The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a “possible world� (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be false…or a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isn’t President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, it’s possible.

That being said; let’s turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, I’d like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)…an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying “It is possible for a necessary being to exist�.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because God’s existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, God’s existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, you’ve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting “The argument is not valid� or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I don’t think that you can, can you?

[For_The_Kingdom]

That's the point: You have defined God as a necessary being, but does it follow that God is a necessary being?

But the argument isn't " God is defined as a necessary being, therefore, God must exist"

That isn't the argument, is it? No, it isn't. Yet, that is the contention of your above quote, which doesn't reflect the actual argument.

... If you actually have a proof that God is necessary, then the modal ontological argument is entirely redundant. There is no need to demonstrate that the possibility of a MGB existing logically leads to God existence, because it is trivial:
God is necessary, therefore God exist. That was the first thing I brought up in response to you. We are way ahead of you.

You are still misrepresenting the argument...see, you said it again; "God is necessary, therefore, God exists".

That isn't even the argument...that isn't even one of the PREMISES of the argument.

[Furrowed Brow]

Anyone following the details of this thread should now be aware the MOA is valid in a modal system called S5. In this system the implication possibly necessary p implies p in the form <>[]p -> p is a theorem. The implication is not a theorem in every modal logic. Thus it takes a particular definition of necessity for the MOA to be valid. There are reasons to doubt this version of necessity within a possible world semantic.

R is the accessibility relationship. The idea of accessibility is a standard device in possible world semantics.

Accessibility simply means that if in one possible world we shall call world w, another possible world we shall call world u is accessible so long as nothing in u is impossible within world w. A simple example might be if Abraham Lincoln is dead in world w then world u is accessible so long as Abraham Lincoln is also dead in u. If u is a world in which Lincoln is alive then world w (where Lincoln is dead) cannot access world u (where Lincoln is alive)…..or as we shall maybe this limitation does not hold true and we might allow Lincoln to be resurrected.

The doubts about S5’s version of necessity run as follows. In S5 possible world semantics the Euclidean accessibility relationship between worlds holds true viz.,

• wRu & wRv => uRv.

This notation means that world u is accessible from world w and world v is also accessible from world w, then, world v is accessible from world u. We might also write vRu, as accessibility must run both ways.

Here’s the problem: if Abraham Lincoln is alive in world w, and also alive in world u, but world v is the world in which Lincoln comes to be assassinated, then wRu & wRv may hold true I.E. Lincoln is alive in w and as he is alive in u, then u is accessible. Whilst alive in w he may still come to be assassinated and thus world v is accessible from world w. But if Lincoln is dead in v then world u is not accessible from world v.

Here I tried to draw the accessibility relationships.

[center][/center]

What this shows is that a non-reversible event like an assassination is not a Euclidean property and S5 fails to give a convincing account of this kind of property that has an irreversible before and an after. If the MOA is a general truth then w lose the top world map with the direction arrow (accessibility) going only one way between u and v. What we get is...

[center][/center]

...worlds where Lincoln is dead may access worlds where Lincoln is alive. In other words it is allowed that Lincoln may be resurrected.

For_The_Kingdom’s advocacy of the MOA relies on a definition of necessity that says if something is possibly necessary it is actually true. There is a Euclidean relationship behind this definition of necessity. The point is well known, and it is easily seen: if something is necessarily true in w and w can access v and w can also access u then this thing that is necessary in w is also necessarily true in both v and u, and thus v and u may access each other. This looks plausible except of course we have just seen one kind of property for which this accessibility relationship fails to give a credible account. Consequently, we have to cherry pick the concepts for which we might consider system S5 to be useful, or for this definition of necessity to hold true we must deny irreversibility i.e. Lincoln assassinated in one world may come back to life in another possible world. This may be consistent with the idea of an omnipotent God that can break any rule it wishes and so Abraham Lincoln may indeed be resurrected. In this sense S5 has the right properties for a modal logic that permits the existence of God. However anyone wishing to hang on to the idea of cause and effect, before and after, the idea of time and so forth may find the modal logic behind the MOA invites too many questions and problems to be convincing.

[Willum]

[Replying to For_The_Kingdom]

That isn't even the argument...that isn't even one of the PREMISES of the argument.

Well, we've destroyed the premise of the argument, and all you've done is ignore or deny it. We are all getting rather desperate to show you the MOA is a fallacy.

Perhaps our next step is to invoke "Alice in Wonderland," verses to convince you. Use fire to fight fire as it were.

[JoeyKnothead]

On "omnipresent", on "omni", on how proud I am, to declare the subjective has magically morphed into reality, 'cause it is, I'm a-hopin' it does:

Our problem here is with the issue of "possible", "all places", and "all time".

Who here's so proud to say their calculations show it? Who then is equally proud to present their calculations?

Then, there's the problem of this proposed "all places" god, a-hidin' in the toilet, when we was expecting us some privacy.

Is a god who's "omnipresent" such a cuss, he'd fret our toiletarial behaviors?

And is this god so "omnipresent", that we need to consult us the Bible when we gotta clip us off a deuce? For fear we might strangle God in the process?

This is the absurdity of declaring something's everywhere.

If such is true and factual, shame on every dang one of y'all, that ever flushed y'all a commode. Y'all ain't no better'n them that strung up Jesus, y'all God down the drain flushers y'all. Or the god that'd hide down in the bowl, so's he can tell you're a sinner or not, well shame on him too.


Omniscient.

If God's so omniscient he can tell if me releasing gastual pressures was appropriate or not, well he's just a busybody like the rest of his bunch.

Omnipresent.

Well God, you be as everywhere as it is you wanna be. Just don't complain to me when I flush you down the sewer. I can't help you sewer dwell, and won't be made to feel shame that ya do.

Omni-hand-over-the-ears.

Well don't it beat all, as long as OP keeps snuggling his ears underneath his hands, the only -possible- conclusion is that God exists. And is present in every toilet in the land!

[Kenisaw]

Ok, I'm totally cherry picking here, but I had to respond to this.

You are suggesting an eternal past is absurd, yet an eternal God is not?

I think anything eternal fries my brain when I think about it too hard, but if you are going to grant one thing is absurd to being eternal, I think you are destroying your own argument for something else being eternal.

There is a difference in existing eternally, and existing eternally in time. One is absurd, and the other one isn't.

Can you guess which one is, and which one isn't?

Why is one absurd?

Here is the entire quote that you were "too lazy to go and find", let me know you'd thoughts please

[Kenisaw]

Which is why those two sentences of mine you quote separately were written together. Just because it can be imagined does not mean it is possible. Just because you can imagine a MGB does not make it possible. You just agreed with me.

When it comes to necessary propositions, if we can imagine it, it is possible.

Why is it absurd? How is the premise faulty? Details my boy, details...

I forgot what I was responding to, nor did you provide the full context in your quote...and I am too lazy to go back and fetch it.

That is all an ugly 3-headed monster, isn't it.

Actually the question of why is relevant, since philosophy is all about asking "why". But that wasn't even the point.

My point was, even if I am unable to tell you "why" a MGB needs to exist, that still doesn't invalidate the argument in any way, shape, or form...making it irrelevant.

But even with that being said, answer that question, just not regarding this argument.

The point was that "necessary" isn't part of your premise. You've changed the premise in the middle of the argument. And you got caught doing it too.

Um, I gave the definition of the MGB in this context...that was in the preface, before the actual argument was laid out.

You haven't addressed any of my points yet. One of them you didn't even understand the point made. I'd say it is false logic to claim the argument remains unrefuted. (To continue that using your methodology, we can now say that your claim is necessarily refuted)...

I did.

No you didn't. From the OP: "Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying “It is possible for a necessary being to exist�. This is where you run amok. Nowhere have you shown that a MGB is necessary. You go from a premise that a MGB is possible to a claim that it is necessary. That it is possible (which it actually isn't per post 110) doesn't make it necessary. There is no evidence that it is necessary. You still haven't rectified this dilemma...

[Blastcat]

[Replying to post 1 by For_The_Kingdom]

The Ontological argument for the existence of Vampyres.

Let us suppose that you (still the fool, sorry - I hope you don't mind...) understand the concept of a Vampyre as the worst possible bloodsucking undead being that could ever be conceived

(The idea of) Vampyre thus ``exists in your understanding''.

1. You can conceive of this Vampyre existing in reality, that is, not just in your understanding. If you can understand the idea of Vampyre, you can imagine that the Vampyre exists outside of just your understanding.

2. But gee, a Vampyre that exists in reality is worse than (more evil than) something that just exists in your understanding, incapable of giving a single living being a single undead bite. Therefore either you couldn't really conceive of the idea of Vampyre in your understanding or...

3. The Vampyre must exist in reality, because a Vampyre that exists in reality is Eviller than one that exists only in your understanding and Vampyre is the Evillest bloodsucking undead thing you can conceive of.

from http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/Philosophy ... ode46.html

[rikuoamero]

While working today, I realized that no-one else has yet to make this point.
The fact that the MOA is an invalid logical argument, in that it sneaks its conclusion into its premises.

Here's how it goes. In the theist's mind, the person who is proposing the argument, arguing in favour of it, there is one and precisely only one 'God'. There can be no other. This god has characteristics it shares with no-one else.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

The phrase 'Maximally Great Being' is nothing more than a mask for God, specifically the God of the theist who is proposing this argument. Notice how in this thread, the name God, with a capital G, was used more than once. Notice how often, when other entities were proposed using the exact same argument, they were rejected.
So let's do a little copy and replace shall we?

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that God exists

2. If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world.

3. If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in every possible world.

4. If God exists in every possible world, then God exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.

6. Therefore, God exists.

I like to collapse this down to
1. It is possible God exists
2. Therefore, God exists.
or God, Therefore God. The conclusion is in the premise, which last I checked is a no-no for logical arguments.

[For_The_Kingdom]

[Replying to post 151 by For_The_Kingdom]

My point was, even if I am unable to tell you "why" a MGB needs to exist, that still doesn't invalidate the argument in any way, shape, or form...making it irrelevant.

Woah woah woah...woah. Hold on there a second. You're in a philosophical argument with someone...and you think that when you are UNABLE to answer a WHY question, that somehow DOESN'T invalidate your argument?

There is a difference in "why THINK the cause is necessary", and "Why MUST the cause be necessary".

[For_The_Kingdom]

[Replying to post 149 by For_The_Kingdom]

Never have I seen such a long thread over what the word 'possible' means.

Some of us, including myself, originally granted that anything is possible using the colloquial meaning of 'possible'. i.e. there is a chance where the chance is 0 to 100 percent.

Now that most everyone realizes that this argument hinges on a more formal meaning of possible i.e. >0 % chance, many have since rejected the whole thing at premise 1, myself included.

Long story short, nobody has been convinced and most are now busy eating popcorn watching For_The_Kingdom trying to convince those who are still participating that God is real because of fancy word play.

Cool. Then I don't expect to see you on this thread any longer.