God Must Exist: Infinite Regression is Impossible

[We_Are_VENOM]

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First off, by "universe", I mean all physical reality govern by natural law. This would include universes that we know/don’t know about.

1. If God does not exist, then the universe is past eternal.

Justification: We know that the universe exist, and if there is no transcendent supernatural cause, then either

A. the universe either popped into being, uncaused, out of nothing.
B. OR, it has existed for eternity.

I think we can safely remove posit A from the equation (unless there is someone who thinks it is a plausible explanation).

Let’s focus on posit B.

Based on posit B, we need not provide any naturalistic explanation as to the cause of our universe, considering the fact that the term “universe” applies (as mentioned earlier) to all physical reality, which means that any naturalistic explanation one provides is already accounted for as “eternal”.

And if God does not exist, then physical reality (the universe) is all there is, and thus must be eternal.

2. If the universe is not past eternal, then God exists.

Justification: If the universe (all physical reality) is NOT eternal, then it had a beginning.

Since natural law (mother nature) cannot logically be used to explain the origin of its own domain, then an external, supernatural cause is necessary.

If “nature” had a beginning, one cannot logically use nature to explain the origin of nature, and to do so is fallacious.

So, where nature stops, supernatural begins.

3. The universe is not past eternal.

Justification: If the universe is past eternal, then the causal chain of events (cause and effect) within the universe is infinite. But this is impossible, because infinity cannot be traversed or “reached”.

If the past is eternal, that would mean that there are an infinite amount of “days” which lead to today. But in order for us to have “arrived” to today, an infinite amount of days would have to be traversed (one by one), which is impossible, because infinite cannot be “reached”.

Consider thought analogy..

Sandman analogy: Imagine there is a man who is standing above a bottomless hole. By “bottomless”, of course if one was to fall into the hole, he would fall forever and ever and ever.

Now, imagine the man is surrounded by an infinite amount of sand, which is at his disposal.

Imagine if the man has been shoveling sand into this hole for an infinite amount of time (he never began shoveling, or he never stopped shoveling, he has been shoveling forever).

Imagine if the man’s plan was to shovel sand into the hole until he successfully filled the sand from the bottom, all the way to the top of the hole.

How long will it take him to accomplish this? Will he ever accomplish this task? No. Why? Because the sand is bottomless, so no matter how fast he shoveled, or how long he shoveled, the sand will never reach the top.

So lets put it all together…

The sand falling: Represents time travel, and the trajectory of the sand falling south of the top represents time traveling into the past, which is synonymous with past eternity.

The man shoveling: Represents the “present”, as the man is presently shoveling without halt. This is synonymous with our present causal reality. We are presently in a state of constant change, without halt.

Conclusion: If the sand cannot reach the bottom of the hole (because of no boundary/foundation) and it can’t be filled from the bottom-up to the present (man), then how, if there is no past boundary to precedent days, how could we have possibly reached the present day…if there is/was no beginning foundation (day).

However, lets say a gazillion miles down the hole, there is a foundation…then the hole will be filled in a finite amount of time, and it will be filled from the bottom-up.

But ONLY if there is a foundation.

Likewise, we can only reach today if and ONLY IF there is a beginning point of reference, a foundation in the distant past.

4. Therefore, an Uncaused Cause (UCC) must exist: As explained, infinite regression is impossible, so an uncaused cause is absolutely necessary.

This UCC cannot logically be a product of any precedent cause or conditions, thus, it exists necessarily (supplementing the Modal Ontological Argument).

This UCC cannot logically depend on any external entity for it’s existence (supplementing the Modal Ontological Argument).

This UCC is the foundation for any/everything which began to exist, which included by not limited to all physical reality…but mainly, the universe an everything in it.

This UCC would also have to have free will, which explains why the universe began at X point instead of Y point...and the reason is; it began at that point because that is when the UCC decided it should begin...and only a being with free will can decide to do anything.

This UCC would have to have the power to create from nothing (as there was no preexisting physical matter to create from, before it was created).

So, based on the truth value of the argument, what can we conclude of the UCC?

1. It is a supernatural, metaphysically necessary being
2. A being of whom has existed for eternity and can never cease existing
3. A being with the greatest power imaginable (being able to create from nothing)
4. A being with free will, thus, a being with a mind

This being in question is what theists have traditionally recognized as God. God exists.

In closing, I predict the whole "well, based on your argument, God cannot be infinite".

My response to that for now is; first admit the validity of the presented argument, and THEN we will discuss why the objection raised doesn't apply to God.

[The Tanager]

Seeing that it is externally and internally consistent is the same thing as making sense of it though.

But it’s not externally consistent.

What do you think scientists are talking about then?

I think they are talking about the same kind of expansion I am.

Because it is not how I would analyze the result either. The analyzing bit is, see if there are any elements left in either set, if there are not, then there is a 1 to 1 correspondence. There still isn't anything about continual matching left over elements.

My analysis added to your method didn’t talk about continually matching leftover elements.

What does "make sense" even mean to you?

There is an internally consistent sense, which actual infinite mathematics has, and an externally consistent sense, which actual infinite mathematics don’t have because of the contradictions that result with actual infinity and specific concepts like expansion, subtraction, etc.

How does it make less assumptions?

It does not assume there is a center.

It assumes there is no center instead. That’s not less assumptions, but a different one.

And you don't see that as question begging fallacy? That premise is just "expansion therefore boundary" rewritten.

How do you know ‘cat’ and ‘feline’ are talking about the same object? I offered analysis as to why I thought ‘expansion therefore boundary’ was the case previously (in support of premise 1). You don’t agree with that analysis, but you haven’t even tried to offer an analysis of what an expansion without a change in boundary would look like. You are simply saying to get rid of that implication without offering how that makes sense. You might even think of saying something like: just think of an actual infinity, which doesn’t have a boundary, expanding and there you go (which would be question begging since that is what you are trying to prove is the case).

No, adopting things that make sense in order to make sense of a concept is great reasoning though.

Sure, but those things you are adopting don’t make sense.

No. 2.2) is true regardless of whether one starts at P or not, it says if you can start from P then... One can starts from P whether one does start at there or not.

2.2) Says you can W and T and E, but the cases in which the can becomes do has only been shown to be those in which you start at P or X. So, we get to 4) where you can W and T and E for all x (with the unstated caveat that you must start at P or X to do so). Then you jumped from this to 5) that takes away that caveat.

In trying to justify that move you offered 4.1-4.3. Premise 4.2) is unknown because, for all we know (with your proof) there exists instances where there is an X and you cannot W and T and E, namely, those X’s that a part of a series that has no beginning.

[Bust Nak]

But it’s not externally consistent.

Not consistent with your preconceptions doesn't count as externally inconsistent. The preconceptions in question aren't necessities, drop your preconceptions.

I think they are talking about the same kind of expansion I am.

Why would you think that when they are talking about an expanding universe without a boundary?

My analysis added to your method didn’t talk about continually matching leftover elements.

This is what you said "...but if there are elements left over in both sets, then you’ve got to continue the method." What did you mean by that, if not continually matching leftover elements?

It assumes there is no center instead. That’s not less assumptions, but a different one.

A more parsimonious assumption is less assumptions.

How do you know ‘cat’ and ‘feline’ are talking about the same object? I offered analysis as to why I thought ‘expansion therefore boundary’ was the case previously (in support of premise 1).

I've already pointed out that as an argument, it's a hasty generalization. Examples of expansion appealing to boundary doesn't imply all expansion require boundary.

You don’t agree with that analysis, but you haven’t even tried to offer an analysis of what an expansion without a change in boundary would look like. You are simply saying to get rid of that implication without offering how that makes sense.

Smarter people have done it better than I ever could, you've already heard of Hibert's grand hotel.

Sure, but those things you are adopting don’t make sense.

That's because you are unwilling to discard your preconceptions.

2.2) Says you can W and T and E, but the cases in which the can becomes do has only been shown to be those in which you start at P or X. So, we get to 4) where you can W and T and E for all x (with the unstated caveat that you must start at P or X to do so). Then you jumped from this to 5) that takes away that caveat.

In trying to justify that move you offered 4.1-4.3.

No, the caveat is already gone by step 3, I justified removing it with steps 2.1-2.4. I even labelled it with "note this is where we got rid of the start from P or X." Are you having trouble following the proof?

Premise 4.2) is unknown because, for all we know (with your proof) there exists instances where there is an X and you cannot W and T and E, namely, those X’s that a part of a series that has no beginning.

4.2) is not even a premise, it follows deductively from previous step; we 100% know that there are no instances where there is an X and you cannot W and T and E, given that for all X you can W and T and E. No amount of talking about can becoming do can change the fact that "for all X you can W and T and E" is logically equivalent to "not (exist X where cannot W and T and E)." If the premises are true, and the steps are valid, then the conclusion must follow. You can't deny deductive reasoning just because it doesn't make sense to you; if you don't think 4.2 is true, then you need to find a premise you disagree with, or a step you think is invalid.

[The Tanager]

Not consistent with your preconceptions doesn't count as externally inconsistent. The preconceptions in question aren't necessities, drop your preconceptions.

That is the question we are debating. I’ve offered analysis that at least makes sense (i.e., that expansion with a boundary is accepted as something that exists by both of us). You aren’t even attempting an analysis of what an expansion without a boundary being something that makes sense.

Why would you think that when they are talking about an expanding universe without a boundary?

I think they are simply assuming infinite mathematics makes sense in reality (either on their own or just accepting it on authority). Since they are convinced the universe is expanding, that would mean that an actual infinity must be able to expand. All the while, their initial assumption remains ungrounded.

This is what you said "...but if there are elements left over in both sets, then you’ve got to continue the method." What did you mean by that, if not continually matching leftover elements?

That if there are leftovers in both sets, then you’ve got to keep applying your method until there isn’t a leftover in at least one set. If there aren’t leftovers, then there is no need to worry about them.

A more parsimonious assumption is less assumptions.

How is “no center” versus “a center” a more parsimonious assumption rather than just a different assumption?

Smarter people have done it better than I ever could, you've already heard of Hibert's grand hotel.

You can quote sections of their explanation if you are unable to summarize them. From what I’ve read, Hilbert didn’t think actual infinities had anything to do with the real world. He supposedly wrote: “The infinity is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought – a remarkable harmony between being and thought. (Hilbert, “Uber das Unendliche” in Mathematische Annalen 95, p. 190).

No, the caveat is already gone by step 3, I justified removing it with steps 2.1-2.4. I even labelled it with "note this is where we got rid of the start from P or X." Are you having trouble following the proof?

Those didn’t get rid of starting from P. All you did is phrase W in a way that doesn’t mention the P. Let’s follow the proof:

2.1 states that if there is a P, then you can start at P and end at X. We aren’t rid of P.

2.2 states that if you can start at P, go through X, and end at E, then you can get to E without starting at X. But we aren’t actually rid of if you start at P here. This says nothing of what happens if you don’t start at P.

You are simply getting the language of ‘P’ out of the premises and then equivocate (knowingly or not) on what W means later. So that in premise 3, you haven’t gotten rid of actually starting from P, you've only gotten rid of writing that if one starts at P, then you can get to E without starting at X. Starting at P is still there to make W work. You want W in 3 (and 4.2) to mean without starting at P or X, but it just refers to not starting at X.

2.3 and 2.4 were ways to support the if-clause of 2.2 being true.

[Bust Nak]

That is the question we are debating. I’ve offered analysis that at least makes sense (i.e., that expansion with a boundary is accepted as something that exists by both of us). You aren’t even attempting an analysis of what an expansion without a boundary being something that makes sense.

You have to tell me what doesn't make sense for me to explain. So far all your objections can be summed up as it doesn't fit in with your preconceptions.

I think they are simply assuming infinite mathematics makes sense in reality (either on their own or just accepting it on authority). Since they are convinced the universe is expanding, that would mean that an actual infinity must be able to expand. All the while, their initial assumption remains ungrounded.

Okay, which is more likely: 1) they have the same concepts as you, but are uncritical of their own beliefs, are unaware that there is a contradiction, or 2) they don't have the same concept as you, theirs is compatible with an expanding infinity?

That if there are leftovers in both sets, then you’ve got to keep applying your method until there isn’t a leftover in at least one set. If there aren’t leftovers, then there is no need to worry about them.

Well, then it is not my method, mine doesn't match any more element after the first, whether you want to include the analysis of the results as part of the method itself or as something separate that happens after applying the method. Leading back to my original point, my method is valid for some sets but invalid for others, supporting my claim that validity cannot be isolated from the sets under examination.

How is “no center” versus “a center” a more parsimonious assumption rather than just a different assumption?

The same way "no god" versus "a god" is a more parsimonious assumption (granted theists don't see the latter as an assumption at all) rather than just a different assumption. Or as Occam put it "entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity."

You can quote sections of their explanation if you are unable to summarize them.

"Consider a hypothetical hotel with a countably infinite number of rooms, all of which are occupied... Suppose a new guest arrives and wishes to be accommodated in the hotel. We can (simultaneously) move the guest currently in room 1 to room 2, the guest currently in room 2 to room 3, and so on, moving every guest from their current room n to room n+1. After this, room 1 is empty and the new guest can be moved into that room." You just without appealing to any boundary, made room for an extra guest, that is become or make larger or more extensive, AKA expanding.

From what I’ve read, Hilbert didn’t think actual infinities had anything to do with the real world...

And even he didn't think expanding his hotel require there to be a boundary.

Those didn’t get rid of starting from P. All you did is phrase W in a way that doesn’t mention the P.

That's just semantics. A statement that doesn't mention P when prior statement did, has gotten rid of P.

Let’s follow the proof:

2.1 states that if there is a P, then you can start at P and end at X. We aren’t rid of P.

2.2 states that if you can start at P, go through X, and end at E, then you can get to E without starting at X. But we aren’t actually rid of if you start at P here. This says nothing of what happens if you don’t start at P.

I don't need it to say what happens if you not starting at P, I just need the premise to be true. This objection has been addressed already, that's the "or not" part when I told you 2.2 "is true regardless of whether one starts at P or not... One can starts from P whether one does start at there or not." 2.2 is still true, despite it saying nothing of what happens if you don't start at P. True premises with valid logic must result in true conclusions. Here you are attacking neither the truth of the premises nor the validity of the steps.

You are simply getting the language of ‘P’ out of the premises and then equivocate (knowingly or not) on what W means later.

W means exactly this: "without starting at X (no mention of P. It’s not equivalent 'without starting at all.') Nothing more, nothing less. I have not use W in any sense other than this. You simply want W to mean "without starting at X (but starting from P)" that's not equivocation on my part.

So that in premise 3, you haven’t gotten rid of actually starting from P, you've only gotten rid of writing that if one starts at P, then you can get to E without starting at X.

That's how logic works. I got rid of writing down "if one starts at P," then further steps no longer need to worry about P, I can indeed get to E without starting at X. This is a recurring sticking point, you are rejecting a deductive proof without pointing out which premise you reject, or which step is invalid; instead you appeal to some reasoning outside these two factors about how the conclusion doesn't follow. That's illogical.

[The Tanager]

You have to tell me what doesn't make sense for me to explain. So far all your objections can be summed up as it doesn't fit in with your preconceptions.

Expansion without a boundary doesn’t make sense to me. Explain how that works. If it’s just a misguided preconception that a boundary is needed, then you should be able to explain expansion without a boundary in a way that shows it makes sense.

Okay, which is more likely: 1) they have the same concepts as you, but are uncritical of their own beliefs, are unaware that there is a contradiction, or 2) they don't have the same concept as you, theirs is compatible with an expanding infinity?

I don’t care which is more likely, if (2) is correct, then explain the concept they mean.

Well, then it is not my method, mine doesn't match any more element after the first, whether you want to include the analysis of the results as part of the method itself or as something separate that happens after applying the method. Leading back to my original point, my method is valid for some sets but invalid for others, supporting my claim that validity cannot be isolated from the sets under examination.

You’ve said nothing new, my critiques of your method’s validity remain. You aren’t convinced by the critiques; we’ve both had our say unless you have something new.

The same way "no god" versus "a god" is a more parsimonious assumption (granted theists don't see the latter as an assumption at all) rather than just a different assumption. Or as Occam put it "entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity."

How is atheism more parsimonious than theism?

"Consider a hypothetical hotel with a countably infinite number of rooms, all of which are occupied... Suppose a new guest arrives and wishes to be accommodated in the hotel. We can (simultaneously) move the guest currently in room 1 to room 2, the guest currently in room 2 to room 3, and so on, moving every guest from their current room n to room n+1. After this, room 1 is empty and the new guest can be moved into that room." You just without appealing to any boundary, made room for an extra guest, that is become or make larger or more extensive, AKA expanding.

Without talking about the boundary isn’t the same as saying there wasn’t a boundary crossed.

That's just semantics. A statement that doesn't mention P when prior statement did, has gotten rid of P.

You’ve linguistically gotten rid of mentioning P, but you haven’t gotten rid of the need for starting at P.

This is a recurring sticking point, you are rejecting a deductive proof without pointing out which premise you reject, or which step is invalid; instead you appeal to some reasoning outside these two factors about how the conclusion doesn't follow. That's illogical.

No, I’ve pointed out the premises I disagree with. I’ll try to say the same thing in a slightly different way. Do you think premise 3 applies to every circumstance ‘x’ finds itself in? If so, why? Not that it applies for all X, but that it applies for all X in all circumstances?

[Bust Nak]

Expansion without a boundary doesn’t make sense to me. Explain how that works.

Think back on your wall analogy. If the wall is infinite in length, i.e. there is no boundary. Now imagine a single brick of the wall doubling in length. The wall is now longer, expanded, but since there was never a boundary in the first place, no boundary was crossed.

I don’t care which is more likely, if (2) is correct, then explain the concept they mean.

You think 1 is true but don't care if it is more or less likely than 2?

You’ve said nothing new, my critiques of your method’s validity remain.

You did not critique my method, you critiqued one of your own creation, a strawman fallacy. Perhaps more to the point, the validity of a method is exactly the point, I deliberately offered a method that is invalid to support my claim that the validity depends on the sets being applied on. You are helping my case by pointing out how it is invalid, you are missing the entire point of this part of the conversation if all you are doing is critiquing its validity.

How is atheism more parsimonious than theism?

Because it does not invoke this unnecessary entity: god.

Without talking about the boundary isn’t the same as saying there wasn’t a boundary crossed.

Okay. Consider a hypothetical hotel without boundary as to the number of rooms, all of which are occupied. Suppose a new guest arrives and wishes to be accommodated in the hotel. We can move the guest currently in room n to room n+1. Each guest moved into a pre-existing room that was already there before the move. After this, room 1 is empty and the new guest can be moved into that room. You've just without crossing any boundary, made room for an extra guest, that is become or make larger or more extensive, AKA expanding.

You’ve linguistically gotten rid of mentioning P, but you haven’t gotten rid of the need for starting at P.

Why do you think it's linguistically instead of logically gotten rid of mentioning P? It's not a linguistic trick, if the premises are true and the steps valid, the conclusion follows necessarily.

No, I’ve pointed out the premises I disagree with.

By "disagree" I meant point out a premise you don't think is true. You said premise 2.2) does not say what you want it to say, that's not the same thing as 2.2) is not true. Do you question the truth of 2.2) without outright saying it's false? Going that one extra step, do you think 2.2) is false?

I’ll try to say the same thing in a slightly different way. Do you think premise 3 applies to every circumstance ‘x’ finds itself in?

Yes. Note that it's not a premise. The premises are 1, 2, 2.1, 2.2 and 4.1, they are clearly labelled.

If so, why?

Because it can be deductively proven.

Not that it applies for all X, but that it applies for all X in all circumstances?

What's the difference? Given the premise all cats are animal, is there a circumstance a cat can finds itself in, where it is not an animal? At a glance, "applies to all cats" seems to be logically equivalent to "applies for all cats in all circumstances."

[The Tanager]

Think back on your wall analogy. If the wall is infinite in length, i.e. there is no boundary. Now imagine a single brick of the wall doubling in length.

A single brick has a boundary, so that doubling in length makes sense.

The wall is now longer, expanded, but since there was never a boundary in the first place, no boundary was crossed.

Assuming it makes sense to be a size with no boundary, but I’m not asking you to explain what it is like if we assume it makes sense; I’m asking you to show how such a thing makes sense.

ou think 1 is true but don't care if it is more or less likely than 2?

I don’t think there is a way to properly judge which is more likely and which is more likely doesn’t matter; which one is true is what matters even if it is less likely in some probabilistic sense. If they have a different concept then me, then explain the concept.

You did not critique my method, you critiqued one of your own creation, a strawman fallacy. Perhaps more to the point, the validity of a method is exactly the point, I deliberately offered a method that is invalid to support my claim that the validity depends on the sets being applied on. You are helping my case by pointing out how it is invalid, you are missing the entire point of this part of the conversation if all you are doing is critiquing its validity.

I critiqued your method. You separated out method and analysis. My critique remained the same under your new terms (something that is a recurring theme in this conversation). I shared my critique that your method doesn’t support your claim that the validity depends on the sets being applied on. There is nothing new here, content-wise with that.

Because it does not invoke this unnecessary entity: god.

It invokes a different cause, though, not less causes.

Okay. Consider a hypothetical hotel without boundary as to the number of rooms, all of which are occupied. Suppose a new guest arrives and wishes to be accommodated in the hotel. We can move the guest currently in room n to room n+1. Each guest moved into a pre-existing room that was already there before the move. After this, room 1 is empty and the new guest can be moved into that room. You've just without crossing any boundary, made room for an extra guest, that is become or make larger or more extensive, AKA expanding.

If all the rooms are occupied, then how can each guest move in a pre-existing room that was already there before the move without two people having to double up? Another example of actual infinity just not making sense.

What's the difference? Given the premise all cats are animal, is there a circumstance a cat can finds itself in, where it is not an animal? At a glance, "applies to all cats" seems to be logically equivalent to "applies for all cats in all circumstances."

I think there is a difference, but this clarifies what you mean by “for all x,” which is what is important.

1) For all x in all circumstances: You can start counting from X and end at last Sunday…I agree.

2) For all x in all circumstances: there are prior members before X…I don’t agree because in this situation {X, Y, Z} there is no prior member, but this premise is easy to fix and not the problem I see.

2.1) For all x in all circumstances: If there are prior members, then you can start from any prior member and end at X…I agree.

2.2) For all x in all circumstances: If you start from any prior member and end at X and then start counting from X and end at last Sunday, then you can, without starting at X, count through X and end at last Sunday…I agree.

Note what this claims. It claims that all of those circumstances where you start from a prior member. It’s about all x in all of those kinds of circumstances. It’s not about X in a circumstance where you don’t start at a prior member or where you don’t start at X.

3) For all x in all circumstances: You can, without starting at X, count through X and end at last Sunday (from 2.2 and 2.4)…I disagree. In 2.2 you are only talking about the circumstances where you start from any prior member. That doesn’t cover all circumstances. Premise 3 doesn’t follow from 2.2 and 2.4 because 2.2 limited the circumstances that apply to those where you start from P.

[Bust Nak]

A single brick has a boundary, so that doubling in length makes sense.

Same thing with the universe, space between two points has a boundary, so that doubling in length makes sense, right?

Assuming it makes sense to be a size with no boundary, but I’m not asking you to explain what it is like if we assume it makes sense; I’m asking you to show how such a thing makes sense.

Why do you need to assume it though? I just explain what it is like and that's it. Examine what it is like and then see if it make sense.

I don’t think there is a way to properly judge which is more likely and which is more likely doesn’t matter; which one is true is what matters even if it is less likely in some probabilistic sense. If they have a different concept then me, then explain the concept.

It's the one that is in the dictionary.

I critiqued your method. You separated out method and analysis. My critique remained the same under your new terms (something that is a recurring theme in this conversation).

No you didn't. Your version of the analysis repeated, mine doesn't. This isn't just semantic of whether the method includes the analysis or not. The content-wise you have attacked a strawman.

It invokes a different cause, though, not less causes.

It is less because it is not unnecessary.

If all the rooms are occupied, then how can each guest move in a pre-existing room that was already there before the move without two people having to double up?

I just told you how. Each guest just uses the pre-existing room next door.

I think there is a difference, but this clarifies what you mean by “for all x,” which is what is important.

1) For all x in all circumstances: You can start counting from X and end at last Sunday…I agree.

2) For all x in all circumstances: there are prior members before X…I don’t agree because in this situation {X, Y, Z} there is no prior member, but this premise is easy to fix and not the problem I see.

2.1) For all x in all circumstances: If there are prior members, then you can start from any prior member and end at X…I agree.

2.2) For all x in all circumstances: If you start from any prior member and end at X and then start counting from X and end at last Sunday, then you can, without starting at X, count through X and end at last Sunday…I agree.

Note what this claims. It claims that all of those circumstances where you start from a prior member. It’s about all x in all of those kinds of circumstances. It’s not about X in a circumstance where you don’t start at a prior member or where you don’t start at X.

Look carefully at the "then" clause, do you see a "where you start from any prior member" qualifier? The "if" clause has it, the "then" clause don't. As stated it says something different to what you think it is saying. Look at it again, then get back to me if you agree with it or not.

[The Tanager]

Same thing with the universe, space between two points has a boundary, so that doubling in length makes sense, right?

Yes. But this doesn’t tell us anything, one way or the other, about whether something without a boundary doubling in length makes sense. It’s not analogical.

Why do you need to assume it though? I just explain what it is like and that's it. Examine what it is like and then see if it make sense.

Yes, in examining it, it doesn’t make sense. If you think otherwise, explain how it makes sense instead of just assuming it must.

It's the one that is in the dictionary.

No it’s not. It’s the dictionary without possibly necessary implications. I’m not even asking you yet to prove those implications aren’t necessary, but to explain, assuming they aren’t necessary, what you are even talking about. You have not even tried.

No you didn't. Your version of the analysis repeated, mine doesn't. This isn't just semantic of whether the method includes the analysis or not. The content-wise you have attacked a strawman.

You think so, I don’t. I’ve nothing new to respond to here.

It is less because it is not unnecessary.

Go more in depth to show what you are saying, so we can analyze it. What effect are you talking about explaining, where atheism is a simpler explanation than theism?

If all the rooms are occupied, then how can each guest move in a pre-existing room that was already there before the move without two people having to double up?

I just told you how. Each guest just uses the pre-existing room next door.

No, you didn’t. You didn’t say anything about people not having to double up. Prior, all rooms are full. Afterwards, there is the same amount of rooms, no room previously empty was filled (because none were empty), but then we do have an empty room that is filled by the new guest with one guest per room being maintained. Explain how this makes sense.

Look carefully at the "then" clause, do you see a "where you start from any prior member" qualifier? The "if" clause has it, the "then" clause don't. As stated it says something different to what you think it is saying. Look at it again, then get back to me if you agree with it or not.

Okay, if the “for all x” is meant to apply separately to the if-clause and the then-clause, then I disagree with premise 2.2. That premise would then be saying that given one particular kind of circumstance X is found in (those were we start at P), we can make a statement about all kinds of circumstances X is found in (those that start at P and those that don't start at P or X). Why think that is true?

[Bust Nak]

Yes. But this doesn’t tell us anything, one way or the other, about whether something without a boundary doubling in length makes sense. It’s not analogical.

You said if the bricks in a wall is longer, the whole wall is longer. Well, here one brick here is longer, so the whole wall is longer. Should make sense to you given what you said.

Yes, in examining it, it doesn’t make sense. If you think otherwise, explain how it makes sense instead of just assuming it must.

I am not assuming it though. I've examined it and it made perfect sense. It makes sense because it's consistent with everything I know.

No it’s not. It’s the dictionary without possibly necessary implications.

That is the dictionary version.

I’m not even asking you yet to prove those implications aren’t necessary, but to explain, assuming they aren’t necessary, what you are even talking about. You have not even tried.

Why doesn't the hotel example count as trying? Why doesn't the wall analogy count as trying?

You think so, I don’t. I’ve nothing new to respond to here.

This isn't a matter of opinion. I explicitly said not to match any element after the first. Your version factually does not match mine.

Go more in depth to show what you are saying, so we can analyze it. What effect are you talking about explaining, where atheism is a simpler explanation than theism?

Theism appeals to at least one unnecessary deity. Atheism does not. The Big Bang as a cause (presumably that's what you were referring to as a different cause) is present in both atheism and theism. One is larger than zero. It doesn't get simpler than that.

No, you didn’t. You didn’t say anything about people not having to double up. Prior, all rooms are full. Afterwards, there is the same amount of rooms, no room previously empty was filled (because none were empty), but then we do have an empty room that is filled by the new guest with one guest per room being maintained. Explain how this makes sense.

By moving each guest to the room next door, that's how it makes sense. What is so difficult about a room that was filled becoming available when the guest there moves next door?

Okay, if the “for all x” is meant to apply separately to the if-clause and the then-clause, then I disagree with premise 2.2. That premise would then be saying that given one particular kind of circumstance X is found in (those were we start at P), we can make a statement about all kinds of circumstances X is found in (those that start at P and those that don't start at P or X). Why think that is true?

Because it is trivially, you can indeed "for all x" without starting at x, reaching last Sunday, given the premise that there is a prior member to x. Think back to your analogy with my child buying a car with my money.