The Problem with the Problem of Evil

[williamryan]

I'm new to this site. I've surfed around a bit on this topic, and I've constantly run into incantations of the problem of evil. I've seen Juliod, among others, use it over and over. I hope this thread will isolate the real issues of contention and shed some light on this often misused and abused argument. I have learned much from William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga's writings on this matter, and much of what I say is from their writings.

There are two basic versions of the problem of evil: deductive and probalistic (aka inductive). The propontent of the deductive problem of evil attempts to show that the existence of Deductive looks like this:

1. If a God exists who is omnipotent (all powerful) and omnibenevolent (all loving),
2. and evil exists,
3. then God cannot be omnipotent or omnibenevolent.

This version of the argument has been almost completely abandoned by professional philosophers today. It lives on in its popular level form and is made immortal by producing this corpse of an argument between non-philosopher friends. Alvin Plantinga (a preeminent Christian philosopher at Notre Dame and past president of the Amer. Philosophical Assoc., which is the main association of professional philosophers) showed that this version of the problem of evil is logically untenable.

Alvin Plantinga presented a "defense" as opposed to a theodicy. A theodicy is an effort to explain why God would allow evil to exist. A defense, however, merely seeks to show that the atheist has failed to carry their case that evil is incompatible with God's existence. In other words, a sucessful defense with show that the atheist has failed to show that evil is logically incompatible with God's existence, while leaving us in the dark as to why God allows evil.

The deductive argument was destroyed because, in short, the atheist has assumed an overwhelming burden. Premises (1) and (2), above, are at not explicitly, logically inconsistent. An explicit, logically inconsistent statement would be that "God is blue, but God is not blue."

If the atheist thinks that premises (1) and (2) are implicitly inconsistent, then he or she must be assuming some hidden premise(s) that would make the inconsistency explicit. Those premises seem to be these:

(3) If God is omnipotent, then God can create any world that God desires.
(4) If God is omnibenevolent, then God prefers a world without evil over a world with evil.

Hidden premise (3) then is the view that if God is omnipotent, he could create a world that were all humans freely choose to do the right thing. This world would then be free of all moral evil: no lying, no cheating, no murder etc. So, because we can conceive of a world in which everyone freely chooses every time to do the right thing, and God is all-powerful, then God must be able to create it.

This links with hidden premise (4) because if God was powerful enough to create this type of world, then he certaintly would because he is all-loving. In other words, if God had the choice between creating a flawed, evil world like this one and creating one w/o any evil, then God would most certainly chose the latter. Otherwise, God would be evil to prefer that people experience pain and suffering when God could have given them happiness and prosperity.

In David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, he summarized this last point when he asked: "Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"

Plantinga and others object to hidden premise (3) with what he calls the free will defense. It goes like this: if it is possible that humans have complete freedom to make choices, then (3) and (4) are not necessarily true. If humans have freedom to make choices, then it is not necessarily true that God could have created another world in which no evil exists but people have complete freedom of choice. This is because God's omnipotence doesn't imply that God can do logical impossibilities like create a round triangle or make a married bachelor, or make someone freely chose to do something.

All God can really do is create a world in which a person may freely chose to act and then allow that person to make the free choice. This implies that there are possible worlds that are not feasible for God to create. Just like its not "feasible" for God to create a round triangle or a married bachelor. This does not impinge on God's omnipotence though, because God cannot be impinged for not being able to do a logical impossibility. Another example how how non-sensical this is, is for someone to say that God is not all-powerful because he cannot exist and non exist at the same time.

So, suppose that in every feasible world that God could create, free creatures sometimes choice evil. Here it is us, the creature, not God that is responsible for evil and God can do nothing to prevent their ability to choose the evil, apart from refusing to create such a world at all. Therefore it is at least possible that feasible world that God could create that contains free human beings is a world that has evil in it.

I'm about to say something that will seem crazy and you might be tempted to label be a total fundamentalist and crazy, but please keep reading past the next few sentences. As for natural evils (i.e. earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.) it is possible that these evils could result from demonic activity. Demons could have freedom just like humans and it is possible that God could not preclude natural evil w/o removing demons' free will. You might be thinking, "That is ridiculous!" and you might even think that it is a spurious, frivolous argument. But only let this thought last a few moments lest you confuse the deductive argument with the probabilistic arguments. I admit, ascribing all evil to demonic beings is improbable, but that is completely irrevelant to the deductive version of this argument. Probability only enters the calculus in the probalistic argument. All I must do here is show that such an explanation (both for the moral evil and natural evil) is merely possible.

In summary, hidden premise (3), that an omnipotent God can create any world he desires, is plainly not necessarily true. Therefore, the atheist's argument on this ground alone fails, which causes the whole argument to fail. But we can go further, what about hidden premise (4).

What about (4), the hidden premise that if God is all-loving then he would prefer a world w/o evil over a world with evil. Again, this is not necessarily true. By analogy, we allow pain and suffering to exist in a person's life to bring about some greater good. Every parent knows this. There comes a time when parents cannot protect their child from every mishap, or when the parent must discipline the child so the child matures. Similarly, God could permit suffering in our lives to build us or test us or others and to achieve some greater good. Therefore, premise (4) is also not necessarily true. And again the argument fails, this time on totally separate grounds. Notice that the atheist must show that both (3) and (4) are true, while the theist merely need show one is false.

If I may be permitted to read some of your minds, at this point you might be thinking, "Even if there is no inconsistency between God and evil, surely the existence of God is incompatible with the amount and kinds of evils that actually exist." What good, you might ask, could possibly come from a pregnant mother in the wrong part of town that is struck down by a stray bullet fired from a gang member's 9mm?

This as its own hidden premise, that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons to allow the amount and kinds of evil that exist. But again, this is not necessarily true, and all I must show is that it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason. As terrible as some things about the world are, people generally agree that life is worth living, from which we could surmise that there is much more good that evil in the world, regardless of the amount and kind of evil actually present. As for the kinds of evil, it is possible that God has some overriding reasons to permit the kinds of evil that occur.

Again, you might think that that seems pretty unlikely. But this would confuse the deductive problem with the probabilistic problem again. To refute the deductive version, the theist doesn't have to suggest a likely solution--all he or she must do is suggest a possible solution.

In summary, the atheist assumes at least two hidden premises in the deductive version of this argument. He or she must prove both of those premises for this version to be true. I have shown that both of those hidden premises can be indenpendently refuted.

Further, because it is the atheist who claims to note a contradicition w/in the theist's truth claims, it is the atheist that bears the burden of proof to show that there is no possible world in which premises (1) and (2) are true. That is an incredibly heavy burden, which the atheist ultimately cannot shoulder. The deductive version of the problem of evil is impotent.


Probabilistic Version

After the deductive argument was destroyed, most who want to use the problem of evil (POE) to show that God cannot be all loving or all powerful moved to the probabilistic argument. The inductive version admits that it is possible for the traditional God of Christianity and evil to coexist, but it is highly improbable for them to coexist. The argument looks like this:

1. If a god exists who is all loving and all powerful,
2. yet evil exists,
3. then it is highly improbable or unlikely that a god exists who is all loving or all powerful.

Let me make a few observations. Notice that even if the Christian granted this argument, this argument does not show that God does not exist. It is, however, a step along that path. At most, this argument can claim that the type of God posited by traditional Christianity does not exist. Further, this argument cannot show that God is not all loving and not all powerful; it can only show that one of this is incorrect. But this is all only the case if we grant this argument, and there are powerful reasons not to grant it.[/u]

Given that this post is way too long already, I'll be brief here, and will flesh out my comments on this version as other posts come in (if anybody actually gets this far into the novel

(1) Given the full scope of the evidence for God's existence, it is far more likely than not that God exists.

(2) Because of our finite nature, we are not in a good position to asses with a sufficient confidence that God has no morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evils that occur.

(3) Christianity entails doctrines that increase the probability that God and evil coexist

I look forward to your comments.

[McCulloch]

Your argument has not disproven the possibility of the existence of a supernatural being that can do all that is logically possible.

I'm not sure why I would have to do this. The burden would be on the theist who believes in such a lesser-omnipotent being. If the being is not fully omnipotent, how can we know the being is god?
Let's say a christian says "YHWH can do anything not logically impossible." A follower of Baal may say "Baal can do anything including the logically impossible." Therefore Baal is more powerful than YHWH, and therefore YHWH could not be considered god.

No one can do those things which are impossible to do. That is why they are called impossible. If the followers of Baal or of YHWH say that their god can do that which cannot be done, then they have contradicted themselves. If any god can do a particular thing, then it is not impossible. Stop trying to assert that omnipotence means being able to do the impossible. It does not and it cannot mean that. Asserting that God can do the impossible is equivalent to asserting that there are no logically impossible actions.

I do not know about your definition of ordinary, but I would not consider a being capable of doing all that is logically possible ordinary.

But is it god? Once you remove your god from being infinitely powerful you must at the least prove there are no greater beings.

Monotheism is the belief that there is one god. Polytheism is the belief that there are more than one god. It is not the Christian god, but the possibility of a less than omnipotent god does not rule out the existence of god altogether. Infinitely powerful means being capable of doing anything that can be done. I don't think that we have ruled out the infinitely powerful god here.

Secondly, where do we draw the line? One example above was pain-free dentistry. That does not appear to present any logical impossibilities.

I do not think there is a theist anywhere who would deny that their god (or one of their gods) could perform pain-free dentistry. So the problem of evil comes down to answering the question why has god withheld the ability to perform pain-free dentistry from us mortals. I'll leave that to the theists to answer.

[theleftone]

BTW, has anybody yet offered a working definition of "evil" for the purposes of this debate? I think we'll need to agree on some definitions here before we can further tackle the PoE.

Scorpia offered a suggestion, about 2-3 posts back.

Good is not the absence of evil but the defeat of it.

I would suggest Augustine's definition as a potential starting point (i.e., "Evil is the absence of good.").

[Lotan]

I would suggest Augustine's definition as a potential starting point (i.e., "Evil is the absence of good.").

Yes, let's define one subjective quality in relationship to another.
There is no such thing as "evil".
Or "good" or "bad" or "ugly" or "naughty" or "nice"...

[theleftone]

I would suggest Augustine's definition as a potential starting point (i.e., "Evil is the absence of good.").

Yes, let's define one subjective quality in relationship to another.

The idea is that you would then define what "good" is. However, it was merely a suggestion.

There is no such thing as "evil".

If there is no such thing as evil, then the "problem of evil" ceases to exist.

[Lotan]

If there is no such thing as evil, then the "problem of evil" ceases to exist.

It never existed in the first place. It is a human conception, like the idea of evil itself.

[williamryan]

Lotan

(Evil) never existed in the first place. It is a human conception, like the idea of evil itself.

.

Lotan, for purposes of this thread, we're assuming that evil and good are not a subjective constructs of the human mind.

Juliod

Juliod wrote:

The burden (to show prove that God doesn't exist via the PoE)would be on the theist who believes in such a lesser-omnipotent being.

You often hear both sides shouting back and forth about which side has the burden of proof. Often its used to merely short-circuit the other side w/o evaluating their arguments in the first instance. I don't always think that the burden is on the athiest/agnostic, but here I do. As I noted in an earlier post the burden is on the atheist/agnostic because it she who claims there is a contradiction in the beliefs held by the theist. The atheist/agnostic makes a positive claim that the underlying beliefs of the theist are inconsistent. It is incumbent on the atheist/agnostic to show why those beliefs are inconsistent.


All

I raised a number of issues several posts back that seem to have fallen through the cracks. No one has responded to them. I am reproducing them below and implore people to respond. In sum, I'm taking the necessary step before dealing with possible reasons why God allows evil. Its important to establish the validity of what follows in this argument. Please respond.

Williamryan wrote:

About this recent conversation of the reasons for the extent of evil, i.e. the dentist and philipino baby. As I noted above this is called a theodicy, an effor to explain why God allows evil. Of course, a theist might like to have an answer to why God permits evil; indeed there are many such proposels. But assume not none of those proposals are quite accurate. That is, assume that none of those proposals actually gives some plausible reasons why God would permit evil, what you then be the result for the theist. Actually, very little of interest results.

Why suppose that if God does have a good reason for permitting evil that the theist would be the first person to know. Perhaps God does have a good reason, but that reason is too complicated for us to understand. Or perhaps he has not revealed it for some other reason. The truth is, that assuming the theist cannot give any good reasons for why evil exists (I do, however think there are some good ones) this fact is an interesting fact about the theist herself, but by itself its shows little or nothing of interest relevant to the rationality of the belief in God. The atheist/agnostic needs much more to for their argument to even get off the ground.

Here's why it is of little interest. Assume the following: the theist believes that God exists, that god is all-powerful and all-loving in the senses that I and Osteng have been using them, and the theist believes that God has reasons for permitting evil, but the theist doesn't know those reasons. But why should this mean that his belief is improper or irrational?

Take an analogy. I believe there is a connection of sorts between Osteng's deciding to mow the lawn and the complex bodily movements invovled in doing so. But what type of connection is there exactly? Does his decision "cause" these bodily movements? And if so how? Osteng's decision to mow the lawn may take place long before he actually sets foot on the lawn to actually mow it. Is there some kind of intermediary causal chain of events that fills that gap? If so how long is it? If it is related what sorts or events make up this claim and how is the decision related, let's say, to the first event? Does it even have a first event?

No one, I suspect, knows the answers to each of these questions. But does it follow that it is irrational or unreasonable to believe that this decision has something to do with that series of motions? Surely not. In the same way the theist's not knowing why God permits evil does not by itself show that the theist is irrational in thinking that God does indeed have a reason. Therefore, to make the case, the atheist/agnostic cannot rest content with asking embarrasing questions to which the theist does not have a ready and complete answer. He must do more--he must try to show that it is impossibel (deductive) or at least unlikely (probablistic) that God has those requisite reasons. Indeed an overwhelming burden to bear!

[juliod]

If God were counterfactually omnipotent (i.e., God is all-powerful except that God restrains the use of that power in cases where God desires to establish a universe of law and order), then I see no reason why this would make God ordinary.

But how would you know he is god, rather than just a very powerful being? It seems to me that once you demote god from being deep-omnipotent then you have the problem of proving that he is god. A being with infinite power would definitely be god, but a being with limitations (of whatever nature) could be some lesser being.

DanZ

[juliod]

Again juliod, it seems like you're the only here that is defining omnipotent as being able to do what is illogical. And I think we can all agree that such a god does not exist.

Yet I think the bulk of christians to posit an omipotent god. I often, even on these forums (although this one is pretty thin on fundementalists), encounter people whosay god is "outside", "beyond" or "transcending" our reality/universe/dimension.

And also, most miracle claims (from the bible and later) are illogical. If you say god cannot do the "impossible" then most miracle stories are falsified. It is a general tenet of theism that gods can do the impossible.

If you start picking and choosing what is possible and impossible, you will enter the realm of Special Pleading.

How do you know that God does not have a great desire to reduce evil? Just because evil exists does not necessarily mean that his desire to reduce it is not there.

But we do know that if god's power is infinite and his goodness (desire to reduce evil) is infinite. But you are suggesting a god with finite power and finite goodness. I agree that the PoE does not dispel that god (but then you need to show that it is god).

BTW, has anybody yet offered a working definition of "evil" for the purposes of this debate?

I don't think it is relevant. Like Lotan, I don't believe in evil. We can leave it to the theists. Make your own definition. It doesn't matter if you make is violence, death, disease, war, hatred, or just disobedience to god. All theists believe evil exists, so the PoE is in full effect.

DanZ

[juliod]

No one can do those things which are impossible to do. That is why they are called impossible.

Are you sure that applies to a being with infinite power? Do parallel lines meet? No. Well, they do: at infinity. Impossible things become ordinary when infinities are involved.

If the followers of Baal or of YHWH say that their god can do that which cannot be done, then they have contradicted themselves. If any god can do a particular thing, then it is not impossible. Stop trying to assert that omnipotence means being able to do the impossible.

What is your problem with that? If we are going to make up imaginary beings, we can give them any properties we want. Including the power to do this impossible.

Asserting that God can do the impossible is equivalent to asserting that there are no logically impossible actions.

But tales of deities are full of not just logically, but demonstrably, impossible actions. It's not my claim, but the claim of legions of theists.

Monotheism is the belief that there is one god. Polytheism is the belief that there are more than one god. It is not the Christian god, but the possibility of a less than omnipotent god does not rule out the existence of god altogether. Infinitely powerful means being capable of doing anything that can be done. I don't think that we have ruled out the infinitely powerful god here.

But if you claim a god that is less than fully-omnipotent, how can you qualify it as a god? It's not a trivial question? If a powerful alien came to earth, stronger, smarter, and possesing an array of psychic powers, would that being be a god? How can we tell.

And isn't the "everything that can be done" a bit of a dodge? I can do everything that can be done (by me). It is "logically impossible" for me to lift 16 billion tons. But everything that is not "logically impossible" for me to do, I can do. Do I qualify as a god? (If not, what is the standard by which you decide? What is the weight requirement for infinite strength?)

I do not think there is a theist anywhere who would deny that their god (or one of their gods) could perform pain-free dentistry. So the problem of evil comes down to answering the question why has god withheld the ability to perform pain-free dentistry from us mortals.

So it restores the PoE. God obviously favors pain for children.

DanZ

[juliod]

The atheist/agnostic makes a positive claim that the underlying beliefs of the theist are inconsistent. It is incumbent on the atheist/agnostic to show why those beliefs are inconsistent.

You misunderstood the statement that ked to by claim about burden of proof. The question is, if a theists holds of view of god that has limits, then the theist must explain why we should think that being is a god, rather than a merely powerful being. Couldn't the being be an angel, demon, gorgon, titan, etc etc? An atheist can't speak to that question. It's the theists that must tell us about the being that they have invented.

DanZ