There is evidence for God according to Atheist Philosopher

[AquinasForGod]

Question for debate: Do atheist just missunderstand what evidence means?

Alex O'Connor (Cosmic Skeptic) and atheist philosopher says there is evidence for God. He explains why in the first part of this discussion.



He is not the only one, though. Also, Joseph Schmid explains that there is evidence for God, even though he is agnostic.

Alex explains that evidence doesn't have to fully convince you in order to serve as evidence. Something serves as evidence even if it only moves you by 1% toward belief in God.

If you say, there is no "true" evidence for God then that is the no true Scotsman fallacy. Or if you say anything like that. No true evidence, not actual evidence, not real evidence, etc.

It is either evidence or it is not.

He says, an argument could be successful in the sense that it makes the conclusion more probably true than false.

He says, but another way an argument can be successful is if it makes a conclusion more probably true than sans the argument.

This means that if prior to the argument you thought the probability for God was 1%, then after say the fine-tuning argument, you raise that probability to 2%, then the argument was successful.

[JoeyKnothead]

It seems there is a true interpretation of the data, but science cannot show us that truth. Science clearly cannot show us what all propositions are true.

Whereas theists can't show the god they're so proud of even exists.

[historia]

So, it's not the same thing.

. . .

My argument is not that God and Dark Matter or the Multiverse are "the same." I'm saying they are analogous. Objecting to the analogy because the two things are not "the same" is just telling me you don't understand how analogies work.

Ok, clearly we seem to be talking past each other.

I'm also talking in analogies. Nowhere have I suggested that I think Dark Matter is God i.e. 'the same'.

No, I understand that. What I'm trying to head off here is this tendency some folks have to object to an analogy simply because there are differences between the two things being compared.

I took your comment above that they are "not the same thing" to mean there are differences between the two. But, since an analogy is, by definition, a comparison of two otherwise unlike things based on resemblance of a particular aspect, simply pointing out that there are differences is not enough to show the analogy is false.

I already answered the special pleading charge in post #27

viewtopic.php?p=1101575#p1101575

If you want to posit an unknown entity as a hypothesis and call this unknown entity "God", I'm fine with that. However, we all know most theists have a particular god in mind and are not just describing some yet to be determined thing.

But that doesn't directly address the point I'm objecting to. The point, again, was your assertion -- as I understood it -- that it is in some sense illegitimate for theologians to posit attributes for God without having directly observed God. That's different from simply proposing God as a hypothesis or explanation, as you stated here.

Maybe we should stop and clarify this before proceeding further, as perhaps I've misunderstood you. Do you think it is illegitimate for theologians to posit attributes for God even though they haven't directly observed God, and, if so, why?

[historia]

I suggest that where benchwarmer and I are at odds with your position is in the manner of theologists not constraining themselves in the same way.

Let's focus on this a bit more closely. What, exactly, do you (and perhaps also benchwarmer) mean by "the same way"?

. . .

I meant the 'constraint' comment to reflect the practice of some theologians of ascribing 'God' as the solution wherever they find something beautiful, surprising, complex, etc.

You'll find memes on the internet mocking a 'proof of God' based on a single flag flapping despite other flags around it remaining still.

I fear we have two very different groups of people in mind here.

By 'theologian', I don't mean just any rando on the Internet arguing for God's existence. I'm talking about scholars with doctoral degrees in theology or philosophy who have published academic works on some aspect of theology.

We can certainly find bad theological arguments on the Internet, as your flag example here suggests. We can also find bad scientific arguments on the Internet -- see the recent uptick in anti-vax arguments. But we shouldn't judge entire academic disciplines, like theology or biology, based on bad arguments we stumble across online.

The post from benchwarmer that details how a more scientific 'prayer experiment' might work says much the same thing: we don't see apologists ever attempt to falsify their hypothesis.

Consider the kalam cosmological argument: it rests on a number of philosophical arguments and cosmological theories that, if they turn out to not be true, would essentially falsify the kalam argument.

There are, in fact, scholars who have written extensively on the kalam, arguing that it doesn't succeed for a variety of philosophical or scientific reasons, basically looking to falsify it. We tend to call those people 'philosophers' instead of 'theologians', but they are engaged in the same area of study.

Now, I will happily grant that philosophy and theology rarely entail conducting experiments. History also doesn't engage in experiments. That just means different disciplines use different methods. It doesn't entail the further conclusion my analogy does not work.

Again, my argument from analogy here is that, if we accept that scientists and historians can posit attributes for things that they cannot directly observe (e.g., black holes or people who lived in the past) then we should not object to philosophers or theologians positing attributes for God, which also cannot be directly observed.

[TRANSPONDER]

I suggest that where benchwarmer and I are at odds with your position is in the manner of theologists not constraining themselves in the same way.

Let's focus on this a bit more closely. What, exactly, do you (and perhaps also benchwarmer) mean by "the same way"?

. . .

I meant the 'constraint' comment to reflect the practice of some theologians of ascribing 'God' as the solution wherever they find something beautiful, surprising, complex, etc.

You'll find memes on the internet mocking a 'proof of God' based on a single flag flapping despite other flags around it remaining still.

I fear we have two very different groups of people in mind here.

By 'theologian', I don't mean just any rando on the Internet arguing for God's existence. I'm talking about scholars with doctoral degrees in theology or philosophy who have published academic works on some aspect of theology.

We can certainly find bad theological arguments on the Internet, as your flag example here suggests. We can also find bad scientific arguments on the Internet -- see the recent uptick in anti-vax arguments. But we shouldn't judge entire academic disciplines, like theology or biology, based on bad arguments we stumble across online.

The post from benchwarmer that details how a more scientific 'prayer experiment' might work says much the same thing: we don't see apologists ever attempt to falsify their hypothesis.

Consider the kalam cosmological argument: it rests on a number of philosophical arguments and cosmological theories that, if they turn out to not be true, would essentially falsify the kalam argument.

There are, in fact, scholars who have written extensively on the kalam, arguing that it doesn't succeed for a variety of philosophical or scientific reasons, basically looking to falsify it. We tend to call those people 'philosophers' instead of 'theologians', but they are engaged in the same area of study.

Now, I will happily grant that philosophy and theology rarely entail conducting experiments. History also doesn't engage in experiments. That just means different disciplines use different methods. It doesn't entail the further conclusion my analogy does not work.

Again, my argument from analogy here is that, if we accept that scientists and historians can posit attributes for things that they cannot directly observe (e.g., black holes or people who lived in the past) then we should not object to philosophers or theologians positing attributes for God, which also cannot be directly observed.

Yet again, I see the constant underlying fallacy that invalidates so many Theist arguments. Your last line is effectively the well-worn "My (theist) theory is as valid as yours." No, because the natural world with explained process that do not require a god is the default theory and a creative Intelligence which has not been demonstrated (Kalam and the other gaps for God - that is what it is where it is relevant at all) is not an equally valid hypothesis (it is not even that as there is merely an act of magic at most) but one that has not been disproved.

Undisprovables are not evidence for a god. Gaps for God are not evidence for a god. The unexplained is not evidence for a god. 'We don't know' (yet) is the valid, honest and correct position and a creative intelligence is not. It exists only because of - as i say - an underlying invalidating bias in an a priori faith-claim starting - point, not because they have it, but because they rely on it in constructing argument and (as i saw just now in the reading too much into a cosmological paper) misrepresenting evidence.

Never mind the hints as denied bias on the part of the atheist theologians posing as Philosophers - there is a timber -beam in the eyes of the Theist apologists posing as philosophers.

[benchwarmer]

What I'm trying to head off here is this tendency some folks have to object to an analogy simply because there are differences between the two things being compared.

I took your comment above that they are "not the same thing" to mean there are differences between the two. But, since an analogy is, by definition, a comparison of two otherwise unlike things based on resemblance of a particular aspect, simply pointing out that there are differences is not enough to show the analogy is false.

I think maybe the issue is that we are assuming the analogy is based on different things.

My assumption is that the analogy is based on the process being the same. i.e. X observes Y. X can't observe the cause, so proposes Z. X assigns some attributes to Z based on the observable effects. X is open to dismissing Z if counter evidence is produced, etc.

It sounds like your analogy is based on the positing of attributes. Sure, anyone can posit anything like like about anything. That has little utility though unless this positing is based on something right?

My original rebuttal was perhaps not clear enough. My issue is that theologians are likely positing attributes to a god based simply on wishful thinking/hope/faith/etc. Example: Something like "God is outside of space and time". I would answer: "Based on what did you arrive at that? What observation can we make that this would be an answer for?".

Maybe you could supply a concrete example. I gave a possible example using prayer. Perhaps you have something that has actually been done.

Maybe we should stop and clarify this before proceeding further, as perhaps I've misunderstood you. Do you think it is illegitimate for theologians to posit attributes for God even though they haven't directly observed God, and, if so, why?

See above.

Is it legitimate for me to propose attributes to invisible unicorns? That probably sound flip or perhaps insulting, but it's not meant to be. To me, a 'god' is no different than an invisible unicorn. In fact, unicorns are animals with single horns and we actually have an example of those alive and available for study: rhinos. However, if I start positing attributes for invisible unicorns that seems kind of useless doesn't it?

[historia]

Again, my argument from analogy here is that, if we accept that scientists and historians can posit attributes for things that they cannot directly observe (e.g., black holes or people who lived in the past) then we should not object to philosophers or theologians positing attributes for God, which also cannot be directly observed.

Yet again, I see the constant underlying fallacy that invalidates so many Theist arguments. Your last line is effectively the well-worn "My (theist) theory is as valid as yours."

This is simply a straw man argument.

My objection above has nothing to do with whether any of theses hypotheses or explanations are true or not. Rather, I'm pointing out that it is special pleading to object to one discipline's methodology while allowing for other disciplines to engage in that same methodology.

If benchwarmer's complaint had been directed at, say, the Multiverse or the conclusions of historians, instead of God, I'd be making the exact same arguments. Would you?

[historia]

What I'm trying to head off here is this tendency some folks have to object to an analogy simply because there are differences between the two things being compared.

I took your comment above that they are "not the same thing" to mean there are differences between the two. But, since an analogy is, by definition, a comparison of two otherwise unlike things based on resemblance of a particular aspect, simply pointing out that there are differences is not enough to show the analogy is false.

I think maybe the issue is that we are assuming the analogy is based on different things.

I think we actually roughly agree what the analogy is based on. A note before we continue, though:

My assumption is that the analogy is based on the process being the same.

You had bolded 'process' in your original statement, but I want to focus on your assertion that they must be "the same."

In an analogy the two things being compared have to have a "resemblance of a particular aspect." They don't have to be identical, i.e., "the same," with regard to that aspect.

With that in mind:

My issue is that theologians are likely positing attributes to a god based simply on wishful thinking/hope/faith/etc. Example: Something like "God is outside of space and time". I would answer: "Based on what did you arrive at that? What observation can we make that this would be an answer for?".

Maybe you could supply a concrete example.

Sure, again, consider the kalam cosmological argument:

Proponents of kalam make numerous observations concerning various cosmological evidence and philosophical considerations, which leads them to the conclusion that the universe likely has a cause for its beginning. We can't directly observe the cause. But, since the universe includes both space and time, the cause of the space-time universe (i.e., God, in their framing) must be in some sense "outside of space and time." In the event that cosmologists prove that the universe has no beginning, or philosophers provide defeaters for the philosophical considerations underlying the kalam argument, then proponents of kalam would have to abandon the argument.

Now, I'm not asking you to accept the conclusions of the kalam argument. I'm simply noting that the process here, especially in terms of inferring properties for something we cannot directly observe from indirect evidence, is analogous to that of science or history.

[TRANSPONDER]

Again, my argument from analogy here is that, if we accept that scientists and historians can posit attributes for things that they cannot directly observe (e.g., black holes or people who lived in the past) then we should not object to philosophers or theologians positing attributes for God, which also cannot be directly observed.

Yet again, I see the constant underlying fallacy that invalidates so many Theist arguments. Your last line is effectively the well-worn "My (theist) theory is as valid as yours."

This is simply a straw man argument.

My objection above has nothing to do with whether any of theses hypotheses or explanations are true or not. Rather, I'm pointing out that it is special pleading to object to one discipline's methodology while allowing for other disciplines to engage in that same methodology.

If benchwarmer's complaint had been directed at, say, the Multiverse or the conclusions of historians, instead of God, I'd be making the exact same arguments. Would you?

I don't think so, as I thought I'd pointed out. If like was being compared with like, then yes, but they are not. Let me explain or repeat: the hypotheses are both unproven, therefore neither has evidential weight. However multiverses are based on science, physics and mathematics, which have a good track record, so that as a hypothesis it already has more credibility than a god that does magic. Moreover, I believe that multiverses have been worked out mathematically from string theory which is also hypothetical. So nothing is proven, but, like relativity and the Hiiggs -Boson, they have science backing whereas the goddunnit theory has none.

And evidential validity for the god - claim is just what all these Kalam and ID arguments are supposed to be. Bottom line - the gap for god argument (unknowns and unexplaineds) are legitimate gaps to speculate about, but not all hypotheses or speculations have equal weight. That's where the materialist default (the record of science) comes in, and the failure of the ID -claims makes the god - hypothesis a far less persuasive choice of theory.

Quite apart from'which god', ID arguments are gaps for god, but not evidence for god, not even 1% towards a cumulative plausibility - theory. Sorry.

A p.s just to make it clear. Now, I know the topic is about philosophy rather than science, but philosophy itself cannot prove any of its' argument, and needs science to do that. Iit is not the logical responsibility of atheism or skepticism to validate and prove an explanation for this or that unexplained problem that excludes a god, but the burden of proof falls on the Theist to validate never mind prove the god - hypothesis. A natural -physics eventual explanation has the whole weight of science and physics behind it. Theism has nothing validated that I can think of.

[TRANSPONDER]

[Replying to historia in post #77]

And just to comment on this, I do accept the relative validity of Kalam (without a god in there). The Universe (or cosmos that it was produced from) having a 'cause' does seem the more intuitively persuasive suggestion than an eternal cosmos of stuff without origin or infinite regression. It is where it is used to validate a god (which it is and the god -apologists are being dishonest and deceptive if they protest it isn't) that it fails, because the causse could be physics as much as a god, and any hypothesis the theists make for a cosmic intellect can be matched by natural physics.

It is of course a neat trick to play the pair of aces: 'Anything physics would have to do,can be ascribed to a god" and any problem,scientific or logical by waving the magic wand 'God can do anything' and thinking that is evidence for a god. In fact it is a lazy placeholder -- claim as were disease, floods or lightning. "God is doing it". it is deceptive as well as sloppy to make the fact that a god can be popped in a gap for god some attribute of God as much as the daft ontological argument that whatever we can think of beyond the space and time we know, has to be God, and evidence for a god.

[historia]

Again, my argument from analogy here is that, if we accept that scientists and historians can posit attributes for things that they cannot directly observe (e.g., black holes or people who lived in the past) then we should not object to philosophers or theologians positing attributes for God, which also cannot be directly observed.

Yet again, I see the constant underlying fallacy that invalidates so many Theist arguments. Your last line is effectively the well-worn "My (theist) theory is as valid as yours."

This is simply a straw man argument.

My objection above has nothing to do with whether any of theses hypotheses or explanations are true or not.

. . .

If like was being compared with like, then yes, but they are not.

. . .

multiverses are based on science, physics and mathematics, which have a good track record, so that as a hypothesis it already has more credibility than a god that does magic.

. . .

Bottom line - the gap for god argument (unknowns and unexplaineds) are legitimate gaps to speculate about, but not all hypotheses or speculations have equal weight.

You're still committing the same straw man argument. Notice what my conclusion is above, and notice what your objections are below.

My argument was not: if we accept that scientists and historians can posit attributes for things that they cannot directly observe, then that means the conclusions of theologians are true or persuasive or credible or of equal weight, or whatever else you want to say here.

Rather, the conclusion is that we cannot then object to philosophers or theologians positing attributes for God. We're discussing an issue of methodology or process here, as benchwarmer correctly understood above. If you want to actually address the point I'm making, instead of yet another straw man, then I'd be happy to hear your response.