Freewill

[Wootah]

Is free will demonstrated in eating the cake or not eating the cake?

Eating the cake seems to demonstrate action and so demonstrate free will but not eating the cake demonstrates free will more so because you are overcoming something you want to do.

Always doing what you want demonstrates less freewill than not doing what you want. IMO...

[Mithrae]

There are only two ways actions take place; completely at random, or caused.

Seems to me we can conceptualize at least five models under which events might occur:
A- Complete randomness (a coin toss is just as likely to land on its edge, or turn into a chicken, or destroy the planet)
B- Deterministic (any outcome that occurs was always a certainty)
C- Probability distribution (some outcomes are more likely, but not certain)
D- Choice/'free will' (outcomes are chosen by a thinking agent)
E- Erratic (some outcomes are determined, some may be probabilistic, some may be random, some may be chosen)

A and B are the absolutist options; the ones which would require the most exacting conditions to be true, and therefore arguably the most unlikely.

To expand on that a little now that I've got some more time, I think of this in terms of constraints on an outcome: Complete randomness is a scenario in which there are no constraints whatsoever, no laws of nature, no inherent properties or tendencies of objects, whereas determinism is a scenario in which absolutely everything is completely constrained. They're the far and opposite extreme ends of the constraint spectrum. In between are the other three conceptual models. We may not know exactly what the constraints are, how they come about or when they apply, but they're scenarios in which outcomes either generally or in specific cases are only partially constrained.

'Completely random' seems to be by far the least likely accurate description of our reality. In a completely random world, even on a single coin flip the odds of getting heads or tails would be roughly 2 in infinity, the odds of a normal outcome on a die roll would be around 6 in infinity, the odds of satisfying hunger by eating would be similarly low... and there's been an essentially infinite number of occasions on which we've seen these expected 'normal' outcomes. So the odds of a single random universe being as we observe it would be in the order of one in infinity squared. We could be in a sort of million monkeys scenario of course: If there were an infinite number of random universes the odds of one being as we see it would be in the order of one in infinity, and if each of those universes were essentially infinite compared to the reliable observations of a civilization within it there'd be a decent chance for at least one such set of observations to seem completely non-random - perhaps a good chance if we introduced anthropic reasoning (such observations would be contingent on beings from a seemingly non-random portion of the infinite-infinite reality, since they couldn't exist if their planet were being regularly exploded or turned into cheese). But without knowing there to be an infinite-infinite reality, it seems highly unlikely that 'completely random' is a suitable way of thinking about it.

Complete determinism seems like just as much of a fringe/extreme scenario as complete randomness. If you've got two non-identical things, for example two hydrogen atoms separated from each other by their individual histories in time and space, just think about what a vast and extreme claim it is to say that those non-identical things will always behave and interact identically as each other, with all other objects, at all times and in all places! That if atom A was in the same situation as atom B, it would certainly do exactly the same things. How could anyone possibly know that? One might say that the things which distinguish the two atoms as non-identical are somehow not relevant to their behaviour, but how could anyone possibly know that? And then to make this claim not only about two hydrogen atoms, but about trillions upon trillions of hydrogen atoms, and almost as many helium atoms, and almost as many again of various heavier elements, and about photons and neutrinos and dark matter and so on and on...

The one thing (and to be fair it is a pretty big thing) that determinism has going for it is that our observations - at least our reliable scientific observations - seem to be fairly consistent with it. But as an argument some problems with that seem to be: A) The selection bias that science properly concerns itself only with the consistent phenomena subject to experimentation or repeatable observation, hence arguably limiting or excluding reliable scientific confirmation of non-deterministic phenomena by default; B) The incomplete and descriptive nature of scientific theories in the sense that proven exceptions to a prior 'rule' are not taken as proof of non-determinism, but become incorporated into a new rule, such that we can't really say that the current or any future set of rules will actually match reality; C) The fact that there have been many 'unreliable' and non-scientific reports of observation contrary to a deterministic model, with our personal sense of having free will being an important example; and D) The above-mentioned million-monkeys-with-anthropic-biases possibility, that we observe our section of reality to be kind of/mostly deterministic within the descriptive framework of our scientific methodology mainly because those sorts of conditions are more amenable to the development of beings capable of making those kinds of observations.

[Miles]

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Miles's response:

There are only two ways actions take place; completely at random, or caused.

Seems to me we can conceptualize at least five models under which events might occur:
A- Complete randomness (a coin toss is just as likely to land on its edge, or turn into a chicken, or destroy the planet) [Whaaaat? In any case it isn't just as likely to land on its edge. The likelihood of such an outcome is close to zero. AND, any such a landing would still be determined by the physical factors that bore on the toss]
B- Deterministic (any outcome that occurs was always a certainty) [Yup]
C- Probability distribution (some outcomes are more likely, but not certain) [Is this really why actions occur? Of course not.]
D- Choice/'free will' (outcomes are chosen by a thinking agent) [There is no such a thing as choosing. It's an illusion.]
E- Erratic (some outcomes are determined, some may be probabilistic, some may be random, some may be chosen) [And I say that aside from the possibility of quantum mechanical randomness, all outcomes are determined]

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[Miles]

There are only two ways actions take place; completely at random, or caused.

Seems to me we can conceptualize at least five models under which events might occur:
A- Complete randomness (a coin toss is just as likely to land on its edge, or turn into a chicken, or destroy the planet)
B- Deterministic (any outcome that occurs was always a certainty)
C- Probability distribution (some outcomes are more likely, but not certain)
D- Choice/'free will' (outcomes are chosen by a thinking agent)
E- Erratic (some outcomes are determined, some may be probabilistic, some may be random, some may be chosen)

A and B are the absolutist options; the ones which would require the most exacting conditions to be true, and therefore arguably the most unlikely.

To expand on that a little now that I've got some more time, I think of this in terms of constraints on an outcome: Complete randomness is a scenario in which there are no constraints whatsoever, no laws of nature, no inherent properties or tendencies of objects, whereas determinism is a scenario in which absolutely everything is completely constrained. They're the far and opposite extreme ends of the constraint spectrum. In between are the other three conceptual models. We may not know exactly what the constraints are, how they come about or when they apply, but they're scenarios in which outcomes either generally or in specific cases are only partially constrained.

An odd approach to be sure, but okay.

'Completely random' seems to be by far the least likely accurate description of our reality. In a completely random world, even on a single coin flip the odds of getting heads or tails would be roughly 2 in infinity, the odds of a normal outcome on a die roll would be around 6 in infinity, the odds of satisfying hunger by eating would be similarly low... and there's been an essentially infinite number of occasions on which we've seen these expected 'normal' outcomes. So the odds of a single random universe being as we observe it would be in the order of one in infinity squared. We could be in a sort of million monkeys scenario of course: If there were an infinite number of random universes the odds of one being as we see it would be in the order of one in infinity, and if each of those universes were essentially infinite compared to the reliable observations of a civilization within it there'd be a decent chance for at least one such set of observations to seem completely non-random - perhaps a good chance if we introduced anthropic reasoning (such observations would be contingent on beings from a seemingly non-random portion of the infinite-infinite reality, since they couldn't exist if their planet were being regularly exploded or turned into cheese). But without knowing there to be an infinite-infinite reality, it seems highly unlikely that 'completely random' is a suitable way of thinking about it.

A little wool gathering a it were.

Complete determinism seems like just as much of a fringe/extreme scenario as complete randomness. If you've got two non-identical things, for example two hydrogen atoms separated from each other by their individual histories in time and space, just think about what a vast and extreme claim it is to say that those non-identical things will always behave and interact identically as each other, with all other objects, at all times and in all places!

And that's why no one says such things.

That if atom A was in the same situation as atom B, it would certainly do exactly the same things.

Why? Do you think all atoms are exactly alike. That at any particular moment their neutrons and protons are in the same exact relative position to each other, and that the configuration of their electron clouds are always exactly alike? They're not. Now any dissimilarity may not effect how they behave, but so what? If their behavior is not absolutely random then it has to be deterministic. Do atoms behave utterly at random?

The one thing (and to be fair it is a pretty big thing) that determinism has going for it is that our observations - at least our reliable scientific observations - seem to be fairly consistent with it. But as an argument some problems with that seem to be: A) The selection bias that science properly concerns itself only with the consistent phenomena subject to experimentation or repeatable observation, hence arguably limiting or excluding reliable scientific confirmation of non-deterministic phenomena by default; B) The incomplete and descriptive nature of scientific theories in the sense that proven exceptions to a prior 'rule' are not taken as proof of non-determinism, but become incorporated into a new rule, such that we can't really say that the current or any future set of rules will actually match reality; C) The fact that there have been many 'unreliable' and non-scientific reports of observation contrary to a deterministic model, with our personal sense of having free will being an important example; and D) The above-mentioned million-monkeys-with-anthropic-biases possibility, that we observe our section of reality to be kind of/mostly deterministic within the descriptive framework of our scientific methodology mainly because those sorts of conditions are more amenable to the development of beings capable of making those kinds of observations.

All of which is why science has little concern with deterministic issues---science has better things to do with its time, and readily accepts that all actions within their scope of study to be deterministic. The fact is, determinism and free will fall pretty much within the purview of philosophy.

"Determinism is a philosophical view, where all events are determined completely by previously existing causes. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations."
-Wikipedia-

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[Wootah]

[Replying to Miles in post #8]

Will The capacity to act decisively on one's desires.

Free will "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate."

I don't see the difference. I think that will and free will are essentially the same and tautologous. Can you give me an example to understand the difference?

I don't think 'I went to work cause I have a job that pays me' is the same as 'the billiard ball was caused to bounce as it did because of determinism'.

I can see the deterministic problem to free will - did you present anything different to that?

Actually and here is a scary thought, what if the reasoning as to why we did something (I did x because of y) is post facto (after the fact). We try to rationalise our irrationality.

[Miles]

[Replying to Miles in post #8]

Will The capacity to act decisively on one's desires.

Free will "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate."

I don't see the difference. I think that will and free will are essentially the same and tautologous. Can you give me an example to understand the difference?

One's will, the capacity to act decisively on one's desires, is said to be driven by two very different mechanisms. One, is that it is directed by the ability to freely act as it wishes. A person could have desired to act differently at time X if it had wanted to. Two, is that the will has no freedom to act any differently than it did because its desires are controlled by the necessary consequence of the antecedent states leading up to it.

I don't think 'I went to work cause I have a job that pays me' is the same as 'the billiard ball was caused to bounce as it did because of determinism'.

I can see the deterministic problem to free will - did you present anything different to that?

Not different, but at times I've said quite a bit. See HERE if you care.

Also, here is an entertaining 10 minute video on Determinism vs Free Will


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Actually and here is a scary thought, what if the reasoning as to why we did something (I did x because of y) is post facto (after the fact). We try to rationalise our irrationality.

From what I've seen, it happens all the time.

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[Wootah]

Well just to try to flesh this out ....

Assumptions
All deterministic systems always follow and have to follow a causal chain to completion/rest/energy runs out.
All deterministic systems always perform the same given the same conditions SLC


OK so when humans eat, Since there is enough energy to eat and energy is nearby to eat the fact that sometimes we don't eat indicates determinism is false.

Basically, I have never seen a fire not burn the wood it can reach. I have seen people not eat food within reach.

Either there is a causal step we don't understand that if we did understand we would see why they were determined not to eat at that point OR there is no causal step hence free will.

But the belief 'determinism did it' is falling to the faulty thinking called God of the gaps. God of the gaps thinking is when we don't know why something happens, we claim God did it, and so we maintain our belief in God.

We don't know why determinism failed, we still assert determinism and we maintain our belief in determinism.

So either we dogmatically assert determinism or we accept room for free will until we can find the deterministic reason for something?

And in this case, we have visible evidence of people not eating all the time, violating an obvious causal chain.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_of_the_gaps

edit: I posted this on that youtube video as a comment. Will see if anyone responds.

[Miles]

Well just to try to flesh this out ....

All deterministic systems always follow and have to follow a causal chain to completion/rest/energy runs out.
All deterministic systems always perform the same given the same conditions SLC

Not at all sure what you mean by "systems" here.

OK so when humans eat, Since there is enough energy to eat and energy is nearby to eat the fact that sometimes we don't eat indicates determinism is false.
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And in this case, we have visible evidence of people not eating all the time, violating an obvious causal chain.

So, why don't you eat? Just as a reminder; not doing X is just as deterministically grounded as is doing X. "I didn't do X because" is just as much a result of determinism as "I did do X because." If there is no "because"--- there truly is no reason---then the event would have been utterly random in nature: Eating all the time and Not eating all the time were equally likely to have happened.


Just to note: Don't confuse a chain of cause ---> effects that eventually doesn't turn into a cause of something else with having failed in some way. Perhaps the refreshing taste and the limited aftereffect of the mouthwash I drank is all that will come from the chain of events that led up to drinking it. Not all chains of cause ---> effect necessarily run on forever.


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[Wootah]

Well just to try to flesh this out ....

All deterministic systems always follow and have to follow a causal chain to completion/rest/energy runs out.
All deterministic systems always perform the same given the same conditions SLC

Not at all sure what you mean by "systems" here.

OK so when humans eat, Since there is enough energy to eat and energy is nearby to eat the fact that sometimes we don't eat indicates determinism is false.
.
.
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And in this case, we have visible evidence of people not eating all the time, violating an obvious causal chain.

So, why don't you eat? Just as a reminder; not doing X is just as deterministically grounded as is doing X. "I didn't do X because" is just as much a result of determinism as "I did do X because." If there is no "because"--- there truly is no reason---then the event would have been utterly random in nature: Eating all the time and Not eating all the time were equally likely to have happened.


Just to note: Don't confuse a chain of cause ---> effects that eventually doesn't turn into a cause of something else with having failed in some way. Perhaps the refreshing taste and the limited aftereffect of the mouthwash I drank is all that will come from the chain of events that led up to drinking it. Not all chains of cause ---> effect necessarily run on forever.


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I think my use of 'systems' can be understood as you saying 'a chain of cause ---> effects'.
I don't think they run forever but I do think they run until they run out of energy. Friction slows the billiard ball, there is no more wood for a fire to burn, etc.


My point is that the flame, the chemical reaction, goes to completion. It can't not go to completion. The visible everyday act of not eating is a mystery to determinism because it violates the rules of determinism.

You are saying no it is not a mystery, the part that is a mystery is we don't know what caused you to not eat. But I am saying that at that point you are committing the god of the gaps fallacy. There is a gap in determinism, we assume determinism and that is the fallacy.

So I think you could argue I have the fallacy backwards. God of the gaps is the claim that a cause is God. You are saying there is an unknown cause that caused the person to not eat. Not that God is the cause.

But what I am trying to get at it is that if you are making the call of determinism on an unknown answer you are doing the same thing, plugging a gap with an answer.

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ohhh ... actually can determinism explain not causation at all?

Given the assumptions I have given of determinism I don't see how determinism explains something not happening in a causal chain at all.

Could it be said that if we find a causal chain that has one example of not doing the same thing that determinism is false?

Assumptions
All deterministic systems always follow and have to follow a causal chain to completion/rest/energy runs out.
All deterministic systems always perform the same given the same conditions SLC

[Mithrae]

Complete determinism seems like just as much of a fringe/extreme scenario as complete randomness. If you've got two non-identical things, for example two hydrogen atoms separated from each other by their individual histories in time and space, just think about what a vast and extreme claim it is to say that those non-identical things will always behave and interact identically as each other, with all other objects, at all times and in all places!

And that's why no one says such things.

They might not have thought it through enough to actually say it, but that's the necessary consequence of determinism: That when all relevant prior conditions are the same, the outcomes will necessarily be the same also.

That if atom A was in the same situation as atom B, it would certainly do exactly the same things.

Why? Do you think all atoms are exactly alike. That at any particular moment their neutrons and protons are in the same exact relative position to each other, and that the configuration of their electron clouds are always exactly alike? They're not. Now any dissimilarity may not effect how they behave, but so what?

It seems like you're trying to have your cake and eat it too, both suggesting that purported quantum indeterminacy is not relevant to discussion of macroscopic outcomes (per your earlier post, that it "has no effect on superatomic events"), and now that it somehow is relevant (apparently because you don't like the necessary consequences of adopting determinism as outlined above).

If their behavior is not absolutely random then it has to be deterministic. Do atoms behave utterly at random?

That's a false dichotomy as I'd already showed above, in that we can readily conceive at least three other alternatives to absolute randomness and absolute determinism; probability distribution, choice and erratic behaviour. And given that your two options lie on the extreme ends of the spectrum of how constrained outcomes may be - either 100% constrained to a single outcome or no constraints whatsoever - it would seem that intuitively at least we'd expect an answer somewhere in between them, somewhere in the vast range of conceptual possibilities between absolute 0 and 100, to be far more likely.

For example the observations which can be interpreted as quantum indeterminacy obviously are not completely random. If they were completely random, completely unconstrained, a photon fired through two slits in a wall would be just as likely to turn into a chicken as to contribute to an interference pattern; in fact given the infinite possible outcomes if there were no constraints at all, the odds of getting an interference pattern would be roughly 1 in infinity! Instead, from what little I know on the subject quantum indeterminacy is at most probabilistic, such that while we can't predict the quantum state of a single photon we can reliably and consistently predict the aggregate behaviour of many photons.

Human behaviour in terms of its outcomes likewise appears to be best described or quantified as probabilistic: We can never be sure what a single human will do, but with large enough sample sizes we can often predict general trends of aggregate behaviour. In terms of its causal process, our behaviour often feels qualitatively to be a matter of choice or free will, not deterministic. And that's not a point to be casually tossed aside as irrelevant, since this is the only causal process which we directly experience without mediation by our senses and interpretive cognition. We never actually see randomness, we never actually see determinism, we never actually see laws of physics or objects' inherent properties... all of these are things which we infer based on patterns of behaviour. But there is one causal process which we directly experience, and that is our own choice.

We repeatedly see that arguments against free will rely heavily if not exclusively on the assumption of determinism, including your posts and the excellent Crash Course video you posted: But that is an incredibly dubious assumption in its own right - a claim which is unprovable, essentially unfalsifiable and very extreme in both its scope and in the conditions required for it to be true - and seemingly contradicted by empirical evidence on numerous fronts, in purported quantum indeterminacy, in our own experience of choice and (not least) in reported non-scientific observations contrary to the expected 'natural order' such as miracles.

[Miles]

Miles wrote: ↑Tue Mar 21, 2023 4:29 pm
If their behavior is not absolutely random then it has to be deterministic. Do atoms behave utterly at random?

That's a false dichotomy as I'd already showed above, in that we can readily conceive at least three other alternatives to absolute randomness and absolute determinism; probability distribution, choice and erratic behaviour..

I think my use of 'systems' can be understood as you saying 'a chain of cause ---> effects'.
I don't think they run forever but I do think they run until they run out of energy. Friction slows the billiard ball, there is no more wood for a fire to burn, etc.


My point is that the flame, the chemical reaction, goes to completion. It can't not go to completion. The visible everyday act of not eating is a mystery to determinism because it violates the rules of determinism.

Sorry people, but I don't believe I have the time it would take to bring you up to speed on determinism. Perhaps re-watching the video in post 15 will help.


Have a good day, and good luck.

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