Evidentialism...Is it viable?

[Ionian_Tradition]

Surely I am not beyond correction, but it seems to me that the most intellectually satisfactory epistemic framework one can adopt is that of Foundationalist Evidentialism (not to be confused with classical Empiricism) viz. the notion that, barring all basal assumptions, no sufficiently plausible belief can be shown to exist without reference to some form of evidentiary support (be it experiential or argumentative). In other words, both observation, and the very nature of plausibility itself, suggests that if a belief is to be made plausible, it must be supported by evidence. As such, the plausibility of a belief will be measured in proportion to the evidence in support thereof. I would go further by adding that though all evidence based beliefs enjoy varying degrees of plausibility in proportion to the evidence which supports them, not all beliefs will be deemed sufficiently plausible by consensus. Only beliefs for which there exists mutually verifiable evidence can a measure of demonstrable plausibility be properly identified by multiple observers. To illustrate, let us suppose that I believe that all human beings possess a moral imperative to eradicate all forms of “Bieber Fever� from the face of the Earth. Suppose my belief enjoys evidence in the form of a strong intuitive conviction upon which my belief is founded. It could be said that the impassioned “moral intuitiveness� which instructs my vitriolic hatred of all things “Bieber� constitutes a form of evidence which renders my belief plausible. Granted, the fundamentally subjective nature of my own moral dispositions, as well as the conspicuous absence of additional evidence supporting the existence of a transcendent moral standard by which we might assess the moral quality of “Bieberdom�, renders the notion of there existing an objectively binding moral imperative to vanquish “Bieber Fever� from the Earth somewhat dubious (much to my chagrin of course). For this reason, we might say that the plausibility of my belief is quite low. Moreover, since the reliability of my moral intuition cannot be mutually verified, it follows that my belief is also lacking in demonstrable evidence. It is therefore likely that my belief will not prove very persuasive, and could potentially be rejected out of hand. Thus, if I am to convince others that my belief is indeed veridical, I ought to scrounge up additional evidence (of the demonstrable variety) which would serve to heighten both the plausibility of my belief, and in turn, its overall persuasiveness.

So it is with all beliefs (again, with the exception of basal assumptions). The degree to which a belief is both plausible and mutually persuasive will be contingent upon the amount of verifiable evidence which exists in its support. A common objection to this brand of Epistemology is that Evidentialism is ultimately self-refuting (there is no evidence that Evidentialism is true), but such claims fail to address the subtle complexities of the theory and are largely reduced to a set of semantic cavils. The two central claims of Foundationalist Evidentialism (as I have defined it) are 1.) No sufficiently plausible belief can be shown to exist without reference to some form of evidentiary support, and 2.) (from 1.) It is more evident than its negation that all sufficiently plausible beliefs must be supported by evidence. Notice that both 1 & 2 do enjoy evidence in support of their veracity. The evidence for 1 is born from observations concerning the very nature of plausibly with regard to all known beliefs and 2 is made plausible by an appeal to 1. With that said, it is not the aim of the Evidentialist to “prove� that Evidentialism is true (per se), rather the aim is to show that Evidentialism is more plausible than competing theories in addressing the “problem of justification� (one of the salient questions pertinent to Epistemological philosophy). Since it is evident that the evidence in support of Foundationalist Evidentialism far outweighs the complete absence of evidence in support of its negation, it follows that (far from being an exercise in self-refutation) Foundational Evidentialism is a sufficiently plausible, if not superior, method of Epistemology.


Question for debate:

Is Foundationalist Evidentialism self refuting, or does it constitute a viable epistemological model?

[Nilloc James]

Can any system be entirely self consistent and justify itself?

I don't think so.

Ultimately we have to make some assumptions, just the smaller the assumptions the better.

[Talishi]

Can any system be entirely self consistent and justify itself?

No, in 1930 Kurt Godel demonstrated this cannot happen when he developed a language to encode propositions in number theory as numbers, and then using that language produced a well-formed, recursive theorum that said, "I'm not a well-formed theorum". The Liar's paradox in formal language.

[Friedrich]

Can any system be entirely self consistent and justify itself?

No, in 1930 Kurt Godel demonstrated this cannot happen ...

I would have to disagree with Kurt. As there is a system that is entirely self consistent and can justify itself, and that system is the very Universe that we inhabit. We may at times think that it does but the Universe never contradicts itself.

[Talishi]

[I would have to disagree with Kurt. As there is a system that is entirely self consistent and can justify itself, and that system is the very Universe that we inhabit. We may at times think that it does but the Universe never contradicts itself.

Have you heard that neutral kaons can turn into their own anti-particles, but the reverse operation does not occur with the same probability? This is called charge-parity violation, and it's an inconsistency that is very important. It's why we live in a universe that has a gross imbalance between matter and anti-matter.

[Friedrich]

[Replying to post 5 by Talishi]

Be that as it may, but I don't see that as a contradiction. Rather it is more like a feature, that is just how the Universe works, and consistently.