From another thread: @
bluegreenearth: Language is important in any type of epistemology because it is the tool we use to communicate a coherent train of thought. Therefore, we need to ensure the words we choose to represent our thoughts are defined appropriately in order to minimize the potential for confusion. To begin with, let’s establish what it functionally means for a proposition to be true in the reality we all experience. A fact often overlooked in Christian apologetics and theological debates is that that truth is just a word which can be defined by whatever arbitrary metric we want when there is no agreed upon epistemological framework. For example, maybe I want to measure the truth of a proposition by its ability to make me feel emotionally satisfied or comfortable. Given that epistemology, I would be perfectly justified in believing my consciousness will survive beyond the physical death of my body because the proposition satisfies my instinct for self-preservation and provides me reassuring comfort. I could also define truth by anything which corroborates the perspective of an authority figure or dictates transcribed in an ancient text. In that instance, I would be completely justified in accepting the proposition that all fossils are evidence of a global flood which occurred only a few thousand years ago because such a claim agrees with bronze-age scriptures I’ve defined as being true. On the other hand, someone who defines truth differently will have no reason to accept those claims if they don’t satisfy the metrics set by their epistemology.
More commonly, truth is defined as that which corresponds with reality. This understanding of truth seems intuitive and tempts us to accept the definition without objection. The problem, though, is our perception of reality and what reality actually is may not be identical. Therefore, an objective method for determining if a claim actually corresponds with reality is not possible under that definition of truth. The limitation with many definitions of truth is that they are rendered useless by a fundamental and functional purpose for believing something is true. The pragmatic reason to believe anything is true at all is to use that information to guide our actions. Sooner or later, the truth of a claim is measured by its power to inform our decisions under the expectation of predictable outcomes. Decisions based on true beliefs will manifest themselves in the form of experiences that were correctly anticipated. Decisions based on false beliefs will eventually fail in that goal. Given that understanding, truth must be defined as follows:
TRUTH = A label or measure given to propositions which satisfy the requirements of a pragmatic epistemology.
William: What the above does is essentially rule out Metaphysical ideas by stating that the only truth is that which can be established through observing the Physical Universe, and that anything to do with metaphysical ideas cannot be called 'Truth' due to the rule-set imposed.
Thus anything to do with a supposed Metaphysical Universe cannot be accepted as 'true' on account that it cannot be established as true using scientific method.
In that, the position of agnostic becomes invalid, because the language imposed in bluegreenearth's proposal restricts in such a way that 'maybe/maybe not' and even 'either/or' is disallowed, and 'only' takes the primary position.
In this, we then have something resembling a position which is non-negotiable non - faith based dogmatism, which essentially renders debate pointless, in the same way that non-negotiable faith based dogmatism does.
Pragmatic Epistemology.
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Re: Pragmatic Epistemology.
Post #2[Replying to post 1 by William]
Your self-awareness and sensory experiences are limited to that which corresponds with the reality you perceive. If your metaphysical reality is something different from the reality you perceive, then knowledge of that absolute truth is inaccessible to you. However, your self-awareness and sensory experiences do enable you to distinguish imagined things (the conceptual) from observable things (the empirical) within the boundaries of what is objectively verifiable. For example, when you imagine yourself eating an apple like the one you observed at the grocery store, your senses do not detect the existence of an apple in your external reality as they would for an apple you purchased at the grocery store. You can also imagine yourself throwing an apple at your glass window and predict what your senses would observe if such an event actually took place. Conversely, taking the action of actually throwing the apple you purchased from the grocery store at your glass window will result in observable and objective consequences your senses will definitely distinguish as not imaginary. This is not only the case for apples and windows but for everything observable in the external world including yourself. In other words, there are demonstrable, consistent, and objective consequences for various actions taken by and on things which are perceived to exist in the external world unlike things which only exist as mental concepts. Under this revised understanding, you can subdivide “truth� into three categories: Metaphysical truth, Conceptual truth, and Empirical truth.
The “Empirical� truth is represented by the observable apple which experiences predictable and objective consequences for actions taken on it. Because you can observe the apple either through direct empirical observations with your senses or through indirect empirical observations using reliable technology which functions to extend or amplify your senses (like a mass spectrometer or a microscope), it is possible to know you are not just imagining an apple. Furthermore, because the observed objective consequences (empirical evidence) of throwing an object at another object have been consistent in the external world, it is possible to reliably predict the consequences of throwing an apple at your window. At the same time, it would be unreasonable to predict the apple would suddenly stop in midair before hitting the window because you have no empirical evidence of apples or other similar objects having ever behaved in that way before.
The imaginary apple from the example illustrates “Conceptual� truth. While the imaginary apple does not empirically exist in the same way as an observable apple does at the grocery store, you can at least know the imaginary apple exists as a true concept. This is because the apple you are imagining is a conceptual representation of something already known to exist. In other words, the imaginary apple is supported by “implicit empirical� evidence. However, the conceptual version of the apple which only exists in your imagination cannot be substituted for the apple which empirically exists at the grocery store. You cannot gain nutrients by eating an imaginary apple. Similarly, just because you can imagine a window being damaged by throwing an apple at it does not indicate such an event must have occurred or will occur. The only way to personally know a window was damaged by an apple is to obtain direct or indirect empirical evidence from the event itself. Meanwhile, your prior experience with the consistent and objective consequences of throwing solid objects as glass objects provides sufficient implicit empirical evidence for you to know it is at least conceptually possible for a window to be damaged by throwing an apple at it. Therefore, you can know the claim that the window will brake if you throw an apple at it is at least conceptually true. On the other hand, your ability to imagine an apple stopping in midair just before impacting the window does not imply such an event is conceptually possible. Since you have no implicit empirical evidence of an apple or any other solid object stopping in midair after being thrown, you cannot know the possibility exists. As such, the conceptual claim that an apple can stop in midair after it was thrown could not be validated as conceptually true.
If an eyewitness claimed to have observed someone damage a window by throwing an apple at it, you cannot personally know the event occurred exactly as described just because the eyewitness’s testimony was found to be compelling or credible. Since testimonial evidence represents someone else’s memory of a perceived event, it only exists in the mind of the eyewitness and must be classified as conceptual evidence. You did not directly or indirectly observe the event yourself to know the claim is empirically true. However, empirical data from similar events you have previously observed demonstrates that an impact from an object (like an apple) on another object (like a window) consistently produces catastrophic results for one or both objects. You could also reproduce the event exactly as described with an apple and a window to observe that the empirical results are consistent with the eyewitness testimony. Therefore, even though you were not on scene at the time the reported event occurred, the implicit empirical evidence allows you to know the claim is at least conceptually true. Consequently, you would be justified in accepting the eyewitness’s testimony as conceptual evidence to support your confidence in the belief that the event occurred. Unfortunately, your high level of confidence in the belief would still not qualify as knowledge that the claim is empirically true.
Now, imagine someone presents you with an ancient manuscript that claims over 100 ancient eyewitnesses from the legendary city of Atlantis previously observed an apple stop in midair after it was thrown. Compelling as this information may be, these ancient testimonies would still be classified as conceptual evidence for the same reasons already discussed. However, in this scenario, let’s presume various archaeological discoveries of an ancient civilization from the time and place the city of Atlantis is thought to have existed are offered in support of the claim. Unfortunately, archaeological artifacts only serve as empirical evidence for the existence of Atlantis and not for the extraordinary event which was claimed to have occurred there. Nevertheless, you can determine if the extraordinary claim has implicit empirical support to know if it could at least be conceptually true. Unlike the previous example, though, this extraordinary claim cannot be reproduced to know if such an event is possible. No matter how many times you throw an apple, it never stops in midair. Logically, this limitation not only prohibits you from personally knowing if the reported event is conceptually true but would make it irrational for you to believe it was even conceptually possible.
To be clear, the possibility of “supernatural� intervention is not being arbitrarily dismissed here, but supernatural claims require their own objective verification before they can serve as explanations. Unfortunately, every attempt to objectively verify a supernatural claim thus far has failed because it either lacked reproducible evidence or was superseded by a verified natural explanation. Even when there are no known natural explanations, it would be premature to conclude a supernatural cause is the best explanation until it can be verified as a possible candidate. The proposition that invisible fairies used their magic to interfere with the trajectory of the apple to make it appear as if it stopped in midair is not a viable candidate hypothesis even though it offers an explanation where no natural explanation currently exists. Likewise, the proposition that the apple appeared to stop in midair after it encountered a temporary supernatural force-field also serves as an explanation yet is equally inadmissible as a candidate hypothesis. This is because it is impossible to falsify either supernatural claim. As such, there is no way to know which supernatural explanation is superior to the other since neither can be ruled out. Furthermore, there is no mechanism by which you can rule out the possibility that some natural explanation does exist but has yet to be discovered.
On the other hand, if you have ever observed and understood how illusions occur, then that experience and knowledge will serve as conceptual and implicit empirical evidence for the alternative claim which suggests large groups of people can misperceive an event. Illusions can occur naturally as is the case for mirages and can also result from natural invisible forces like magnetism. Of course, a skilled illusionists can also artificially cause large groups of people to misperceive an event using “sleight of hand� techniques or clever applications of technology. Although you could not know if this alternative explanation for the reported claim is empirically true, it is at least conceptually possible for those ancient eyewitnesses to have misperceived the event in such a way that it appeared to them as though an apple stopped in midair after it was thrown. If someone could demonstrate how the misperception could occur, then that demonstration would serve to validate the misperception hypothesis as conceptually true. No matter how implausible it might seem, the misperception claim should be preferred over the supernatural claim since it can be replicated either naturally or artificially.
“Metaphysical� truth, meanwhile, is represented by the absolute reality of the observable apple and everything else you perceive as existing in the external world. If the apple is just a sophisticated virtual component of an elaborately simulated environment which your senses interpret as an external world, then that would be the metaphysical truth under those circumstances. Conversely, if the apple and everything else in the observable external world absolutely exists independent of your perception of them, then that would be the metaphysical truth. However, as previously demonstrated, the unresolvable problem of hard solipsism makes it impossible for you to know if the apple exists as part of an elaborate virtual world your mind interprets as an external reality or exists independently of your perception of it.
At best, you can evaluate the logical consistency of a metaphysical claim about the apple’s absolute reality from a philosophical perspective to determine if it could at least be conceptually possible, but no quantity or quality of valid philosophical arguments will ever demonstrate the metaphysical truth of the apple’s existence. For instance, it is valid to argue that it is logically possible for the apple and everything else you perceive as existing in the external world to be part of an elaborate simulation, but the problem of hard solipsism still prohibits you from validating if the claim is metaphysically true. It is pragmatic to realize, though, that regardless of what you believe about the metaphysical truth of the observable apple, the empirical consequences of throwing that apple at your window in the reality you experience are still predictable and knowable. In other words, conceptual and empirical truths which can be known are all that is needed to inform your decisions in the reality you perceive even without having access to metaphysical truths.
Your self-awareness and sensory experiences are limited to that which corresponds with the reality you perceive. If your metaphysical reality is something different from the reality you perceive, then knowledge of that absolute truth is inaccessible to you. However, your self-awareness and sensory experiences do enable you to distinguish imagined things (the conceptual) from observable things (the empirical) within the boundaries of what is objectively verifiable. For example, when you imagine yourself eating an apple like the one you observed at the grocery store, your senses do not detect the existence of an apple in your external reality as they would for an apple you purchased at the grocery store. You can also imagine yourself throwing an apple at your glass window and predict what your senses would observe if such an event actually took place. Conversely, taking the action of actually throwing the apple you purchased from the grocery store at your glass window will result in observable and objective consequences your senses will definitely distinguish as not imaginary. This is not only the case for apples and windows but for everything observable in the external world including yourself. In other words, there are demonstrable, consistent, and objective consequences for various actions taken by and on things which are perceived to exist in the external world unlike things which only exist as mental concepts. Under this revised understanding, you can subdivide “truth� into three categories: Metaphysical truth, Conceptual truth, and Empirical truth.
The “Empirical� truth is represented by the observable apple which experiences predictable and objective consequences for actions taken on it. Because you can observe the apple either through direct empirical observations with your senses or through indirect empirical observations using reliable technology which functions to extend or amplify your senses (like a mass spectrometer or a microscope), it is possible to know you are not just imagining an apple. Furthermore, because the observed objective consequences (empirical evidence) of throwing an object at another object have been consistent in the external world, it is possible to reliably predict the consequences of throwing an apple at your window. At the same time, it would be unreasonable to predict the apple would suddenly stop in midair before hitting the window because you have no empirical evidence of apples or other similar objects having ever behaved in that way before.
The imaginary apple from the example illustrates “Conceptual� truth. While the imaginary apple does not empirically exist in the same way as an observable apple does at the grocery store, you can at least know the imaginary apple exists as a true concept. This is because the apple you are imagining is a conceptual representation of something already known to exist. In other words, the imaginary apple is supported by “implicit empirical� evidence. However, the conceptual version of the apple which only exists in your imagination cannot be substituted for the apple which empirically exists at the grocery store. You cannot gain nutrients by eating an imaginary apple. Similarly, just because you can imagine a window being damaged by throwing an apple at it does not indicate such an event must have occurred or will occur. The only way to personally know a window was damaged by an apple is to obtain direct or indirect empirical evidence from the event itself. Meanwhile, your prior experience with the consistent and objective consequences of throwing solid objects as glass objects provides sufficient implicit empirical evidence for you to know it is at least conceptually possible for a window to be damaged by throwing an apple at it. Therefore, you can know the claim that the window will brake if you throw an apple at it is at least conceptually true. On the other hand, your ability to imagine an apple stopping in midair just before impacting the window does not imply such an event is conceptually possible. Since you have no implicit empirical evidence of an apple or any other solid object stopping in midair after being thrown, you cannot know the possibility exists. As such, the conceptual claim that an apple can stop in midair after it was thrown could not be validated as conceptually true.
If an eyewitness claimed to have observed someone damage a window by throwing an apple at it, you cannot personally know the event occurred exactly as described just because the eyewitness’s testimony was found to be compelling or credible. Since testimonial evidence represents someone else’s memory of a perceived event, it only exists in the mind of the eyewitness and must be classified as conceptual evidence. You did not directly or indirectly observe the event yourself to know the claim is empirically true. However, empirical data from similar events you have previously observed demonstrates that an impact from an object (like an apple) on another object (like a window) consistently produces catastrophic results for one or both objects. You could also reproduce the event exactly as described with an apple and a window to observe that the empirical results are consistent with the eyewitness testimony. Therefore, even though you were not on scene at the time the reported event occurred, the implicit empirical evidence allows you to know the claim is at least conceptually true. Consequently, you would be justified in accepting the eyewitness’s testimony as conceptual evidence to support your confidence in the belief that the event occurred. Unfortunately, your high level of confidence in the belief would still not qualify as knowledge that the claim is empirically true.
Now, imagine someone presents you with an ancient manuscript that claims over 100 ancient eyewitnesses from the legendary city of Atlantis previously observed an apple stop in midair after it was thrown. Compelling as this information may be, these ancient testimonies would still be classified as conceptual evidence for the same reasons already discussed. However, in this scenario, let’s presume various archaeological discoveries of an ancient civilization from the time and place the city of Atlantis is thought to have existed are offered in support of the claim. Unfortunately, archaeological artifacts only serve as empirical evidence for the existence of Atlantis and not for the extraordinary event which was claimed to have occurred there. Nevertheless, you can determine if the extraordinary claim has implicit empirical support to know if it could at least be conceptually true. Unlike the previous example, though, this extraordinary claim cannot be reproduced to know if such an event is possible. No matter how many times you throw an apple, it never stops in midair. Logically, this limitation not only prohibits you from personally knowing if the reported event is conceptually true but would make it irrational for you to believe it was even conceptually possible.
To be clear, the possibility of “supernatural� intervention is not being arbitrarily dismissed here, but supernatural claims require their own objective verification before they can serve as explanations. Unfortunately, every attempt to objectively verify a supernatural claim thus far has failed because it either lacked reproducible evidence or was superseded by a verified natural explanation. Even when there are no known natural explanations, it would be premature to conclude a supernatural cause is the best explanation until it can be verified as a possible candidate. The proposition that invisible fairies used their magic to interfere with the trajectory of the apple to make it appear as if it stopped in midair is not a viable candidate hypothesis even though it offers an explanation where no natural explanation currently exists. Likewise, the proposition that the apple appeared to stop in midair after it encountered a temporary supernatural force-field also serves as an explanation yet is equally inadmissible as a candidate hypothesis. This is because it is impossible to falsify either supernatural claim. As such, there is no way to know which supernatural explanation is superior to the other since neither can be ruled out. Furthermore, there is no mechanism by which you can rule out the possibility that some natural explanation does exist but has yet to be discovered.
On the other hand, if you have ever observed and understood how illusions occur, then that experience and knowledge will serve as conceptual and implicit empirical evidence for the alternative claim which suggests large groups of people can misperceive an event. Illusions can occur naturally as is the case for mirages and can also result from natural invisible forces like magnetism. Of course, a skilled illusionists can also artificially cause large groups of people to misperceive an event using “sleight of hand� techniques or clever applications of technology. Although you could not know if this alternative explanation for the reported claim is empirically true, it is at least conceptually possible for those ancient eyewitnesses to have misperceived the event in such a way that it appeared to them as though an apple stopped in midair after it was thrown. If someone could demonstrate how the misperception could occur, then that demonstration would serve to validate the misperception hypothesis as conceptually true. No matter how implausible it might seem, the misperception claim should be preferred over the supernatural claim since it can be replicated either naturally or artificially.
“Metaphysical� truth, meanwhile, is represented by the absolute reality of the observable apple and everything else you perceive as existing in the external world. If the apple is just a sophisticated virtual component of an elaborately simulated environment which your senses interpret as an external world, then that would be the metaphysical truth under those circumstances. Conversely, if the apple and everything else in the observable external world absolutely exists independent of your perception of them, then that would be the metaphysical truth. However, as previously demonstrated, the unresolvable problem of hard solipsism makes it impossible for you to know if the apple exists as part of an elaborate virtual world your mind interprets as an external reality or exists independently of your perception of it.
At best, you can evaluate the logical consistency of a metaphysical claim about the apple’s absolute reality from a philosophical perspective to determine if it could at least be conceptually possible, but no quantity or quality of valid philosophical arguments will ever demonstrate the metaphysical truth of the apple’s existence. For instance, it is valid to argue that it is logically possible for the apple and everything else you perceive as existing in the external world to be part of an elaborate simulation, but the problem of hard solipsism still prohibits you from validating if the claim is metaphysically true. It is pragmatic to realize, though, that regardless of what you believe about the metaphysical truth of the observable apple, the empirical consequences of throwing that apple at your window in the reality you experience are still predictable and knowable. In other words, conceptual and empirical truths which can be known are all that is needed to inform your decisions in the reality you perceive even without having access to metaphysical truths.
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William
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Re: Pragmatic Epistemology.
Post #3[Replying to post 2]
bluegreenearth:(See post #2)
William: What you have written confirms my observations which are laid out in the OP.
Specifically:
In this, we then have something resembling a position which is non-negotiable non - faith based dogmatism, which essentially renders debate pointless, in the same way that non-negotiable faith based dogmatism does.
Do you agree with the above, in bold, bluegreenearth?
bluegreenearth:(See post #2)
William: What you have written confirms my observations which are laid out in the OP.
Specifically:
In this, we then have something resembling a position which is non-negotiable non - faith based dogmatism, which essentially renders debate pointless, in the same way that non-negotiable faith based dogmatism does.
Do you agree with the above, in bold, bluegreenearth?
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bluegreenearth
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Re: Pragmatic Epistemology.
Post #4The word “faith� generates a disproportionate amount of confusion in conversations about epistemology. Colloquially, the word “faith� is interchangeable with the word “trust.� The accusation that we all exhibit faith in our sources of knowledge is grounded on an equivocation with the concept of trust. If the meaning of “faith� always directly paralleled the meaning of “trust�, then it would resolve much confusion assuming everyone has the same understanding of what it means to trust. For example, you might trust an apple exists at the grocery store despite the fact that you are not on location to observe it. The foundation of your trust in this case is based on implicit empirical evidence you have collected from previous visits to the grocery store where you consistently observed apples in the produce section. Therefore, the application of faith here is reasonable because it refers to a conceptual truth as supported by an implicit empirical foundation. However, having a reasonable faith in a claim does not mean the claim is empirically true or that you can claim to know it is empirically true.William wrote: [Replying to post 2]
bluegreenearth:(See post #2)
William: What you have written confirms my observations which are laid out in the OP.
Specifically:
In this, we then have something resembling a position which is non-negotiable non - faith based dogmatism, which essentially renders debate pointless, in the same way that non-negotiable faith based dogmatism does.
Do you agree with the above, in bold, bluegreenearth?
Conversely, if you had no prior knowledge of apples being sold at the grocery store, you would lack the implicit empirical foundation upon which your faith in the claim would be justified. Likewise, if your prior experiences with grocery stores were that they never maintained a supply of apples in the produce section, trusting the aforementioned claim would not be reasonable because the implicit empirical evidence contradicts it. Similarly, if a grocery store advertises an apple for sale with the capability of stopping in midair after it is thrown, you would have neither a conceptual nor implicit empirical basis to have faith in the advertisement. In fact, the available conceptual and implicit empirical evidence would better justify faith in the alternative claim which suggests the grocery store is advertising an optical illusion which creates the misperception of an apple stopping in midair.
Now, consider how the word “faith� is used in the following statement, “It is by faith I know the apple stopped in midair after it was thrown.� Here, faith is given as the method (epistemology) used to distinguish knowledge from belief. When the word “trust� is substituted for the word “faith� in this context, the statement suggests I acquired such knowledge by trusting the event happened exactly as described. However, there is no objective reason given to justify why that particular claim should be trusted. Therefore, my decision to trust the claim must have either been arbitrary or influenced by some form of undisclosed bias. As such, I could have equally chosen not to trust that particular claim for some arbitrary or biased reason and applied my faith towards another competing or contradictory claim instead. This ability to achieve two different or contradictory conclusions through the application of the same method exposes the unreliability of using faith as an epistemological foundation for acquiring a functional knowledge base.
So, I'm not describing a non-negotiable position. We can debate whether a faith claim about metaphysical truth could at least be conceptually true as previously indicated.
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Re: Pragmatic Epistemology.
Post #5[Replying to post 4]
William: What you have written confirms my observations which are laid out in the OP.
Specifically:
In this, we then have something resembling a position which is non-negotiable non - faith based dogmatism, which essentially renders debate pointless, in the same way that non-negotiable faith based dogmatism does.
Do you agree with the above, in bold, bluegreenearth?
bluegreenearth: The word “faith� generates a disproportionate amount of confusion in conversations about epistemology. Colloquially, the word “faith� is interchangeable with the word “trust.� The accusation that we all exhibit faith in our sources of knowledge is grounded on an equivocation with the concept of trust.
William: I have not stated that you are speaking about faith, so no need for you to argue that faith and trust are the same thing, bluegreenearth.
The OP specifically speaks to Pragmatic Epistemology being as impotent a device for debate against anything to do with a supposed Metaphysical Universe as the Pragmatic Epistemology position is similar to a faith-based position which is non-negotiable
Dealing with the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope and the distinction between justified belief and opinion sensibly and realistically in a way that is based on practical rather than theoretical considerations places one in a position whereby debating Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs, cannot be achieved.
This because, Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs are outside of the scope of Pragmatic Epistemology.
So yes, you are describing a non-negotiable position, in relation to Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs.
bluegreenearth: We can debate whether a faith claim about metaphysical truth could at least be conceptually true as previously indicated.
William: Certainly we can, but that is not the OP observation of Pragmatic Epistemology.
Indeed, even if the faith was removed and no claim was made as to truth regarding Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs, I don't see how one can debate anything to do with a supposed Metaphysical Universe, from a position of Pragmatic Epistemology.
William: What you have written confirms my observations which are laid out in the OP.
Specifically:
In this, we then have something resembling a position which is non-negotiable non - faith based dogmatism, which essentially renders debate pointless, in the same way that non-negotiable faith based dogmatism does.
Do you agree with the above, in bold, bluegreenearth?
bluegreenearth: The word “faith� generates a disproportionate amount of confusion in conversations about epistemology. Colloquially, the word “faith� is interchangeable with the word “trust.� The accusation that we all exhibit faith in our sources of knowledge is grounded on an equivocation with the concept of trust.
William: I have not stated that you are speaking about faith, so no need for you to argue that faith and trust are the same thing, bluegreenearth.
The OP specifically speaks to Pragmatic Epistemology being as impotent a device for debate against anything to do with a supposed Metaphysical Universe as the Pragmatic Epistemology position is similar to a faith-based position which is non-negotiable
Dealing with the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope and the distinction between justified belief and opinion sensibly and realistically in a way that is based on practical rather than theoretical considerations places one in a position whereby debating Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs, cannot be achieved.
This because, Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs are outside of the scope of Pragmatic Epistemology.
So yes, you are describing a non-negotiable position, in relation to Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs.
bluegreenearth: We can debate whether a faith claim about metaphysical truth could at least be conceptually true as previously indicated.
William: Certainly we can, but that is not the OP observation of Pragmatic Epistemology.
Indeed, even if the faith was removed and no claim was made as to truth regarding Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs, I don't see how one can debate anything to do with a supposed Metaphysical Universe, from a position of Pragmatic Epistemology.
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Re: Pragmatic Epistemology.
Post #6William wrote: [Replying to post 4]
This because, Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs are outside of the scope of Pragmatic Epistemology.
So yes, you are describing a non-negotiable position, in relation to Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs.
That is precisely my point. In relation to metaphysical ideas and beliefs, there doesn't appear to be any way for anyone to properly debate these issue from any epistemological framework. Therefore, I suggest people default to a pragmatic epistemology as the best and only option for developing a functional knowledge base. This is because metaphysical knowledge is not an essential component of a functional knowledge base for the simple reason that it doesn't inform any decision we could make in the reality we perceive.
Once again, this is precisely my point. I am recommending the adoption of a Pragmatic Epistemology as the foundation for knowledge because attempting to justify metaphysical knowledge using any epistemology is a waste of time.Indeed, even if the faith was removed and no claim was made as to truth regarding Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs, I don't see how one can debate anything to do with a supposed Metaphysical Universe, from a position of Pragmatic Epistemology.
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William
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Re: Pragmatic Epistemology.
Post #7William: Indeed, even if the faith was removed and no claim was made as to truth regarding Metaphysical Ideas and Beliefs, I don't see how one can debate anything to do with a supposed Metaphysical Universe, from a position of Pragmatic Epistemology.
bluegreenearth: Once again, this is precisely my point. I am recommending the adoption of a Pragmatic Epistemology as the foundation for knowledge because attempting to justify metaphysical knowledge using any epistemology is a waste of time.
William: Epistemology is the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope, and the distinction between justified belief and opinion.
I see no reason that Metaphysical Ideas cannot be debated, discussed etc within the scope of epistemology as defined above.
It is the 'pragmatic' coupled to that, which I think, renders such debating, pointless.
I think that we are existing within an extremely interesting and complex simulation. Such an idea falls under the heading "Metaphysical", but there are still valid reasons for it being a justified understanding, rather than simply an opinion.
[yt][/yt]
bluegreenearth: Once again, this is precisely my point. I am recommending the adoption of a Pragmatic Epistemology as the foundation for knowledge because attempting to justify metaphysical knowledge using any epistemology is a waste of time.
William: Epistemology is the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope, and the distinction between justified belief and opinion.
I see no reason that Metaphysical Ideas cannot be debated, discussed etc within the scope of epistemology as defined above.
It is the 'pragmatic' coupled to that, which I think, renders such debating, pointless.
I think that we are existing within an extremely interesting and complex simulation. Such an idea falls under the heading "Metaphysical", but there are still valid reasons for it being a justified understanding, rather than simply an opinion.
[yt][/yt]
