To what extent can the immaterial affect the material?

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To what extent can the immaterial affect the material?

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Post by QED »

In the topic titled When God knows a soul goes to hell..
Harvey1 wrote: Newtonian mechanics is an approximation to quantum mechanics. It's possible that the uncertainty principle can be more generalized with some yet undiscovered theory, however the uncertainty principle is a theorem in the theory of operators, a derivation of the Cramer-Rao inequality, derivation of the Fourier transform on general locally compact groups, formulation for Fourier integral operators on manifolds, along with other deep mathematical concepts. So, I would argue that the uncertainty principle points to some kind of platonic structure that has deep mathematical significance. Given its importance in explaining the virtual particles, Casimir effect, Hawking radiation, etc., I think we have good reason to believe that the immaterial affects the material.
I think this is a really tricky issue. For example, love can be considered to be immaterial and it can evidently affect material things through the actions of those in love. But then I'd argue that love is a signal riding on a material medium (the neural nets within our brains). I have often stated that wherever we look we find software to be supervenient on hardware. I am unaware of any evidence for pure Information that exists without a supporting material structure anywhere in the cosmos.

The question I wish to put here is how are we to know for sure that a platonic view is justified when all we might be doing is to default to this assumption simply because we lack a complete understanding of some phenomenon or other that we are studying. It seems to me that while Physics lacks a Grand Unification Theory we do not know if the laws we are observing represent restrictions of degrees of freedom imposed by some as yet undiscovered, underlying, material framework. The analogy that I like to use is the tracing-out of the image of a penny coin beneath a sheet of paper by rubbing over it with a pencil. If we never saw behind the paper, the impression might seem to comes to us from nowhere.

This topic covers the related issue of prescriptive vs descriptive laws and can serve to host debates that frequently go off-topic in other threads.

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Post #91

Post by harvey1 »

QED wrote:you tend to paint me as some arch reductionist... I would say that things only appear to be more than the sum of their parts... it is simply the tireless and comprehensive efforts of nature doing that which we cannot even begin to conceive of calculating.
I'm not sure why the latter statement here doesn't make you an arch reductionist.

In any case, if you go that route, then you again are faced with mental inefficacy, but you need mental efficacy in order to establish mental properties as a selective advantage. Without this selective advantage there's little reason to believe that there are approximately true beliefs for the reasons that I specified. This amounts to a post modernist absurdity, so there's something wrong with your strict reductionism versus scientific realism.

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Post #92

Post by Bugmaster »

Ok, I'm back from vacation. Behold my new and improved wrath ! I'll respond on this thread in a bit.

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Post #93

Post by Bugmaster »

Ok, this thread seems to be stuck on evolution for some reason; I don't think this issue is particularly relevant, but I'll try to un-stick it anyway.

As I see it, harvey1 is asking two separate questions:

1). Under a purely materialistic worldview, how could "truth-seeking" behavior develop ?

2). How do we know that our truth-seeking behavior does, indeed, seek the truth ?

The answer to #1 is, natural selection. The ability to rapidly model and predict the real world -- assuming, of course, that the real world actually exists -- is a tremendous evolutionary advantage. The ability to quickly disseminate this knowledge to one's peers, and children, within a single generation, is also a tremendous advantage. Even a weak form of abstract thought -- such as the ability to predict where a mouse will dodge to, before actually pouncing on the mouse -- would already be very advantageous to a species who had it (in this case, the cat).
It stands to reason that organisms with such an advantage would be selected for during the evolutionary process.

Note that, for the purposes of answering #1, the mechanism by which truth-seeking operates is irrelevant. It could be using dualistic mental properties, or divine intervention, or purely material molecules... all that matters is that the advantage exists, and is selectable.

If you reject the notion that abstract thought is a trait that is selectable by natural selection, then you need to explain what makes this trait special (in contrast to claws, or fur, or warm blood, etc.). You also need to explain why we have a continuum of intelligence in the animals we see today, and the mechanism by which humans acquire the capacity for abstract thought. It's not enough to merely say, "humans possess qualia"; you have to explain why evolution doesn't apply to qualia, and why my hamster doesn't have them.

The answer to #2 is, we don't. For all we know, we might be living in the Matrix, and all our models of the world could be a pack of lies. However, our sense appear to be feeding us information about a real world; and, based on this information, we appear to be making definite progress toward discovering the mechanisms by which this seemingly real world operates. It's simply more parsimonious to assume that this is, indeed, the case -- until some evidence to the contrary.

You keep saying things like,
harvey1 wrote:In any case, if you go that route, then you again are faced with mental inefficacy, but you need mental efficacy in order to establish mental properties as a selective advantage. ... The issue, though, is how is that possible if the mental has no causal efficacy.
But remember, QED and I do not believe that mental properties exist, at all. You might as well be saying, "you need mental efficacy to establish communication with the Earth spirits as a selective advantage".

From my viewpoint, all these "mental properties" are just shorthand for "a complex system of atoms", just as "water" is shorthand for "H2O". There's simply no room for any kind of dualistic entities, because they don't explain anything that isn't already explained by atoms.

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Post #94

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harvey1 wrote:In addition, how do you avoid the same pitfall that Bugmaster's computer chess has? Recall that this chess program has an instruction set to determine the best move (i.e., its EB is selecting for BT). However, if our instruction set is the minimizing of action at the quantum level, then there is no overwhelming reason to believe that any minimizing of action requires that our EBs are accurately optimized for selecting "true beliefs."
Whoa there, what do you mean by "pitfall" ? We humans are also trying to select the best move.

The criteria for what's "best" in chess are fairly complex. Ultimately, the "best" move is the one that leads to victory, but no chess program can see that far all the way from the beginning of the match. Therefore, the chess program uses heuristics, such as: capturing the opponent's pieces, preventing the opponent from capturing the player's own pieces, decreasing the number of squares that the opponent can move to without losing important pieces, establishing a Check (and thus limiting the opponent's choices, etc.).

The criteria for what's "best" in life are a lot more complex, but we humans also use heuristics for determining the best move. Ultimately, the best thing to do is to avoid pain and death, and maximize reproductive potential -- but you can't map out every course of action for the rest of your life. So, you use heuristics, such as not standing under falling rocks, eating healthy foods, etc.

So, there's a great difference in complexity between chess and human life, but ultimately, both chess programs and humans are striving to make the "best" move. And just because you know how a chess program works doesn't automatically imply that its decisions are arbitrary.
We have to suppose "true beliefs" aid in our survival, which contrasts with the paragraph above.
How so ? As I've pointed out multiple times, true beliefs do aid in our survival. For example, the belief that fire doesn't harm you will greatly reduce your chances of survival as soon as you put it to the test. What's so controversial about that ?
If quantum particles are collectively organized as a belief and this belief causes someone to act in favor of their survival and reproduction, then how does a belief cause them to act in favor of their survival and reproduction since the mind has no causal role?
Er... what ? You just answered your own question, except in a roundabout way. Our bodies are just quantum particles which are "collectively organized". If there's a configuration of quantum particles somewhere in our body that exerts electrostatic and other forces on the rest of the particcles in a way that eventually causes the entire collection of particles to walk into a bonfire, then that configuration is not acting in favor of our survial. On the other hand, a configuration that causes the body to plant crops in such a way that they will yield a bountiful food supply does act in favor of survival.

Again, remember that, from where I stand, there's no such thing as a "mind". I do not merely believe that it's somehow ineffectual; I believe that it doesn't exist at all. Our brains are wet, squishy, massively parallel computers, not vessels for spirits.

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Post #95

Post by harvey1 »

Bugmaster wrote:But remember, QED and I do not believe that mental properties exist, at all. You might as well be saying, "you need mental efficacy to establish communication with the Earth spirits as a selective advantage". From my viewpoint, all these "mental properties" are just shorthand for "a complex system of atoms", just as "water" is shorthand for "H2O". There's simply no room for any kind of dualistic entities, because they don't explain anything that isn't already explained by atoms.
Great, and that's why I keep saying that mental properties have no causal efficacy in your view. They don't exist, so how could they be causally efficacious? If a cat has a belief, that belief and decision of the cat cannot be the reason why the cat jumps on the mouse in your view, since there are no efficacious decisions on the part of the cat's "self" to make that move. Rather, it is a "decision" happening at the neurological level of the cat, and the beliefs are anything but a reason for the cat to jump.
Bugmaster wrote:As I see it, harvey1 is asking two separate questions:
1). Under a purely materialistic worldview, how could "truth-seeking" behavior develop ?
2). How do we know that our truth-seeking behavior does, indeed, seek the truth ?
The answer to #1 is, natural selection. The ability to rapidly model and predict the real world -- assuming, of course, that the real world actually exists -- is a tremendous evolutionary advantage. The ability to quickly disseminate this knowledge to one's peers, and children, within a single generation, is also a tremendous advantage.
The mind exists only if it has causal powers. However, once you place the instruction set of humans beyond access to the self and down to the quantum level, then there is no causal role for the self. We don't consciously choose our beliefs since there is no "us" to make the choices. Therefore, if the self has no causal role in the decisions or beliefs that it forms, then what function could a belief have in terms of our actions? Beliefs affect the path of people who are in charge of making their choices. If there is no "us" to make a choice, then a false belief is going to happen anyway (neuro-chemically speaking). Beliefs are just consequences of physical things that happen in the interiors of our skull.

If quantum particles are collectively organized as a belief and this belief causes someone to act in favor of their survival and reproduction, then how does a belief cause them to act in favor of their survival and reproduction since the mind has no causal role? Beliefs would be analogous to watching a movie, we can certainly watch them like we watch characters on a screen have beliefs, but we cannot control what we do as a result of a belief anymore than we can control what the movie characters do after they form their beliefs. Therefore, for a strict reductionist account such as what you are suggesting, I think true beliefs would have virtually no role whatsoever in our survival and reproduction. This would also undercut your argument that "true beliefs" would naturally occur in organisms that are enhancing their chances of surviving and reproducing.
Bugmaster wrote:Even a weak form of abstract thought -- such as the ability to predict where a mouse will dodge to, before actually pouncing on the mouse -- would already be very advantageous to a species who had it (in this case, the cat). It stands to reason that organisms with such an advantage would be selected for during the evolutionary process.
Okay, but does the cat believe that pouncing on the mouse will catch the mouse? If so, then how is it that the mental is not efficacious?
Bugmaster wrote:If you reject the notion that abstract thought is a trait that is selectable by natural selection, then you need to explain what makes this trait special (in contrast to claws, or fur, or warm blood, etc.). You also need to explain why we have a continuum of intelligence in the animals we see today, and the mechanism by which humans acquire the capacity for abstract thought. It's not enough to merely say, "humans possess qualia"; you have to explain why evolution doesn't apply to qualia, and why my hamster doesn't have them.
I don't reject that abstract thought is a trait selectable by natural selection. However, mental properties (e.g., making a decision because you have a belief) are selectable because they have causal efficacy. For example, if having claws wasn't the reason the creature was more effective at surviving and reproducing, then chances are that trait would either not form, or if it did, the causal inefficacy of having that trait would sooner or later be lost. Since it is your position that holds that there is no mental efficacy (as I understand it), then this seems to be a problem for your position and not mine.
Bugmaster wrote:The answer to #2 is, we don't. For all we know, we might be living in the Matrix, and all our models of the world could be a pack of lies. However, our sense appear to be feeding us information about a real world; and, based on this information, we appear to be making definite progress toward discovering the mechanisms by which this seemingly real world operates. It's simply more parsimonious to assume that this is, indeed, the case -- until some evidence to the contrary.
The problem with your argument is that we actually have much better reason to believe that beliefs are merely adequate for survival and reproduction than we have reasons to think that our beliefs are approximately true of the world. The reason is that there's tons and tons of evidence to show that natural selection is better equipped to supply an organism with traits that are adequate to survival and reproduction. Why should beliefs about the world be any different? There's certainly a lot more potential beliefs out there that are merely adequate for survival and reproduction than there are that are "engineered" for an accurate depiction of the world.

Once you lose the ability to appeal to mental efficacy, and you lose the ability to appeal to beliefs as anything more than adequate for survival and reproduction (i.e., assuming they have some kind of neurological function in your view), then organisms would appear to be mere robotons of quantum events happening well below the surface. Those quantum events are not concerned about truth, and there's no good reason to postulate that your position would lead these collective quantum actions to be truth producing machines.

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Post #96

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harvey1 wrote:Rather, it is a "decision" happening at the neurological level of the cat, and the beliefs are anything but a reason for the cat to jump.
Not quite. According to me, the word "belief" simply means, "some configuration of atoms at the neurological level of the cat". It makes sense that this neurological configuration will lead to a "decision", which is a description of some neurological activity in the cat's body. Sounds pretty causally efficacious to me...
The mind exists only if it has causal powers. However, once you place the instruction set of humans beyond access to the self and down to the quantum level, then there is no causal role for the self.
Eh ? I'm not sure what you're saying here. Are you saying, "a person can never know his own instruction set" ? Or, "a person's instruction set is unknowable, by anyone" ? Or what ?
We don't consciously choose our beliefs since there is no "us" to make the choices.
Strictly speaking, you're right: there's no self, only a certain configuration of atoms (or quantum particles or whatever). Also strictly speaking, there's no "rock", there are only atoms. However, speaking non-strictly, we can say things like, "this rock is gray", or "this person's self is mean".

The mistake you're making here is to assume that, just because the person's "self" (or a rock) is reducible to atoms, the person's "self"(or a rock) does not exist. This is clearly false (well, at least it's clear in the case of the rock), since the atoms that comprise the rock (or a person's "self") will exist regardless of what you're calling them at the moment.

You keep saying things like, "the self has no causal role in the decisions or beliefs that it forms...", but to me that statement sounds like, "this particular configuration of atoms has no causal role in the internal changes made to this particular configuration of atoms", which is false. Again, just look at a rock for a quick demonstration: the interactions between its atoms ensure that all the atoms move together when you throw the rock, they ensure that the rock will break up along some specific lines when you hit it very hard, etc. Similarly, the atoms of a paramecium have a very specific causal role in its reactions to acid. The atoms in our human bodies are no different.

Thus, you are wrong when you say,
If there is no "us" to make a choice, then a false belief is going to happen anyway (neuro-chemically speaking). Beliefs are just consequences of physical things that happen in the interiors of our skull.
Yes, and the paremecium's movements are also just consequences of physical things that happen in the interiors of its cellular membrane. But, nonetheless, the paramecium's choices are not arbitrary. All the paremecia that made arbitrary choices have died out long ago.

I think that, ultimately, your difficulty with grasping my worldview comes from your attachment to the idea of free will:
Beliefs would be analogous to watching a movie, we can certainly watch them like we watch characters on a screen have beliefs, but we cannot control what we do as a result of a belief anymore than we can control what the movie characters do after they form their beliefs.
In other words, you really want there to be something more to humans than chemicals in their brains... But why ? Why is it so important for beliefs to be based on qualia, or souls, or whatever, as opposed to brain chemistry ? Ultimately, regardless of whether you have qualia or not, your beliefs are still shaped by the physical inputs to your brain (visual, aural, etc.). Thus, your will is not truly free, no matter what worldview you subscribe to. And thus, I think it makes sense to pick a worldview that does not breed extraneous entities, as Occam would put it.
I think true beliefs would have virtually no role whatsoever in our survival and reproduction.
Ok, I think I see what you're saying here. You're saying that my belief that fire is hot doesn't matter; all that matters is that I don't go around walking into fires. Evolutionary speaking, this is true. However, the capacity for abstract thought allows us to avoid walking into fires before we even know they're there ("hmm, I smell smoke from the west... smoke is made by fire... forest fires are hot... I am not going west today"); and the capacity for language allows us to disseminate this knowledge to our entire population, within a single generation. This greatly increases the number of individuals that survive to reproduction, which, again, is a clear evolutionary advantage.
I don't reject that abstract thought is a trait selectable by natural selection. However, mental properties (e.g., making a decision because you have a belief) are selectable because they have causal efficacy.
I think we both agree that humans possess some evolutionary adaptation that makes them much more survivable than, say, paramecia or tigers. You call this adaptation "dualistic mental properties", and I call it "brain chemistry". So, both of us believe that it exists, we're just proposing different mechanisms for how it works.
The problem with your argument is that we actually have much better reason to believe that beliefs are merely adequate for survival and reproduction than we have reasons to think that our beliefs are approximately true of the world.
Not quite... As I said, I think that the capacity for creating true beliefs about the world is the evolutionary advantage, not the beliefs themselves. For example, most animals share the belief that "fire is hot"; however, not all of them can form true beliefs about fire (and whatever else they see) in real time. That's our real advantage.

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Post #97

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Bugmaster wrote:..."belief" simply means, "some configuration of atoms at the neurological level of the cat". It makes sense that this neurological configuration will lead to a "decision", which is a description of some neurological activity in the cat's body. Sounds pretty causally efficacious to me... atoms that comprise the rock (or a person's "self") will exist regardless of what you're calling them at the moment...
Okay, just to clarify, do you think mental properties (such as beliefs) exist as a result of a neural configuration, or do you think mental properties are the neural configuration? I assumed that you thought that mental properties exist as a result of a neural configuration (e.g., how virtual reality exists as a result of software and hardware combining to make a virtual world like the real world). If you think the mental properties are neural configurations, which is how I understand you, then why does the "self" have a "virtual reality"-like experience? Afterall, if a galaxy of marbles had the same configuration as the brain and simulated the action in the brain 100%, then where is the mental experience of the galaxy? Is it a virtual experience or is it what exactly?

I think this question is a real basic one, so I sort of need an answer to it in order to reply to any of the issues that we've raised here.

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Post #98

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harvey1 wrote:Okay, just to clarify, do you think mental properties (such as beliefs) exist as a result of a neural configuration, or do you think mental properties are the neural configuration?
The latter. I believe that mental properties are neural configurations; more accurately, I believe that they are abstractions we humans use to describe neural configurations, just as we use the word "rocks" to refer to particular silicate configurations.
If you think the mental properties are neural configurations, which is how I understand you, then why does the "self" have a "virtual reality"-like experience? Afterall, if a galaxy of marbles had the same configuration as the brain and simulated the action in the brain 100%, then where is the mental experience of the galaxy? Is it a virtual experience or is it what exactly?
Er, now I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "virtual experience". How's it different from real experience ? If we had a simulated brain that exactly duplicated the configuration of a physical brain, I'd say that the simulated brain has the same experiences as the physical one.

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Post #99

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Bugmaster wrote:
where is the mental experience of the galaxy? Is it a virtual experience or is it what exactly?
Er, now I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "virtual experience". How's it different from real experience ? If we had a simulated brain that exactly duplicated the configuration of a physical brain, I'd say that the simulated brain has the same experiences as the physical one.
In other words, when you say "experiences," I want to know what you mean by that term. For example, if you are familiar with Star Trek Next Generation, the crew members of the Enterprise could experience any world they wanted to by visiting the Holodeck. Is that how people experience the world in your view; the brain creates a holodeck-like experience for the "self"? If not, then please describe how brains go from "brain stuff" to "the 'self' experiencing a 3D world stuff."

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harvey1 wrote:In other words, when you say "experiences," I want to know what you mean by that term. For example, if you are familiar with Star Trek Next Generation, the crew members of the Enterprise could experience any world they wanted to by visiting the Holodeck. Is that how people experience the world in your view; the brain creates a holodeck-like experience for the "self"? If not, then please describe how brains go from "brain stuff" to "the 'self' experiencing a 3D world stuff."
That holodeck stuff is a bit too complicated for me -- especially considering how it breaks all the time :-)

Anyway, I don't believe that there's any kind of a separate "self", for which the brain creates stuff. I'd say that the chemical processes inside the brain (and the rest of the nervous system, and the sensory organs, etc.), are the "self". It experiences 3D world stuff through eyes, ears, etc.; when the 3D world stuff (photons, air molecules, etc.) hits the neurons in these organs, the resulting chemical reaction sets off a chain of electrochemical events that amounts to changes in the self.

In other words, there's no holodeck, there's only the ship. Er. Or something.

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