An Argument against the Argument against Miracles

[Don Mc]

According to Hume's famous "general maxim" against the confirmation of miracles in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, "no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish." The basic idea is that the laws of nature being what they are, and human nature being what it is, the probability of a miracle is always lower than the probability that the testimony given for it is simply false. In this Hume seems to have anticipated the logic of Carl Sagan, who popularized the idea that "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence."

While this principle appears rational enough at first blush, there are reasons to think it's not sound. First, it was Hume himself who spelled out the problem of induction – that there is no logical basis for inferring future outcomes from past experiences. Assuming there exists a set of well-defined "laws of nature," those regularities would seem to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. But if the laws of nature are descriptive, there is no reason to think miracles cannot or should not occur. Second, the argument against miracles is essentially circular. Hume asserts that there is "uniform experience" against the resurrection, for example, adding that a man risen from the dead "has never been observed, in any age or country." The question of the resurrection, however, is precisely whether or not Jesus was observed by his disciples to have risen from the dead. To say that a resurrection event was never observed because there is "uniform experience" against it is to beg that question (and we should bear in mind that there is equally uniform experience that life does not arise from nonliving elements – yet here we are). Finally, while it's true that human nature has the potential to corrupt the testimony of eyewitnesses and the writings of biographers and historians, it also has the potential to corrupt the field reports, lab results, journal articles, textbooks, etc., that lead us to accept the same scientific theories thought to render miracle reports implausible or even impossible. The problem of "confirmation bias" among humans, and scientists in particular, is well documented.

Evidently underlying popular skepticism of miracles is a belief that miracles are inherently, extremely improbable. But that seems to hold only if a miracle is defined in naturalistic terms. After all, the proposition "A man rose from the dead by natural processes" appears considerably less probable on its face than the proposition "Jesus Christ rose from the dead by the power of God." As Paul put it, "Why should any of you consider it incredible that God raises the dead?" (Acts 26:8)

Questions for debate:
Are miracles improbable? If so, how improbable are they and why?
Could historical evidence for a miracle give us good evidence for theism?

[Mithrae]

If you're going to declare in the face of common sense that the occurrence of a miracle is not an explanation were such a scenario to occur, you're going to have to define what you mean by that term. Near as I can tell, explaining an observed phenomenon means situating it within a broader, coherent theory with better scope and parsimony than competing alternatives; for example falling objects are explained in the context of gravity, overseas shift in manufacturing work is explained in the context of globalisation and labour costs etc.. In this scenario, the theory that someone's legs spontaneously, coincidentally happened to grow back in the seconds after our Prophet prayed for it is obviously absurd. The theory that he was a clever illusionist who collaborated with the atheist and the mayor, somehow ensuring that they'd be the first ones to make miracle requests and with unknown motivations unhindered by the probable eventual discovery of the deception would be more plausible, but perhaps not by much and, more importantly, in contrast to the miracle explanation the fraud explanation would have zero explanatory scope regarding miracles credibly reported elsewhere.

Of course discovery of hidden gadgets and wires which allowed them to pull of the stunt would make that latter explanation much more plausible and thereby obviously replace the miracle explanation. In the rest of your post you still seem to be confused about the fact that an explanation will not be falsified if it's not false, and equating that with not being falsifiable in principle.

The problem with the regrown limbs miracle claim is that, even if the discovery of hidden gadgets and wires would falsify that one particular miracle claim, every other miracle claim would also need to be similarly falsified to disprove "miracle" as an explanation for those. Alternatively, a failure to find any hidden gadgets and wires only rules-out that one particular natural explanation but not any other potential natural explanation including those we haven't thought of or discovered yet. In any case, the miracle explanation is not an explanation at all because it doesn't provide us with a description of how the limbs were regrown. In other words, claiming the event was caused by a miracle is functionally equivalent to having no explanation for how the limbs were regrown. Hence, the event would be more accurately described as unexplained.

They say that the existence of babies is 'explained' by sex, but it seems to me that your logic would leave babies' existence "unexplained" and the sex theory unfalsifiable. Sure, in theory we could observe an alternative cause of babies' existence in some particular cases, but every other sex-to-babies claim would also need to be similarly falsified to disprove sex as an explanation for those. Alternatively, a failure to find any baby-growing laboratories only rules out that one particular explanation but not any other potential explanation like uterine implantation by aliens or delivery by storks, not to mention the explanations we haven't thought of or discovered yet! In any case, the "sex" explanation is not an explanation at all because it doesn't provide us with a description of how it was done; was it missionary, cowgirl, in vitro... what did the alleged mother eat and do during alleged pregnancy... how did the baby exit the womb...? In other words claiming that the existence of a baby was caused by sex is functionally equivalent to having no explanation for how the baby came to exist. Hence, its existence would more accurately be described as unexplained.

I think that a more reasonable perspective would be that whenever agency is involved - human, divine or otherwise - speaking or thinking in absolutes whether in terms of breadth (the range of particular events described under terms like 'miracle' or 'pregnancy') or depth (all the precise details of who, what, when, where, why and how) becomes rather tricky. It's often said that all it takes is a single falsification to overturn a theory in the hard sciences, but the reason for that is the presumption of consistency; that if matter and energy behave in such a manner in the falsification experiment, the same kinds of matter and energy will always behave the same in all comparable circumstances, so that the falsification always makes a new rule rather than an exception to the old one. Of course despite proving itself incredibly useful and so far quite accurate, that presumption in itself is genuinely not explained in terms of broader observations/theory. So trying to use the fact that this presumption doesn't hold the same weight in cases where agency is part of the explanation as the basis for arguing that (divine) agency isn't really an explanation at all doesn't seem very convincing.

Again, in principle it could easily be falsified. In fact the story is already explicitly about the ad hoc attempts of the atheist and the mayor to falsify the Prophet's claim of divine power. And it seems you're trying to change your goalposts here in any case; your original objection was that we don't know whether miracles are actually possible... now you're trying to say it's not about proving anything possible? The 'negative' approach of seeing which particular theories/explanations can be falsified by further observational data or better explanations is the angle I have always taken; you were the one claiming that some positive demonstration of 'possibility' is required. If you've changed that view now that's good

To demonstrate where an explanation is possible is to disprove the potential for the explanation to be impossible. If you cannot disprove the impossibility of the explanation, then it is unfalsifiable and cannot be known as possible or impossible.

This looks an awful lot like sophistry. Perhaps it would help in clarifying what you mean if we consider the proposition that "it impossible that all matter and energy in the universe behaves and interacts identically under identical circumstances; as explanations for observed phenomena, that kind of appeal to physical laws simply cannot work." How would you go about disproving the potential for that explanation to be impossible? This was my third objection to your argument, obviously - how would you prove an explanation such as physical laws to be 'possible' - to which you objected that science is not in the business of proving unfalsifiable claims... but now you're asserting that demonstrating such a thing to be possible is really the disproof of its potential impossibility.

You're just making random assertions here. You haven't shown any hint of 'confirmation bias' in my position. You seem not to understand what 'falsification' entails; that an explanation will not be falsified if it's not false, which is not the same thing as not being falsifiable in principle. You seem happy to blindly dismiss thousands of credible miracle reports by experts in their field simply because they don't "map onto" your version of reality.

I did not claim your conclusion was a result of confirmation bias but that you cannot know if confirmation bias was a factor or not because of your failure to mitigate for it.

Ooookaay... And with equally sound reasoning I suppose I could say that you "cannot know" whether demonic influence was a factor in your acceptance and promotion of the arguments you are making because of your failure to mitigate for that. Unless I can actually give some kind of reason for thinking that demonic influence actually is a factor, and unless you can give some kind of reason for thinking that confirmation bias actually is a factor, this too would seem to be nothing more than empty sophistry with no rational bearing on the merit of our respective arguments.

Also, I don't blindly dismiss miracle reports by "experts" because they don't map onto my version of reality, but I am compelled by intellectual honesty to withhold a positive belief in them because the potential for the explanation to be impossible has not been disproved.

Likewise I suppose you must withhold belief in all explanations which involve physical laws. Reported observations that rainfall is caused by the interplay of humidity, temperature and air pressure in thousands of previous instances cannot help you understand why it's raining right now, because such a viewpoint would depend on the explanation that molecules of water and air always behave identically in identical circumstances, and the "potential for that explanation to be impossible" has not yet been disproven. Rain is almost always unexplained, if we apply your reasoning consistently.

[brunumb]

Let me put it this way: in empirical/observational terms, life does not arise from nonliving constituents. To put it another way: if it is a law of nature that men do not rise from the dead, it's just as much a law of nature that life does not arise from inorganic chemicals.

All living things are made from the same chemical elements that are in themselves non-living things. DNA is composed primarily of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen and phosphorus. How these came together resulting in molecules that are able to self-replicate is still unknown. Reproduction of living things is where life comes from life, but that is not the question here.

[brunumb]

It's not too unreasonable to posit abiogenesis on the premise that life is "essentially chemistry," true, but we can't really know that life is essentially chemistry until someone confirms abiogenesis.

We know that life is essentially chemistry because we observe that every day. Abiogenesis refers to the beginning of all that. We don't know what sequence of chemical events led to the formation of structures which could use chemistry to reproduce.

[bluegreenearth]

They say that the existence of babies is 'explained' by sex, but it seems to me that your logic would leave babies' existence "unexplained" and the sex theory unfalsifiable. Sure, in theory we could observe an alternative cause of babies' existence in some particular cases, but every other sex-to-babies claim would also need to be similarly falsified to disprove sex as an explanation for those. Alternatively, a failure to find any baby-growing laboratories only rules out that one particular explanation but not any other potential explanation like uterine implantation by aliens or delivery by storks, not to mention the explanations we haven't thought of or discovered yet! In any case, the "sex" explanation is not an explanation at all because it doesn't provide us with a description of how it was done; was it missionary, cowgirl, in vitro... what did the alleged mother eat and do during alleged pregnancy... how did the baby exit the womb...? In other words claiming that the existence of a baby was caused by sex is functionally equivalent to having no explanation for how the baby came to exist. Hence, its existence would more accurately be described as unexplained.

Sexual reproduction is a remarkably well understood process and in no way qualifies as unexplained. In fact, I have no idea how that example would even begin to be analogous to a miracle claim. The rest of your argument, to be completely honest, is so obviously and absurdly disingenuous that it doesn't deserve the dignity of a response because it was clearly offered in bad faith. When you are ready to argue in good faith, I'll take your perspective more seriously.

[Mithrae]

They say that the existence of babies is 'explained' by sex, but it seems to me that your logic would leave babies' existence "unexplained" and the sex theory unfalsifiable. Sure, in theory we could observe an alternative cause of babies' existence in some particular cases, but every other sex-to-babies claim would also need to be similarly falsified to disprove sex as an explanation for those. Alternatively, a failure to find any baby-growing laboratories only rules out that one particular explanation but not any other potential explanation like uterine implantation by aliens or delivery by storks, not to mention the explanations we haven't thought of or discovered yet! In any case, the "sex" explanation is not an explanation at all because it doesn't provide us with a description of how it was done; was it missionary, cowgirl, in vitro... what did the alleged mother eat and do during alleged pregnancy... how did the baby exit the womb...? In other words claiming that the existence of a baby was caused by sex is functionally equivalent to having no explanation for how the baby came to exist. Hence, its existence would more accurately be described as unexplained.

Sexual reproduction is a remarkably well understood process and in no way qualifies as unexplained. In fact, I have no idea how that example would even begin to be analogous to a miracle claim.

Which of the sentences above do you think is incorrect? It's obvious that the overall conclusion that sexual reproduction is "unfalsifiable" and "unexplained" is absurd - that's the point. Your reasoning simply doesn't work, and I've gone on to explain one of the reasons why. Simply reiterating that the conclusion is obviously absurd when your premises are applied something else doesn't help your argument.

The rest of your argument, to be completely honest, is so obviously and absurdly disingenuous that it doesn't deserve the dignity of a response because it was clearly offered in bad faith. When you are ready to argue in good faith, I'll take your perspective more seriously.

Funny thing is I thought my first paragraph was the weakest. It's possible that you've responded to the part of my post you felt you could, but being obviously unable or unwilling to "disprove the potential for the (alternative) explanation to be impossible" you've chosen to opt for insults instead. Bad faith indeed

[bluegreenearth]

[Replying to Mithrae in post #35]

How do you distinguish between a miracle and an unexplained event or are they functionally equivalent?

[Mithrae]

[Replying to Mithrae in post #35]

How do you distinguish between a miracle and an unexplained event or are they functionally equivalent?

A couple of posts ago I suggested that

• If you're going to declare in the face of common sense that the occurrence of a miracle is not an explanation [for the scenario of a Prophet praying immediately followed by regrowth of an amputation], you're going to have to define what you mean by that term. Near as I can tell, explaining an observed phenomenon means situating it within a broader, coherent theory with better scope and parsimony than competing alternatives; for example falling objects are explained in the context of gravity, overseas shift in manufacturing work is explained in the context of globalisation and labour costs etc.

Rather than either challenging that idea of what an explanation entails or providing your own definition as requested, your response was essentially to repeat a little louder that miracle is not an 'explanation,' this time by introducing another (and even more dubious) term, "functionally equivalent." And then in your next post tried to claim that I was the one approaching the discussion in "bad faith" What do you suppose would be the 'function' of an explanation that my cat woke up and went to sleep on the other side of the room because the sunlight was making the original spot too hot? And if it has no obvious function does that mean that it would be more accurately described as unexplained? It seems like an illogical criterion.

Nevertheless, purported miracles clearly are not "functionally equivalent" to unexplained events (at least for my best guess as to what you mean by that!): As Don Mc already pointed out earlier in the thread, in the bible generally and the gospels specifically - as the main starting point for how western folk tend to think about the miraculous - miracles are depicted as signs and wonders to draw people closer to God and promote their wellbeing. The alleged 'miracle of Calanda' and healings at Lourdes which I've cited obviously share similar features. A comparison might be drawn with 'near-death experiences'; while not quite the same thing, they share the distinctive feature of undermining belief or presumptions about a materialistic/deterministic universe, and in most cases "NDEs profoundly influence one's subsequent sense of spirituality, leading to increased compassion, altruism, and sense of purpose in life, and to decreased fear of death, competitiveness, and materialistic interests. They do not necessarily lead to an increased involvement in organized religion but rather tend to foster an internal sense of connection to the divine and to something greater than the self."

[FarWanderer3]

It's good to see you posting here again, FW. I've always found your arguments intriguing even if not entirely convincing.

Thank you for the kind words.

Biblical accounts are not the only testimonies to miracles, for one thing. More significantly, the only way we could know that the rest of human experience is really against the "handful of claims" is if humans were to universally attest to that experience – but that would mean…accepting their testimony. On Hume's premise that miracle claims should be rejected because human testimony is inherently suspect, then all claims should be rejected regardless of their content. That would leave precious little for us to learn about beyond our own personal experiences.

I have admittedly not read much of Hume directly, but I suspect that you aren't characterizing his argument accurate and fairly.

My take on it is the following:
An event supposedly occurs. All human testimonials are "accepted" as the data points they are. All data points, testimony and otherwise, are compared and a conclusion is drawn. If the overall evidence is weak, belief in the occurrence of the event in question is not warranted. If the overall evidence is strong, belief in the occurrence of the event in question is warranted, but simultaneously also normalized by the strength of the evidence to the point that belief in its miraculousness is not warranted.

Of course the conclusion can fall somewhere in between on a spectrum, but there is never any way it could end up simultaneously both
(A) congruent enough with our general understanding of reality to be believed and
(B) incongruent enough with our general understanding of reality to be considered miraculous.

This is fundamentally the problem that Hume is pointing out, or at least I interpret him to be pointing out. Regardless, it is my personal position.

Finally, while it's true that human nature has the potential to corrupt the testimony of eyewitnesses and the writings of biographers and historians, it also has the potential to corrupt the field reports, lab results, journal articles, textbooks, etc., that lead us to accept the same scientific theories thought to render miracle reports implausible or even impossible. The problem of "confirmation bias" among humans, and scientists in particular, is well documented.

Are you suggesting the problem is that these theories are scientifically wrong? Or that people are wrongly applying them to miracles, which are scientific exceptions?

If it's the former, then the event simply being a misunderstood natural event is no less viable an interpretation than it being a miracle. After all, the very premise is that we are lacking in scientific understanding.

If it's the latter, then you are simply making a special pleading.

That's a compelling dilemma at a glance, I must admit. But I think your argument relies too heavily upon an assumed reliability of natural science that doesn't seem justified.

It wasn't intended as a dilemma. I was honestly asking clarification on what you meant, and just answering for either case ahead of time. Or perhaps you have a third answer. I remain unclear about what you meant. Fundamentally, I find it quite strange that you imply that certain "biased" scientific theories create erroneous ideas about the possibility of miracles, being as miracles are not supposed to be subject to scientific understanding in the first place.

[bluegreenearth]

Nevertheless, purported miracles clearly are not "functionally equivalent" to unexplained events (at least for my best guess as to what you mean by that!): As Don Mc already pointed out earlier in the thread, in the bible generally and the gospels specifically - as the main starting point for how western folk tend to think about the miraculous - miracles are depicted as signs and wonders to draw people closer to God and promote their wellbeing. The alleged 'miracle of Calanda' and healings at Lourdes which I've cited obviously share similar features. A comparison might be drawn with 'near-death experiences'; while not quite the same thing, they share the distinctive feature of undermining belief or presumptions about a materialistic/deterministic universe, and in most cases "NDEs profoundly influence one's subsequent sense of spirituality, leading to increased compassion, altruism, and sense of purpose in life, and to decreased fear of death, competitiveness, and materialistic interests. They do not necessarily lead to an increased involvement in organized religion but rather tend to foster an internal sense of connection to the divine and to something greater than the self."

You've described what might be possible outcomes of unexplained events that some people perceive and label as miracles. That doesn't serve to explain how the observed phenomenon occurred such that it can be understood. If I observe an amputee regrow the limb that was previously missing, claiming the event was a miracle doesn't explain how the limb was regrown but merely leaves me with an unexplained event. It also doesn't do anything to rule-out any other unfalsifiable claim. How could I know the limb wasn't regrown by intervening extra-terrestrials with advanced medical technology? How could I know this particular individual didn't happen to regrow a limb as a consequence of some undiscovered force of nature that just happened to occur in the right place at the right time?

[Mithrae]

Nevertheless, purported miracles clearly are not "functionally equivalent" to unexplained events (at least for my best guess as to what you mean by that!): As Don Mc already pointed out earlier in the thread, in the bible generally and the gospels specifically - as the main starting point for how western folk tend to think about the miraculous - miracles are depicted as signs and wonders to draw people closer to God and promote their wellbeing. The alleged 'miracle of Calanda' and healings at Lourdes which I've cited obviously share similar features. A comparison might be drawn with 'near-death experiences'; while not quite the same thing, they share the distinctive feature of undermining belief or presumptions about a materialistic/deterministic universe, and in most cases "NDEs profoundly influence one's subsequent sense of spirituality, leading to increased compassion, altruism, and sense of purpose in life, and to decreased fear of death, competitiveness, and materialistic interests. They do not necessarily lead to an increased involvement in organized religion but rather tend to foster an internal sense of connection to the divine and to something greater than the self."

You've described what might be possible outcomes of unexplained events that some people perceive and label as miracles. That doesn't serve to explain how the observed phenomenon occurred such that it can be understood. If I observe an amputee regrow the limb that was previously missing, claiming the event was a miracle doesn't explain how the limb was regrown but merely leaves me with an unexplained event.

Explaining it as a miracle situates it within a broader, coherent theory with better scope and parsimony than currently competing alternatives. That's what an explanation is. You can assert otherwise 'til you're blue in the face, but unless you can actually offer a better, consistent definition and some valid reasons for favouring it, your assertions count for very little. Claiming that some process occurs due to, say, the law of conservation of energy doesn't describe how or why that law functions either, but (pending some attempt at a coherent answer to my earlier post) presumably you don't deny that the coveted 'explanation' status. And that's a scenario where there is no involvement of agency which we know tends to confound absolute descriptions to begin with.

It also doesn't do anything to rule-out any other unfalsifiable claim. How could I know the limb wasn't regrown by intervening extra-terrestrials with advanced medical technology? How could I know this particular individual didn't happen to regrow a limb as a consequence of some undiscovered force of nature that just happened to occur in the right place at the right time?

How do you rule out alien intervention for the existence of a baby? You're just repeating the same tired old assertions and flawed arguments I've already addressed. Can you not even be honest enough to acknowledge that miracles explanations are not - as you're constantly claiming - "unfalsifiable" but rather could be falsified in most if not all cases and in theory could all be falsified entirely by proof of absolute determinism or materialism? Your reliance on rhetoric over reason perhaps says something about the validity of your conclusions