Scientism and Scientific Fallacies and Role of Philosophy

[Rob]

[S]ientism is the concept that science can and will resolve every question or problem in any realm if given enough time and resources. I do not think that most professional researchers readily subscribe to it, but I know of individuals who seem to.

-- Pigliucci, Massimo. Denying Evolution: Creationism, Scientism, and the Nature of Science. Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates; 2002; p. 184.

Philosophy is not meant to "solve" problems the way science does, and most certainly not to solve scientific problems. The role of the philosopher -- at least in the modern understanding of the word -- is to be a metathinker, to think about how we reach certain conclusions and by what means we proceed in our inquiries (epistemology), as well as to elaborate on the relationship between what we do and what we should do (ethics) and on the big picture of reality (metaphysics). Although all these philosophical activities must be informed by science (or the philosopher will condemn herself to a rather sterile exercise in logic decoupled from the real world), they are not scientific and their effectiveness cannot be judged by scientific standards. It is precisely this obsession with applying scientific standards to everything else that characterizes scientism.

-- Pigliucci, Massimo. Denying Evolution: Creationism, Scientism, and the Nature of Science. Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates; 2002; p. 115.

While I accept the evidence for evolution, as almost all scientists do, I do not accept the philosophy of materialism that is assumed or defended by many scientists. Materialism is the assertion that matter is the fundamental reality in the universe. Materialism is a form of metaphysics (a set of claims concerning the most general characteristics and constituents of reality). It is often accompanied by a second assertion: the scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge. This is a form of epistemology (a set of claims concerning inquiry and the acquisition of knowledge). The two assertions are linked: if the only real entities are those with which science deals, then science is the only valid path to knowledge. (Barbour 2002: 4-5)

In addition, many forms of materialism express reductionism. Epistemological reductionism claims that the laws and theories of all the sciences are in principle reducible to the laws of physics and chemistry. Metaphysical reductionism claims that the component parts of any system determine its behavior. The materialist believes that all phenomena will eventually be explained in terms of the actions of material components, which are the only effective causes in the world. In the past, powerful new theories excited the imagination of scientists who sometimes extrapolated them beyond their proper domains. In the eighteenth century many scientists thought that Newtonian physics could in principle account for all phenomena, but in the twentieth century quantum physics has shown the limits of such predictability. Today molecular biology is an immensely fruitful research program, and we may be tempted to think that it will explain the behavior of all living things. But new ideas in the biological sciences encourage a less reductionist view. (Barbour 2002: 5)

Scientists have often extended scientific concepts beyond their scientific use to support comprehensive materialistic philosophies. The identification of the real with measurable properties that can be correlated by exact mathematical relationships started in the physical sciences, but it influenced scientists in other fields and continues today. I would argue that the quantifiable properties of matter have been abstracted from the real world by ignoring the particularity of events and the nonquantifiable aspects of human experience. We do not have to conclude that matter alone is real or that mind, purpose, and human love are only byproducts of matter in motion. (Barbour 2002: 5)

In their popular writings, scientists tend to invoke the authority of science for ideas that are not really part of science itself. Theism and materialism are alternative belief systems, each claiming to encompass all reality. If science is taken to be the only acceptable form of understanding, then explanation in terms of evolutionary history, biochemical mechanisms, or scientific theories excludes all other forms of explanation. (Barbour 2002: 5)

-- Barbour, Ian G. Nature, Human Nature, and God. Minneapolis: Fortress Press; 2002; pp. 4-5.

[Rob]

[W]hen the facts speak against the adequacy of the concepts, something needs to give way. (Weinert 2004: 95) The notion of presupposition is well known to philosophers and historians of science.... It has often been observed that presuppositions play a pivotal role in human thinking.... It is important to realize that presuppositions change. But it is even more important to inquire how and why they change. (Weinert 2004 100)

The reason for the everlasting interaction between science and philosophy transpires clearly. The human mind musters an admirable ability to think up equations for physical systems. But equations need to be interpreted in terms of physical models and mechanisms. Science requires conceptual understanding. This understanding employs fundamental philosophical notions.

(….) The scientific enterprise comes with philosophical commitments, whether the scientist likes it or not. The scientist needs philosophical ideas, simply because amongst the experimental and mathematical tools in the toolbox of the scientist there are conceptual tools, like fundamental notions. The despairing scientist may ask: ‘Will we ever get an answer?’ The philosopher replies: ‘Not a definitive answer, but a few tentative answers.’ Recall that the philosopher (and the scientist qua philosopher) works with conceptual models. At any one time only a few of these models are in circulation. They cannot provide the definitive answers of which the scientist is fond. But this is typical of models even in the natural sciences.

-- Weinert, Friedel. The Scientist as Philosopher: Philosophical Consequences of Great Scientific Discoveries. Berlin: Springer-Verlag; 2004; pp. 278-279.

[K]nowledge of history helps us appreciate that out current knowledge and convictions are only a moment on a continuum of change. This realization can make us more open to new ideas and less dogmatically certain about what we believe to be true and unchallengeable. Jonathan Cohen, a neuroscientist at Princeton, was recently asked by a reporter why he would want to participate in a symposium on Buddhism and the biology of attention. He replied that: (Valenstein 2005: 182)

"Neuroscientists want to preserve both the substance and the image of rigor in their approach, so one doesn’t want to be seen as whisking out into the la-la land of studying consciousness. On the other hand, my personal belief is that the history of science has humbled us about the hubris of thinking we know everything." (Cited in the New York Times, September 14, 2003, sec, 6, p. 46.)

-- Valenstein, Elliot S. The War of the Soups and the Sparks: The Discovery of Neurotransmitters and the Dispute Over How Nerves Communicate. New York: Columbia University Press; 2005; p. 182.

Catastrophe apart, I believe it to be science's greatest glory that there is no limit upon the power of science to answer questions of the kind science can answer.

-- Medawar, Peter. The Limits of Science. New York HarperCollins; 1984 87.

Science is what replaced traditional societies with the modern, technological, industrial world. What accomplished that transition was the controlled experiment. Science is the body of facts about the natural world that controlled experiments require us to believe, together with logical extrapolations from those facts, and the added things that scientific instruments enable us to see with our own eyes.... Only thus narrowly defined does science tell us what we must believe. Every enlargement of the definition produces cracks into which philosophy can seep to weaken the claims put forward. Because philosophy always allows for reasonable differences, the claim that a scientific hypothesis makes on us weakens in direct proportion to the increase of philosophy in the mix.

-- Smith, Houston. Why Religion Matters: The Fate of the Human Spirit in an Age of Disbelief. New York: HarperCollins; 2001; pp. 191-192.

The underlying axiom of the "strong program" [of "social constructivists"] in the sociology of knowledge and science, whose aim is to understand the reasons why we believe what we think we know, is that these reasons are to be sought exclusively in the social conditions, interactions and arrangements in which we find ourselves. "Symmetry" is an explicit postulate of this program--true and false beliefs are to be treated on an equal footing, and judgments are to be avoided at all costs. In this manner, our knowledge of nature is viewed as socially constructed and therefore relative; questions of the admissibility of evidence, the superiority of one kind of reasoning over another, and the coherence with publicly ascertainable facts are consciously ignored. The anthropologists of science assume they can figure out the reasons why some scientific evidence or theory prevails by studying how scientists interact in their laboratories, seminars, and professional meetings, without being able to or even wanting to understand any of the contents of the discussions and debates. (Newton 1998: 282)

(....) The constructivist enterprise stipulates that logical reasoning on the basis of experimental evidence from the natural world is irrelevant--unless, as some of its adherents contend, this reasoning and the facts themselves are the constructs of social arrangements. If a critic ignores your logic and answers all your arguments by pointing to their purported psychoanalytic, social, ideological, or other extrarational origins--a profoundly anti-intellectual posture carrying with it an unsavory history--you naturally become exasperated and a real debate is foreclosed. (Newton 1998: 282)

To some extent, we physicists may have been unwitting supporters of the relativists. In contrast to earlier times, many of us now eschew the words "truth" and "reality." The term "model" is much more common in physics than it was in the past; even the most fundamental of our present theories of elementary particles is called "the standard model." Still, however cautious, in contrast to Einstein, we tend to be and should be about "reality," we can avoid neither the t-word nor the r-word. Surely our theories, like QED or general relativity, are closer to reality than the models economists construct. Needless to say, this not mean that science is in pursuit of the holy grail of eternal truth, but it is important to keep in mind that whatever sense we mean to give these words, the progress of science is guided by attempts to come closer to a--not necessarily the--true description of reality. Science is not in possession of the bedrock TRUTH and never will be, but neither is all scientific truth flotsam on the waves of social currents. (Newton 1998: 282)

-- Newton, Roger G. Guest Comment: The science wars. American Journal of Physics. 1998 Apr; 66(4):282-293.

The one thing all the authors above have in common, whether scientist, philosopher, or religionist, is the pursuit of truth; the wholehearted love of truth and willingness to follow it wherever it might chance to lead. The comments by scientists, philosophers, and religionists within this thread are self-evident and need no explanation; they speak for themselves for those who have the eyes to see and ears to hear. Science, without philosophy invariably falls into dogmatism and materialism; philosophy and religion without science invariably fall into blind metaphysics and superstition respectively. It is true that "The scientific enterprise comes with philosophical commitments." It is the role of critical philosophical evaluation to make explicit what those presuppositions, those philosophical commitments are, so that we can think consciously about our beliefs and the reasons we claim to know what we know. Scientism is no more a part of true science than creationism is, but is just as frequently encountered on this site as creationism, and is just as stridently dogmatic as any fanatical fundamentalist. And both are a dis-service to science as a human enterprise.

[Furrowed Brow]

I do not accept the philosophy of materialism that is assumed or defended by many scientists. Materialism is the assertion that matter is the fundamental reality in the universe. Materialism is a form of metaphysics (a set of claims concerning the most general characteristics and constituents of reality).

Got to disagree with that one. Materialism is a flight from metaphysics. Meta meaning beyond or higher. Metaphysics being beyond physics.

Philosophy is not meant to "solve" problems the way science does, and most certainly not to solve scientific problems. The role of the philosopher -- at least in the modern understanding of the word -- is to be a metathinker, to think about how we reach certain conclusions and by what means we proceed in our inquiries (epistemology), as well as to elaborate on the relationship between what we do and what we should do (ethics) and on the big picture of reality (metaphysics). Although all these philosophical activities must be informed by science (or the philosopher will condemn herself to a rather sterile exercise in logic decoupled from the real world), they are not scientific and their effectiveness cannot be judged by scientific standards. It is precisely this obsession with applying scientific standards to everything else that characterizes scientism.

Well Pigliucci is giving one view of philosophy. Some philosophers might say the real job of philosophy is to unravel the conceptual knots we tie ourselves up in. In particular epistemology and metaphysics problems dissolve into an analysis of language. The job of the philosopher is then to clear the conceptual terrain of incoherencies.

Also: It was one school of philosophy - logical positivism - that put science on a separate road to metaphysics. Their mantra - if it could not be empirically tested then it was not real. This appealed to science because they tend to do empirical testing. But it was the philosophers who told the scientist that metaphysics was nonsense. Science just took that ball and ran with it gleefully. And what is wrong with that. If they cannot test for it, then what affect on reality does a metaphysical entity/concept have? Answer: nothing repeatable.

It is often accompanied by a second assertion: the scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge. This is a form of epistemology (a set of claims concerning inquiry and the acquisition of knowledge). The two assertions are linked: if the only real entities are those with which science deals, then science is the only valid path to knowledge. (Barbour 2002: 4-5)

Well again I think this is skewed. True some scientist I think are clumsy when putting heir view across And some get a bit muddled over the nature of truth. But why do they insist on sticking to the scientific method? Well frankly it is what they know and do best. unlike metaphysics science does tend to go somewhere, and make gains. Until it stops making gains then it is probably best to be cautious and not posit anything not necessary to explain phenomena. Again if you read someone like Feynman it becomes apparent science is more a pragmatic endeavor, that requires a sceptical attitude to be done well.

We do not have to conclude that matter alone is real or that mind, purpose, and human love are only byproducts of matter in motion. (Barbour 2002: 5)

No we don't. But then why suppose it is anything else? whilst we are developing our knowledge of the universe why presume it is anything more than one thing - or the minds as described by folk psychology is even anything at all.

If we don't need to do it, then keep it simple seems a worthwhile methodology, viz., presume materialism until an introduction of immaterialism is forced upon us. This methodology is also fecund because some concepts under philosophical analysis show themselves to be a product of human language, rather than any deeper immaterialism. The concepts of folk psychology e.g. intentions, wants, desires etc, seems to be one example of this.

. If science is taken to be the only acceptable form of understanding, then explanation in terms of evolutionary history, biochemical mechanisms, or scientific theories excludes all other forms of explanation. (Barbour 2002: 5)

Again I think this is skewed. it is not the explanation but the methodology that is at the heart of the matter.

1) Testable predications
2) Falsification principle
3) Search for the simplest explanation, with the least ad hoc presumptions, with the most explanatory power.

These are just three methodological criteria. Perhaps they can be put better, and more might be added. If a theist can produce an immaterial theory that meets these three criteria better than a material theory then great. Game on. Barbour is wrong about epistemological. It is about methodology. Ok some commentators might overstate the case for science, but any explanation that fails to meet or is weak in respect to 1, 2 and 3 just looks like a lot of empty huffing and puffing.

[Rob]

I do not accept the philosophy of materialism that is assumed or defended by many scientists. Materialism is the assertion that matter is the fundamental reality in the universe. Materialism is a form of metaphysics (a set of claims concerning the most general characteristics and constituents of reality).

Got to disagree with that one. Materialism is a flight from metaphysics. Meta meaning beyond or higher. Metaphysics being beyond physics.

Your confusing methodological materialism with philosophical materialism, when they are two very different things. Barbour is speaking of philosophical materialism, which is very much a meta-physics, as it makes claims and assertions that go beyond the domain of science and are not amenable to its methodologies. Of course, as an atheist, I suspect you have a vested interest in continuing this rhetorical conflation of two different uses of the term Materialism, as it suits your self-chosen religious beliefs.

It was the philosophers who told the scientist that metaphysics was nonsense. Science just took that ball and ran with it gleefully. And what is wrong with that. If they cannot test for it, then what affect on reality does a metaphysical entity/concept have? Answer: nothing repeatable.

Here we see the true hubris of a Mechanistic Materialist, presuming to speak for all science and all scientists. This is the rhetoric of a mechanistic materialist that has a vested interest in espousing his self-chosen religion.

No we don't. But then why suppose it is anything else? whilst we are developing our knowledge of the universe why presume it is anything more than one thing - or the minds as described by folk psychology is even anything at all.

Here is the typical rhetoric of a mechanistic materialist: mind is not "anything at all."

Does consciousness matter?

We cannot rule out the possibility that carefully avoiding the concept of consciousness in quantum cosmology may lead to an artificial narrowing of our outlook. Let us remember an example from the history of science that may be rather instructive in this respect. Prior to the invention of the general theory of relativity, space, time, and matter seemed to be three fundamentally different entities. Space was thought to be a kind of three-dimensional coordinate grid which, when supplemented by clocks, could be used to describe the motion of matter. Spacetime possessed no intrinsic degrees of freedom; it played a secondary role as a tool for the description of the truly substantial material world. The general theory of relativity brought with it a decisive change in this point of view. Spacetime and matter were found to be interdependent, and there was no longer any question which one of the two is more fundamental. Spacetime was also found to have its own inherent degrees of freedom…. This is completely opposite to the previous idea that spacetime is only a tool for the description of matter.

The standard assumption is that consciousness, just like spacetime before the invention of general relativity, plays a secondary, subservient role, being just a function of matter and a tool for the description of the truly existing material world. But let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with perceptions. I know for sure that my pain exists, my “green” exists, and my “sweet” exists. I do not need any proof of their existence, because these events are a part of me; everything else is a theory. Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond our perception. This model of a material world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon we forget about our starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are nothing but a useful tool for the description of matter. This assumption is almost as natural (and maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the description of matter. We are substituting reality of our feelings by the successful working theory of an independently existing material world. And the theory is so successful that we almost never think about its possible limitations.

-- Linde, Andrei, Author. Inflation, quantum cosmology, and the anthropic priniciple. In Science and Ultimate Reality: Quantum Theory, Cosmology and Complexity. (John D. Barrow, Paul C. W. Davies, and Charles L. Harper, Jr., eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2004: 450-451.

Mechanistic Materialists like Mr. Brow like to presume they speak for all scientists. Of course they don't, but they try to give of an air of affectation that they do, because their metaphysical beliefs (religious beliefs regarding materialism) seek to use the logical fallacy of an appeal to the authority of science to support their special pleadings that their beliefs are "true."

[Furrowed Brow]

Hi Rob

Your confusing methodological materialism with philosophical materialism, when they are two very different things. Barbour is speaking of philosophical materialism, which is very much a meta-physics, as it makes claims and assertions that go beyond the domain of science and are not amenable to its methodologies. Of course, as an atheist, I suspect you have a vested interest in continuing this rhetorical conflation of two different uses of the term Materialism, as it suits your self-chosen religious beliefs.

It would be helpful if you could provide clear definitions for methodological materialism and philosophical materialism, and show how they are distinct. Also can you detail some of the claims of philosophical materialism not supported by scientific methodology, and give a clear account of where it departs from scientific methodology.

Vested interest? Well to be true I see things in a certain way. But I'm willing to thrash out some definitions and explore whether you have a strong or a weak case. Rhetorical conflation? But do you seriously think atheists are sophists? Just trying to score points, cheat at arguments if we have to. You do me a disservice sir.

It was the philosophers who told the scientist that metaphysics was nonsense. Science just took that ball and ran with it gleefully. And what is wrong with that. If they cannot test for it, then what affect on reality does a metaphysical entity/concept have? Answer: nothing repeatable.

Here we see the true hubris of a Mechanistic Materialist, presuming to speak for all science and all scientists. This is the rhetoric of a mechanistic materialist that has a vested interest in espousing his self-chosen religion.

Hmm Ok. There goes that accusation of vested interest again. Can you be explicit as to where and how this passage demonstrates hubris. You are going to have to break it down for me with a bit more detailed analysis.

Actually no. Don't. To make it easy. For arguments sake lets assume I'm a mechanicil materialist, and have a vested interested and I am guilty of hubris, and I do want to talk for the whole of science. Now you don't have to argue against those phantoms anymore.

So rather than getting your teeth into me you are now free to get your teeth into answering the question: why and what is wrong with a scientific approach that ignores metaphysical concepts that cannot be tested for?

No we don't. But then why suppose it is anything else? whilst we are developing our knowledge of the universe why presume it is anything more than one thing - or the minds as described by folk psychology is even anything at all.

Here is the typical rhetoric of a mechanistic materialist: mind is not "anything at all."

Which bit is the rhetoric? The term Folk psychology? Well that is just a standard philosophical term -it is well defined and has bee argued all over. Or is it the suggestion that concepts like intentions, wants, desires, wishes i.e. folk psychology, are drawn from language and society and are not something in themself. It is certainly a philosophical point of view - but rhetoric?

Rob, you might not like my philosophical leanings. My materialism. But your response is of the kind - he would say that wouldn't he, he's a materialist. Well true, But I'm not offering you an empty insincere sophism. They are real points, with some considerable philosophical precedent.

Mechanistic Materialists like Mr. Brow like to presume they speak for all scientists. Of course they don't, but they try to give of an air of affectation that they do, because their metaphysical beliefs (religious beliefs regarding materialism) seek to use the logical fallacy of an appeal to the authority of science to support their special pleadings that their beliefs are "true."

Sorry - I missed something - where was my appeal to the authority of science to support my beliefs? And where did I say anything that made it look like I was speaking for all scientists? I'd be interested to see your analysis as to how you drew that conclusion.

And another thing. Are you certain I'm a mechanistic materialist? Are there aspects of materialism I shy away from? Do you know what these are? You seem certain you have me pegged.