Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

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Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #1

Post by We_Are_VENOM »

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Greetings. A couple of years ago, I created a similar thread on the Modal Ontological Argument for the existence of God. It was a fun thread, with some by some interesting exchanges.

I thought we should reexamine the argument and why I feel it is just one of many valid/sound arguments for the existence of God.

The Modal Ontological Argument (MOA), of course, using “modal” logic…and this frame of logic relies heavily on “possible world” semantics. This is the great Alvin Plantiga’s version of it…and it is extremely elegant, I must say.

But lets define some stuff first..

What is a possible world? A possible world (PW) is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. In other words, there is a “possible world at which Lebron James wins MVP at least twice in his career”.

What this is saying is that there are a set of circumstances which will allow for the said proposition to be true.

There is also a possible world at which the said proposition will be false (should at the end of his career, he didn't win MVP at least twice).

So, when PW semantics is being used, it is just describing a set of circumstances which may/may not be true (or possible).

That being said, lets distinguish two concepts of truths..


Contingent truth: is a true proposition that could have been false; a contingent falsehood is a false proposition that could have been true. This is sometimes expressed by saying that a contingent proposition is one that is true in some possible worlds and not in others.

For example, the fact that I currently live in the United States is a contingent truth…because there are a set of circumstances at which I could possibly currently live in another country…so where I live is based on a variety of circumstances.

Necessary truth: is a proposition that could not possibly have been false. This can be expressed by saying that a necessary truth is a proposition that is true in every possible world. An example of a truth that many philosophers take to be necessary in this sense is: 2+2 = 4.

Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical, as 2+2=4 in all possible worlds, with no exceptions…making its truth necessary.

Now, we’ve defined possible worlds, we’ve defined the two concepts of truths…now, lets define God..

God, at least in the Christian tradition, has been defined as..

Omnipotent: All powerful
Ominicient: All knowing
Omnipresent: Active and in control everywhere at all times
Eternal: Having no beginning, or end, not depending on anything for its existence. An existence which is..necessary (which means under no circumstance can it cease existing).

For sake of the argument, we call this being a Maximally Great Being (MGB).
Now, the question is; does such a being exists or not?? Which brings forth the argument..

See next post..
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #21

Post by We_Are_VENOM »

Diagoras wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 6:32 pm Interesting video, Miles - thanks.

I hadn’t spotted the fallacy of equivocation in the original argument, and only watched your video after I’d posted, but it was interesting to see that it results in the MOA essentially stating the conclusion in the argument - which is analogous to begging the question like I pointed out just above.

The fact that two independent criticisms of the MOA converge on the same weakness in it does lend more weight to the position that the MOA is not in fact a strong argument for the existence of God.
Nonsense.

"It is possible for a MGB to exist".

That is a proposition, which is either true or false.

If it is true, then like pearls on a string, the rest of the premises just logically flows from there.

So far, no one has even attempted to demonstrate why any single premise is false, besides the irrelevant "counter-examples"...which served the folks giving it no justice anyway.

That, followed by the fact you all were provided an actual justification for the conclusion(s).

It is just a valid/sound argument...and no Youtube video can help you here.
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #22

Post by Purple Knight »

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 04, 2021 6:29 pmJustification: The existence of a MGB is conceivable. We can imagine the existence of such a being. And if it is conceivable, it is possible.
I dispute this. We can imagine lots of things that aren't possible because we're not aware of all the physical limitations of reality (we can imagine Peter Pan, a boy who can fly, because we don't happen to be thinking about the limitations of flight and are not aware of some of them), are flat-out illogical because our minds are not completely logical (I can make the statement, a dog that is not a dog, I can then name that not-dog dog Hallie and use Hallie in an argument, so I clearly conceive of Hallie), or are flat impossible because our minds are capable of being tricked.

Image

If our minds weren't capable of conceiving things that were not possible, there would be no conception of the impossible object. The fact that we all know what this is shows that no, just because we can dream it, doesn't mean we can do it. And just because we can think about it, doesn't make it possible.

Now here's where the ontological argument has ground, but you have to weaken it considerably.

If infinite power is possible, and if there are infinite universes, a being with infinite power exists somewhere. Now, because that being of infinite power has infinite power, it can do anything, so it can cross universes if it wishes. It can affect our universe.

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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #23

Post by We_Are_VENOM »

Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 04, 2021 9:30 pm Still disagree. I am with you that we cannot conceive of logical absurdities like square circles. However, I likewise am not sure that we can conceive of things that, on a surface level, appear possible, but, if you go into the details, may very well not be.

For instance, I can conceive of a substance like water, that can sustain organic beings, but also be used as a fuel for space engines. I can use my imagination and "conceive" such a thing. Problem is, if such a thing were real, we would have to do a lot more homework. We would have to, for instance, design a molecular, chemical structure for said substance that actually worked in the way that we imagined. It is very possible that such a thing, although conceivable on a surface level, dissolves into absurdity because we can't realize it once we get down to the nitty-gritty of it. The devil's in the details in other words, and it could very well be that such a substance is not possible at all. No more possible than a square circle.
You, amigo, are conflating the two truth concepts. In the analogy you gave of the organic water, you aren't describing a necessary truth...you are describing a contingent truth; sure, you can conceive it, but the very fact that isn't true in the actual world (which is a possible world), then its truth value isn't one of necessity.

Now, if you were to claim that you can conceive of such water with a necessary existence (necessary natural existence), then the truth value of its existence would be false...why?

Because the mere fact that such water doesn't exist in this world MAKES it contingent...because if it were necessary, it WOULD exist in this world...because necessary truths are true in all possible worlds, including the actual world.
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #24

Post by We_Are_VENOM »

Dimmesdale wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 1:04 am Seriously though, I think that greatness can be a measure of some quantity - that is originally what is meant by 'great' - some level of recognizable being over and beyond the average. We can measure intelligence to some extent. The same with physical strength.
Yeah, I was gonna raise this very point (but in a different way).

However, when I realized just how irrelevant one's view is of "greatness", I didn't bother.

You can take "greatness" however you like, but the question remains; is the argument (as presented) valid/sound or not.

I say it is, and I haven't seen anything yet to convince me otherwise.
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #25

Post by Diagoras »

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 10:14 pm Nonsense.
A one-word rebuttal isn’t worth much on a debating site. Have you ever seen Monty Python’s ‘Argument Sketch’? Worth checking out on YouTube if you fancy a laugh.
"It is possible for a MGB to exist".

That is a proposition, which is either true or false.

If it is true, then like pearls on a string, the rest of the premises just logically flows from there.

So far, no one has even attempted to demonstrate why any single premise is false, besides the irrelevant "counter-examples"...which served the folks giving it no justice anyway.

Did you even read my Post #17? I’m questioning the definition of a MGB (maximally great being), which would make your proposition false, and your string of pearls then leads you to the logical conclusion that God (as you define it) doesn’t exist.

I further note that in this thread I’m not alone in finding flaws in the Modal Ontological Argument. Choosing to ignore arguments that one doesn’t like is of course up to you, but declaring that they don’t exist (or simply dismissing them with a single word) runs counter to the spirit of this website, IMHO. I’d politely ask that you give more consideration to others who may think differently on these topics.

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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #26

Post by We_Are_VENOM »

Diagoras wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 10:45 pm A one-word rebuttal isn’t worth much on a debating site.
I agree. I agree with you so much that I provided more words after that.
Diagoras wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 10:45 pm Have you ever seen Monty Python’s ‘Argument Sketch’? Worth checking out on YouTube if you fancy a laugh.
I will give it its due consideration.
Diagoras wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 10:45 pm Did you even read my Post #17?
No, I didn't. I missed it. I will deal with it tomorrow.
Diagoras wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 10:45 pm I’m questioning the definition of a MGB (maximally great being), which would make your proposition false, and your string of pearls then leads you to the logical conclusion that God (as you define it) doesn’t exist.
We will see about that.
Diagoras wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 10:45 pm I further note that in this thread I’m not alone in finding flaws in the Modal Ontological Argument. Choosing to ignore arguments that one doesn’t like is of course up to you, but declaring that they don’t exist (or simply dismissing them with a single word) runs counter to the spirit of this website, IMHO. I’d politely ask that you give more consideration to others who may think differently on these topics.
First of all, I am the wrong person who needs to get accused of ignoring, ducking, or dodging anything.

I run towards the smoke, not from it.

Second, I glanced at your post and from what I read, I am unimpressed with it and will make light work of it tomorrow when I effortlessly pick it apart.

Laters :D
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #27

Post by benchwarmer »

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 10:01 pm [Replying to benchwarmer in post #12]

See, this so called MGD(dog) or MGC(cat) that you envision....what you are calling this MGD/C, is actually God. You are just giving the MGB a different name. It is God, but under a different name.

And yes, God can manifest himself as a dog or a cat...and thus be a MGD/C.

You've failed to negate the argument, is what I am trying to say. :D
You missed my point (or simply decided to ignore it).

I can imagine that my MGDog and MGCat are so great (maximally) that they can coexist with other maximally great things. This is greater than your defined MGB which is lesser and must be alone among maximally great things, thus my beings must exist over your single MGB. Your MGB may be able to manifest as other things, but my imagined entities can do that as well as coexist amongst other MG<insert thing>.

This of course exposes just one of the fatal flaws of this argument. Handwaving what is "maximally great". Another of course is that we are imagining things into existence. There are so many fallacies and holes in this argument I'm surprised anyone trots it out anymore.

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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #28

Post by We_Are_VENOM »

benchwarmer wrote: Tue Apr 06, 2021 2:29 pm You missed my point (or simply decided to ignore it).
Like a broken pencil, you had no point.
benchwarmer wrote: Tue Apr 06, 2021 2:29 pm I can imagine that my MGDog and MGCat are so great (maximally) that they can coexist with other maximally great things. This is greater than your defined MGB which is lesser and must be alone among maximally great things, thus my beings must exist over your single MGB. Your MGB may be able to manifest as other things, but my imagined entities can do that as well as coexist amongst other MG<insert thing>.
First off, my MGB does exist with other MGBs....ever heard of the Trinity? 3 beings who are all MG, and of whom all coexist with one another.

How is that for a...point?
benchwarmer wrote: Tue Apr 06, 2021 2:29 pm This of course exposes just one of the fatal flaws of this argument. Handwaving what is "maximally great". Another of course is that we are imagining things into existence. There are so many fallacies and holes in this argument I'm surprised anyone trots it out anymore.
I am sorry you feel that way, but I hope you don't get such a feeling based off such a ridiculous "refutation" of the argument.
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #29

Post by We_Are_VENOM »

[Replying to Diagoras in post #18]

I retract what I said about picking your counter-argument apart. You presented a slight dilemma for me...and I do emphasis on slight.

What I have to do is add some supplementary argumentation for this argument. I will go on a hiatus from this thread, and start another thread for the supplementary one.

See ya there. :approve:
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #30

Post by Dimmesdale »

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Mon Apr 05, 2021 10:25 pm
Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 04, 2021 9:30 pm Still disagree. I am with you that we cannot conceive of logical absurdities like square circles. However, I likewise am not sure that we can conceive of things that, on a surface level, appear possible, but, if you go into the details, may very well not be.

For instance, I can conceive of a substance like water, that can sustain organic beings, but also be used as a fuel for space engines. I can use my imagination and "conceive" such a thing. Problem is, if such a thing were real, we would have to do a lot more homework. We would have to, for instance, design a molecular, chemical structure for said substance that actually worked in the way that we imagined. It is very possible that such a thing, although conceivable on a surface level, dissolves into absurdity because we can't realize it once we get down to the nitty-gritty of it. The devil's in the details in other words, and it could very well be that such a substance is not possible at all. No more possible than a square circle.
You, amigo, are conflating the two truth concepts. In the analogy you gave of the organic water, you aren't describing a necessary truth...you are describing a contingent truth; sure, you can conceive it, but the very fact that isn't true in the actual world (which is a possible world), then its truth value isn't one of necessity.

Now, if you were to claim that you can conceive of such water with a necessary existence (necessary natural existence), then the truth value of its existence would be false...why?

Because the mere fact that such water doesn't exist in this world MAKES it contingent...because if it were necessary, it WOULD exist in this world...because necessary truths are true in all possible worlds, including the actual world.
I can conceive it and also not conceive of it. I can conceive of it at a surface level -- as a hypothetical substance in a thought experiment. But I can't conceive of it in any comprehensive, molecular way that would actually make sense and work.... So for the latter reason, it is not a necessary potential truth. It would have to be established that such a thing could work, given our laws. For the same reason I don't think we can jump to the conclusion that it is even possible.

Of course, the laws in a different universe could be different. But I would say you would need to establish that as well. That too is not an "obvious" necessary truth.

I believe reality is not malleable. It is fixed. It isn't that "just anything" could be possible. That's what I think.

P.S., I believe anything that can be even contingent must be necessarily possible - coherent for one thing. So I still disagree. I probably misunderstood your post though.
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