Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[The Tanager]

I hope you enjoyed your break.

If I'm understanding your confusion correctly, then here's a try at straightening what I meant out. I believe simple subjectivism and subjectivism proper (or objectivism) can be taken as focusing on different parts of the same phrase. Simple subjectivism simply shares what the opinion is without analyzing what kind of reason is given for the opinion being held. Objectivism/Subjectivism Proper addresses what kind of reason Y is.

So, "I feel people should do X because of Y," where Y is "people's opinion" is subjectivism proper because the focus is now on what kind of reason Y is that leads to the opinion one has, Y being a subjective fact of reality. Does that help at all?

Sure, this bit does, but aren't you just affirming my claim that the same statement can be simple subjectivism and objectivism, depending on which bit of the statement you are focusing on?

I'm either saying that when you thought I disagreed before, (1) you were misunderstanding what I was saying (possibly because I was misunderstanding what you were saying/asking) or (2) that I misspoke. If you quote again why you think I was saying something different, then I could try to clarify.

So, above, we have that The Tanager [Person A] judges X [Johnny is right to eat pistachio] is best because of Y [The Tanager judges Johnny eating pistachio is best]. So, Person A judges that X is best because Person A judges that X is best. That's just saying my opinion is my opinion. It's not addressing objectivism/subjectivism proper.

Okay, but that doesn't seem to address my point that judging pistachio is fundamentally the same as judging Johnny's taste re: pistachio, which in turn is fundamentally the same as judging Johnny's child abuse. (In other words, my opinion that "child abuse is wrong" does seem to be like The Tanager's opinion that "chocolate ice cream is the best.")

As simple subjectivism? Yes. They are both statements of what we dislike.
As objectivism/subjectivism proper?

If being an objectivist/subjectivist proper about my personal taste and about Johnny's personal taste is something that is distinct from simple subjectivism, then I'm an objectivist. It is objectively true that the Tanager dislikes pistachio and dislikes child abuse. I dislike pistachio because of an objective fact of reality: my taste buds being a certain, objective way. I'm a subjectivist proper about food choices (being equal on other factors), though. I'm an objectivist about moral choices like child abuse.

Are you ignoring the objectivism vs. subjectivism proper aspect of your view that "child abuse is wrong" or wanting to address it? If the latter, then are you an objectivist/subjectivist proper about child abuse? Why do you think child abuse is wrong? Because of an objective fact (how thinking about it makes Bust Nak feel) or a subjective fact of reality (that people feel differently about it)? It's the first one, right? Okay, then that position is objectivism, not subjectivism proper.

At a glance, this seem to be different from what you typed before, "I think it's weird that you do this and claim to believe morality is a subjective feature of reality." I can believe morality is a subjective feature of reality, without considering "this is wrong because of my emotional response" subjectivism proper.

By "child abuse is wrong" are you:

(1) merely stating how you physically feel about child abuse? Or, in addition to that,

(2) making a moral claim about child abuse, in itself, being good, bad, or neither?

If they are mutually exclusive, then one or both of the following must be false.
a) Judging by one's own emotion is a form of objectivism.
c) Believe that morality is a subjective feature of reality makes one a subjectivist proper.

Which one do you think is false? Or perhaps they are consistent but addressing different issue (or focusing on different part of the same statement?)

I think you think they are addressing different issues, where (a) is the judgment of an action/thought/etc. and (c) is the judgment of a feature of reality. But the context I keep asking the questions in are judgments of the same action/thought/etc.

Then, as I've said, you are an objectivist here. Notice we are talking about Bust Nak's favorite taste, not ice cream taste in general (which we both believe is subjective).

But I am also a subjectivist proper, since I believe that morality is a subjective feature of morality.

The context here is judging the same action/thought/etc., namely, "Bust Nak's favorite taste". You are either an objectivist about that or a subjectivist proper. And there you are an objectivist. Saying "I'm a subjectivist proper about morality" changes the context.

But even when we change to that context, of a moral choice, where child abuse is one example of a moral choice, you show yourself to be an objectivist there because you judge everyone's actions by an objective fact of reality, namely, how the action makes Bust Nak emotionally feel.

My point was all opinions are non-objective. It's not useful to introduce a new category of "objective opinion" for the purpose of distinguishing between objective and non-objective kinds of opinions, when distinguishing between facts and opinions is already a thing.

The opposite of a fact is not an opinion. Something is either a fact or a fiction. That the Earth is spherical is a fact rather than a fiction. One can have the opinion that (1) the shape of the Earth is an objective feature of reality or (2) the shape of the Earth is a subjective feature of reality. That is a useful distinction.

[Bust Nak]

I'm either saying that when you thought I disagreed before, (1) you were misunderstanding what I was saying (possibly because I was misunderstanding what you were saying/asking) or (2) that I misspoke. If you quote again why you think I was saying something different, then I could try to clarify.

What I had in mind was the many instances where you said simple subjectivism doesn't address what objectivism/subjectivism proper addresses. With this latest clarification you said a statement that addresses objectivism/subjectivism proper, can be a simple subjectivism statement if you don't focus on the bit that addresses objectivism/subjectivism proper. It just seem completely redundant as a point, of course a statement doesn't address X, if you don't focus on the bit that addresses X.

As simple subjectivism? Yes. They are both statements of what we dislike.
As objectivism/subjectivism proper?

If being an objectivist/subjectivist proper about my personal taste and about Johnny's personal taste is something that is distinct from simple subjectivism, then I'm an objectivist. It is objectively true that the Tanager dislikes pistachio and dislikes child abuse. I dislike pistachio because of an objective fact of reality: my taste buds being a certain, objective way. I'm a subjectivist proper about food choices (being equal on other factors), though. I'm an objectivist about moral choices like child abuse.

Are you ignoring the objectivism vs. subjectivism proper aspect of your view that "child abuse is wrong" or wanting to address it? If the latter, then are you an objectivist/subjectivist proper about child abuse? Why do you think child abuse is wrong? Because of an objective fact (how thinking about it makes Bust Nak feel) or a subjective fact of reality (that people feel differently about it)? It's the first one, right? Okay, then that position is objectivism, not subjectivism proper.

I treat food, food choices and morality the same way, and would fall under objectivism according to your classification, i.e. the same way you deal with pistachio, I am not ignoring objectivism vs. subjectivism proper aspect, I like/dislike certain food, food choices and morality because of an objective fact of reality: with me (including my taste buds) being a certain, objective way. I also believe that food taste, food choices and morality are subjective feature of reality.

By "child abuse is wrong" are you:

(1) merely stating how you physically feel about child abuse? Or, in addition to that,

(2) making a moral claim about child abuse, in itself, being good, bad, or neither?

My position is "how I physically feel about child abuse" is the exact same thing as "a moral claim about child abuse," completely interchangeable. I am stating how I feel about child abuse, which trivially is also a moral claim about child abuse. I don't really know if that count as (1) or something else. If pushed for an answer, I would say (1). It's not (2) because of the "in itself" clause.

I think you think they are addressing different issues, where (a) is the judgment of an action/thought/etc. and (c) is the judgment of a feature of reality. But the context I keep asking the questions in are judgments of the same action/thought/etc...

The context here is judging the same action/thought/etc., namely, "Bust Nak's favorite taste". You are either an objectivist about that or a subjectivist proper. And there you are an objectivist. Saying "I'm a subjectivist proper about morality" changes the context.

But even when we change to that context, of a moral choice, where child abuse is one example of a moral choice, you show yourself to be an objectivist there because you judge everyone's actions by an objective fact of reality, namely, how the action makes Bust Nak emotionally feel.

Okay, so do you think it's weird that I am an objectivist on one issue re: "Bust Nak's favorite taste" and subjectivist proper on another re: "Bust Nak's taste is one out of many?"

The opposite of a fact is not an opinion. Something is either a fact or a fiction. That the Earth is spherical is a fact rather than a fiction. One can have the opinion that (1) the shape of the Earth is an objective feature of reality or (2) the shape of the Earth is a subjective feature of reality. That is a useful distinction.

But you can make the distinction between (1) and (2) without appealing to to "objective opinion" and "subjective opinion" thus: Both are opinion (there is only one kind - subjective, so it's redundant to point out it is indeed subjective,) the distinction is one matches reality, while the other doesn't.

[The Tanager]

I treat food, food choices and morality the same way, and would fall under objectivism according to your classification, i.e. the same way you deal with pistachio, I am not ignoring objectivism vs. subjectivism proper aspect, I like/dislike certain food, food choices and morality because of an objective fact of reality: with me (including my taste buds) being a certain, objective way. I also believe that food taste, food choices and morality are subjective feature of reality.

I don't think you treat food choices and moral choices the same, though. I think you think you do because of the wording you use (bolded above). That bolded statement is true about everyone in existence. We like what we like because of how we actually are. Perhaps you mean it in a deterministic way, but I think the same can be said of those who believe in free will, without the added deterministic element. If we were objectively different, then we would objectively like different things. That's what I keep calling trivially true.

You are okay with freedom in food choices because you actually are objectively a person who is okay with freedom in food choices. You are not okay with freedom in moral choices because you actually are objectively a person who is not okay with freedom in moral choices. The difference I am talking about, however, is that you are okay with people who make different food choices than your personal food choice would be, while that is not the case with moral choices.

My position is "how I physically feel about child abuse" is the exact same thing as "a moral claim about child abuse," completely interchangeable. I am stating how I feel about child abuse, which trivially is also a moral claim about child abuse. I don't really know if that count as (1) or something else. If pushed for an answer, I would say (1). It's not (2) because of the "in itself" clause.

That you think those are synonymous is why I think you may be only addressing simple subjectivism. There is a difference between stating one's emotional response to something and judging the behavior that elicited that emotional response. Even if one judges all behavior by their own emotional response, there is still a difference there. Just like there is a difference between physical and non-physical beings, even if there are no non-physical beings in existence.

But you can make the distinction between (1) and (2) without appealing to to "objective opinion" and "subjective opinion" thus: Both are opinion (there is only one kind - subjective, so it's redundant to point out it is indeed subjective,) the distinction is one matches reality, while the other doesn't.

Okay, I think we've been equivocating on the term 'opinion'. I've used it as a synonym of 'belief'.

Okay, so do you think it's weird that I am an objectivist on one issue re: "Bust Nak's favorite taste" and subjectivist proper on another re: "Bust Nak's taste is one out of many?"

No, I don't think that is weird. But we've been talking about subjectivism proper in the context of moral judgment. What I think is weird is if you are saying that (1) you believe Bust Nak's taste is one out of many and (2) you think people should conform to Bust Nak's taste in their actions, anyway. That although you believe that your belief that child abuse is bad is an opinion (i.e., not fact), that you think others should conform their actions to your opinion instead of their own.

Which is different than your view on food choices. There, you believe that your belief about pistachio is X is an opinion (i.e., not fact) but you think others should conform their actions to their opinion instead of your own.

[Bust Nak]

You are okay with freedom in food choices because you actually are objectively a person who is okay with freedom in food choices. You are not okay with freedom in moral choices because you actually are objectively a person who is not okay with freedom in moral choices. The difference I am talking about, however, is that you are okay with people who make different food choices than your personal food choice would be, while that is not the case with moral choices.

What is so special about this difference of being okay with people who make different food choices from me, while not okay with people who makes different moral choices from me? I don't see how that's any more significant than I okay with vanilla ice-cream, while that is not the case with bitter gourds. Would you object to the statement "I treat vanilla ice-cream and bitter gourds the same way, because of an objective fact of reality: my taste buds being a certain, objective way," yet I like vanilla ice-cream while hating bitter gourds?

That you think those are synonymous is why I think you may be only addressing simple subjectivism. There is a difference between stating one's emotional response to something and judging the behavior that elicited that emotional response. Even if one judges all behavior by their own emotional response, there is still a difference there. Just like there is a difference between physical and non-physical beings, even if there are no non-physical beings in existence.

I am pretty sure I asked you this before. What is the difference between stating the emotional response of "vanilla ice-cream makes me response positively" and judging ice-cream as tasty? I don't see a difference. If there isn't a difference, then what's the difference between stating one's emotional response to child abuse and judging it as wrong?

Okay, I think we've been equivocating on the term 'opinion'. I've used it as a synonym of 'belief'.

In which case, it's as simple as using the label "factual" for objective beliefs and "opinion" for subjective beliefs.

What I think is weird is if you are saying that (1) you believe Bust Nak's taste is one out of many and (2) you think people should conform to Bust Nak's taste in their actions, anyway. That although you believe that your belief that child abuse is bad is an opinion (i.e., not fact), that you think others should conform their actions to your opinion instead of their own.

Isn't (2) "people should conform to Bust Nak's taste in their actions" just an instance of "Bust Nak's favorite taste?" In other words, My favorite way for people to act, is to refrain from child abuse.

How this this: I am an objectivist on one issue re: "people should conform to Bust Nak's taste in their actions" and subjectivist proper on another re: "Bust Nak's taste is one out of many," any weirder than I am an objectivist on one issue re: "Bust Nak's favorite taste" and subjectivist proper on another re: "Bust Nak's taste is one out of many?"

Which is different than your view on food choices. There, you believe that your belief about pistachio is X is an opinion (i.e., not fact) but you think others should conform their actions to their opinion instead of your own.

See above. re: same difference between vanilla ice-cream and bitter gourds.

[The Tanager]

What is so special about this difference of being okay with people who make different food choices from me, while not okay with people who makes different moral choices from me? I don't see how that's any more significant than I okay with vanilla ice-cream, while that is not the case with bitter gourds. Would you object to the statement "I treat vanilla ice-cream and bitter gourds the same way, because of an objective fact of reality: my taste buds being a certain, objective way," yet I like vanilla ice-cream while hating bitter gourds?

I'm not talking about whether it's a more or less signficant kind of difference than other differences, although I do think it more significant. My objection has been that you aren't doing subjectivism proper. If you aren't claiming, in the above, that this is subjectivism proper, then I wouldn't object to it as I have been your other claim.

I am pretty sure I asked you this before. What is the difference between stating the emotional response of "vanilla ice-cream makes me response positively" and judging ice-cream as tasty? I don't see a difference. If there isn't a difference, then what's the difference between stating one's emotional response to child abuse and judging it as wrong?

Tasty and wrong are different concepts. Even if you think right and wrong are based on tastiness, they are still different concepts. Even if you think right/wrong are imaginary concepts and don't exist while taste does, they are still different concepts.

In which case, it's as simple as using the label "factual" for objective beliefs and "opinion" for subjective beliefs.

That is one way, sure.

What I think is weird is if you are saying that (1) you believe Bust Nak's taste is one out of many and (2) you think people should conform to Bust Nak's taste in their actions, anyway. That although you believe that your belief that child abuse is bad is an opinion (i.e., not fact), that you think others should conform their actions to your opinion instead of their own.

Isn't (2) "people should conform to Bust Nak's taste in their actions" just an instance of "Bust Nak's favorite taste?" In other words, My favorite way for people to act, is to refrain from child abuse.

How this this: I am an objectivist on one issue re: "people should conform to Bust Nak's taste in their actions" and subjectivist proper on another re: "Bust Nak's taste is one out of many," any weirder than I am an objectivist on one issue re: "Bust Nak's favorite taste" and subjectivist proper on another re: "Bust Nak's taste is one out of many?"

Depends on how you mean it. If you are saying that (1) "child abuse...yuk!" is an opinion among other equally as valid opinions on child abuse and (2) people should conform their actions to that opinion rather than other equally as valid opinions, then, no, (2) isn't an instance of (1).

On top of that, I don't get the rationality behind one thinking others should conform themselves to an action that you don't even believe is an objective fact.

[Bust Nak]

I'm not talking about whether it's a more or less signficant kind of difference than other differences, although I do think it more significant. My objection has been that you aren't doing subjectivism proper. If you aren't claiming, in the above, that this is subjectivism proper, then I wouldn't object to it as I have been your other claim.

Come on, does stating "I treat vanilla ice-cream and bitter gourds the same way, because of an objective fact of reality: my taste buds being a certain, objective way" sound like I was claiming subjectivism proper? This is objectivism, as far as your usage goes, which I've adopted for the sake of explaining my position.

I am only doing subjectivism proper on another issue, where I acknowledge Bust Nak's taste is one out of many.

Tasty and wrong are different concepts. Even if you think right and wrong are based on tastiness, they are still different concepts. Even if you think right/wrong are imaginary concepts and don't exist while taste does, they are still different concepts.

They are as different as cars and vehicles are different concepts. A car is an instances of vehicles. Morality is an instance of taste; food taste is another instance, music taste is yet another.

Depends on how you mean it. If you are saying that (1) "child abuse...yuk!" is an opinion among other equally as valid opinions on child abuse and (2) people should conform their actions to that opinion rather than other equally as valid opinions, then, no, (2) isn't an instance of (1).

I am saying neither. Instead I am saying "people should conform their actions to that opinion rather than other opinions." I am also saying this is an instance of "Bust Nak's favorite taste," taste on behavior around children in particular. This does not state that other opinions are equally valid.

On top of that, I don't get the rationality behind one thinking others should conform themselves to an action that you don't even believe is an objective fact.

"Others should conform themselves to this action" is just an longer way of saying "I like this action." Why would I like this action when I don't believe "I like this action" is an objective fact? There is no rationality as such, logically it's simply cannot be anything else: I like it, therefore I like it, regardless of how objective it is or isn't.

[JoeyKnothead]

Subjective morality?

All morality is subjective. That statement is objectively true.

I challenge anyone to present just one example of an 'objective' morality.

Morality is a statement of opinion, not of some undying truth. That's all morality will ever be.

[The Tanager]

I'm not talking about whether it's a more or less signficant kind of difference than other differences, although I do think it more significant. My objection has been that you aren't doing subjectivism proper. If you aren't claiming, in the above, that this is subjectivism proper, then I wouldn't object to it as I have been your other claim.

Come on, does stating "I treat vanilla ice-cream and bitter gourds the same way, because of an objective fact of reality: my taste buds being a certain, objective way" sound like I was claiming subjectivism proper? This is objectivism, as far as your usage goes, which I've adopted for the sake of explaining my position.

I am only doing subjectivism proper on another issue, where I acknowledge Bust Nak's taste is one out of many.

Thus, like my conditional stated, I would not object.

Tasty and wrong are different concepts. Even if you think right and wrong are based on tastiness, they are still different concepts. Even if you think right/wrong are imaginary concepts and don't exist while taste does, they are still different concepts.

They are as different as cars and vehicles are different concepts. A car is an instances of vehicles. Morality is an instance of taste; food taste is another instance, music taste is yet another.

I said 'tasty' and 'wrong' are different concepts. I didn't define 'morality' as different than taste, although I think it is. Still, assuming that you are correct that morality is an instance of taste, why do you treat it differently than all those other tastes? You are okay with everyone indulging in tastes that don't match your own in every kind of taste but moral taste.

I am saying neither. Instead I am saying "people should conform their actions to that opinion rather than other opinions." I am also saying this is an instance of "Bust Nak's favorite taste," taste on behavior around children in particular. This does not state that other opinions are equally valid.

If you are a subjectivist proper than you are stating that other opinions are equally valid. "Opinion is all there is."

"Others should conform themselves to this action" is just an longer way of saying "I like this action."

So, saying I like eating chocolate ice cream is the same thing as saying everyone else should eat chocolate ice cream?

Why would I like this action when I don't believe "I like this action" is an objective fact? There is no rationality as such, logically it's simply cannot be anything else: I like it, therefore I like it, regardless of how objective it is or isn't.

That's not the objective fact I'm talking about. I like people only teaching and learning that the shape of the Earth is objectively spherical because I believe the shape of the Earth is objectively spherical.

Notice the difference there. It's not: Why would I like people only teaching and learning that the shape of the Earth is objectively spherical when I don't believe "I like people only teaching and learning that the shape of the Earth is objectively spherical" is an objective fact.

So, analogically, I would be saying: it would be irrational of me to say I like people only teaching and learning that the shape of the Earth is objectively spherical, even though I believe the shape of the Earth is a subjective feature of reality.

With child abuse, you are saying "I like people to not abuse children even though I believe the rightness/wrongness/value/morality/taste/whatever of child abuse is a subjective feature of reality."

[The Tanager]

Subjective morality?

All morality is subjective. That statement is objectively true.

I challenge anyone to present just one example of an 'objective' morality.

Morality is a statement of opinion, not of some undying truth. That's all morality will ever be.

Sorry, you make a positive claim and it's your duty to back it up, not ask people to prove it wrong.

[Bust Nak]

Why do you treat it differently than all those other tastes? You are okay with everyone indulging in tastes that don't match your own in every kind of taste but moral taste.

In one sense I am treating it the same as all those other tastes. I judge them according my taste. i.e. The same way I treat bitter gourd as I do vanilla ice-cream, I judge them by taste.

In the sense that I am treating them differently, I do so because of an objective fact of reality: my taste being a certain, objective way. Or as I like to put it, there is no accounting for taste, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that's how I roll. i.e. The same reason I treat bitter gourd differently than I do vanilla ice-cream, one is yuck, the other is yum.

If you are a subjectivist proper than you are stating that other opinions are equally valid. "Opinion is all there is."

Opinion being all there is doesn't imply they are equally valid. Validity is measured with a standard, and I made no mention of any standards when I said opinion are all there is to it. Which standard are you referring to here, and more importantly why should I adopt that standard for evaluating validity?

So, saying I like eating chocolate ice cream is the same thing as saying everyone else should eat chocolate ice cream?

No. Instead, saying I like everyone else only eating chocolate ice cream, is the same thing as saying everyone else should eat chocolate ice cream.

Which incidentally, is the same class of statement as I like eating chocolate ice cream.

That's not the objective fact I'm talking about. I like people only teaching and learning that the shape of the Earth is objectively spherical because I believe the shape of the Earth is objectively spherical...

So, analogically, I would be saying: it would be irrational of me to say I like people only teaching and learning that the shape of the Earth is objectively spherical, even though I believe the shape of the Earth is a subjective feature of reality.

Why would that be irrational? If I cannot appeal to an objective fact, then of course I am gonna appeal to subjective preference. On the contrary, it would be irrational to act otherwise. As irrational as choosing to eat bitter gourd over vanilla ice-cream because I believe "ice-cream is tastier than bitter gourd" is a subjective feature of reality. I might be struggling to explain this because this is entirely trivial and intuitive to me.