The Problem with the Problem of Evil

[williamryan]

I'm new to this site. I've surfed around a bit on this topic, and I've constantly run into incantations of the problem of evil. I've seen Juliod, among others, use it over and over. I hope this thread will isolate the real issues of contention and shed some light on this often misused and abused argument. I have learned much from William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga's writings on this matter, and much of what I say is from their writings.

There are two basic versions of the problem of evil: deductive and probalistic (aka inductive). The propontent of the deductive problem of evil attempts to show that the existence of Deductive looks like this:

1. If a God exists who is omnipotent (all powerful) and omnibenevolent (all loving),
2. and evil exists,
3. then God cannot be omnipotent or omnibenevolent.

This version of the argument has been almost completely abandoned by professional philosophers today. It lives on in its popular level form and is made immortal by producing this corpse of an argument between non-philosopher friends. Alvin Plantinga (a preeminent Christian philosopher at Notre Dame and past president of the Amer. Philosophical Assoc., which is the main association of professional philosophers) showed that this version of the problem of evil is logically untenable.

Alvin Plantinga presented a "defense" as opposed to a theodicy. A theodicy is an effort to explain why God would allow evil to exist. A defense, however, merely seeks to show that the atheist has failed to carry their case that evil is incompatible with God's existence. In other words, a sucessful defense with show that the atheist has failed to show that evil is logically incompatible with God's existence, while leaving us in the dark as to why God allows evil.

The deductive argument was destroyed because, in short, the atheist has assumed an overwhelming burden. Premises (1) and (2), above, are at not explicitly, logically inconsistent. An explicit, logically inconsistent statement would be that "God is blue, but God is not blue."

If the atheist thinks that premises (1) and (2) are implicitly inconsistent, then he or she must be assuming some hidden premise(s) that would make the inconsistency explicit. Those premises seem to be these:

(3) If God is omnipotent, then God can create any world that God desires.
(4) If God is omnibenevolent, then God prefers a world without evil over a world with evil.

Hidden premise (3) then is the view that if God is omnipotent, he could create a world that were all humans freely choose to do the right thing. This world would then be free of all moral evil: no lying, no cheating, no murder etc. So, because we can conceive of a world in which everyone freely chooses every time to do the right thing, and God is all-powerful, then God must be able to create it.

This links with hidden premise (4) because if God was powerful enough to create this type of world, then he certaintly would because he is all-loving. In other words, if God had the choice between creating a flawed, evil world like this one and creating one w/o any evil, then God would most certainly chose the latter. Otherwise, God would be evil to prefer that people experience pain and suffering when God could have given them happiness and prosperity.

In David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, he summarized this last point when he asked: "Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"

Plantinga and others object to hidden premise (3) with what he calls the free will defense. It goes like this: if it is possible that humans have complete freedom to make choices, then (3) and (4) are not necessarily true. If humans have freedom to make choices, then it is not necessarily true that God could have created another world in which no evil exists but people have complete freedom of choice. This is because God's omnipotence doesn't imply that God can do logical impossibilities like create a round triangle or make a married bachelor, or make someone freely chose to do something.

All God can really do is create a world in which a person may freely chose to act and then allow that person to make the free choice. This implies that there are possible worlds that are not feasible for God to create. Just like its not "feasible" for God to create a round triangle or a married bachelor. This does not impinge on God's omnipotence though, because God cannot be impinged for not being able to do a logical impossibility. Another example how how non-sensical this is, is for someone to say that God is not all-powerful because he cannot exist and non exist at the same time.

So, suppose that in every feasible world that God could create, free creatures sometimes choice evil. Here it is us, the creature, not God that is responsible for evil and God can do nothing to prevent their ability to choose the evil, apart from refusing to create such a world at all. Therefore it is at least possible that feasible world that God could create that contains free human beings is a world that has evil in it.

I'm about to say something that will seem crazy and you might be tempted to label be a total fundamentalist and crazy, but please keep reading past the next few sentences. As for natural evils (i.e. earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.) it is possible that these evils could result from demonic activity. Demons could have freedom just like humans and it is possible that God could not preclude natural evil w/o removing demons' free will. You might be thinking, "That is ridiculous!" and you might even think that it is a spurious, frivolous argument. But only let this thought last a few moments lest you confuse the deductive argument with the probabilistic arguments. I admit, ascribing all evil to demonic beings is improbable, but that is completely irrevelant to the deductive version of this argument. Probability only enters the calculus in the probalistic argument. All I must do here is show that such an explanation (both for the moral evil and natural evil) is merely possible.

In summary, hidden premise (3), that an omnipotent God can create any world he desires, is plainly not necessarily true. Therefore, the atheist's argument on this ground alone fails, which causes the whole argument to fail. But we can go further, what about hidden premise (4).

What about (4), the hidden premise that if God is all-loving then he would prefer a world w/o evil over a world with evil. Again, this is not necessarily true. By analogy, we allow pain and suffering to exist in a person's life to bring about some greater good. Every parent knows this. There comes a time when parents cannot protect their child from every mishap, or when the parent must discipline the child so the child matures. Similarly, God could permit suffering in our lives to build us or test us or others and to achieve some greater good. Therefore, premise (4) is also not necessarily true. And again the argument fails, this time on totally separate grounds. Notice that the atheist must show that both (3) and (4) are true, while the theist merely need show one is false.

If I may be permitted to read some of your minds, at this point you might be thinking, "Even if there is no inconsistency between God and evil, surely the existence of God is incompatible with the amount and kinds of evils that actually exist." What good, you might ask, could possibly come from a pregnant mother in the wrong part of town that is struck down by a stray bullet fired from a gang member's 9mm?

This as its own hidden premise, that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons to allow the amount and kinds of evil that exist. But again, this is not necessarily true, and all I must show is that it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason. As terrible as some things about the world are, people generally agree that life is worth living, from which we could surmise that there is much more good that evil in the world, regardless of the amount and kind of evil actually present. As for the kinds of evil, it is possible that God has some overriding reasons to permit the kinds of evil that occur.

Again, you might think that that seems pretty unlikely. But this would confuse the deductive problem with the probabilistic problem again. To refute the deductive version, the theist doesn't have to suggest a likely solution--all he or she must do is suggest a possible solution.

In summary, the atheist assumes at least two hidden premises in the deductive version of this argument. He or she must prove both of those premises for this version to be true. I have shown that both of those hidden premises can be indenpendently refuted.

Further, because it is the atheist who claims to note a contradicition w/in the theist's truth claims, it is the atheist that bears the burden of proof to show that there is no possible world in which premises (1) and (2) are true. That is an incredibly heavy burden, which the atheist ultimately cannot shoulder. The deductive version of the problem of evil is impotent.


Probabilistic Version

After the deductive argument was destroyed, most who want to use the problem of evil (POE) to show that God cannot be all loving or all powerful moved to the probabilistic argument. The inductive version admits that it is possible for the traditional God of Christianity and evil to coexist, but it is highly improbable for them to coexist. The argument looks like this:

1. If a god exists who is all loving and all powerful,
2. yet evil exists,
3. then it is highly improbable or unlikely that a god exists who is all loving or all powerful.

Let me make a few observations. Notice that even if the Christian granted this argument, this argument does not show that God does not exist. It is, however, a step along that path. At most, this argument can claim that the type of God posited by traditional Christianity does not exist. Further, this argument cannot show that God is not all loving and not all powerful; it can only show that one of this is incorrect. But this is all only the case if we grant this argument, and there are powerful reasons not to grant it.[/u]

Given that this post is way too long already, I'll be brief here, and will flesh out my comments on this version as other posts come in (if anybody actually gets this far into the novel

(1) Given the full scope of the evidence for God's existence, it is far more likely than not that God exists.

(2) Because of our finite nature, we are not in a good position to asses with a sufficient confidence that God has no morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evils that occur.

(3) Christianity entails doctrines that increase the probability that God and evil coexist

I look forward to your comments.

[williamryan]

A quick response to all aruging about the "definition" of omnipotence:

Several posters have pointed to dictionary definitions of omnipotence. This is a mistake. Its a bad idea to leave it up to Hughton Miflan or Websters to let us know the ins and outs of obscure metaphysical terms. Further, its part and parcel of debate to define terms in precise ways. If you disagree with my definition of omnipotence, thats fine. But if you were writing in a philosophy journal or presenting a paper to a group of philosophers and you merely cited Webster's for all your metaphysical definitions, then you'd never be taken seriously.

Juliod wrote that he is not interested in responding to my argument unless the majority of Christians hold it. This seems rather immature and an inappropriate way of viewing the distinction between Christian scholars and lay people. Very often the definitions and arguments propounded by lay people (which would be the majority of Christians) are not the best arguments out there. For that we must turn to the Christian scholars with the requisite training to carry out that task (certainly the minority of Christians...many of whom would agree with my formulation of omnipotence). If there is a cogent approach to understanding omnipotence and evil why ignore it Juliod?

upallnite wrote:

Someone else was trying to argue subjective with you and you disagreed. But here you are showing that you know that good and evil are subjective. It is going to be hard to argue if you are not consistent.

Just because I disagree with someone over whether moral relativisim, it doesn't follow that I've proven that there are in fact relative values. Perhaps you misunderstood me. I was not arguing that good and evil are subjective, but merely that you cannot call something "good" unless you have an understanding of what "good" means. This has nothing to do with subjectivsm. I cannot help but think that scrotum was being a little disingenuous when he said that it was "good" to find the most attractive woman and rape her. Perhaps I should phrase the question more sharply, even though I tread on delicate ground. Would any of you who think that morals are relative be able to place any moral blame on someone for lying to you, for incenerating Jews, or for perhaps raping your wife or your child? Or would you say if well, whats good for you is okay?

Further, I think you're still misunderstanding the definition or a "hidden" premise. This a term of art. This is a term that has a special definition in logic. It has nothing to do with definitions from a dictionary. It simply means that the arguer has relied on premises that he or she has failed to make explicit. What do you have to say to this statement?

Upallnite wrote:

You are limiting the power of god with your new definition. If you can limit the power of god then so can I. I wounder what I would take from him first.

This statement assumes that God's power extended to something else that I cut off with my definition. If this is what GOd's omnipotence means then its no limitation at all, its a description of reality.

To all:

It is patently insufficnet to answer questoins such as "What is your basis for saying that God can all people their freedom of choice while keeping people from pain" by saying "omnipotence" and citing Webster's for your definition. Interact with the definition I gave for God's omnipotence, which is in fact, a definition that many Christian scholars would agree with.

Juliod wrote

Why do you think it is "absurd" that god both exist and not exist at the same time? If he's omnipotent then he can do both and dance the horn pipe all at once

Your statment that something can exist yet not exist is a logical fallacy. You seem to think this is okay because of your understanding of the nature of what omnipotence means. Yet, you fail to even consider how this would work its way out under my definition. Further, I think you'd be hard pressed to find an professional philosopher that would agree that it is not facially absurd to say that God can exist and not exist and the same time. Your comments don't help move the disccusion along much because the simply say, "nuh-uh," you can't fool me about the definition of omnipotence, I'll just look it up in the dictionary. This is not how learned debates are conducted. Please interact with you definitions. If my definition is inadequte, then please show me how.

[juliod]

If there is a cogent approach to understanding omnipotence and evil why ignore it Juliod?

Because what I want to argue against is religion as it is actually believed and practiced by adherents. It is uninteresting to debate the hypothetical constructs of professional philosophers and theologians.

Why do you think it is "absurd" that god both exist and not exist at the same time? If he's omnipotent then he can do both and dance the horn pipe all at once

Your statment that something can exist yet not exist is a logical fallacy.

Are you familiar with the Fallacy Fallacy? That is the false belief that a falacious argument must have a false conclusion. It means that the fact that you percieve a fallacy in this view of god does not mean that this claim is automatically false.

You seem to think this is okay because of your understanding of the nature of what omnipotence means.

That and the fact that adherents to religions teaching omnipotence of god believe that god can ignore, at will, any logical or factual limitations on his power.

Further, I think you'd be hard pressed to find an professional philosopher that would agree that it is not facially absurd to say that God can exist and not exist and the same time.

So?

If my definition is inadequte, then please show me how.

What you are trying to do is change what other christians mean by "omnipotence" without getting them to agree to it.

You apparently believe in a god that has certain limitations on his power. I agree that the problem of evil does not apply to your god. We can agree to disagree on whether your god is "omnipotent". But until your view gains a certain threshold of support (I was too demanding to expect a majority) I won't consider it necessary to refute it. so let's set a standard of 500 million adherents.

DanZ

[williamryan]

Juliod wrote:

Because what I want to argue against is religion as it is actually believed and practiced by adherents. It is uninteresting to debate the hypothetical constructs of professional philosophers and theologians.

In other words, you'd rather argue against an inferior argument because you know you can win that one. I just cannot see why it is uninteresting to debate with those people who have the training to present rigorous and compelling arguments. I don't want to cast any aspersitions on you, but is it perhaps that its just like shooting ducks in a barrel the other way, and too difficult dealing with the scholars.

Are you familiar with the Fallacy Fallacy? That is the false belief that a falacious argument must have a false conclusion. It means that the fact that you percieve a fallacy in this view of god does not mean that this claim is automatically false

If an argument with false premises reaches a true conclusion, all you have is a true conclusion--not an argument. You merely have a conclusory statement. One of the most basic things in logic is presenting true premises that lead to a true conclusion. You cannot deny this and be anywhere near widely accepted principles of logic.

Further, I think you'd be hard pressed to find an professional philosopher that would agree that it is not facially absurd to say that God can exist and not exist and the same time.

So?

So are you presenting an argument of one Certainly there is no need to have other professional philosophers ascribe to your position, but having learned people adhere or not to your position is certainly a major factor in assesing whether your argument is sound. After all, the more people that agree with you the more likely it is that you are right. Notice that I didn't say that the more that agree then you're right; merely more likely to be right because more people can make up for frailties in a single persons thought and logic.

What you are trying to do is change what other christians mean by "omnipotence" without getting them to agree to it.

That is not true. You may think this because you have never heard this type of an argument before, but actually, my argument is representative of mainstream thought amoung Christian philosophers and theologians. I'm not trying to "change" what anybody means. I'm trying to apply a more rigous thought and argument to an often misunderstood facet of God's character.

You apparently believe in a god that has certain limitations on his power. I agree that the problem of evil does not apply to your god. We can agree to disagree on whether your god is "omnipotent". But until your view gains a certain threshold of support (I was too demanding to expect a majority) I won't consider it necessary to refute it. so let's set a standard of 500 million adherents.

While I wouldn't charactrize my position a limitation, I understand what you mean and won't pick that bone. Thank you for assessing my argument on its on merits. I am glad to see that you agree that the PoE doesn't apply to God as I have described him. I would point out again that my view is not completely out of left field. It is the mainstream view among christian philosophers and theolgians today--the scholars, not the layman. You seem thoughtful and well-read, so I suppose I'll close the conversation with you by repeating an oft heard remark: "Why don't you pick on someone your own size!?" Ante up and take on the scholars and stop preying on laymen.

[upallnite]

If god is not bound by logic then the existence of evil means he is not all-good. If god is bound by logic then he is not the god that created all the illogical miricals. I think you are adding restrictions to omnipotent. You think I am not allowing a known factor. Correct?

As for "pie world" I did not say that they would have to know what good and evil are. I will not be cohersed into saying anything is always good or evil. I see a gray area.

[williamryan]

Upallnite wrote:

If god is not bound by logic then the existence of evil means he is not all-good. If god is bound by logic then he is not the god that created all the illogical miricals. I think you are adding restrictions to omnipotent. You think I am not allowing a known factor. Correct?

I read this several times and I have no idea what you are talking about. I also don't know what you mean by "not allowing a known factor." I'm not trying to be difficult or curt, but the definition of a hidden premise is not that complicated. What you do with the premise is complicated and whether you agree that the arguer must rely on other premises is also tough. I'm sorry I can't add more, I just don't understand what you're talking about.

[otseng]

First off, I'm a little late, but I'd like to extend a welcome to williamryan to this forum. Glad you stopped by.

On with the debate...

I have my own twist on solving the PoE.

Let's start with your first three statements:
1. If a God exists who is omnipotent (all powerful) and omnibenevolent (all loving),
2. and evil exists,
3. then God cannot be omnipotent or omnibenevolent.

The atheist implies with this argument that an omnipotent (I like your definition and that is how I'll be using it) God must cause all evil to cease. Since we don't have to look very far to see evil in the world, then God must not be omnipotent and omnibenevolent. There are some problems with this argument. What exactly can be considered "evil"? Why must God stop "all" evil?

When I took my 6 year old daughter to the dentist, she needed to get a tooth pulled out. And from her perspective, I let the dentist stick a painful needle in her gums. Was that evil of me since I permitted her to experience pain? Why didn't I stop it? From her perspective, it might not have made sense unless she understood the purpose in the pain.

So, sometimes there is a greater good out of what we might construe as "evil". And this is consistent with the Biblical description of God.

I think the atheist argument would stand if the following statement was true.

4. God has done nothing to address evil in the world.

If God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent and evil exists in the world and God has done nothing to address the evil in the world, then it could be concluded that either God is not able to address evil or God does not care to address evil.

And, of course, point 4 is easily refutable.

As for defining omnipotence as the ability to do anything including doing illogical things I believe is a straw man argument. If one accepts this definition, then of course this type of God does not exist. Nor is this type of God described in the Bible. And it is not a God that any theist is trying to show exists.

[wuntext]

When I took my 6 year old daughter to the dentist, she needed to get a tooth pulled out. And from her perspective, I let the dentist stick a painful needle in her gums. Was that evil of me since I permitted her to experience pain? Why didn't I stop it? From her perspective, it might not have made sense unless she understood the purpose in the pain.

Yes. It is easy to rationalise away 'evil' in such a scenario. But let's take another scenario:

"A six month old baby lies on a hill side in the Philippines. She is there because her parents have both just died in a mudslide. As she lies there, the mud and water slurry is rising around her small body and slowly choking her. As she screams in pain and fear, she breathes in yet more foul stinking mud, and after a while her lungs fill with mud and she dies convulsing in agony."


Unlike the dentist scenario - where you can point to the 'greater good' - what, if you had the chance, would you say to that child? Could you tell her that like having tooth out, it's for her own good? And explain to her why it's for her own good?

Of course, a believer could hide behind the 'Unknown Purpose' defence and claim that we cannot know gods motives. Fine, but that particular cop out carries some baggage.
If it is claimed we cannot understand gods motives, and he "works in mysterious ways" then believers have no basis to call their god 'good' 'loving' or 'merciful', the best they can do is state "we cannot fathom his motives or purpose, but we hope they are benign"

[otseng]

I understand what you're saying wuntext. Tragedies and calamities happen and we wonder, "Where is God in all this? Why does he allow bad things to happen?" It's probably the oldest and most common questions in the history of civilization. And I'm not going to say here that there's any simple answers to these.

I am not saying either that there is always some higher purpose for everything, including tragedies.

But, what I am saying is that it's not so simple to say, bad (evil) things happen, therefore god does not exist. My argument is "Has God done anything about the evil that is in the world?" If God has not, then it's clear that he's powerless or does not care.

For children in the Philippines that are going through pain, I have not done a single thing to help them. And it shows that I don't care about them and/or I don't have the ability to help them.

But for my own children, I have over the course of their lives helped them through bad/evil times. This shows that I care about them and I have the ability to help them. But have I prevented every bad thing from happening to them? If I stood over them all the time and had access to unlimited resources, would I prevent all bad things from happening? Even in that case probably not.

Another example. On this forum, I have practically unlimited power. I can edit anyone's post to make it say anything I want. I can create users and make posts under their names. I can delete anything said that is contrary to what I believe in. I can even edit peoples' posts when they make bbcode errors or misspell words. But, do I do any of these things? Almost never. Why not since I am a god here? Don't I care that people don't know how to use spell correctly? Why don't I just go ahead and fix all the spelling errors?

If I did any of these things, though my motive might be right (correct spelling), it would violate peoples' free will. So, if a post does need to be changed, it's the practice here to ask the original poster to modify it, instead of jumping in and modifying it.

Also, it would not be a good forum if I exercised my "omnipotence" all the time. And I doubt many people would sign up if I did that.

So, even though I have absolute power here, I don't exercise it all the time. But how would anyone know I do have absolute power? If I would demonstrate just once my powers, then it'd point to me having absolute power. But if I could not even demonstrate it once, then it'd be highly suspect that I have such powers.

[williamryan]

Osteng

Thank you for your welcome and your thoughtful comments. I heartifly agree with your assessment.

Further, let us all dispense with strawman definitions. Even if you don't agree with my definition, assess the strenght of (both mine and Osteng's) argument within those terms and not Websters Dictionary.

About this recent conversation of the reasons for the extent of evil, i.e. the dentist and philipino baby. As I noted above this is called a theodicy, an effor to explain why God allows evil. Of course, a theist might like to have an answer to why God permits evil; indeed there are many such proposels. But assume not none of those proposals are quite accurate. That is, assume that none of those proposals actually gives some plausible reasons why God would permit evil, what you then be the result for the theist. Actually, very little of interest results.

Why suppose that if God does have a good reason for permitting evil that the theist would be the first person to know. Perhaps God does have a good reason, but that reason is too complicated for us to understand. Or perhaps he has not revealed it for some other reason. The truth is, that assuming the theist cannot give any good reasons for why evil exists (I do, however think there are some good ones) this fact is an interesting fact about the theist herself, but by itself its shows little or nothing of interest relevant to the rationality of the belief in God. The atheist/agnostic needs much more to for their argument to even get off the ground.

Here's why it is of little interest. Assume the following: the theist believes that God exists, that god is all-powerful and all-loving in the senses that I and Osteng have been using them, and the theist believes that God has reasons for permitting evil, but the theist doesn't know those reasons. But why should this mean that his belief is improper or irrational?

Take an analogy. I believe there is a connection of sorts between Osteng's deciding to mow the lawn and the complex bodily movements invovled in doing so. But what type of connection is there exactly? Does his decision "cause" these bodily movements? And if so how? Osteng's decision to mow the lawn may take place long before he actually sets foot on the lawn to actually mow it. Is there some kind of intermediary causal chain of events that fills that gap? If so how long is it? If it is related what sorts or events make up this claim and how is the decision related, let's say, to the first event? Does it even have a first event?

No one, I suspect, knows the answers to each of these questions. But does it follow that it is irrational or unreasonable to believe that this decision has something to do with that series of motions? Surely not. In the same way the theist's not knowing why God permits evil does not by itself show that the theist is irrational in thinking that God does indeed have a reason. Therefore, to make the case, the atheist/agnostic cannot rest content with asking embarrasing questions to which the theist does not have a ready and complete answer. He must do more--he must try to show that it is impossibel (deductive) or at least unlikely (probablistic) that God has those requisite reasons. Indeed an overwhelming burden to bear!

[harvey1]

But, what I am saying is that it's not so simple to say, bad (evil) things happen, therefore god does not exist.

I wholeheartedly agree. However, there's another question that we must address, and that is whether the reasons for God not acting are sufficient to suggest that God has all the qualities in full that people often ascribe to God.

I don't think it is beneficial for Christians to deny the probablistic argument altogether since it suggests that we're in a kind of denial. I think strength comes from being able to acknowledge evidence and its impact in letting us settle on a more realistic view of God, while at the same time holding our ground that there's a great deal of room to believe that the Christian God actually exists.

I think even in your example we see that you have reasons for allowing debate, but I don't think you would allow people to suffer greatly as a result of not exercising your influence here to at least stop the suffering. If God doesn't choose to do so, then it is in my opinion cruel to suggest that God could stop it (i.e., God is omnipotent in terms that it is logically and physically possible for God to stop evil), but God merely chooses not to in order to reach a better goal. I think that sets up a very cruel image of God as being pigheaded ("you're gonna eat your vegetables whether you like or not..."). The situation gets even worse if we say that God is influenced by prayer because then we're saying that if you pray, then God might ease up on the suffering. In other words, God would have allowed you to experience more suffering if you had not asked God politely to yield from the divine plan of getting us to eat our vegetables. I honestly think this terribly distorts the image of God as Christian. So, I have to come forward in intellectual honesty by saying that I cannot defend this kind of image of God.

However, with that said, I think there's an immense lattitude that a Christian can take which acknowledges that re-definitions of God's properties are in order, but these re-definitions do not affect the way God is portrayed in scriptures. For example, God is often said to be omnipotent, meaning that God can do whatever is logically possible. However, I don't think this is even scriptural. I think what the scriptures say is that God is counterfactually omnipotent. That is, if it wasn't the case that God were morally perfect, then God could lie. Or, God could destroy all of humanity. Or, God could destroy the universe, etc.. etc... Similarly, I think it's also the case that scriptures say that God is counterfactually omnibenevolent. That is, if it wasn't the case that there are laws of physics, then God would save those who are injured. Or, God would heal every disability. Or, God would have prevented those drownings, random shootings, etc...

I think that speaking in counterfactuals makes God look much more of the kind of God that we can worship and be glad that exists. I think there is another kind of all powerfulness and all goodness that is spoken of in the Bible, and that is that God has the power to bring about all goodness. This is the chief "omnipotence" and "omnibenevolence" that Christians ought to be interested in and defend.

I think all of these defenses of God being omnipotent or omnibenevolent in that God is able to have these properties for anything logically possible is way too strong of a concept for the Christian God. If God really had this kind of potency or benevolent motivations, then there would be no evil in the world. There's evil, and therefore this kind of un-Christian God does not exist. I say the Christian God exists, and Christians ought to defend that God as existing versus these other gods which are the imaginations of medieval philosophers and theologians, and their modern descendents who choose to follow them in their folly.