The Problem with the Problem of Evil

[williamryan]

I'm new to this site. I've surfed around a bit on this topic, and I've constantly run into incantations of the problem of evil. I've seen Juliod, among others, use it over and over. I hope this thread will isolate the real issues of contention and shed some light on this often misused and abused argument. I have learned much from William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga's writings on this matter, and much of what I say is from their writings.

There are two basic versions of the problem of evil: deductive and probalistic (aka inductive). The propontent of the deductive problem of evil attempts to show that the existence of Deductive looks like this:

1. If a God exists who is omnipotent (all powerful) and omnibenevolent (all loving),
2. and evil exists,
3. then God cannot be omnipotent or omnibenevolent.

This version of the argument has been almost completely abandoned by professional philosophers today. It lives on in its popular level form and is made immortal by producing this corpse of an argument between non-philosopher friends. Alvin Plantinga (a preeminent Christian philosopher at Notre Dame and past president of the Amer. Philosophical Assoc., which is the main association of professional philosophers) showed that this version of the problem of evil is logically untenable.

Alvin Plantinga presented a "defense" as opposed to a theodicy. A theodicy is an effort to explain why God would allow evil to exist. A defense, however, merely seeks to show that the atheist has failed to carry their case that evil is incompatible with God's existence. In other words, a sucessful defense with show that the atheist has failed to show that evil is logically incompatible with God's existence, while leaving us in the dark as to why God allows evil.

The deductive argument was destroyed because, in short, the atheist has assumed an overwhelming burden. Premises (1) and (2), above, are at not explicitly, logically inconsistent. An explicit, logically inconsistent statement would be that "God is blue, but God is not blue."

If the atheist thinks that premises (1) and (2) are implicitly inconsistent, then he or she must be assuming some hidden premise(s) that would make the inconsistency explicit. Those premises seem to be these:

(3) If God is omnipotent, then God can create any world that God desires.
(4) If God is omnibenevolent, then God prefers a world without evil over a world with evil.

Hidden premise (3) then is the view that if God is omnipotent, he could create a world that were all humans freely choose to do the right thing. This world would then be free of all moral evil: no lying, no cheating, no murder etc. So, because we can conceive of a world in which everyone freely chooses every time to do the right thing, and God is all-powerful, then God must be able to create it.

This links with hidden premise (4) because if God was powerful enough to create this type of world, then he certaintly would because he is all-loving. In other words, if God had the choice between creating a flawed, evil world like this one and creating one w/o any evil, then God would most certainly chose the latter. Otherwise, God would be evil to prefer that people experience pain and suffering when God could have given them happiness and prosperity.

In David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, he summarized this last point when he asked: "Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"

Plantinga and others object to hidden premise (3) with what he calls the free will defense. It goes like this: if it is possible that humans have complete freedom to make choices, then (3) and (4) are not necessarily true. If humans have freedom to make choices, then it is not necessarily true that God could have created another world in which no evil exists but people have complete freedom of choice. This is because God's omnipotence doesn't imply that God can do logical impossibilities like create a round triangle or make a married bachelor, or make someone freely chose to do something.

All God can really do is create a world in which a person may freely chose to act and then allow that person to make the free choice. This implies that there are possible worlds that are not feasible for God to create. Just like its not "feasible" for God to create a round triangle or a married bachelor. This does not impinge on God's omnipotence though, because God cannot be impinged for not being able to do a logical impossibility. Another example how how non-sensical this is, is for someone to say that God is not all-powerful because he cannot exist and non exist at the same time.

So, suppose that in every feasible world that God could create, free creatures sometimes choice evil. Here it is us, the creature, not God that is responsible for evil and God can do nothing to prevent their ability to choose the evil, apart from refusing to create such a world at all. Therefore it is at least possible that feasible world that God could create that contains free human beings is a world that has evil in it.

I'm about to say something that will seem crazy and you might be tempted to label be a total fundamentalist and crazy, but please keep reading past the next few sentences. As for natural evils (i.e. earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.) it is possible that these evils could result from demonic activity. Demons could have freedom just like humans and it is possible that God could not preclude natural evil w/o removing demons' free will. You might be thinking, "That is ridiculous!" and you might even think that it is a spurious, frivolous argument. But only let this thought last a few moments lest you confuse the deductive argument with the probabilistic arguments. I admit, ascribing all evil to demonic beings is improbable, but that is completely irrevelant to the deductive version of this argument. Probability only enters the calculus in the probalistic argument. All I must do here is show that such an explanation (both for the moral evil and natural evil) is merely possible.

In summary, hidden premise (3), that an omnipotent God can create any world he desires, is plainly not necessarily true. Therefore, the atheist's argument on this ground alone fails, which causes the whole argument to fail. But we can go further, what about hidden premise (4).

What about (4), the hidden premise that if God is all-loving then he would prefer a world w/o evil over a world with evil. Again, this is not necessarily true. By analogy, we allow pain and suffering to exist in a person's life to bring about some greater good. Every parent knows this. There comes a time when parents cannot protect their child from every mishap, or when the parent must discipline the child so the child matures. Similarly, God could permit suffering in our lives to build us or test us or others and to achieve some greater good. Therefore, premise (4) is also not necessarily true. And again the argument fails, this time on totally separate grounds. Notice that the atheist must show that both (3) and (4) are true, while the theist merely need show one is false.

If I may be permitted to read some of your minds, at this point you might be thinking, "Even if there is no inconsistency between God and evil, surely the existence of God is incompatible with the amount and kinds of evils that actually exist." What good, you might ask, could possibly come from a pregnant mother in the wrong part of town that is struck down by a stray bullet fired from a gang member's 9mm?

This as its own hidden premise, that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons to allow the amount and kinds of evil that exist. But again, this is not necessarily true, and all I must show is that it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason. As terrible as some things about the world are, people generally agree that life is worth living, from which we could surmise that there is much more good that evil in the world, regardless of the amount and kind of evil actually present. As for the kinds of evil, it is possible that God has some overriding reasons to permit the kinds of evil that occur.

Again, you might think that that seems pretty unlikely. But this would confuse the deductive problem with the probabilistic problem again. To refute the deductive version, the theist doesn't have to suggest a likely solution--all he or she must do is suggest a possible solution.

In summary, the atheist assumes at least two hidden premises in the deductive version of this argument. He or she must prove both of those premises for this version to be true. I have shown that both of those hidden premises can be indenpendently refuted.

Further, because it is the atheist who claims to note a contradicition w/in the theist's truth claims, it is the atheist that bears the burden of proof to show that there is no possible world in which premises (1) and (2) are true. That is an incredibly heavy burden, which the atheist ultimately cannot shoulder. The deductive version of the problem of evil is impotent.


Probabilistic Version

After the deductive argument was destroyed, most who want to use the problem of evil (POE) to show that God cannot be all loving or all powerful moved to the probabilistic argument. The inductive version admits that it is possible for the traditional God of Christianity and evil to coexist, but it is highly improbable for them to coexist. The argument looks like this:

1. If a god exists who is all loving and all powerful,
2. yet evil exists,
3. then it is highly improbable or unlikely that a god exists who is all loving or all powerful.

Let me make a few observations. Notice that even if the Christian granted this argument, this argument does not show that God does not exist. It is, however, a step along that path. At most, this argument can claim that the type of God posited by traditional Christianity does not exist. Further, this argument cannot show that God is not all loving and not all powerful; it can only show that one of this is incorrect. But this is all only the case if we grant this argument, and there are powerful reasons not to grant it.[/u]

Given that this post is way too long already, I'll be brief here, and will flesh out my comments on this version as other posts come in (if anybody actually gets this far into the novel

(1) Given the full scope of the evidence for God's existence, it is far more likely than not that God exists.

(2) Because of our finite nature, we are not in a good position to asses with a sufficient confidence that God has no morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evils that occur.

(3) Christianity entails doctrines that increase the probability that God and evil coexist

I look forward to your comments.

[The Happy Humanist]

Sorry its taken me so long to respond. Quite frankly, it's taken me this long to get over the shock of realizing that Harvey1 has actually conceded a point. I guess there's a first time for everything.

At first, you said,

There is "nothing," so there is nothing for God to pre-exist.

Then you concede,

God causally precedes the material universe, but existed when there was nothing.

So we are finally on the same page. God pre-existed the universe. He existed at a time when there was nothing. So if there was nothing, there were no constraints on God, since constraints are "somethings." No constraints, that is, apart from his own nature, which includes omnibenevolence. This omnibenevolence would prevent him from creating a universe in which humans would endure suffering. Whatever good could possibly come from millenia of abject misery, could certainly be recreated directly by an omnipotent (or even ultipotent) creator, without all the fol-de-rol. That is my point.

I'll address the other points after my wife stops yelling at me.

[harvey1]

...it's taken me this long to get over the shock of realizing that Harvey1 has actually conceded a point.

I've conceded many points in the past, but I don't see this as a case here.

At first, you said,

"The phenomenal world begins in darkness and void" because God made it that way

Why is this necessary? It seems to me that if God made no action at all, there would be nothing--that is, the phenomenal world would be void of all stuff. This is a state of incompleteness and could give God good reason to give completeness to creation.

I am speaking of the time before there is a phenomenal world, when there is nothing to be void or incomplete. At some point God (who I assume you agree pre-existed such a world) decided to create it, and to put stuff in it.

There is "nothing," so there is nothing for God to pre-exist.

Then you concede,

God causally precedes the material universe, but existed when there was nothing.

So we are finally on the same page. God pre-existed the universe. He existed at a time when there was nothing.

If you read the context of our dialogue in the first response, it was your erroneous claim that "'[t]he phenomenal world begins in darkness and void' because God made it that way" which began that bit about me having to eventually say that God can exist prior to there being something in the phenomenal world. That is, it is logically impossible for there to be a creation unless God has created something. If God has not created anything, then there is nothing.

So if there was nothing, there were no constraints on God, since constraints are "somethings."

When I say "nothing" I was quite clear that I was talking about the phenomenal world. Constraints can exist even if there's no atoms in the world. For example, at 10^-35 seconds after the big bang inflation got underway, and there were no atoms at this time, but there were plenty of constraints. Many quantum cosmologists believe the universe originated from non-material constraints called the laws of physics that existed prior to the phenomenal world.

This omnibenevolence would prevent him from creating a universe in which humans would endure suffering. Whatever good could possibly come from millenia of abject misery, could certainly be recreated directly by an omnipotent (or even ultipotent) creator, without all the fol-de-rol. That is my point.

I think that you are making a claim of knowledge with not enough information. For one, it might be downright evil for God to exist in a state of aloneness. God may have no choice based on being a Being that brings about all-goodness to exist; so God is all-goodness by existing and bringing about all-good. You condemn it, but you'll be the first to thank God if everyone you ever lost and felt a great deal of pain for because of what has happened to them is in God's loving presence for eternity. But, even if you don't, God is not less omnibenelovent if it just is a matter of logical fact that omnibenevolence requires God to bring about a universe that experiences death and suffering. I myself am saddened by the fact that the universe must go through suffering for goodness to come, but life is short and the joy of everlasting life in God's heavenly kingdom would make it all worth it to me. It's certainly a lot better of a picture of reality than what you are painting on that little canvas of your's. I'll hang my picture in place of your's any day of the week.

[The Happy Humanist]

Harvey1, are you saying that God had no choice but to create the universe? After all, at this point, there is God and there is nothing. God is all-good, the "nothing" is value-neutral. Therefore that which exists is all-good. Now perhaps his all-good nature might compel him to create more goodness, in which case he can create humanity already in heaven, fully glorified and sanitized. If, instead, you are saying that something compels him to take the long route, creating a universe knowing that there would be suffering, that makes it sound more like God is less a free agent and more some kind of programmed machine. At any point, did God have a choice not to create the universe?

life is short and the joy of everlasting life in God's heavenly kingdom would make it all worth it to me.

Now who's making a claim of knowledge without enough information?

[The Happy Humanist]

(PS: Yay! I'm a Sage! )

[harvey1]

Harvey1, are you saying that God had no choice but to create the universe?

This is how I read your question:

Are you saying that God had no choice but to be Good?

Well, this is a bit of a tail chasing question. God chooses to be Good because as God this is what God would choose. If God were not God, then God would choose what "God" would choose as being not God. However, since God is God, God chooses those things that as God, that God would choose--which is goodness. Goodness is exemplified by being good, which means by creating goodness when there is darkness. Hence, goodness means overcoming evil, which God does as being good would require.

the "nothing" is value-neutral. Therefore that which exists is all-good.

No. Goodness does not yet exist in terms of that which is other than God, and therefore the world is not complete (i.e., it is evil).

Now perhaps his all-good nature might compel him to create more goodness, in which case he can create humanity already in heaven, fully glorified and sanitized.

You're assuming that the process doesn't matter, and that's a very poor assumption since we know that even in mathematics the process to proving truth has a very particular process to it. In fact, I cannot think of one good thing that I know of which doesn't require a process (e.g., families, romantic love, etc.).

If, instead, you are saying that something compels him to take the long route, creating a universe knowing that there would be suffering, that makes it sound more like God is less a free agent and more some kind of programmed machine. At any point, did God have a choice not to create the universe?

Well, without replying again to the chasing tail question issue which I answered above, God could certainly of had a choice to create our universe with great evil in it if it meets God's criteria for reaching ultimate Goodness. There's free will in this decision, but that doesn't imply that God wouldn't have created anything at all.

life is short and the joy of everlasting life in God's heavenly kingdom would make it all worth it to me.

Now who's making a claim of knowledge without enough information?

Life is short, TMM. And, having a wonderful heavenly world where you reunite with loved ones would be worth it to me. Why is this a claim of knowledge without enough information?

[The Happy Humanist]

God chooses to be Good because as God this is what God would choose. If God were not God, then God would choose what "God" would choose as being not God. However, since God is God, God chooses those things that as God, that God would choose--which is goodness. Goodness is exemplified by being good, which means by creating goodness when there is darkness. Hence, goodness means overcoming evil, which God does as being good would require.

Talk about tail-chasing...

First of all, the entire point of my post is that it is arguable that creating the universe was a good act, especially in comparison to the alternative I presented. I hear your arguments about God having to meet some criteria, having to go through some process, and I can't help seeing it as a contrivance.

Let's go to the videotape:

God is an all-good free agent, yet he is compelled by some "process" or "criteria" to create a universe of suffering, instead of creating mankind fully sanitized and glorified in heaven.

God is omniscient, yet he has to prove (to whom?) that this so-called "process" works.

Forgive me if I am not bowled over with your logic.

And, having a wonderful heavenly world where you reunite with loved ones would be worth it to me. Why is this a claim of knowledge without enough information?

Because you only have God's word for it that such a heavenly world exists. Perhaps it is part of some "process" or "criteria" for God to lie to us about this heavenly world, part of some unforeseen greater good towards which he is working, one that does not involve humanity, but some higher form of life that is more worthy.

You see what happens when you invent contrivances in debates such as these? You get bonked in the head with your own "Get Out Of Jail Free" cards.

[otseng]

Sorry for this late reply. Been out of town, catching up on work, preparing to move into a new house, etc.

mmmm....not quite "potent" enough. I chose "ulti"potent because it implies ultimacy...that is, as powerful as an entity can be; the most powerful entity. Not necessarily all-powerful or infinitely powerful, but powerful enough to qualify as God.

Ultipotent sounds good to me then.

If happiness is good, then your omnibenevolent God must answer as to why he does not provide it on a continual basis.

I throw the question back at you, why must God provide happiness on a continual basis?

What "good" is he otherwise?

I do not equate "good" with "happiness". Just because something is good, it will not necessarily make you happy. Or even if something makes you happy, it is not necessarily good.

But if you had the power to wiggle your nose, and poof, your kids could be happy the rest of their lives, would you not use it?

No, just making them happy all the time would produce spoiled brats. Further, I do not believe that happiness is the highest thing to seek for in this world. (And I don't believe the Bible says so either.) So, no, if I had the power, I would not use it.

I'd like to get back to defining "evil". ... "Evil is an intent or action of a free agent that violates the wishes of another free agent."

Don't like it. Too many exceptions.

Thinking about it more myself, I can see other exceptions to the definition I offered. But more thoughts on defining evil below.

Evil: An act is evil if it can reasonably be expected by the actor to cause unnecessary pain. An intent is evil if actualizing it would knowingly result in an evil act. Note that this definition embraces evil acts against one's self, such as becoming addicted to harmful drugs. No second agent is necessary. Note also that "failing to act" is itself an act, for this purpose. So God's failing to prevent the tsunami, if it was within his power to do so, qualifies as an evil act.

Pain would be a component of evil, but I'm wondering how to classify something as "unnecessary". Suppose a boyfriend and girlfriend have a major quarrel. The BF calls it quits and breaks up the relationship. The GF is deeply hurt and can't let him go. The GF sees the breakup as unnecessary pain. Did the BF commit evil?

So far, here are some more components of what would make something evil:
- Violation of freewill
- Pain
- Unconstructive/destructive purpose

I'm sure there are other things to refine the description of evil, but hopefully we're getting closer.

Let me also go over the two positions on the PoE that I see.

First is my argument, that if God has done nothing to address evil, then the PoE argument is valid and that God cannot be ultipotent and omni(ulti)benevolent. It seems my argument here stands since nobody has challenged this. And as I've explained with the illustration with me being ultipotent on this forum, it is not necessary for God to stop all evil for him to be ultipotent.

The second point I think is where most atheists seem to want to argue. That is God must stop/prevent all evil from ever occurring. And I do not believe it is possible to do this (at least in this world). Primarily because it would require violating freewills to do this. I do not believe it is possible to have good or evil without freewill. If there is no free choice, then things are just neutral. So, if evil exist, then freewill must exist. If freewill is to exist, then stopping all evil cannot exist, otherwise freewill would not exist. So, stopping all evil would not be a logical possibility.

THH, you bring up the point that in heaven, evil would not exist. Does that mean that people in heaven will not have any freewill? I do not think so. People would've already demonstrated they have freewill while they were on earth. They freely chose to do evil or good while on earth. In heaven, they would always choose to do good.

[harvey1]

First of all, the entire point of my post is that it is arguable that creating the universe was a good act, especially in comparison to the alternative I presented. I hear your arguments about God having to meet some criteria, having to go through some process, and I can't help seeing it as a contrivance.... God is an all-good free agent, yet he is compelled by some "process" or "criteria" to create a universe of suffering, instead of creating mankind fully sanitized and glorified in heaven. God is omniscient, yet he has to prove (to whom?) that this so-called "process" works... Forgive me if I am not bowled over with your logic.

Again, the mathematician is in a very similar plight. If we call mathematical truth as "good," then in order to create good things one must admit to a certain process. You can't just say, as a mathematician, that Goldbach's conjecture is true. You have to prove it for it to be true. Similarly, I think that God cannot just declare something as true (/good), first God must show that it meets the quality of being true by adhering to a process (e.g., logical consistency). You might think as a person interested in mathematics that this proof thing is all very contrived. Perhaps you want what you believe to be true because it looks good and beautiful, but that doesn't cut it. There could exist inconsistencies in your imagined structure that would entail you to violate mathematical procedure to arrive at your imagined structure. Similarly, if God choose to create an Omega state world that does not show a logical flow as to how it exists, then that would be a violation of what it means to exist. Existence is tied to rationality, and if something is not rational then that means that it is not possible. God cannot create an logically impossible world, God can only create worlds that are logically possible. To do so, God must look at process. God must be able to prove that there's no conservation laws of logic being violated (e.g., magic).

Because you only have God's word for it that such a heavenly world exists. Perhaps it is part of some "process" or "criteria" for God to lie to us about this heavenly world, part of some unforeseen greater good towards which he is working, one that does not involve humanity, but some higher form of life that is more worthy.

No, I have many mathematical structures whose beauty can be shown to exist by mathematical processes. Therefore, I am only extending all processes in nature by analogy to these mathematical processes. If that analogy is valid, then it is reasonable to say that a beautiful object will be reached through evolutionary processes.

You see what happens when you invent contrivances in debates such as these? You get bonked in the head with your own "Get Out Of Jail Free" cards.

Your making claims based on insufficient information. My argument of the mathematician at work is a perfectly valid argument that defutes your assumptions, and hence your conclusions. In fact, I can argue that the world certainly appears to follow mathematical describable processes, and therefore one ought to think that a mathematical object is going to be the result. I just drew a "Community Chest" card.

[The Happy Humanist]

Again, the mathematician is in a very similar plight. If we call mathematical truth as "good," then in order to create good things one must admit to a certain process.

So God is now a mathematician, working it all out with a pencil. No longer all-powerful, he is a slave to his own process, which he must "prove" to God-only-knows-who.

Tell me something, Harvey, is this Iraqi boy part of the process? Why don't you try discussing your theodicy with him. Ask him if he feels that God, or Allah, or any other supreme being, is a mathematician, and that the loss of his arms is just part of the "process" of making things alright, and that God/Allah needs to "prove" to whomever that the end justifies the means.

On second thought, never mind, he will probably say "yes." And that is the saddest thing of all.

If that analogy is valid, then it is reasonable to say that a beautiful object will be reached through evolutionary processes.

Ultipotence would seem to suggest that it could be reached via more direct processes, as well. Without horrors like the one above.

My argument of the mathematician at work is a perfectly valid argument that defutes your assumptions, and hence your conclusions.

Its not even an argument, Harvey, its a metaphor, and a contrived one at that. Mathematicians only prove axioms to see, or to show, that they are valid for all cases. An omniscient being would "see" in advance the results of his handiwork, and would have no one to "show" it to. The only reason there are mathematicians is because humans don't know everything about math. Try saying that about your God.

[harvey1]

So God is now a mathematician, working it all out with a pencil. No longer all-powerful, he is a slave to his own process, which he must "prove" to God-only-knows-who.

I don't recall saying that this is a show-and-tell exercise. Rather, I recall saying that "existence is tied to rationality." In order for an object or event to exist, there must be a logical causal chain of affairs that does not violate logical possibility. I would say that it is impossible for God to cause something to exist without reason, and it is equally impossible for God to cause something to exist by violating conservation laws. Your idea of God being able to "poof" something into its end state without going through a process is a violation of conservation laws (e.g., the preservation of logical principles and physical constants).

The poor Iraqi boy suffers a great deal, along with millions of others in the world because of evil that exists. It is the result of living in a natural world that has not yet been transformed into a world where there is no pain, suffering, or death. I believe there is a God that is working to bring about this new age, but not prior to the end of the natural world.

Ultipotence would seem to suggest that it could be reached via more direct processes, as well. Without horrors like the one above.

Again, you are assuming that conservation laws can be violated. If you violate conservation laws, you have a paradox.

My argument of the mathematician at work is a perfectly valid argument that defutes your assumptions, and hence your conclusions.

Its not even an argument, Harvey, its a metaphor, and a contrived one at that.

The mathematician metaphor is a metaphor, but the argument is that God cannnot violate conservation laws (of the logical and physical varieties) is a reasonable argument for evil to exist. You haven't even addressed that argument. You just assume that there can be no conservation laws that impact an ultipotent creator, and I think that assumption must be justified. The mathematician metaphor illustrates how poor that assumption is with regard to how mathematics is done, and given the fundamental nature of math with regard to how the universe is organized, I think it is a very good metaphor.

Mathematicians only prove axioms to see, or to show, that they are valid for all cases. An omniscient being would "see" in advance the results of his handiwork, and would have no one to "show" it to. The only reason there are mathematicians is because humans don't know everything about math. Try saying that about your God.

This is not all that mathematicians do (although technically they don't prove axioms, they derive and prove theorems--but I know what you mean). They also try to construct new branches of mathematics (e.g., non-Euclidean geometry) by adding, subtracting, or changing an axiom. If a branch of math is possible, then if platonism is correct you'd also have to commit to that branch of math as being discovered because it "exists." Not only do the theorems exist, but the deductions on how that theorem is derived also exist. Similarly, if the Omega state is a theorem in God's kingdom, then the deductions (universes) that arrive at the Omega state also exist. If those "deductions" include evil, then evil must exist--i.e., evil cannot but exist.

Here's another way of looking at it. Why do you think that evil is unlikely to exist in this scenario? It seems to me that arriving at a Omega state could entail many conceivable paths. Why assume that path must be a path without evil? It seems quite natural that arriving at an Omega state might have certain limitations, and those limitations are via evil existing. Even if there were Omega states that did not require evil to exist in order to arrive at that particular Omega state, that doesn't mean that the Omega states where evil was needed to arrive at it can't also exist. That would be like saying that group theory can't exist because it requires the use of groups. It does exist--must exist--and therefore it does require the existence of groups. Our Omega state does exist, because it is a possible world that God would want to exist and it is not impossible for it to exist. In order to say that our Omega state future (which requires the existence of evil) cannot exist is if it is impossible for evil to co-exist with God. Yet, that's a very strong argument to say that evil cannot co-exist with God when it is surely seems possible that evil can co-exist with God. If it is possible for evil to exist for God, then this implies that God would make such a world if God wants all Omega state that can possibly exist to actually exist.

So, again, I see you making assumptions that just are not justified. Yoda: "Based on ignorance they are."