Can Atheism ground objective morality?

[The Tanager]

In my exploration and discussions, I have not seen an atheistic worldview be able to logically account for morality being objective. The closest I've seen is an atheistic platonic kind of moral system, but while that seems to be able to account for the existence of 'good' and 'evil', it still doesn't seem to account for why humans would be obligated to choose Good over Evil. I'd love to hear cases from those who think atheism can account for objective morality to make sure I haven't missed (or misunderstood) thoughts in my exploration.

[bluegreenearth]

In my exploration and discussions, I have not seen an atheistic worldview be able to logically account for morality being objective. The closest I've seen is an atheistic platonic kind of moral system, but while that seems to be able to account for the existence of 'good' and 'evil', it still doesn't seem to account for why humans would be obligated to choose Good over Evil. I'd love to hear cases from those who think atheism can account for objective morality to make sure I haven't missed (or misunderstood) thoughts in my exploration.

Are you defining "objective" to mean something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind?
Are you defining "morality" to mean a set of behavioral standards that consistently distinguishes conduct valued as "good" from conduct valued as "evil?"

[Bradskii]

...if you are not allowed to cheat...you are not willing to be intelectually honest...

Hey, back the damn truck up, please. You can cut out comments such as the ones above. I'm quite willing to have a polite discussion with you, but I really don't like my integrity being questioned.

And note the term 'with you'. Do I have to repeat myself yet again? I'm not the slightest bit interested in arguing with whatever app you have on your laptop. Either make an argument yourself or deal with someone who doesn't mind discussing things with AI.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Bradskii in post #69]

If someone asks for a view on a moral problem then we give our position on it. It cannot therefore, in that case, be an objective position. It is, by definition, a relative position. If it's claimed that a moral problem has an objective answer, that a moral answer to it can be objectively true, then it cannot rely on what we think. It has to be separate from our feelings on the matter. There has to be a rule or a law that determines the answer.

If someone asks for a view on an evolutionary problem (say, some particular line of descent) or a cosmological problem (say, whether the Big Bang emerged from a pre-existing state or not), then we can also give our position on it. That doesn’t mean that we are saying it is a subjective feature of reality; we are offering those positions as objective features of reality.

I think you are conflating two senses of subjective/relative here. Objective positions also involve us giving our position on the matter. This isn’t reality relying on what we think, but us making a statement about how we think our thinking relies on reality.

And as a Christian might say 'If there is a law, then there must be a law giver'. If I don't believe that such a law giver exists then the opposite is true: there cannot be a law that determines the answer.

Hence, there is no objective morality. Therefore an atheistic 'worldview' is not consistent with morality being objective.

Okay, thank you for bearing with me in my phrasing to get your thoughts on the initial question I was asking. Yes, this is my conclusion as well.

I'm not saying that because we don't know the answer to a moral problem then an objective answer doesn't exist. My point was that if there was an objective answer and we couldn't know what it is, then saying it exists is worthless. It carries no weight. It affects nothing.

My point was just that it could still carry weight on the specific question of “is X objective or subjective?” which is what we were talking about considering morality, not on further questions like “Well, what should we actually do in this situation?”

And in passing, morality isn't necessarily black and white or fixed in some way as would be the answer to a maths problem. Morality is often on a continuum. Keeping a girl in her room for the evening is OK. Keeping her there for most of the day...well not so OK. Keeping her there for a couple of days? Well, it starts to verge on the immoral. There is not point at which you can say, this is objectively acceptable and a minute later it is not.

I still don’t get this. You seem to be treating two moral questions as one. Either there are separate moral questions of “should she be kept in her room as punishment?” and “how long should she be kept in her room for punishment?” or you are asking one question “is it moral for her to be kept in her room for a couple of days?” which is a separate moral question than “is it moral for her to be kept in her room for the evening”. Either way, we can’t conflate them into one moral continuum as though they are the same moral question. And different answers to different moral questions doesn’t point to there being no objectivity for each of those questions.

I'm having a lot of trouble with the fact that you can't differentiate between choosing to sexually assault someone rather than tucking them up in bed and choosing vanilla over chocolate.

I’m not saying they aren’t different kinds of preferences. Choosing vanilla over chocolate is also a different kind of perspective from what vehicle I’d like to drive and my perspective on what the best movie is, etc. I’m asking why treat your moral preferences in a different way from those other preferences? It can’t be just because of the label one arbitrarily uses to distinguish them.

Morality comes down to whether harm is being done or not. If no harm is done, be it physical, mental, psychological, spiritual etc then morality doesn't come into the picture. If harm is done, then the morality of the act needs to be considered.

This looks like exchanging the label and punting the question back another level. We are now just talking about preferences concerning what harms to allow or not allow, instead of using the synonym of “moral”.

Isn't it better to decide ourselves rather than someone else deciding for us? Of course it is. So when Joe assaults his daughter I make a choice. I decide that it's wrong. And it it's in my power, I'll try to prevent him doing it.

There isn't a person on the planet who disagrees with objective morality who says 'Hey, it's all relative, so there's not difference in raping a girl and having a choc top. Who am I to say which is right and which is wrong'. Why that position is presented as an argument against relative morality is utterly beyond me.

I’m presenting as an argument because it seems to be logically going against the very definitions being discussed. The supposed subjectivist seems to me to be logically incoherent. On ice cream preferences, we all agree that this is subjective precisely because there is no one right or wrong flavor to prefer, just different but equally valid preferences; that’s what makes it a subjective feature of reality. You can’t be a subjectivist and say there is a right and wrong, you can only say they are different from each other. But when moral preferences are being talked about, that definition isn’t holding.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to bluegreenearth in post #71]

Are you defining "objective" to mean something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind?

No. If God exists, then the objective shape of the earth is still contingent on a mind and objective. It needs to be something more like “...such that its properties are independent of the observer’s opinions.”

Are you defining "morality" to mean a set of behavioral standards that consistently distinguishes conduct valued as "good" from conduct valued as "evil?"

I think I’m using it this way, yes.

[bluegreenearth]

[Replying to bluegreenearth in post #71]

Are you defining "objective" to mean something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind?

No. If God exists, then the objective shape of the earth is still contingent on a mind and objective. It needs to be something more like “...such that its properties are independent of the observer’s opinions.”

So, if I've understood correctly, you are using a proprietary definition of "objective" that was purposefully and conveniently designed to accommodate an exemption specifically for the mind of your god?

Are you sure this is the definition of "objective" you want to use?