Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

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Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

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Post by We_Are_VENOM »

.

Greetings. A couple of years ago, I created a similar thread on the Modal Ontological Argument for the existence of God. It was a fun thread, with some by some interesting exchanges.

I thought we should reexamine the argument and why I feel it is just one of many valid/sound arguments for the existence of God.

The Modal Ontological Argument (MOA), of course, using “modal” logic…and this frame of logic relies heavily on “possible world” semantics. This is the great Alvin Plantiga’s version of it…and it is extremely elegant, I must say.

But lets define some stuff first..

What is a possible world? A possible world (PW) is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. In other words, there is a “possible world at which Lebron James wins MVP at least twice in his career”.

What this is saying is that there are a set of circumstances which will allow for the said proposition to be true.

There is also a possible world at which the said proposition will be false (should at the end of his career, he didn't win MVP at least twice).

So, when PW semantics is being used, it is just describing a set of circumstances which may/may not be true (or possible).

That being said, lets distinguish two concepts of truths..


Contingent truth: is a true proposition that could have been false; a contingent falsehood is a false proposition that could have been true. This is sometimes expressed by saying that a contingent proposition is one that is true in some possible worlds and not in others.

For example, the fact that I currently live in the United States is a contingent truth…because there are a set of circumstances at which I could possibly currently live in another country…so where I live is based on a variety of circumstances.

Necessary truth: is a proposition that could not possibly have been false. This can be expressed by saying that a necessary truth is a proposition that is true in every possible world. An example of a truth that many philosophers take to be necessary in this sense is: 2+2 = 4.

Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical, as 2+2=4 in all possible worlds, with no exceptions…making its truth necessary.

Now, we’ve defined possible worlds, we’ve defined the two concepts of truths…now, lets define God..

God, at least in the Christian tradition, has been defined as..

Omnipotent: All powerful
Ominicient: All knowing
Omnipresent: Active and in control everywhere at all times
Eternal: Having no beginning, or end, not depending on anything for its existence. An existence which is..necessary (which means under no circumstance can it cease existing).

For sake of the argument, we call this being a Maximally Great Being (MGB).
Now, the question is; does such a being exists or not?? Which brings forth the argument..

See next post..
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #41

Post by benchwarmer »

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:44 am Please explain to me why can I daydream about a flying elephant with wings, but I can't daydream about beating you with a one-sided stick.

Why can imagine one, and not the other?
Well, I can imagine it, I just did :)

It's actually pretty easy. From your perspective you would see my righteous stick of truth heading for your noggin. You see it, thus easily step out of the way, avoiding taking the hit. Nice move. However, from my perspective, the stick is completely invisible. I can only feel the side that is pointed at you because it only has one side. It's actually the perfect stick to use to whack people with. If the police show up I show them my hand and they see nothing as long as I keep the one side pointed away from them. Man, this stick is awesome. Perhaps I shouldn't have imagined it though, because now it's apparently in some possible world and probably being used for evil. Oh well...

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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

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Post by We_Are_VENOM »

benchwarmer wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 9:21 am
We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:44 am Please explain to me why can I daydream about a flying elephant with wings, but I can't daydream about beating you with a one-sided stick.

Why can imagine one, and not the other?
Well, I can imagine it, I just did :)

It's actually pretty easy. From your perspective you would see my righteous stick of truth heading for your noggin. You see it, thus easily step out of the way, avoiding taking the hit. Nice move. However, from my perspective, the stick is completely invisible. I can only feel the side that is pointed at you because it only has one side. It's actually the perfect stick to use to whack people with. If the police show up I show them my hand and they see nothing as long as I keep the one side pointed away from them. Man, this stick is awesome. Perhaps I shouldn't have imagined it though, because now it's apparently in some possible world and probably being used for evil. Oh well...
Red herring.
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #43

Post by benchwarmer »

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 10:02 am
benchwarmer wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 9:21 am
We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:44 am Please explain to me why can I daydream about a flying elephant with wings, but I can't daydream about beating you with a one-sided stick.

Why can imagine one, and not the other?
Well, I can imagine it, I just did :)

It's actually pretty easy. From your perspective you would see my righteous stick of truth heading for your noggin. You see it, thus easily step out of the way, avoiding taking the hit. Nice move. However, from my perspective, the stick is completely invisible. I can only feel the side that is pointed at you because it only has one side. It's actually the perfect stick to use to whack people with. If the police show up I show them my hand and they see nothing as long as I keep the one side pointed away from them. Man, this stick is awesome. Perhaps I shouldn't have imagined it though, because now it's apparently in some possible world and probably being used for evil. Oh well...
Red herring.
Blue turkey.

I thought we were debating not just throwing random one liners with no explanation. I disproved your point. Rather than showing your issue with it, you think tossing something that sounds good on the table.

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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #44

Post by Dimmesdale »

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:44 am
There mere definition of conceive is to "imagine".
From Merriam-Webster:

Definition of conceive
transitive verb

1a: to become pregnant with (young)
conceive a child
b: to cause to begin : ORIGINATE
a project conceived by the company's founder
2a: to take into one's mind
conceive a prejudice
b: to form a conception of : IMAGINE
a badly conceived design
cleverly conceived teleplays
3: to apprehend by reason or imagination : UNDERSTAND
unable to conceive his reasons
It is easy enough to conceive the notion that your island is a sort of fortress.
— Paul Theroux

As you can see, even in a dictionary definition (which aren't clear - dictionaries aren't necessarily philosophical - they just contain the diction of society and their usages) there is a difference within"apprehending something" -- it can be done by EITHER reason or imagination. Spinoza would say proper concepts are understood/apprehended by reason alone, and they alone are necessary or eternal. Imagination in other words yields only contingent truths. That's actually what he teaches:

"Inadequate ideas are incomplete. Through them we perceive things without perceiving the causes that determine them to be, and it is for this reason that we imagine them to be contingent."

https://iep.utm.edu/spinoza/#SH4b
We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:44 amPlease explain to me why can I daydream about a flying elephant with wings, but I can't daydream about beating you with a one-sided stick.

Why can imagine one, and not the other?
Because there is nothing incoherent about forming the image of flying elephants and you cannot form an image of a one-sided stick since that is fundamentally absurd.

But that is beside the point. Even if you can imagine something without trouble does not make it possible. You are using imagination, not reason, as Spinoza would say.
We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:44 amFalse. I am "imagining" myself waking up tomorrow morning and having breakfast. There is nothing "confused and haphazardly" about it, either.
Well, will you wake up tomorrow and have breakfast? If not, then your imagining was false at least. It was not a necessary truth - but a contingent one that never came to pass.

My point is that you can put together lots of things in your mind which simply aren't true. They may seem interesting, but they do not reveal any necessary truths.

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:44 am
Dimmesdale wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 10:40 pm Well, if the laws are different, but then, other things would therefore also be different. So... it would probably be a universe completely different from our own.
Um, that is kinda the WHOLE POINT of the entire argument. Where do you think the whole "possible world" stuff is coming from?

Do you not understand the argument?
Well, if the whole universe has to be different for one item in it to be true, than that may therefore mean that the same object can't coexist in our own universe. Since there is not commonality or point of contact between this universe and the other. If they must be radically different. Hence it's not a necessary object.
"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." - Albert Einstein

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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #45

Post by We_Are_VENOM »

benchwarmer wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 11:26 am
Blue turkey.

I thought we were debating not just throwing random one liners with no explanation.
I call it how I see it.
benchwarmer wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 11:26 am I disproved your point.
Oh, is that what you did? I really couldn't tell. Something about an invisible stick, though.
benchwarmer wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 11:26 am Rather than showing your issue with it, you think tossing something that sounds good on the table.
The fact that it is a red herring, IS the issue I have with it.
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #46

Post by We_Are_VENOM »

Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:29 pm From Merriam-Webster:

Definition of conceive
transitive verb
3: to apprehend by reason or imagination : UNDERSTAND
unable to conceive his reasons
It is easy enough to conceive the notion that your island is a sort of fortress.
— Paul Theroux

As you can see, even in a dictionary definition (which aren't clear - dictionaries aren't necessarily philosophical - they just contain the diction of society and their usages) there is a difference within"apprehending something" -- it can be done by EITHER reason or imagination. Spinoza would say proper concepts are understood/apprehended by reason alone, and they alone are necessary or eternal. Imagination in other words yields only contingent truths. That's actually what he teaches:

"Inadequate ideas are incomplete. Through them we perceive things without perceiving the causes that determine them to be, and it is for this reason that we imagine them to be contingent."

https://iep.utm.edu/spinoza/#SH4b
This is a text book example of splitting hairs. These irrelevant distinctions between "imagination/conceptions" are...irrelevant .

If the concept of a MGB couldn't be imagined, then I wouldn't be sitting here imagining it. If the concept of a MGB can't be conceived, then I wouldn't be sitting here conceiving it.

Either way, I can imagine it, and I can conceive it. No over-analyzing is needed, as the argument is complex enough.
Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:29 pm
Because there is nothing incoherent about forming the image of flying elephants and you cannot form an image of a one-sided stick since that is fundamentally absurd.
Right, so you admit that the distinction between what we can conceive/not conceive is based upon whether the concept is coherent.

The concept of a MGB is coherent, which means that there is a possible world at which such a concept is actualized, just like if the laws of nature were different, there is a possibility that elephants could have wings instead of tusks.
Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:29 pm But that is beside the point. Even if you can imagine something without trouble does not make it possible. You are using imagination, not reason, as Spinoza would say.
If you can't imagine the impossible, then it follows that you can only imagine the possible.

You said (and rightfully so) earlier that the image of a one-sided stick can't be imaged since it is fundamentally absurd.

Well then, on the flip side, things that aren't fundamentally absurd can be imagined and therefore possible.

If it works one way on one side, it should work the same way (all things equal) on the other side..don't commit the taxi cab fallacy by riding the taxi and jumping ship once the cab begins to go down a path that you don't like.
Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:29 pm Well, will you wake up tomorrow and have breakfast? If not, then your imagining was false at least. It was not a necessary truth - but a contingent one that never came to pass.
Not so fast. I used the "breakfast" thing based upon YOUR definition of imagine.

You had stated in post #39 that, "to imagine is to confusedly and haphazardly arrange images in the mind"...at which all I had to do was provide an example of me imagining a concept, a concept of which wasn't confused or haphazard, as you stated it would be by your definition.

That had nothing to do with necessary or contingent at that point, but more so on your inaccurate definition, with all due respect.
Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:29 pm My point is that you can put together lots of things in your mind which simply aren't true. They may seem interesting, but they do not reveal any necessary truths.
All necessary truths that are found to be possible, must be true. A truth cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false.

2+2 can't possibly necessarily = 4....but actually equals 14.

Because if it is actually 14, it was never possibly necessarily 4.
Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:29 pm Well, if the whole universe has to be different for one item in it to be true, than that may therefore mean that the same object can't coexist in our own universe. Since there is not commonality or point of contact between this universe and the other. If they must be radically different. Hence it's not a necessary object.
I do not follow.
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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #47

Post by benchwarmer »

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 1:12 pm
benchwarmer wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 11:26 am I disproved your point.
Oh, is that what you did? I really couldn't tell. Something about an invisible stick, though.
So you didn't actually read my full response? Did you miss the part where I said I could imagine it and then explained in detail the image I had in my brain of me trying to hit you with it? In fact it wasn't invisible to whoever is facing the one side. How did I come up with that if I didn't imagine it? I certainly didn't actually try to do it, so I MUST have imagined it.

I'm not arguing a one sided stick is possible, I'm arguing that I can imagine one. Point defeated whether you want to admit it or not.

In fact, you have no clue what I can or can't imagine, but somehow I managed to take my idea and write it out into text thus conveying my imagined idea. The only possible reply is that YOU cannot imagine a one sided stick, but that's not the point you were trying to make - or perhaps it was and I missed it. If it was, it's certainly not relevant to explaining what can or cannot be imagined, only what YOU can or cannot imagine.

As for you insistence that this is a red herring, I fail to see how providing evidence that I imagined something you said was impossible is distracting from your point. The bolded bit in the last sentence is, after all, the definition of a red herring. My evidence was writing a description of what I did in my imagination. Unless you can show I copy and pasted that from someone else's writing I must have come up with it. Even if you could, you've only shown someone else could have imagined it. Either way, the concept of using a one sided stick came out of a brain - ridiculous or not.

Your unexplained use of "red herring" is ironically the only red herring I see. i.e. you are hoping to distract the readers that what I said did not apply. You have yet to explain how it doesn't other than you wishing it didn't.

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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #48

Post by Dimmesdale »

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 1:47 pm This is a text book example of splitting hairs. These irrelevant distinctions between "imagination/conceptions" are...irrelevant .

If the concept of a MGB couldn't be imagined, then I wouldn't be sitting here imagining it. If the concept of a MGB can't be conceived, then I wouldn't be sitting here conceiving it.

Either way, I can imagine it, and I can conceive it. No over-analyzing is needed, as the argument is complex enough.
Well, like I said, there are many philosophers (including me) who would argue against you on this point, that it's not splitting hairs, but is a relevant distinction that has great implications.... I would say that these distinctions have been welded together/elided by the way humans use language indiscriminately, because in common parlance we aren't that careful in making distinctions. But I can't persuade you if you aren't willing to give the argument a hearing.
We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 1:47 pmRight, so you admit that the distinction between what we can conceive/not conceive is based upon whether the concept is coherent.

The concept of a MGB is coherent, which means that there is a possible world at which such a concept is actualized, just like if the laws of nature were different, there is a possibility that elephants could have wings instead of tusks.
I don't see why that possible world has to exist actually, not just as a hypothetical in the mind. We haven't demonstrated that there could be a MGB anymore than that laws of nature CAN be different, or that that elephants could have wings under those laws. All that is a big unknown to me and I don't see how you are getting there. I just don't see the logic of it.
We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 1:47 pmIf you can't imagine the impossible, then it follows that you can only imagine the possible.

You said (and rightfully so) earlier that the image of a one-sided stick can't be imaged since it is fundamentally absurd.

Well then, on the flip side, things that aren't fundamentally absurd can be imagined and therefore possible.

If it works one way on one side, it should work the same way (all things equal) on the other side..don't commit the taxi cab fallacy by riding the taxi and jumping ship once the cab begins to go down a path that you don't like.
Just because you can imagine something, doesn't make it possible. Sorry, but I don't see anything in your argument to persuade me otherwise.

Yes, you can only imagine the possible within that particular field of imagination. Given the medium of imagination. Within those parameters. But you can't make it so that those particular images "graduate" to the level of beings on other planes of existence. Such as in science. It simply doesn't follow.

We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 1:47 pmNot so fast. I used the "breakfast" thing based upon YOUR definition of imagine.

You had stated in post #39 that, "to imagine is to confusedly and haphazardly arrange images in the mind"...at which all I had to do was provide an example of me imagining a concept, a concept of which wasn't confused or haphazard, as you stated it would be by your definition.

That had nothing to do with necessary or contingent at that point, but more so on your inaccurate definition, with all due respect.
You're right I should have been clearer.

Yes, the example you gave was at least coherent. You didn't, for example, say you were making dinner in the morning. That would have been absurd at one level -- since dinner is served in the evening -- unless you have a different definition of dinner....

But it still stands that your imagination did not conform to the demands of reality. It didn't turn out to be a necessary truth. Hence it didn't follow any principle of reason. Hence it was random in the sense that it wasn't organized on any basis in the real world, but was dreamt up, having only your particular mind as its basis. Not as an objective fact. It may have partaken of some necessary information (such as that, in the past you made breakfast in the morning) but the very fact you can't universalize this demonstrates that the mind did not conceive it using reason (necessarily) but only imagined it (contingently).

Spinoza would say, however, that even your contingent-seeming imagination had its basis in the necessary law of your mind. Spinoza was a determinist in that sense. Still, to our eyes, it (rightly) appears contingent, because it lacks any (clear) foundation in prior law/causation/reason.
We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 1:47 pmAll necessary truths that are found to be possible, must be true. A truth cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false.

2+2 can't possibly necessarily = 4....but actually equals 14.

Because if it is actually 14, it was never possibly necessarily 4.
A necessary truth is possible only to our limited minds. In actuality, it was never possible, but always actual. There was never any possibility that 2+2 could equal to 4. On the contrary, it was an absolute certainty all along. Possibility (in the ontological sense) has nothing to do with that actually.
We_Are_VENOM wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 1:47 pm
Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:29 pm Well, if the whole universe has to be different for one item in it to be true, than that may therefore mean that the same object can't coexist in our own universe. Since there is not commonality or point of contact between this universe and the other. If they must be radically different. Hence it's not a necessary object.
I do not follow.
If the laws for my mystery substance had to be different, then that would cause everything else in that universe to have to adapt to those different laws. Hence the universe would have a pink sky, for instance (to give a hypothethical example) in order to accommodate the mystery substance.

Hence that mystery substance couldn't exist in our universe. Because it would have to be nested in a universe with different laws that would necessitate, for instance, a pink sky, among so many other things given that the laws are completely different. Since the substance can only exist in one hypothetical universe, not all, it follows it isn't necessary (or universal in all universes). So I assume it has an existence contingent merely on the laws in that particular universe.
"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." - Albert Einstein

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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #49

Post by William »

Dimmesdale wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 2:27 pm
Just because you can imagine something, doesn't make it possible. Sorry, but I don't see anything in your argument to persuade me otherwise.

The way I understand things, if we do exist within a creation, then it is possible to understand the creation is the result of the Creator's imagination.
Given that we too have imagination, it is feasible that in the next phase [afterlife] we create our own realities, based upon stories told regarding the nature of that next phase which are secured in our imaginations.

So it is feasible that whatever can be imagined can then be experienced as real.

This would obviously include one's imaginings in our current phase. So it is feasibly that the gods humans imagine, will be experienced as real beings, by those imagining it so.

However, it has to be pointed out in that, that whatever is imagined as being The Creator [of our universe] need not necessarily be true and accurate.

That is the thing about imagination. It can be used to conjure up any amount of illusions...so one has to really study and examine and be slow to come to such conclusions and only come to them in relation to evidence [Pertaining to metaphysics superimposed onto current physics] the most accurate image we can apply to a supposed Creator of the physical universe has to align with what we see about said universe...And I do not think this information implies an
MGB is directly behind the Creation of our universe, although obviously the mind behind it must be awesome...indeed too awesome for any human to claim truthfully that they understand said mind. They might imagine they do....but they don't really. They simply cannot...

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Re: Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

Post #50

Post by Dimmesdale »

William wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 4:06 pm The way I understand things, if we do exist within a creation, then it is possible to understand the creation is the result of the Creator's imagination.

Given that we too have imagination, it is feasible that in the next phase [afterlife] we create our own realities, based upon stories told regarding the nature of that next phase which are secured in our imaginations.
You have to distinguish between imagination and the raw materials that are necessary to make that imagination take on greater reality.

I too believe the Creation springs from the mind of the Creator. However, the difference is that the Creator has far greater resources to actualize his "dreams" than the human or lesser created being does.

It's like whether one has the finances to become a capable artist. A human being may have a powerful imagination, but unless he has the monetary funds required to purchase things like oil paints, acrylics, spray bottles, canvasses, pain brushes, etc. his imagination can't be actualized. Or only partially compared to someone who owns an entire art studio.
William wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 4:06 pmSo it is feasible that whatever can be imagined can then be experienced as real.
Only, again, to the extent there exists a medium wherein those imaginations can be actualized or given physical form. Otherwise, they reside merely within the mind, with no concrete realization.
"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." - Albert Einstein

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