Revisiting the Modal Ontological Argument

[We_Are_VENOM]

.

Greetings. A couple of years ago, I created a similar thread on the Modal Ontological Argument for the existence of God. It was a fun thread, with some by some interesting exchanges.

I thought we should reexamine the argument and why I feel it is just one of many valid/sound arguments for the existence of God.

The Modal Ontological Argument (MOA), of course, using “modal” logic…and this frame of logic relies heavily on “possible world” semantics. This is the great Alvin Plantiga’s version of it…and it is extremely elegant, I must say.

But lets define some stuff first..

What is a possible world? A possible world (PW) is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. In other words, there is a “possible world at which Lebron James wins MVP at least twice in his career”.

What this is saying is that there are a set of circumstances which will allow for the said proposition to be true.

There is also a possible world at which the said proposition will be false (should at the end of his career, he didn't win MVP at least twice).

So, when PW semantics is being used, it is just describing a set of circumstances which may/may not be true (or possible).

That being said, lets distinguish two concepts of truths..


Contingent truth: is a true proposition that could have been false; a contingent falsehood is a false proposition that could have been true. This is sometimes expressed by saying that a contingent proposition is one that is true in some possible worlds and not in others.

For example, the fact that I currently live in the United States is a contingent truth…because there are a set of circumstances at which I could possibly currently live in another country…so where I live is based on a variety of circumstances.

Necessary truth: is a proposition that could not possibly have been false. This can be expressed by saying that a necessary truth is a proposition that is true in every possible world. An example of a truth that many philosophers take to be necessary in this sense is: 2+2 = 4.

Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical, as 2+2=4 in all possible worlds, with no exceptions…making its truth necessary.

Now, we’ve defined possible worlds, we’ve defined the two concepts of truths…now, lets define God..

God, at least in the Christian tradition, has been defined as..

Omnipotent: All powerful
Ominicient: All knowing
Omnipresent: Active and in control everywhere at all times
Eternal: Having no beginning, or end, not depending on anything for its existence. An existence which is..necessary (which means under no circumstance can it cease existing).

For sake of the argument, we call this being a Maximally Great Being (MGB).
Now, the question is; does such a being exists or not?? Which brings forth the argument..

See next post..

[benchwarmer]

[Replying to We_Are_VENOM in post #1]

This has been debunked countless times. What's one more I guess.

1. It is possible that a maximally great dog exists.

Justification: The existence of a MGD is conceivable. We can imagine the existence of such a dog. And if it is conceivable, it is possible.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great dog exists, then a maximally great dog exists in some possible world.

Justification: If a MGD exists, then its existence is manifested in some possible world (or set of circumstances).

3. If a maximally great dog exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Justification: Since the existence of a MGD is “necessary” (remember, we can conceive it), then based on the fact that all necessary truths must be true in all possible words (2+2=4 in all possible worlds), then it follows that a MGD must exist in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great dog exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

Justification: Since the actual world is among “all possible worlds”, then it follows that if a MGD exists in all possible worlds, then the actual world is among the possible worlds at which a MGD exists.

5. If a maximally great dog exists in the actual world, then a maximally great dog exists.

Justification: Self explanatory

6. Therefore, a maximally great dog exists.

Justification: If a MGD exists in the actual world, then a MGD exists in reality, since the actual world is reality.

1. It is possible that a maximally great cat exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great cat exists, then a maximally great cat exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great cat exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great cat exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great cat exists in the actual world, then a maximally great cat exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great cat exists.

etc.

In other words, defining something into existence does not actually work. Observing something that exists is the only way to avoid imagination.

To further put the nail in the coffin, the maximally great dog and maximally great cat that I can imagine do not flood planets to solve a simple issue with some bad humans. They also don't sanction the killing of innocent babies because a leader refused to relent. Ergo, my maximally great dog and cat are greater than the god portrayed in the Bible and thus greater than any possible version that holds the attributes of the Bible god. Thus the Bible god does NOT exist as it is not greater than my imagined MGD and MGC. QED.

[Dimmesdale]

[Replying to We_Are_VENOM in post #1]

This has been debunked countless times. What's one more I guess.

1. It is possible that a maximally great dog exists.

Justification: The existence of a MGD is conceivable. We can imagine the existence of such a dog. And if it is conceivable, it is possible.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great dog exists, then a maximally great dog exists in some possible world.

Justification: If a MGD exists, then its existence is manifested in some possible world (or set of circumstances).

3. If a maximally great dog exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Justification: Since the existence of a MGD is “necessary” (remember, we can conceive it), then based on the fact that all necessary truths must be true in all possible words (2+2=4 in all possible worlds), then it follows that a MGD must exist in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great dog exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

Justification: Since the actual world is among “all possible worlds”, then it follows that if a MGD exists in all possible worlds, then the actual world is among the possible worlds at which a MGD exists.

5. If a maximally great dog exists in the actual world, then a maximally great dog exists.

Justification: Self explanatory

6. Therefore, a maximally great dog exists.

Justification: If a MGD exists in the actual world, then a MGD exists in reality, since the actual world is reality.

1. It is possible that a maximally great cat exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great cat exists, then a maximally great cat exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great cat exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great cat exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great cat exists in the actual world, then a maximally great cat exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great cat exists.

etc.

In other words, defining something into existence does not actually work. Observing something that exists is the only way to avoid imagination.

To further put the nail in the coffin, the maximally great dog and maximally great cat that I can imagine do not flood planets to solve a simple issue with some bad humans. They also don't sanction the killing of innocent babies because a leader refused to relent. Ergo, my maximally great dog and cat are greater than the god portrayed in the Bible and thus greater than any possible version that holds the attributes of the Bible god. Thus the Bible god does NOT exist as it is not greater than my imagined MGD and MGC. QED.

This is actually a nonsense rebuttal because there is no coherent or realizable definition of what a "maximally great dog" is. Great in what sense?

On the other hand, a maximally great God, if defined as omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, is not incoherent, but is realizable, within those set parameters.

[Miles]

Now, we’ve defined possible worlds, we’ve defined the two concepts of truths…now, lets define God..

God, at least in the Christian tradition, has been defined as..

Omnipotent: All powerful
Ominicient: All knowing
Omnipresent: Active and in control everywhere at all times
Eternal: Having no beginning, or end, not depending on anything for its existence. An existence which is..necessary (which means under no circumstance can it cease existing).

For sake of the argument, we call this being a Maximally Great Being (MGB).

Excuse me. A Maximally Great Being? Greatness is not an objective quantifiable thing, but a value judgement. And to quantify a value judgement amounts to gibberish. It's not coherent because for any being which you can conceive of as maximally great, I can conceive of a being just like yours plus one with the ability to beat yours in arm wrestling. Therefore, my Maximally Great Being being is greater by definition. That's why maximal anything doesn't not logically mean anything when the variables in question are unbounded, which is the case with greatness.

Therefore, your "Maximally Great Being" turns out to be a meaningless concept. So "for sake of the argument, [don't] call this being a Maximally Great Being (MGB)."


.

[Dimmesdale]

Greatness is not an objective quantifiable thing, but a value judgement.

Yes and no. If we are talking on the basis of mere subjectivity, then rock candy may be "greater" than Chocolate creme (hey, at least no emulsifier) but in the end both can get you the 'beetus.

Seriously though, I think that greatness can be a measure of some quantity - that is originally what is meant by 'great' - some level of recognizable being over and beyond the average. We can measure intelligence to some extent. The same with physical strength.

A God would be unbounded in terms of his "beingness" but I can imagine he would not have some attributes. Those attributes would be extraneous, not essential. The sheer fact that God is infinite and all other objects are not, would render him the MGB.

[benchwarmer]

This is actually a nonsense rebuttal because there is no coherent or realizable definition of what a "maximally great dog" is. Great in what sense?

You have just proved my point. Thank you.

My rebuttal was equally nonsensical as the original argument. That was the whole point.

On the other hand, a maximally great God, if defined as omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, is not incoherent, but is realizable, within those set parameters.

Sorry, but my maximally great dog and maximally great cat are also defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. I used the exact same argument, thus they possess the exact same qualities as the god being defined into existence.

In fact, my MGD has the extra characteristic of being a dog which means it's greater than a being that does not have that extra characteristic. Ergo my MGD that I can imagine nullifies the MGB.

My MGC shares equally all the same characteristics as the MGD except it is a cat instead of a dog, thus they have an equal number of properties and thus both can coexist. I'd love to share about the maximally great hamster, frog, and bat as well, but that seems redundant now.

One of the fatal flaws in this argument is of course the word 'great' as my original rebuttal proves.

[Miles]

Greatness is not an objective quantifiable thing, but a value judgement.

Seriously though, I think that greatness can be a measure of some quantity - that is originally what is meant by 'great' - some level of recognizable being over and beyond the average. We can measure intelligence to some extent. The same with physical strength.

So what are these specific units of greatness you're implying here? Not the measurements of intelligence or physical strength, but the concept of greatness.

A God would be unbounded in terms of his "beingness" but I can imagine he would not have some attributes.

Errr,. . . what is this "beingness" you refer to?

Those attributes would be extraneous, not essential.

So what?

The sheer fact that God is infinite and all other objects are not, would render him the MGB.

Prove it. Prove that God is infinite. The only reference I've ever come across is Psalm 147:5 where it says his understanding is infinite.

"Great is our Lord, and of great power: his understanding is infinite."

In fact, I don't consider the sole possession of an infinite character to be any indicator of maximal greatness at all. Why? because I don't regard any unexplained characteristic---"infinite" in this case---to warrant it. And even if it was explained, greatness would still be a subjective opinion rather than an objective fact. Maybe I don't think infinite size, for example, to be any indicator of greatness at all. That's just my opinion, as is your opinion that the infinite character of god is worthy of the label "great." And that's all it comes down to; your opinion verses all other opinions, which hardly renders god as a decisively Maximally Great Being.


Q. What units of measurement are used to establish greatness? Not greatness used in any specific application, but greatness in of itself, like length, weight, or capacity.


.

[Diagoras]

From the OP:

I thought we should reexamine the argument and why I feel it is just one of many valid/sound arguments for the existence of God.

<bolding mine>

Can you expand upon this point from your opening post? Specifically: is the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA) just one of a particular class of argument? And if so, what defines that class?

So, when PW semantics is being used, it is just describing a set of circumstances which may/may not be true (or possible).

I recall a ‘Head 2 Head’ forum discussion a while back on the MOA which ended unresolved. Your definition above actually helps shed some light on why that was the case. The interlocutors reached an impasse when one attempted to introduce a ‘Possible World’ that contained no Maximally Great Being (as defined the same as how you set out). Their argument was essentially “I can imagine such a world, therefore it exists”, while the original proponent of the MOA dismissed that Possible World as impossible, given the definition of God being omnipresent and therefore existing in every possible world.

Your statement about Possible Worlds could be taken to say that one might exist that was not only false, but actually impossible. That appears self-contradictory. But even if simply false (excluding the impossible), then an argument can be constructed from stating “we can conceive of a world in which no maximally great being exists” (perhaps true, perhaps false) and going on to conclude that God doesn’t exist in any possible world using the exact same logic as you have done.

From a bit of research, I’ve come across a few sites which explain how this contradictory position might have come about: the initial problem with the logic is in the initial step of defining God as eternal and therefore necessary. Which begs the question, what justification is there for defining God as eternal in the first place? And to be scrupulously fair, the counter-argument (imagining a possible world with no God) can’t satisfactorily answer with logic alone where the universe came from without a creator.

In summary, the MOA has to rule out impossible worlds, otherwise a “godless world” is allowed, which becomes self-contradictory. And in limiting itself that way, it begs the question “Is an eternal god possible?”, thus committing a logical fallacy.

[Diagoras]

[Replying to Miles in post #4]

Interesting video, Miles - thanks.

I hadn’t spotted the fallacy of equivocation in the original argument, and only watched your video after I’d posted, but it was interesting to see that it results in the MOA essentially stating the conclusion in the argument - which is analogous to begging the question like I pointed out just above.

The fact that two independent criticisms of the MOA converge on the same weakness in it does lend more weight to the position that the MOA is not in fact a strong argument for the existence of God.

[We_Are_VENOM]

Excuse me. A Maximally Great Being? Greatness is not an objective quantifiable thing, but a value judgement.

How you view greatness is irrelevant as to whether or not this subjective "value" judgement is true.

The argument doesn't hinge upon your "view" of greatness, but instead whether or not premises of the argument are true or false.

And to quantify a value judgement amounts to gibberish. It's not coherent because for any being which you can conceive of as maximally great, I can conceive of a being just like yours plus one with the ability to beat yours in arm wrestling. Therefore, my Maximally Great Being being is greater by definition.

Please enlighten me as to how an omnipotent being can lose an arm wrestling match...and if your response is anything like "but my omnipotent being is more omnipotent than yours", then you clearly don't understand what is going on here.

But, of course I am here to educate.

That's why maximal anything doesn't not logically mean anything when the variables in question are unbounded, which is the case with greatness. Therefore, your "Maximally Great Being" turns out to be a meaningless concept. So "for sake of the argument, [don't] call this being a Maximally Great Being (MGB)

Please do not give yourself an unwarranted pat on the back for thinking you've solved the unsolvable, when you did not.

[We_Are_VENOM]

[Replying to benchwarmer in post #12]

See, this so called MGD(dog) or MGC(cat) that you envision....what you are calling this MGD/C, is actually God. You are just giving the MGB a different name. It is God, but under a different name.

And yes, God can manifest himself as a dog or a cat...and thus be a MGD/C.

You've failed to negate the argument, is what I am trying to say.