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Replying to Paul of Tarsus in post #1]
While it does seem intuitively correct that the potential losses incurred by a lack of belief in God would be infinitely more severe than those incurred by belief, this conclusion will continue to be conjectural so long as the term "God" remains ill-defined. After all, the consequences of not believing in God on something like Taoism, for example, are quite distinct from those which obtain within the Christian context. For this reason, the Pascalian Wager, in its classical form, necessarily requires appeals to external evidence/arguments supporting the truth of Christianity (or something approximating it) in order to give the wager its bite. However, if these appeals to external support for Christianity prove successful, Pascal's Wager becomes unnecessary. I suspect this is why Pascal's Wager appears to have fallen out of fashion with the majority of contemporary apologists.
That being said, I've wondered if it is possible to modify Pascal's Wager in a manner which avoids the aforementioned difficulties. Tentatively, I've developed the following (admittedly unpolished) modification:
1. It is incumbent upon all rational persons to select, and live in accordance with, a worldview.
2. A rational person will select only that worldview which most probably entails the greatest potential gains (if true) and least potential losses (if false).
3. The (mere) Christian worldview most probably entails the greatest potential gains (if true) and least potential losses (if false).
4. From 2 & 3, a rational personal will select, and live in accordance with, the (mere) Christian worldview.
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I suspect that detractors of this variation of the Wager will most likely take issue with premise 3. Here is my preemptive defense:
Firstly, I define mere Christianity as a worldview which holds to the most basic/foundational doctrines of Christian theology (i.e. 1st Corinthians 15 coupled with a theology of hell which entail eternal separation from God).
That mere Christianity (if true) entails infinite potential gains is, I think, more or less self-evident. That Christianity (if false) entails the least potential losses is less evident. It is clear that if an atheistic metaphysic is true, then Christianity entails very little loss. However, would the same also be true if another religious worldview were correct? To answer this question, I begin by considering the falsity of Christianity with the context of four major world religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Taoism.
Hinduism: If Christianity is false on Hinduism, then the potential losses are most likely negligible. After all, once karmic debts are paid, all Atman return to Brahman. Sure, the Christian may need to take another spin or two around the proverbial mountain of reincarnation (assuming one's Dharma cannot be properly instantiated within the Christian walk), but so would many practicing Hindus. In the end, as they say, all dogs go to "heaven".
Buddhism: The the potential losses incurred by a practicing Christian are considerably low if Buddhism is true. In its theistic form, the consequences for the Christian are not dissimilar to those which obtain under Hinduism. In its non-theistic form, the consequences are similar to those which obtain on atheism.
Islam: Per the most primary, and foundational Islamic text (the Quran), Christians are classified as "Children of the Book" and are (with certain qualifications) looked upon in a generally favorable way within Islam (see 2:62, 5:69, and 61:14 for reference). While Christianity is certainly not the optimal religious stance within the Islamic context, the potential losses incurred by the Christian are appreciably low if Islam is true. (as an aside, something similar would also apply within the context of Judaism).
Taoism: Within the pantheistic context of Taoism, Christianity is neither wrong or right but instead is a necessary feature of the Tao by which other things are made manifest in contrast according to the principle of yin and yang. On this view, the potential losses incurred by the Christian are not dissimilar from those incurred within the context of metaphysical naturalism.
It would seem that, at least with respect to the major religions of the world, that the potential losses incurred by practicing Christians is considerably low if any one of the aforementioned religions is true. Interestingly, if Christianity is true, the potential loss incurred by each of these religions is substantial. We may conclude, therefore, that Christianity entails the greatest potential gain, and least potential loss, with respect to the major world religions. But what of some obscure worldview known only to a select few? Is it possible that there exists a largely unknown religion which usurps Christianity as the worldview entailing the greatest potential gains and least potential losses?
I cannot deny the possibility that such a worldview exists. However if it does, it is currently unknown to me (and I suspect most of those who will read this post). Never the less, what concerns us is not whether such a worldview exists, but whether it is most probable (prima facie). I would contend that such an obscure worldview would have its work cut out for it if it sought to show itself more prima facie probable than Christianity in particular. The staggering number of individuals (both past and present) who provide anecdotal attestation of the veracity and impact of Christianity in their daily lives elevates the prior probability of Christianity being true well beyond a non-negligible value. So long as the prior probability of Christianity remains higher than any of its obscure competitors, (which its status as humanity's largest global religion ensures) the Wager holds.