My Kidney Challenge

[Kylie]

There is a little girl, named Sally. She needs a kidney transplant or she will die. You are the only compatible donor available.

Should you be forced you to give up one of your kidneys to save her life?

Why or why not?

[historia]

I acknowledge the faults in my analogy and was not trying to make an argument with it. Truly just trying to inquire about your thoughts on the matter in this unlikely scenario.

I appreciate that. My interest lies in assessing the merits of the analogy in the OP -- which I take to be, broadly, the topic of the thread -- so you'll excuse me if I don't address every question inquiring about my personal view on tangential topics.

Would you then argue that I should be forced to provide my kidney to Sally or should I not be forced even in this scenario?

My primary critique of the OP analogy is that it doesn't seem to account for moral responsibility. I think it is entirely uncontroversial to say that you bear greater moral responsibility when you knew an adverse condition could reasonably result from your actions.

In your scenario here, the freak event leading to Sally's kidney failure could not have been reasonably expected. And so, while you likely bear greater moral responsibility in that scenario compared to the one in the OP, I don't think it compels us to hold you culpable.

'Forced' here also implies a legal action, rather than just a moral obligation. I'm not sure what scenario, if any, would allow me to say that, as a matter of law, forced organ harvesting is warranted, as that is certainly an unusual -- as in 'cruel and unusual' -- punishment.

[Kylie]

I'm asking you if you think you have a greater moral obligation to stop and seek help for the people in the other car in an accident you caused versus someone uninvolved driving by later?

I personally think that anyone who can help should help in whatever way they can.

Okay, but that doesn't really answer my question.

I'm asking whether you think you have a greater obligation to provide aid than a bystander. Not just whether you should help, but whether you must help because you are morally (if not also legally) required to do so.

At this point I can only surmise that your answer to that question is 'no', you don't think that someone who caused a car accident has any greater moral responsibility to help the victims than someone driving past the scene later. Correct me if I'm wrong.

I can't answer that question because there are too many variables. If the person who caused the crash is currently laying unconscious in their car with broken bones, then I can't exactly expect them to be going to help the other person.

Clearly, there is an important difference between abortion and other medical procedures: abortion uniquely involves two lives, not just one. That gives it this moral dimension that requires a balancing of the rights of the two lives involved based on circumstances -- as is true of other aspects of the law where two people's rights come into conflict. That simply doesn't apply to, say, heart surgery or a broken leg.

But it does apply to a kidney transplant where the recipient is going to die if they don't get one.

Sure, I'm just noting here that your digression about heart surgery and broken legs was not germane.

Only if we consider that a fertilized egg is a person. I do not.

You're undermining your own analogy here, though.

Each element in the kidney analogy should represent something in the abortion scenario, right? I take it that the person with the functioning kidney represents the mother. Likewise, the kidney is the womb. And Sally represents the unborn child, right?

Sally is clearly a person. So, if the unborn child (or "fertilized egg") is not also a person, then the two scenarios are not parallel, and your analogy breaks down.

I personally don't hold that a fertilized egg is a person, but I've created this analogy for those who hold that it is, the "life begins at conception" crowd.

And would you always choose your own child to save, no matter how many other lives would be lost?

I feel like this line of questioning is growing tedious when I've already answered the basic question.

Let me ask you: Do you think you have a greater moral obligation (as well as legal requirement, see above) to help your own child versus a stranger?

So you think it's morally acceptable to let a plane filled with hundreds of children crash, killing everyone on board just so you can save your own child? How many children does it take before you'd save them instead of your own child?

Again, I've answered two questions on this point already, and you have yet to respond to my question once. I'm willing to answer your continuing questions here, but not if you're just going to ignore mine. I'm here to debate, not give an interview.

Do you think you have a greater moral obligation to help your own child versus a stranger?

I would say I have a greater motivation to save my child over that of a stranger, but I don't see how I could justifiably say that my child's life is worth more than the life of someone else's child.

[Wootah]

[Replying to Wootah in post #19

Given that our cells from t = 0 to t = now are working to propagate us over time then whatever we kill at t=0 to t=now is a human. So if killing humans is wrong, then it's wrong at t=0 or t=now.

Haircuts and nail-trimming are murder? I think that blurs the line between human material and human life.

Edit: Maybe I'm misunderstanding you here. You seem to be arguing that ending all cellular life at any point is killing a human. As I cited elsewhere, there are major religious perspectives in disagreement with that.

It's clear that as we become more cells then we can live without some of them until there is a catastrophic failure. I agree with that.

[Clownboat]

I acknowledge the faults in my analogy and was not trying to make an argument with it. Truly just trying to inquire about your thoughts on the matter in this unlikely scenario.

I appreciate that. My interest lies in assessing the merits of the analogy in the OP -- which I take to be, broadly, the topic of the thread -- so you'll excuse me if I don't address every question inquiring about my personal view on tangential topics.

Would you then argue that I should be forced to provide my kidney to Sally or should I not be forced even in this scenario?

My primary critique of the OP analogy is that it doesn't seem to account for moral responsibility. I think it is entirely uncontroversial to say that you bear greater moral responsibility when you knew an adverse condition could reasonably result from your actions.

In your scenario here, the freak event leading to Sally's kidney failure could not have been reasonably expected. And so, while you likely bear greater moral responsibility in that scenario compared to the one in the OP, I don't think it compels us to hold you culpable.

'Forced' here also implies a legal action, rather than just a moral obligation. I'm not sure what scenario, if any, would allow me to say that, as a matter of law, forced organ harvesting is warranted, as that is certainly an unusual -- as in 'cruel and unusual' -- punishment.

Thanks for clarifying. I have no other questions at this time your honor.

[Purple Knight]

[Replying to Purple Knight in post #26]

And that is the biggest fallacy of the pro-murder side. None of us is free-living or able to live in isolation from society. Most people are not as alive, conscious and aware as a baby. A baby constantly tries to grow and learn about where it is and its environment, most people in our society don't do that anymore. Babies are way more human than us.

If that's really true then the people walking around are zombies, or maybe even animals, and treating them as such wouldn't be wrong.

I don't think everyone is like this and more importantly I don't think we can know if a person is like this, but if I do know and it's really true that he's a zombie then his life has no value. If the baby is looking around trying to discover things then it is sentient and its life has value.

But I don't buy basing value on what something will become because then we can kill the baby anyway because it will become a zombie.

[Wootah]

[Replying to Purple Knight in post #35]

Do you often buy people?

[historia]

At this point I can only surmise that your answer to that question is 'no', you don't think that someone who caused a car accident has any greater moral responsibility to help the victims than someone driving past the scene later. Correct me if I'm wrong.

I can't answer that question because there are too many variables.

That's surprising to hear.

If the person who caused the crash is currently laying unconscious in their car with broken bones, then I can't exactly expect them to be going to help the other person.

Sure, that's obvious. My previous comments, the Illinois law we looked at, and your own comments above ("anyone who can help . . .") are all concerned with the more common scenario where you are able to provide aid.

Let's try one more time, then: Do you think that someone who caused a car accident, and is able to help the victims in the other car, has any greater moral responsibility to do so than someone driving past the scene later?

Do you think you have a greater moral obligation to help your own child versus a stranger?

I would say I have a greater motivation to save my child over that of a stranger, but I don't see how I could justifiably say that my child's life is worth more than the life of someone else's child.

Can I take that as a 'yes' to my question then?

The assertion that you have a greater moral obligation to help your own child does not entail the further claim that your child's life is in some absolute sense "worth more" than a stranger's.

Instead, it's just asserting that your relationship to your child enjoins upon you certain duties and obligations that go beyond those you would have toward a stranger. It's an assertion about you, not your child.

[Kylie]

At this point I can only surmise that your answer to that question is 'no', you don't think that someone who caused a car accident has any greater moral responsibility to help the victims than someone driving past the scene later. Correct me if I'm wrong.

I can't answer that question because there are too many variables.

That's surprising to hear.

Glad to surprise you.

If the person who caused the crash is currently laying unconscious in their car with broken bones, then I can't exactly expect them to be going to help the other person.

Sure, that's obvious. My previous comments, the Illinois law we looked at, and your own comments above ("anyone who can help . . .") are all concerned with the more common scenario where you are able to provide aid.

Let's try one more time, then: Do you think that someone who caused a car accident, and is able to help the victims in the other car, has any greater moral responsibility to do so than someone driving past the scene later?

I would personally say they do, but then again, I'd say that we should all have some moral responsibility.

But, of course, the question is whether the person who causes the accident believes they have a greater moral responsibility.

Do you think you have a greater moral obligation to help your own child versus a stranger?

I would say I have a greater motivation to save my child over that of a stranger, but I don't see how I could justifiably say that my child's life is worth more than the life of someone else's child.

Can I take that as a 'yes' to my question then?

No you may not.

Motivation to do something is not the same thing as a moral responsibility to do that thing.

The assertion that you have a greater moral obligation to help your own child does not entail the further claim that your child's life is in some absolute sense "worth more" than a stranger's.

Instead, it's just asserting that your relationship to your child enjoins upon you certain duties and obligations that go beyond those you would have toward a stranger. It's an assertion about you, not your child.

I said motivation, not obligation.