don Mc wrote: Fri Jun 19, 2020 8:37 pmNot sure what to say to this. I'm an apologist and would be happy to at least take a shot at resolving the objections (or else admit that I can't presently resolve them), but I don't know which ones you have in mind. What would you consider the strongest objection against the fine-tuning argument?
Below is the basic structure of the Teleological argument as I understand it:

Premise 1) The fine tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
Premise 2) It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
Premise 3) Therefore, it is due to design.
Premise 4) That designer is God.
Conclusion) Therefore, God exists.

The argument is proposing to solve an unlikely phenomenon known as Cosmic Fine Tuning. Basically, the physical laws of the universe indicate their values must be within extraordinarily precise tolerances or life would not be possible in the universe. Therefore, it comes as no surprise when theists apply confirmation bias to this observation and immediately jump to conclude the "fine tuning" of physical constants proves the universe must have been designed by their specific God.
Easy there. I merely suggested that evidence for fine-tuning is more surprising on naturalism than on theism, and therefore is prima facie evidence for theism (and would add that atheists like Jeffery Lowder and Paul Draper agree in principle). But right away you charge me with "confirmation bias" and thereby deducing that by itself, evidence of fine-tuning somehow absolutely "proves" the existence of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Talk about confirmation bias and immediately jumping to conclusions...

Even if we offer no contention to the entire argument, what predictive power does it offer us? What experimental measurements confirm the proposition is true in the external reality we all experience? How does knowing a divine cosmic designer was responsible for creating the universe help us make decisions which have empirical consequences? The lack of answers to those questions exposes this argument to be nothing more than a biased framework for concluding God exists without demonstrating the existence of God. Nevertheless, let's continue and examine the first premise.
Sounds good. It's always helpful to first poison the well with some irrelevant rhetoric followed by a non sequitur before proceeding with an actual rebuttal. :P

Premise 1 of the Teleological argument for the existence of God fallaciously presents a false trichotomy. How was it concluded that fine tuning was only explainable by one of three philosophically exclusive options?
The same way that a person sees no more than three options on the menu and concludes that only three options are actually available, I guess. But I am not William Lane Craig, and I'm open to other possibilities. Did you have another option in mind that is not already entailed by one of the three given?

The concept of "physical necessity" proposes the physical constants could not possibly have any other values. As such, there is nothing to fine tune because no other options are available to choose from.
Well yes, that's right. If physical necessity is the best explanation for what appears to be fine-tuning, then no creator or designer is required. The argument, however, is that physical necessity is not the best explanation for the appearance of fine-tuning, because it would entail that a universe without life is actually impossible. On that premise, even given a vast or even infinite number of alternate universes comprising a multiverse (a concept often suggested by critics of the fine tuning argument), none of the vast possible sets of initial conditions and physical laws could fail to produce living organisms in any of those universes. That would defy the very concept of a multiverse (an atheistic concept at that), and again would appear to completely redefine possibility – even on an epistemology that only permits empirical or "implicitly" empirical realities.

Then there is the concept of "chance" where the values of physical constants are purely random variables, but our universe just happened to acquire the life permitting values. The possibility is not all that unlikely because we observe favorable results from random chances in nature relatively frequently. For example, because our galaxy is estimated to contain more than 300 billion stars, it should be no surprise that at least one of those solar systems contains a planet in the habitable zone. Do apologists find it at all compelling that we routinely observe examples of unlikely events occurring by chance and physical necessity in nature but never any observations of God let alone God designing anything?
The problem there is that "chance" is not an explanation for anything in particular. To put it another way: chance is a sweeping explanation for absolutely everything we can observe or imagine, no matter how evidently, antecedently improbable. By that same argument, given enough solar systems and enough time, not only could life emerge on Earth unaided, but Jesus could rise from the dead by a fortunate temporary decrease of entropy following his crucifixion, and someone's mischievous pet monkey could happen to gain access to his owner's computer, mimic his motions, and by sheer accident log on to your account and post the message to which I am currently responding. And that brings me back to the main point of the OP: "It appears that as understood by advocates of scientific [or metaphysical, if you prefer] naturalism, nature, no less than God, can do (and explain) anything."

The notion is that an omniscient and omnipotent being had the capacity to create the universe on an arbitrary whim but was somehow restricted to fine tune the physical laws in order for life to emerge.
What a weird argument. It sounds like you're saying that indications of specified order and deliberate design actually count against theism, because God had the option to arbitrarily create a universe that does not give the appearance of having been designed instead. But that can't be what you're saying. Far as I'm concerned you're simply too intelligent to seriously suggest that evidence of design in nature is evidence against theism.

Even if God can only do what is logically possible, how does this theistic proposition not describe a paradox? Furthermore, the best this God could construct was a universe which is mostly inhospitable to life. To illustrate the absurdity of this idea, imagine a brewery generating a thousand tons of waste each day to produce one molecule of beer per century. According to logic of the argument, the observable properties of the universe implicate its creator to be embarrassingly incompetent and weak.
I think that objection works only if we allow as a premise that God actually intended to fill the universe with life, but I don't see why that would have to be God's intention. It may be that God surrounded our planet with seemingly endless stretches of inhospitable space interspersed with various massive objects precisely to underscore that life is, in fact, a product of fine-tuning. Think of it like this: if the entire universe were filled with living organisms throughout, we would be inclined to think that the emergence and flourishing of life is really no more significant or improbable than the formation of rocks – that there is no appreciable difference between "fine-tuned" and "maybe not tuned at all." Besides that, I know lots of science-minded intellectuals (many of them atheists) who regard the inhospitable universe to be awe-inspiring both in its beauty and vastness. For them, at least, the cosmos surrounding us is not really analogous to industrial waste.

When the scientific experts refer to fine tuning, they don't highlight life as the only beneficiary of the physical constants. Everything in the observable universe depends upon those precise conditions in order to exist. Stars, galaxies, planets, black holes, and the nuclei of atoms would not be possible had the physical laws been slightly different. The phrase could just as easily have been, "finely tuned for black holes." In fact, the premises of the Teleological argument are more supportive of black holes as the objects for which the universe was created rather than life. Indeed, the time and energy required for the construction of a black hole far exceeds that which is necessary for the development of a self-replicating organic molecule.
That's fair. As mentioned previously, I don't believe the entire universe is fine-tuned for life, but that the fine-tuning of various physical constants and quantities appears to be a prerequisite for life to exist on Earth nonetheless. In other words, the fine-tuning of those constants and quantities is a necessary but not sufficient condition for life to emerge and thrive. What seem to be required in addition to this physical or "cosmological" kind of fine-tuning are atmospheric, environmental, and biological fine-tuning. (The latter is essentially what I mean when I mention "specifiable complexity.")

Another inconvenience for apologists is the fact that the experts are discovering the physical constants are not so finely tuned after all. The electroweak force, for instance, used to be considered finely tuned because slight deviations in its value would prohibit the fusion of heavy elements in stars. The false assumption is that the electroweak force is the only one adjustable at a given time. If other variables simultaneously adjust accordingly, it is entirely possible for the universe to function without a weak nuclear force.
Okay. Let's imagine for a moment that just such a scenario took place: all the other variables simultaneously adjusted accordingly so that life was able to thrive without a weak nuclear force. For me this alternate arrangement would be just another example of fine-tuning, maybe the result of God showing off or something. At the least it seems like this counterfactual alignment of life-permitting specifications would still require an explanation, no less than the evidence for fine-tuning that we actually have requires an explanation now.

Anyway, there is no practical purpose in proceeding further with the Fine Tuning argument because it can be rewritten to mirror the apologist's intended logic:

Premise 1) Either cosmic fine-tuning was designed by the God from classical monotheism or it was not.
Premise 2) Theistic dogma supersedes any possibility that a naturalistic explanation accounting for fine-tuning will ever be discovered.
Conclusion) Therefore, God designed the universe and theists are exempted from the burden of proof.
That's my "intended logic," is it? As often as you complain about straw man arguments, the above is a rather blatant example of a straw man. While I do accept that the first premise is reasonable enough, I have never suggested (nor even seriously considered) anything like the second premise, much less the ridiculous conclusion that doesn't begin to follow from the premises. Compare that to my suggestion that your epistemology is empiricist because you define "possibility" as anything that is either 1) empirically confirmed, or 2) "implicitly empirical." If my inference somehow turned out to be a "straw man," as you have alleged, it was not without some justification. But here you're essentially claiming to disclose beliefs on my behalf which I have never entertained, let alone communicated on this forum, and then using them as premises in an argument that we would both agree is perfectly terrible.

Finally, the argument depends on psychological tools of manipulation which appeal to the human desire for cognitive closure.
I must have missed the evidence and arguments you presented for this last assertion.
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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #54

Post by Diagoras »

[Replying to Don Mc in post #51]
The definition of a species is pretty well defined: “a group of living organisms consisting of similar individuals capable of exchanging genes or interbreeding.”

Where did you get your twenty six different definitions (see below) from, and can you provide some examples (and where they are accepted as useful definitions) that significantly differ from what I’ve posted?
With roughly 26 working definitions of "species" in play among biologists, meanwhile, it's hard to say where one species of, say, bacteria ends and another begins, and thus hard to say when (or whether) speciation occurs at all. And it's worth noting that a new species of bacteria emerging from an original population doesn't even begin to explain the evolution of novel structures like appendages or specifiably complex structures like eyes in mammals.
Speciation occurs over very long timescales. Your ‘hard to say’ argument is equivalent of challenging the theory of continental drift after spending a weekend at the coast and noting that the beach hasn’t moved. Complex structures evolve over several millions of years, and what seems ‘novel’ is in fact only a minor change from what’s gone before. Here’s a link that answers your (and many other) misconceptions about evolution in a readable and comprehensive way:

https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibra ... ns_faq.php
In short, there are many ways to interpret a set of facts.
Oh, sure. Some of the resulting theories might fit the facts better than others, and we could probably set up some controlled observations in order to refine those theories and get an even better fit. News flash: this has been going on for a while.

Another aspect:

Some facts do not fit designer theory nearly as well as others. Sea mammal blowholes, the giraffe’s birth canal (and laryngeal nerve), the fact that humans can’t digest cellulose, or produce vitamin C, our ‘back to front’ retina with its blind spot, etc.

All of the above, and many more ‘design flaws’ can be demonstrated to fit very well with the theory of evolution, given our increasing knowledge of genetics, embryology and an ever-increasing fossil record. The same can’t be said for the ‘design theory’, which has never been able to produce any evidence to support it, (other than to wrongly classify bats as birds, I suppose).

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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #55

Post by bluegreenearth »

Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmEasy there. I merely suggested that evidence for fine-tuning is more surprising on naturalism than on theism, and therefore is prima facie evidence for theism (and would add that atheists like Jeffery Lowder and Paul Draper agree in principle). But right away you charge me with "confirmation bias" and thereby deducing that by itself, evidence of fine-tuning somehow absolutely "proves" the existence of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Talk about confirmation bias and immediately jumping to conclusions...
The comments were directed at the common apologetic tactic and not necessarily your personal perspective on the matter. Try not to take it personally. Also, the claim that the evidence for fine-tuning is more surprising on naturalism than on theism is a tautology. This is because the evidence for fine-tuning is what theists perceive and define as "fine-tuning by God." So, the claim is basically saying the same thing twice: The evidence for fine-tuning by God is more surprising on naturalism than on fine-tuning by God. Well, duh!
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmSounds good. It's always helpful to first poison the well with some irrelevant rhetoric followed by a non sequitur before proceeding with an actual rebuttal. :P
What conclusion did I make that didn't follow from the argument, or did I miss where the fine-tuning argument demonstrated the existence of God?
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmThe same way that a person sees no more than three options on the menu and concludes that only three options are actually available, I guess. But I am not William Lane Craig, and I'm open to other possibilities. Did you have another option in mind that is not already entailed by one of the three given?
It is a false trichotomy because there are really only two possible options to be considered; not three. There is no justification for presuming the physical constants could possibly be designed by an intelligent agent. Where in the argument does it describe the mechanism an intelligent agent would use to design the physical constants? What evidence is provided to demonstrate such an intelligent designer could even exist in the first place? Therefore, the premise is unsupported.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmWell yes, that's right. If physical necessity is the best explanation for what appears to be fine-tuning, then no creator or designer is required. The argument, however, is that physical necessity is not the best explanation for the appearance of fine-tuning, because it would entail that a universe without life is actually impossible. On that premise, even given a vast or even infinite number of alternate universes comprising a multiverse (a concept often suggested by critics of the fine tuning argument), none of the vast possible sets of initial conditions and physical laws could fail to produce living organisms in any of those universes. That would defy the very concept of a multiverse (an atheistic concept at that), and again would appear to completely redefine possibility – even on an epistemology that only permits empirical or "implicitly" empirical realities.
We don't know if there is a multi-verse, and I'm not claiming to believe one exists. In fact, I'm not making a positive claim at all but merely demonstrating where the positive claim made by the fine-tuning argument has not been sufficiently justified. The only intellectually honest position to endorse given the insufficient evidence is agnosticism.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmThe problem there is that "chance" is not an explanation for anything in particular. To put it another way: chance is a sweeping explanation for absolutely everything we can observe or imagine, no matter how evidently, antecedently improbable. By that same argument, given enough solar systems and enough time, not only could life emerge on Earth unaided, but Jesus could rise from the dead by a fortunate temporary decrease of entropy following his crucifixion, and someone's mischievous pet monkey could happen to gain access to his owner's computer, mimic his motions, and by sheer accident log on to your account and post the message to which I am currently responding. And that brings me back to the main point of the OP: "It appears that as understood by advocates of scientific [or metaphysical, if you prefer] naturalism, nature, no less than God, can do (and explain) anything."
Science is methodological naturalism; not metaphysical naturalism. It is important not to conflate the two of them.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmWhat a weird argument. It sounds like you're saying that indications of specified order and deliberate design actually count against theism, because God had the option to arbitrarily create a universe that does not give the appearance of having been designed instead. But that can't be what you're saying. Far as I'm concerned you're simply too intelligent to seriously suggest that evidence of design in nature is evidence against theism.
Once again, the claim that theism best explains the evidence of "design" in nature is a tautology and can be rewritten as follows: Design by God best explains the evidence of design by God in nature. Also, my comment was more of an observation than an argument. If theists want to depict God as being omnipotent, then the fine-tuning argument directly implies the contradiction of an omnipotent God who had no choice but to fine-tune the physical constants of this universe or it wouldn't have been possible for him to create and sustain life in it.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmI think that objection works only if we allow as a premise that God actually intended to fill the universe with life, but I don't see why that would have to be God's intention. It may be that God surrounded our planet with seemingly endless stretches of inhospitable space interspersed with various massive objects precisely to underscore that life is, in fact, a product of fine-tuning. Think of it like this: if the entire universe were filled with living organisms throughout, we would be inclined to think that the emergence and flourishing of life is really no more significant or improbable than the formation of rocks – that there is no appreciable difference between "fine-tuned" and "maybe not tuned at all." Besides that, I know lots of science-minded intellectuals (many of them atheists) who regard the inhospitable universe to be awe-inspiring both in its beauty and vastness. For them, at least, the cosmos surrounding us is not really analogous to industrial waste.
It is fine to speculate on the motive's of a god that cannot be demonstrated to exist, but such theological exercises don't function as justifications for believing a god exists and fine-tuned the universe. Nevertheless, your point is noted, though, I suspect an omnipotent god who intended for all of us to know life was a product of fine-tuning would have succeeded in that effort by now. Maybe he just prefers for his followers to embrace claims about life and the universe that are unfalsifiable and make no testable predictions.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmThat's fair. As mentioned previously, I don't believe the entire universe is fine-tuned for life, but that the fine-tuning of various physical constants and quantities appears to be a prerequisite for life to exist on Earth nonetheless. In other words, the fine-tuning of those constants and quantities is a necessary but not sufficient condition for life to emerge and thrive. What seem to be required in addition to this physical or "cosmological" kind of fine-tuning are atmospheric, environmental, and biological fine-tuning. (The latter is essentially what I mean when I mention "specifiable complexity.")
The puddle analogy by Douglas Adams is a clever and appropriate objection to the "specifiable complexity" argument. To my knowledge, the objection has never been adequately resolved. Once the objection has been resolved, I'll be happy to consider the "specified complexity" argument if it can be tested in order to determine whether the claim is false or not. However, for the time being, the claim doesn't appear to make any novel testable predictions.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmOkay. Let's imagine for a moment that just such a scenario took place: all the other variables simultaneously adjusted accordingly so that life was able to thrive without a weak nuclear force. For me this alternate arrangement would be just another example of fine-tuning, maybe the result of God showing off or something. At the least it seems like this counterfactual alignment of life-permitting specifications would still require an explanation, no less than the evidence for fine-tuning that we actually have requires an explanation now.
The most reasonable candidate explanation for fine-tuning is the confirmation bias of many theists causing them to perceive intelligent design in the physical constants of the universe despite having no demonstrable evidence of an intelligent designer existing to fine-tune the physical constants, no demonstrable evidence for the mechanism an intelligent agent would use to fine-tune the physical constants, and no demonstrable evidence that the physical constants can be fine-tuned at all in the first place.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmThat's my "intended logic," is it? As often as you complain about straw man arguments, the above is a rather blatant example of a straw man. While I do accept that the first premise is reasonable enough, I have never suggested (nor even seriously considered) anything like the second premise, much less the ridiculous conclusion that doesn't begin to follow from the premises. Compare that to my suggestion that your epistemology is empiricist because you define "possibility" as anything that is either 1) empirically confirmed, or 2) "implicitly empirical." If my inference somehow turned out to be a "straw man," as you have alleged, it was not without some justification. But here you're essentially claiming to disclose beliefs on my behalf which I have never entertained, let alone communicated on this forum, and then using them as premises in an argument that we would both agree is perfectly terrible.
Here again, my comments were directed at the standard apologetic argument as it is commonly formatted and not necessarily your personal perspective on it. Nothing personal and no straw-man was intended.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmI must have missed the evidence and arguments you presented for this last assertion.
The fine-tuning argument artificially satisfies a very common psychological need for cognitive closure. In general, people are discomforted by confusion and ambiguity. The desire to have an answer to a profound question often motivates people to accept any explanation as long as it muffles their uncertainty. The propensity to be satisfied with an emotionally satisfying answer over the acceptance of no answer is a form of cognitive bias we all share. To complicate things further, humans also have an evolved tendency to perceive agency where none may actually exist. The cumulative effect of these biases amounts to stacking the deck in favor of the easily digestible proposition which concludes the universe was fine-tuned by an intelligent designer.

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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #56

Post by Don Mc »

Diagoras wrote: Mon Jun 29, 2020 12:35 am [Replying to Don Mc in post #51]
The definition of a species is pretty well defined: “a group of living organisms consisting of similar individuals capable of exchanging genes or interbreeding.”

Where did you get your twenty six different definitions (see below) from, and can you provide some examples (and where they are accepted as useful definitions) that significantly differ from what I’ve posted?
The article below is from John Wilkins, an authority on the subject (I saw another link to a review of one of his books that has the number now at 25, but the point still holds, I think):

https://scienceblogs.com/evolvingthough ... s-concepts

I also remember Dan Dennett discoursing at some length on problems with various species definitions in Darwin's Dangerous Idea.

Speciation occurs over very long timescales. Your ‘hard to say’ argument is equivalent of challenging the theory of continental drift after spending a weekend at the coast and noting that the beach hasn’t moved. Complex structures evolve over several millions of years, and what seems ‘novel’ is in fact only a minor change from what’s gone before.
I like that analogy. It's kind of like that, yes, but with the critical difference that nothing about continental drift depends on what it means for something to be a "continent." In other words my objection has to do with consistency in the very concept of "speciation" rather than how much time it may take for speciation to occur, or for enough accumulated instances of speciation to produce functionally complex organs, systems, etc.

But let's imagine that during a weekend at the coast, I were to stumble upon

"…a rock on the beach that is shaped into an intricate series of pipe-looking segments, so that when I blow air into a hole at one end, sounds matching the first eight notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony comes out the other side; or a giant rock with long strings of bumps on it that later turned out to be the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence in a mathematically coded version of Braille. These would be strong evidence for design, in that they are complex, specifiable, and tied to a particular function that would not otherwise be expected. Furthermore, those features would make them unlike any of the countless rocks I have seen over the course of a lifetime."

I quoted myself there, because I'm too lazy to try and think up new analogies, lol:
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35156&p=950952&hili ... 22#p950952.

Here’s a link that answers your (and many other) misconceptions about evolution in a readable and comprehensive way:

https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibra ... ns_faq.php
And here's one of the misconceptions listed: "Species are distinct natural entities, with a clear definition, that can be easily recognized by anyone."

In short, there are many ways to interpret a set of facts.
Oh, sure. Some of the resulting theories might fit the facts better than others, and we could probably set up some controlled observations in order to refine those theories and get an even better fit. News flash: this has been going on for a while.
Indeed. I would agree that the scientific method is a useful and fascinating means of explaining various phenomena, even if the theories that result are eventually replaced by new theories.

Another aspect:

Some facts do not fit designer theory nearly as well as others. Sea mammal blowholes, the giraffe’s birth canal (and laryngeal nerve), the fact that humans can’t digest cellulose, or produce vitamin C, our ‘back to front’ retina with its blind spot, etc.
Granted. Some facts do not fit my theory as well as yours and other facts do not fit your theory as well as mine. One way to decide which theory is better justified by the evidence is to approximate for each theory to what degree explanatory power, conjoined with prior probability of the theory, exceeds the intrinsic probability of that evidence. I am arguing that fine-tuning and specifiable complexity are two forms of particular evidence more probable on theism than on naturalism, all things considered.

All of the above, and many more ‘design flaws’ can be demonstrated to fit very well with the theory of evolution, given our increasing knowledge of genetics, embryology and an ever-increasing fossil record. The same can’t be said for the ‘design theory’, which has never been able to produce any evidence to support it, (other than to wrongly classify bats as birds, I suppose).
Again I agree that numerous facts fit well with evolutionary theory, but disagree that the hypothesis of design has no evidence supporting it. It's usually a mistake, the way I see it, to say "there's no evidence" for an inference to design, one reason being that there appears to be no evidence that there's no evidence (another reason being that there does seem to be strong evidence for design). If evidence is necessary for a belief to be true, and if it's true that there's no evidence for design in nature, then we should have evidence supporting the belief that there's no evidence for design in nature. But not only have I never seen any such evidence, I can't even imagine what form "evidence of no evidence" would take.
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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #57

Post by bluegreenearth »

Don Mc wrote: Fri Jul 03, 2020 3:38 pmBut let's imagine that during a weekend at the coast, I were to stumble upon

"…a rock on the beach that is shaped into an intricate series of pipe-looking segments, so that when I blow air into a hole at one end, sounds matching the first eight notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony comes out the other side; or a giant rock with long strings of bumps on it that later turned out to be the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence in a mathematically coded version of Braille. These would be strong evidence for design, in that they are complex, specifiable, and tied to a particular function that would not otherwise be expected. Furthermore, those features would make them unlike any of the countless rocks I have seen over the course of a lifetime."
I would like to draw your attention to the last line of your comment above where you state, "those features would make them unlike any of the countless rocks I have seen over the course of a lifetime." This demonstrates that you identify intelligently designed things by comparing them to naturally occurring things. In the analogy, you recognized intelligent design in the musical instrument that was made out of a rock and in the Declaration of Independence that was mathematically coded in braille on a giant rock because you had never previously observed those features occurring naturally in rocks. So, if everything in the universe is intelligently designed, then nothing could occur naturally for which you could compare intelligently designed things to know they were intelligently designed. Therefore, the mere perception that an object appears to exhibit "specifiable complexity" tied to a particular unexpected function is not sufficient to conclude it was intelligently designed if the object is also observed to form on its own through natural processes. This isn't to imply the first life-form to appear on this planet couldn't have been intelligently designed but to acknowledge where the perception of "specifiable complexity" doesn't justify that inference.

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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #58

Post by Don Mc »

bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Jun 29, 2020 1:43 am
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmEasy there. I merely suggested that evidence for fine-tuning is more surprising on naturalism than on theism, and therefore is prima facie evidence for theism (and would add that atheists like Jeffery Lowder and Paul Draper agree in principle). But right away you charge me with "confirmation bias" and thereby deducing that by itself, evidence of fine-tuning somehow absolutely "proves" the existence of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Talk about confirmation bias and immediately jumping to conclusions...
The comments were directed at the common apologetic tactic and not necessarily your personal perspective on the matter. Try not to take it personally.
I take it personally not so much because my feelings are hurt (maybe a little), but to encourage direct engagement. I think for most of us it's easier to reinforce stereotypes and refute straw men than it is to come to grips with actual arguments from actual people.

But… I've done the same thing myself. Someone here called me out on another thread for repeatedly referring to "most atheists," I'm guessing because what I said of them didn't actually represent him. Even if a majority of [atheists, theists, whoever] were to, say, commit fallacy x in the course of defending proposition z, that doesn't signal a weakness of proposition z per se if some [atheists, theists, whoever] manage to defend it with sound reasoning.

Also, the claim that the evidence for fine-tuning is more surprising on naturalism than on theism is a tautology. This is because the evidence for fine-tuning is what theists perceive and define as "fine-tuning by God." So, the claim is basically saying the same thing twice: The evidence for fine-tuning by God is more surprising on naturalism than on fine-tuning by God. Well, duh!
I don't know of anyone, theist or not, who actually reasons this way. In any event the same objection would spell defeat for any theory whatsoever.

Let's go back to your example from paleontology. Recall that I conceded Tiktaalik as evidence for evolution. It turns out I was being too generous, as I could just say that Tiktaalik is only considered evidence for evolution because it's what evolutionists already "perceive and define" as evidence for evolution. Of course, that would be a weak objection because the relevant evidence exists independently of the theory and has features that are predicted or explained by the theory, and not otherwise to be expected.

Theism predicts (or explains) indicators of design in the universe like fine-tuning or specifiable complexity while naturalism really does not, in much the same way that evolution predicts creatures like Tiktaalik while creationism really does not. (Even so, naturalism can still find various ad hoc ways to accommodate evidence for fine-tuning, just like creationism can still accommodate Tiktaalik...)

What conclusion did I make that didn't follow from the argument, or did I miss where the fine-tuning argument demonstrated the existence of God?
Well, you asked questions like "How does knowing a divine cosmic designer was responsible for creating the universe help us make decisions which have empirical consequences?" and concluded, "The lack of answers to those questions exposes this argument to be nothing more than a biased framework for concluding God exists without demonstrating the existence of God." I don't see any reason to think a proposition must help us make decisions which have empirical consequences to be true. Sometimes I learn about a new subject just because I find it interesting, for example. And you have contrasted empirical truths with "conceptual truths" which are not only conceptual, but true. At the same time I would say that in many ways knowing God to be the creator of the universe has led me to decisions with empirical consequences in the way of my personal behavior and relationships, among other things.

But even if knowing God created the universe had zero empirical consequences, it wouldn't follow that the fine-tuning argument is "a biased framework for concluding God exists…"

Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmThe same way that a person sees no more than three options on the menu and concludes that only three options are actually available, I guess. But I am not William Lane Craig, and I'm open to other possibilities. Did you have another option in mind that is not already entailed by one of the three given?
It is a false trichotomy because there are really only two possible options to be considered; not three. There is no justification for presuming the physical constants could possibly be designed by an intelligent agent. Where in the argument does it describe the mechanism an intelligent agent would use to design the physical constants? What evidence is provided to demonstrate such an intelligent designer could even exist in the first place? Therefore, the premise is unsupported.
I see. Usually someone objects to a trichotomy because it limits the number of options available to an opposing position, not because there are too many on offer. That's fine with me; it makes the task of demonstrating evidence for design that much easier.

In the meantime I still can't quite understand why you would insist on having evidence that an intelligent designer exists before considering fine-tuning, when fine-tuning is given as evidence that an intelligent designer exists. All I have managed to glean so far is that the objection has something to do with an "empirical or else implicitly empirical" epistemology that is somehow not to be confused with empiricism.

We don't know if there is a multi-verse, and I'm not claiming to believe one exists. In fact, I'm not making a positive claim at all but merely demonstrating where the positive claim made by the fine-tuning argument has not been sufficiently justified. The only intellectually honest position to endorse given the insufficient evidence is agnosticism.
It seems to me you're expressing much more than skepticism of the fine-tuning argument, but advocating for a peculiar epistemology wherein any given proposition is either empirically verified, implicitly empirical, or "impossible." Because they don't happen to share that epistemology, many people do not consider non-empirical propositions to be impossible, and therefore it may be intellectually honest for them to infer theism from fine-tuning.

I should add that a person who determines the existence of God to be impossible assigns it a prior probability of zero, so that their posterior probability will always remain zero quite regardless of any evidence that may be presented. And a persistent belief that the probability of God existing is zero is not agnosticism, but atheism. And given the claim that any position other than agnosticism is intellectually dishonest, atheism is intellectually dishonest.

Don Mc wrote: Sun Jun 28, 2020 9:09 pmThe problem there is that "chance" is not an explanation for anything in particular. To put it another way: chance is a sweeping explanation for absolutely everything we can observe or imagine, no matter how evidently, antecedently improbable. By that same argument, given enough solar systems and enough time, not only could life emerge on Earth unaided, but Jesus could rise from the dead by a fortunate temporary decrease of entropy following his crucifixion, and someone's mischievous pet monkey could happen to gain access to his owner's computer, mimic his motions, and by sheer accident log on to your account and post the message to which I am currently responding. And that brings me back to the main point of the OP: "It appears that as understood by advocates of scientific [or metaphysical, if you prefer] naturalism, nature, no less than God, can do (and explain) anything."
Science is methodological naturalism; not metaphysical naturalism. It is important not to conflate the two of them.
Agreed. But the claim that "chance" explains the phenomenon of fine-tuning and the flourishing of life that depends upon it is not a consequence of the scientific method; it's an untestable metaphysical postulate. Hence my reference to metaphysical rather than methodological naturalism.

Once again, the claim that theism best explains the evidence of "design" in nature is a tautology and can be rewritten as follows: Design by God best explains the evidence of design by God in nature.
No, as a theist I contend that design best explains the evidence of various physical phenomena that appear to be fine-tuned for life to exist in the universe. Design is not the evidence but the inference.

And again, the same objection could apply to any theory – so long as we ignore that the evidence is intersubjectively observable and at the same time is predicted or explained by the theory. So the claim that evolution best explains the evidence for evolution is also a tautology, along with the claim that quantum mechanics best explains the evidence for quantum mechanics, etc.

Also, my comment was more of an observation than an argument. If theists want to depict God as being omnipotent, then the fine-tuning argument directly implies the contradiction of an omnipotent God who had no choice but to fine-tune the physical constants of this universe or it wouldn't have been possible for him to create and sustain life in it.
In a sense that's right. It's not possible for God to create this particular life-permitting universe without creating this particular life-permitting universe, just as it would not be possible for God to create a different universe without creating that universe. But it's not a contradiction for God to create our life-permitting universe complete with evidence of fine-tuning, and for many of us (for example those of us who don't think the existence of God is impossible), that evidence suggests that God created it.

It is fine to speculate on the motive's of a god that cannot be demonstrated to exist, but such theological exercises don't function as justifications for believing a god exists and fine-tuned the universe. Nevertheless, your point is noted, though, I suspect an omnipotent god who intended for all of us to know life was a product of fine-tuning would have succeeded in that effort by now. Maybe he just prefers for his followers to embrace claims about life and the universe that are unfalsifiable and make no testable predictions.
In fairness, I was answering your speculations on the motives of God with speculations of my own.

But I think the last bit above may well be correct. God knows as well as anyone else that theism is not a scientific theory and that his own existence is not falsifiable. From what I've learned in my many years as a follower, what he desires most from his followers is to willingly trust him. In that case, he may not actually intend for all of us to know (hence believe) that life was a product of fine-tuning, even if all of us have access to evidence suggesting that apart from fine-tuning none of us would be here to debate the question.

The puddle analogy by Douglas Adams is a clever and appropriate objection to the "specifiable complexity" argument. To my knowledge, the objection has never been adequately resolved. Once the objection has been resolved, I'll be happy to consider the "specified complexity" argument if it can be tested in order to determine whether the claim is false or not. However, for the time being, the claim doesn't appear to make any novel testable predictions.
Clever, yes; relevant, not so much. Evidently Adams was addressing something more like the weak anthropic principle than anything like an argument from specifiable complexity to design. For one thing, a puddle is strikingly simple, consisting of nothing but water – lots of water molecules, yes, but only water molecules – and would thus make for a terrible analogy for specifiable complexity.,

Adams did address specifiable complexity in the Hitchhiker's Guide, but with a much different argument:
"The Babel fish…is small, yellow, leech-like, and probably the oddest thing in the Universe. It feeds on brainwave energy received not from its own carrier, but from those around it. It absorbs all unconscious mental frequencies from this brainwave energy to nourish itself with. It then excretes into the mind of its carrier a telepathic matrix formed by combining the conscious thought frequencies with nerve signals picked up from the speech centres of the brain which has supplied them. The practical upshot of all this is that if you stick a Babel fish in your ear you can instantly understand anything said to you in any form of language. The speech patterns you actually hear decode the brainwave matrix which has been fed into your mind by your Babel fish.

"Now it is such a bizarrely improbable coincidence that something so mind-bogglingly useful could have evolved purely by chance that some thinkers have chosen to see it as a final and clinching proof of the non-existence of God.

"The argument goes something like this: 'I refuse to prove that I exist,' says God, 'for proof denies faith, and without faith, I am nothing.'

'But, says Man, the Babel fish is a dead giveaway, isn't it? It could not have evolved by chance. It proves you exist, and, by your own arguments, you don't. QED.'

'Oh dear,' says God, 'I hadn't thought of that,' and vanishes in a puff of logic.

'Oh, that was easy,' says Man, and for an encore goes on to prove that black is white and gets himself killed on the next zebra crossing.

"Most leading theologians claim that this argument is a load of dingo's kidneys, but that didn't stop Oolon Colluphid from making a small fortune when he used it as the theme of his best-selling book, Well That About Wraps It Up For God.
Even if Adams was an atheist, he seems to have given a brief nod to theism there (if I'm reading the satire right). Make of it what you will.

The fine-tuning argument artificially satisfies a very common psychological need for cognitive closure. In general, people are discomforted by confusion and ambiguity. The desire to have an answer to a profound question often motivates people to accept any explanation as long as it muffles their uncertainty. The propensity to be satisfied with an emotionally satisfying answer over the acceptance of no answer is a form of cognitive bias we all share. To complicate things further, humans also have an evolved tendency to perceive agency where none may actually exist. The cumulative effect of these biases amounts to stacking the deck in favor of the easily digestible proposition which concludes the universe was fine-tuned by an intelligent designer.
The above amounts to yet another one-size-fits-all objection. Don't like the implications of an inference? Reduce it to bias and wish-fulfillment. After all, if some people are providing evidence for a certain position they're also seeking cognitive closure, and the fact that they're arguing for it reveals their bias toward what you think is for them the more easily digestible proposition. All of that sounds much more like Bulverism than serious psychology or anything remotely "empirical."
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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #59

Post by bluegreenearth »

Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmI don't know of anyone, theist or not, who actually reasons this way. In any event the same objection would spell defeat for any theory whatsoever.
No. The objection doesn't serve as a defeater of anything and only calls attention to the fact that the conclusion of the argument is true by definition. One way to resolve the objection would be to make an argument that isn't simply true by definition. The term "fine-tuning" inherently entails a fine-tuner in its definition. To state that fine-tuning is more surprising on naturalism (no fine-tuner) than on theism (the existence of a fine-tuner) is just true by definition. You first need to demonstrate that the universe is fine-tuned. The arguments for fine-tuning that have been submitted thus far merely identify where the physical constants have particular values but do not demonstrate where those values have been or could be fine-tuned by a fine-tuner.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmLet's go back to your example from paleontology. Recall that I conceded Tiktaalik as evidence for evolution. It turns out I was being too generous, as I could just say that Tiktaalik is only considered evidence for evolution because it's what evolutionists already "perceive and define" as evidence for evolution. Of course, that would be a weak objection because the relevant evidence exists independently of the theory and has features that are predicted or explained by the theory, and not otherwise to be expected.

Theism predicts (or explains) indicators of design in the universe like fine-tuning or specifiable complexity while naturalism really does not, in much the same way that evolution predicts creatures like Tiktaalik while creationism really does not. (Even so, naturalism can still find various ad hoc ways to accommodate evidence for fine-tuning, just like creationism can still accommodate Tiktaalik...)
Neither "fine-tuning" in cosmology nor "specifiable complexity" in biology has been demonstrated to exist. The "evidence" for fine-tuning and specifiable complexity that I've seen from theists does nothing but demonstrate their confirmation bias. Meanwhile, Tiktaalik qualifies as evidence because it was demonstrated to exist. The equivalent evidence for "fine-tuning" and "specifiable complexity" would be the discovery of a fine-tuner for the physical constants and an intelligent designer for biological life.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmWell, you asked questions like "How does knowing a divine cosmic designer was responsible for creating the universe help us make decisions which have empirical consequences?" and concluded, "The lack of answers to those questions exposes this argument to be nothing more than a biased framework for concluding God exists without demonstrating the existence of God." I don't see any reason to think a proposition must help us make decisions which have empirical consequences to be true. Sometimes I learn about a new subject just because I find it interesting, for example. And you have contrasted empirical truths with "conceptual truths" which are not only conceptual, but true. At the same time I would say that in many ways knowing God to be the creator of the universe has led me to decisions with empirical consequences in the way of my personal behavior and relationships, among other things.

But even if knowing God created the universe had zero empirical consequences, it wouldn't follow that the fine-tuning argument is "a biased framework for concluding God exists…"
Until theists can produce the fine-tuner, the fine-tuning argument can be nothing more than a biased framework for defining a fine-tuner into existence. Until you can demonstrate your God exists, the "knowing God to be the creator of the universe has led me to decisions with empirical consequences in the way of my personal behavior and relationships, among other things" argument is nothing more than a biased framework for concluding your God exists.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmI see. Usually someone objects to a trichotomy because it limits the number of options available to an opposing position, not because there are too many on offer. That's fine with me; it makes the task of demonstrating evidence for design that much easier.

In the meantime I still can't quite understand why you would insist on having evidence that an intelligent designer exists before considering fine-tuning, when fine-tuning is given as evidence that an intelligent designer exists. All I have managed to glean so far is that the objection has something to do with an "empirical or else implicitly empirical" epistemology that is somehow not to be confused with empiricism.
Fine-tuning is not the evidence but the claim. You have to demonstrate that the physical constants have been and can be fine-tuned. I'm not sure how anyone could accomplish that necessary task without producing a fine-tuner (intelligent designer).
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmIt seems to me you're expressing much more than skepticism of the fine-tuning argument, but advocating for a peculiar epistemology wherein any given proposition is either empirically verified, implicitly empirical, or "impossible." Because they don't happen to share that epistemology, many people do not consider non-empirical propositions to be impossible, and therefore it may be intellectually honest for them to infer theism from fine-tuning.
Empirical propositions require empirical evidence. Conceptual (non-empirical) propositions require conceptual (non-empirical) evidence. Metaphysical propositions require metaphysical evidence.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmI should add that a person who determines the existence of God to be impossible assigns it a prior probability of zero, so that their posterior probability will always remain zero quite regardless of any evidence that may be presented. And a persistent belief that the probability of God existing is zero is not agnosticism, but atheism. And given the claim that any position other than agnosticism is intellectually dishonest, atheism is intellectually dishonest.
Yes, gnostic (strong) atheism is as intellectually dishonest as gnostic theism (not to be confused with Gnosticism). Personally, I have not determined that the existence of a deistic god is impossible. However, there are some theistic versions of a god that seem to be logically impossible.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmAgreed. But the claim that "chance" explains the phenomenon of fine-tuning and the flourishing of life that depends upon it is not a consequence of the scientific method; it's an untestable metaphysical postulate. Hence my reference to metaphysical rather than methodological naturalism.
The phenomenon of fine-tuning hasn't been demonstrated to exist because a fine-tuner hasn't been demonstrated to exist. Without a fine-tuner, all you have is the phenomenon of the physical constants. If you are asking what the explanation would be for the phenomenon of the physical constants, I'm not aware of any testable hypothesis at this time. For all any us knows, they could just be brute facts. It is anyone's guess at this point.

I'm not aware of any professional evolutionary scientist that would give "chance" as the best explanation for the biodiversity we observe because "natural selection" is currently the most reasonable guiding mechanism. Natural selection as a guiding mechanism for evolution is testable and has passed every test designed to try and falsify it.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmNo, as a theist I contend that design best explains the evidence of various physical phenomena that appear to be fine-tuned for life to exist in the universe. Design is not the evidence but the inference.
The fact that some physical phenomena have the "appearance" of being fine-tuned has more to do with our fallible perceptions and bias towards anthropomorphism than any naturally occurring thing being actually designed by an intelligent agent. This isn't to assert that the intelligent design claim is false but to acknowledge where intelligent design needs to be demonstrated rather than merely inferred.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmAnd again, the same objection could apply to any theory – so long as we ignore that the evidence is intersubjectively observable and at the same time is predicted or explained by the theory. So the claim that evolution best explains the evidence for evolution is also a tautology, along with the claim that quantum mechanics best explains the evidence for quantum mechanics, etc.
No one claims that evolution best explains the evidence for evolution or claims that quantum mechanics best explains the evidence for quantum mechanics. If someone did, those claims would be tautological.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmIn a sense that's right. It's not possible for God to create this particular life-permitting universe without creating this particular life-permitting universe, just as it would not be possible for God to create a different universe without creating that universe. But it's not a contradiction for God to create our life-permitting universe complete with evidence of fine-tuning, and for many of us (for example those of us who don't think the existence of God is impossible), that evidence suggests that God created it.
Since I don't claim the existence of a god is impossible, I'm not arbitrarily dismissing the logical possibility of a god designing and creating the universe. However, I'm compelled by intellectual honesty to also acknowledge the fact that it is equally logically possible for the universe to have emerged into existence through some unknown impersonal mechanism. Since neither claim is falsifiable at this time, I cannot rule-out either claim or demonstrate where either claim is able to pass a test designed to try and disprove it. Therefore, the only intellectually honest option is to remain agnostic about the cause of the universe.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmIn fairness, I was answering your speculations on the motives of God with speculations of my own.

But I think the last bit above may well be correct. God knows as well as anyone else that theism is not a scientific theory and that his own existence is not falsifiable. From what I've learned in my many years as a follower, what he desires most from his followers is to willingly trust him. In that case, he may not actually intend for all of us to know (hence believe) that life was a product of fine-tuning, even if all of us have access to evidence suggesting that apart from fine-tuning none of us would be here to debate the question.
In addition to creating a situation where theists would have no way to know if their fine-tuning claim was true or merely a product of their faith-based confirmation bias, don't forget to add the part about God creating a universe comprised of stars and planets whose physical developments and movements can be entirely understood through natural processes such that any intellectually honest person with a responsibility to reject logically fallacious reasoning would never be convinced by insufficient evidence to believe a god had anything to do with it. Furthermore, we also shouldn't ignore the fact that God intelligently designed life with all the flawed characteristics an intellectually honest person would expect to observe if species slowly and gradually evolved from a common ancestor through the process of natural selection rather than being specially created by God. Obviously, God must have designed life and the universe to display these characteristics in order to weed out all the intellectually honest people who have the audacity to think critically and skeptically about unfalsifiable theistic claims like "fine-tuning" and "specified complexity." Instead, it is evident that God is choosing to favor theists who fallaciously reason backwards from their faith-based conclusions.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmClever, yes; relevant, not so much. Evidently Adams was addressing something more like the weak anthropic principle than anything like an argument from specifiable complexity to design. For one thing, a puddle is strikingly simple, consisting of nothing but water – lots of water molecules, yes, but only water molecules – and would thus make for a terrible analogy for specifiable complexity.,

Adams did address specifiable complexity in the Hitchhiker's Guide, but with a much different argument:
"The Babel fish…is small, yellow, leech-like, and probably the oddest thing in the Universe. It feeds on brainwave energy received not from its own carrier, but from those around it. It absorbs all unconscious mental frequencies from this brainwave energy to nourish itself with. It then excretes into the mind of its carrier a telepathic matrix formed by combining the conscious thought frequencies with nerve signals picked up from the speech centres of the brain which has supplied them. The practical upshot of all this is that if you stick a Babel fish in your ear you can instantly understand anything said to you in any form of language. The speech patterns you actually hear decode the brainwave matrix which has been fed into your mind by your Babel fish.

"Now it is such a bizarrely improbable coincidence that something so mind-bogglingly useful could have evolved purely by chance that some thinkers have chosen to see it as a final and clinching proof of the non-existence of God.

"The argument goes something like this: 'I refuse to prove that I exist,' says God, 'for proof denies faith, and without faith, I am nothing.'

'But, says Man, the Babel fish is a dead giveaway, isn't it? It could not have evolved by chance. It proves you exist, and, by your own arguments, you don't. QED.'

'Oh dear,' says God, 'I hadn't thought of that,' and vanishes in a puff of logic.

'Oh, that was easy,' says Man, and for an encore goes on to prove that black is white and gets himself killed on the next zebra crossing.

"Most leading theologians claim that this argument is a load of dingo's kidneys, but that didn't stop Oolon Colluphid from making a small fortune when he used it as the theme of his best-selling book, Well That About Wraps It Up For God.
Even if Adams was an atheist, he seems to have given a brief nod to theism there (if I'm reading the satire right). Make of it what you will.
Even though I am an admirer of the Hitchhiker's Guide, we have nothing like the Babel fish for which to draw a comparison. Also, I'm not sure if the error by Douglas Adams was deliberate or not, but the Theory of Evolution wouldn't claim the Babel fish evolved by chance. Instead, the Babel fish would have evolved through a process guided by natural selection. Nevertheless, even if a Babel fish existed, the lack of a known natural explanation for its existence would not be evidence that it was intelligently designed. To know the Babel fish was intelligently designed would require someone to produce the intelligent designer because, without the intelligent designer, all we have is a Babel fish without an explanation for its existence. It could have been intelligently designed or there could be some unknown natural explanation. Since we cannot rule-out either possibility, we would have to remain agnostic about the cause of the Babel fish's existence.
Don Mc wrote: Sun Jul 05, 2020 4:17 pmThe above amounts to yet another one-size-fits-all objection. Don't like the implications of an inference? Reduce it to bias and wish-fulfillment. After all, if some people are providing evidence for a certain position they're also seeking cognitive closure, and the fact that they're arguing for it reveals their bias toward what you think is for them the more easily digestible proposition. All of that sounds much more like Bulverism than serious psychology or anything remotely "empirical."
Empirical evidence for the cognitive closure bias has been demonstrated through experimentation. I've read several peer reviewed papers about that observed phenomenon but don't have them immediately available at the moment to cite them here. However, if it becomes a sticking point, I'll try to locate them for you. In any case, the objection only applies when there has been a failure to mitigate for the bias. Based on what I've been presented with thus far, the theist's defense of the fine-tuning argument does not include a provision that attempts to mitigate for this bias but does seem to rely upon it. I have no problem retracting the objection if you can demonstrate where theists have successfully resolved the problem of bias in their evaluation of the fine-tuning claim.

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Re: Is Nature Omnipotent?

Post #60

Post by Don Mc »

Sorry it's taken me so long to reply, BGE, but I'm starting to lose interest in this debate. You and I began talking past one another some posts ago, and we seem to have reached an impasse on definitions, not only of what I had thought were relatively uncontroversial concepts like fine-tuning, but even the meanings of words like "evidence" or "empirical."

bluegreenearth wrote: Mon Jul 06, 2020 12:00 am The term "fine-tuning" inherently entails a fine-tuner in its definition. To state that fine-tuning is more surprising on naturalism (no fine-tuner) than on theism (the existence of a fine-tuner) is just true by definition. You first need to demonstrate that the universe is fine-tuned. The arguments for fine-tuning that have been submitted thus far merely identify where the physical constants have particular values but do not demonstrate where those values have been or could be fine-tuned by a fine-tuner.
That's simply wrong. "Fine-tuning" is commonly used shorthand for a rather large set of individual physical constants and quantities, each of which must fall within a tiny specified range of values (relative to the total range of values those constants and quantities could have taken) in order for life to flourish – none of which in itself says anything one way or another about God or theism. Like most authorities on the subject, the Stanford Encyclopedia seems to agree:

Philosophical debates in which “fine-tuning” appears are often about the universe’s fine-tuning for life: according to many physicists, the fact that the universe is able to support life depends delicately on various of its fundamental characteristics, notably on the form of the laws of nature, on the values of some constants of nature, and on aspects of the universe’s conditions in its very early stages. Various reactions to the universe’s fine-tuning for life have been proposed: that it is a lucky coincidence which we have to accept as a primitive given; that it will be avoided by future best theories of fundamental physics; that the universe was created by some divine designer who established life-friendly conditions; and that fine-tuning for life indicates the existence of multiple other universes with conditions very different from those in our own universe.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fine-tuning

see also:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmology/#FineTuni

Notice that in each of the above articles, of four possible explanations for the phenomenon widely known as fine-tuning, only one postulates design or a designer. Use of the phrase "fine-tuning" by theists to describe the phenomenon in question therefore requires no tautologies, circular definitions, question-begging, confirmation bias or intellectual dishonesty...though it might require some intellectual honesty to go ahead and concede this point. O:)

Neither "fine-tuning" in cosmology nor "specifiable complexity" in biology has been demonstrated to exist. The "evidence" for fine-tuning and specifiable complexity that I've seen from theists does nothing but demonstrate their confirmation bias. Meanwhile, Tiktaalik qualifies as evidence because it was demonstrated to exist. The equivalent evidence for "fine-tuning" and "specifiable complexity" would be the discovery of a fine-tuner for the physical constants and an intelligent designer for biological life.
That is all extremely muddled, probably because you have this idea that teleological arguments are inherently circular or tautologous or whatever. Specifiable complexity does not directly entail a given conscious "specifier" any more than fine-tuning entails a conscious "fine-tuner." The question is who or what is responsible for the observable phenomena of specifiable complexity and fine-tuning, not whether entities in nature objectively fitting those descriptions exist. They do.

As I shared earlier, I first learned the concept of specifiable complexity from an atheist, Richard Dawkins, who explained in some impressive detail that what he called "complicated things" have the particular quality of a complex function (like vision or echolocation) that is specifiable in advance quite regardless of who or what is doing the specifying. Dawkins thought natural selection (the "blind watchmaker") was a sufficient specifier of the complexity, which should tell you that there is no theistic bias in the concept itself. Note also that Dawkins defined "biology" as "the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose" – which suggests that complicated biological functions that are specifiable in advance are at least prima facie evidence for theism.

And for some reason you keep confusing evidence with the inferences drawn from it. Discovery of a fine-tuner busy about the task of fine-tuning various universes would not be required to have "evidence for fine-tuning," because the fine-tuner is inferred from the evidence of fine-tuning we already have. In other words such a discovery would eliminate any need for evidence on the question whatsoever. Rather, fine-tuning is the evidence – in the context of teleological arguments in particular, it's evidence for God being the "fine-tuner." Similarly, if we were to discover Tiktaalik specimens evolving from fish in real time, we would need no evidence for (no need to infer) an evolutionary process (an "evolver"). It would be confusing, if not methodologically incoherent, to ask for real-time observations of the "evolver" before allowing ourselves to accept Tiktaalik as evidence for evolution.

Here's what I suggest is a more coherent and schema. Certain facts or observations are more consistent with specific implications and/or predictions of a belief or theory than other beliefs or theories, and thus count as confirming evidence:

Belief/theory > implication/prediction > observation (evidence) > confirmation

On the above essentially inductive schema,

Theism > intelligent design > fine-tuned constants and quantities > confirmation of theism

and

Evolution > descent with modification > Tiktaalik and other transitional fossils > confirmation of evolution

where ">" means roughly that the previous concept either implies or suggests the high probability of the next.

Notice that in each case only the observation in question is empirically verifiable. No one can see God, or evolution, or intelligent design, or descent with modification. Thus the "equivalent evidence" for Tiktaalik is not God himself but the empirical phenomenon known as fine-tuning.

One drawback to the above inductive approach is that the evidence is not always specifically predicted. Sometimes (as in the case of fine-tuning) we run across evidence that few expected or predicted and then infer the best explanation for it. In that case the schema runs in the other direction:

Observation (explanandum) + assessment of relative probabilities of possible explanations (explanans) = selection of best explanation

So on the abductive schema,

Fine-tuning + fine-tuning more probable on theism than naturalism = theism as best explanation

and

Tiktaalik + Tiktaalik more probable on evolution than creationism = evolution as best explanation

I should add that in neither of the above basic approaches does the evidence "prove" anything. It's possible, then, that a particular finding like Tiktaalik rightly counts as evidence for evolution even while the theory of evolution is still false in light of the total evidence – which is what I believe, in fact.

I will stop there, simply because most of the remainder of your post seems to involve these same basic confusions over definitions. That said, please let me know if there's any particular point you'd still like me to address. Otherwise I respectfully bow out of this exchange. Thanks.
Extraordinary evidence requires extraordinary claims.

Transcending Proof

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