I am seriously questioning my atheism

[Haven]

Disclaimer: This post may be out of place on the Christianity and Apologetics forum (even though it does have some relation to Christianity), if it is, I apologize and ask that it be moved to a more appropriate place on the forum. However, I do intend this thread to be a discussion, if not a debate, so I felt this was the best place for it.

As many of you know, I am an ex-evangelical Christian and a current atheist. By "atheist," I mean I lack belief in god(s) of any kind, although I do not assert that there are definitely no gods. Since departing from Christianity, everything has made so much more sense: an eternal Universe (defined as the totality of natural existence) explained existence, evolution explained the diversity of life on earth, the absence of god(s) explained the problems of evil, inconsistent revelation, and so on.

However, there is one thing that I have been unable to account for under atheism: morality. Atheists almost invariably state that moral values and duties are not objective facts, but are simply subjective statements of preference and have no ontological value. That is, of course, until we are presented with cases of true evil, such as the Holocaust, the atrocities of Pol Pot, or the horrible psychopathic serial killings of individuals like Jeffery Dahmer. Then we as atheists tacitly appeal to objective moral values and duties, saying that individuals who commit should be severely punished (even executed) for doing "evil," saying that they "knew right from wrong." But if right and wrong are simply statements of subjective opinion, then how can we say that others knew "right from wrong" and are accountable for their actions? If relativism is true, they simply had differing opinions from the majority of human beings. However, it seems obvious to me (and to the vast majority of others, theist and atheist alike) that this is absurd -- the monsters who carried out the aforementioned acts really, objectively did evil.

Given this, the only reasonable conclusion is that moral facts and imperatives exist.

However, atheism appears to offer no framework for moral facts. Because of this, a few weeks ago, I started up a discussion on Wielenbergian moral realism, which states that objective moral values are simply "brute facts" that exist without any explanation. However, others rightly pointed out that the existence of "brute facts" is ontologically problematic and that the best explanation (on atheism) is that morality is simply subjective. Additionally, even if atheistic moral facts existed, the Humeian problem of deriving an "ought" from an "is" would preclude them from acting as moral imperatives; commands which human beings are obligated to follow.

In light of these airtight logical objections to atheistic moral realism, I was forced to abandon my position on moral facts and tentatively adopt moral relativism. However, relativism still seems problematic. After all, if morality is subjective, no one person can accuse another of failing to recognize the difference between "right and wrong," however, it is obvious to me (and, I would suspect, to other atheists as well) that right or wrong really objectively (not subjectively) exist.

The only rational conclusion I can seem to come up with is that there is a (are) transcendent moral lawgiver(s) who both grounds moral facts and issues binding moral commands on all humanity; i.e., God(s). This echoes evangelical Christian philosopher William Lane Craig's moral argument, which syllogism reads:

Premise 1: If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
Premise 2: Objective moral values and duties do exist
Conclusion: Therefore, God exists

Premises 1 and 2 seem bulletproof -- (1) was demonstrated earlier in this post, leaving (2) as the only premise to attack. However, (2) seems to be as obvious as a hand in front of my face. The conclusion necessarily follows from (1) and (2), so is there any rational reason for me to reject the conclusion of the argument?

Remember, I am no believer of any kind. I am a staunch, educated, informed atheist, and I am well aware of the philosophical arguments against God(s), such as the problem of evil, the dysteleological argument, the problem of omniscience, etc. I'm also well aware of the plentiful empirical evidence against the existence of God(s), for instance, evolution, mind-body physicalism, etc. These are the reasons I reconverted from Christianity in the first place. However, I don't see way around this problem other than to accept either that our apparently obvious sense of moral facts is somehow mistaken, or that (a) theistic being(s) exist.

Debate question: Are my issues with atheism legitimate? Can atheism provide a coherent moral framework other than nihilism, relativism, or subjectivism? Do these problems really present evidence for theism? Is William Lane Craig right? Is this a real problem for atheism, or are my (our) emotions simply overriding my (our) rationality?

Feel free to present evidence for or against atheism, Christianity, or any religious or nonreligious perspective in this thread.

[Shermana]

Ye, well, Calvinists...that's an evil belief system if there ever was one.

Exactly. I used to be a Calvinist, and the entire premise of that doctrine -- that God decides who will burn in hell before they are even born -- exceedingly morally repugnant. It is disgusting.

How about them Eastern religions where it's decided who will suffer terrible fates in this life before they're born.

(To be fair, that's also close to my belief as I'm a Reincarnationist).

Could you be a little more vague and make overgeneralizations? Really? All "Eastern religons" from Zoroastrianism to Tibetan Buddhism believe that? Are you sure?

Tibetan Buddhism is one of the worst when it comes to this.

http://www.buddhanet.net/mag_dy.htm
http://www.buddhanet.net/deathtib.htm

For example, if one commits suicide, it doesn't "end the suffering, it postpones it to another life", thus indicating that they believe suffering must be doled out through Karmic experience.

The state of mind at the time of death is regarded as extremely important, because this plays a vital part in the situation one is reborn into. This is one reason why suicide is regarded in Buddhism as very unfortunate, because the state of mind of the person who commits suicide is usually depressed and negative and is likely to throw them into a lower rebirth. Also, it doesn't end the suffering, it just postpones it to another life.

Before the PRC liberated Tibet (yes, liberated), the Ruling monks treated their subjects like cattle and worse, and the belief that it was their Karmic lot in life played a big role.

http://www.lalkar.org/issues/contents/j ... tibet.html

As for Zoroastranism, I suppose one could if anything call it a "Western" religion. I was assuming that the quote in reference to which I said "Eastern religions" did not include it. As for the rest of the "Eastern religions", can you name one that does not involve Karma and reincarnation?

[Knight]

It doesn't "ought," it is

Why didn't you say that in your original reply to me why I asked: "Why ought we to do what it is our nature to do?" You're being disingenuous.

[Autodidact]

"That's a negative view of men, I must say. I think men, as well as women, have the capacity for sympathy with other human beings, even including women."

If that were the case, you wouldn't have 72% saying they'd likely do it if they could get away with it while needing to "talk to the victims". Are those 72% all just conditioned? Are they all evil? Are those of us who wouldn't do so under any circumstance the minority? Were we just stronger against the social conditioning?

They're mistaken.* They believe that the woman might even like it, or won't much mind it. They don't have a clear picture of the suffering they are causing.

They may also tend to see women as less human or less real than themselves, possibly even as evil, just because they are not men like themselves. They may likely believe that some women (virgins) are good, while others (sexually active, wearing revealing clothing) are bad. The more we can break this kind of thing down, and get people to realize that people are much the same, that Bosnians/women/Tutsis/Muslims are not any more inherently evil than us, but, like us, seek happiness and to avoid suffering, and the more we can cultivate our own natural ability to sympathize with others, the better.

*Of course, they may be prone to this error due to their own sexual desire, but I think in the long run they would be happier with a reciprocal loving sexual relationship than with rape. Of course, as a woman, I don't really know what this feels like for a man. As I say, though, I don't think men are naturally less able to feel compassion than women, do you?

[Autodidact]

It doesn't "ought," it is

Why didn't you say that in your original reply to me why I asked: "Why ought we to do what it is our nature to do?" You're being disingenuous.

Because they are two different questions. In one you ask why we ought to do something, and in the other why something ought to be our purpose.

I don't find "ought" helpful, and use it only in the sense such as "If you don't want to get wet, you ought to bring your umbrella." If you want to be happy, you ought to be kind to other people (among other things.)

[Knight]

I don't find "ought" helpful, and use it only in the sense such as "If you don't want to get wet, you ought to bring your umbrella." If you want to be happy, you ought to be kind to other people (among other things.)

But you would not say that we ought to be happy. Correct?

[Haven]

. . . I asked: "Why ought we to do what it is our nature to do?" . . .

This is a question that we atheists simply cannot answer. Appeals to anything other than subjective opinion will be both arbitrary and logically unsound. This is the most frustrating part of atheism for me -- everything else makes sense except moral ontology.

This is very, very problematic for atheism, because it is obvious that objective moral values and duties exist. This is the main reason why I am questioning whether atheism is a tenable intellectual stance.

[Autodidact]

. . . I asked: "Why ought we to do what it is our nature to do?" . . .

This is a question that we atheists simply cannot answer. Appeals to anything other than subjective opinion will be both arbitrary and logically unsound. This is the most frustrating part of atheism for me -- everything else makes sense except moral ontology.

This is very, very problematic for atheism, because it is obvious that objective moral values and duties exist. This is the main reason why I am questioning whether atheism is a tenable intellectual stance.

It is obvious? Are you sure? For example, when Christian crusaders slaughtered Muslims by the thousands, and thought they were doing God's will, or Aztec priests believed they were doing God's will by stabbing children to death, or modern Muslim men believe they are combatting evil by throwing acid on girl's faces, or a Christian believes that permitting two people of the same sex to marry, on what basis can you say, objectively, they are wrong?

Second, if it is true, it does not follow that it's because God says so, in fact, that is the least likely explanation.

[Goat]

. . . I asked: "Why ought we to do what it is our nature to do?" . . .

This is a question that we atheists simply cannot answer. Appeals to anything other than subjective opinion will be both arbitrary and logically unsound. This is the most frustrating part of atheism for me -- everything else makes sense except moral ontology.

This is very, very problematic for atheism, because it is obvious that objective moral values and duties exist. This is the main reason why I am questioning whether atheism is a tenable intellectual stance.

Tell me, can the claim for 'objective morality from God' be confirmed? If there is 'objective morality', why so many religions disagree what that objective morality consists of?

Is God subject to 'objective morality'? If not, how can it be 'objective morality'. If God defines morality, how can it be objective?

[Autodidact]

I don't find "ought" helpful, and use it only in the sense such as "If you don't want to get wet, you ought to bring your umbrella." If you want to be happy, you ought to be kind to other people (among other things.)

But you would not say that we ought to be happy. Correct?

Correct.

[Thatguy]

. . . I asked: "Why ought we to do what it is our nature to do?" . . .

This is a question that we atheists simply cannot answer. Appeals to anything other than subjective opinion will be both arbitrary and logically unsound. This is the most frustrating part of atheism for me -- everything else makes sense except moral ontology.

This is very, very problematic for atheism, because it is obvious that objective moral values and duties exist. This is the main reason why I am questioning whether atheism is a tenable intellectual stance.

Ok, I should perhaps stop trying, but one more time:
It isn't obvious that objective morals exist. Some atheists think they do, some don't. I don't. But for those that do, some think that they can prove the origin and some don't. Just as some people think they can prove why gravity is as it is, others don't. And this is no problem for atheism at all.

Why not? Because the only reasonable position if one does not know an answer is to say that you do not know. If you could prove that there is no possible other explanation other than a god of some sort, feel free to try. But since we can't even define what a god is or how it does what it does or why it is as it is, we are not accomplishing anything by saying "A god must have done it." What does that even mean?

Atheism's getting along fine. Some people, I understand, need to be able to assert with certainty that they are right and, equally important, that other people are wrong. So having a god to fall back on helps to give that sense of certainty. But is believing there's a god just to gain the ability to talk with certainty a rational choice?

I might have missed it, but do you have an answer for whether morality exists independent of the god? A lot of people have asked it in many ways, including referring to it by its official philosophical name: the Eurythmics Dilemma. If gods order one to do an act you know to be immoral, does that make it moral? Or is morality defined apart from the will of the gods? If the latter, how are gods needed to explain morality?

I believe in, but cannot prove, subjective morality. Morality, to me, is by its nature an opinion. It is, however, not "just" an opinion. It is not rendered unimportant because there's no objective scale by which it must be calibrated. It is one of the most important areas of thought we could possibly have and that it's "just opinion" doesn't lessen that, for me at least, in any way.


I should stop, but let's throw out this hypothetical: Let's say I assert that morality is objective. It is a physical feature of the universe. It is imparted by the presence of Goodium. We cannot measure Goodium. We cannot quantify it. We can judge it by its affect on the Universe. We know that Ghandi either had a lot of Goodium or had very finely tuned Goodium receptors (something we also can't now test directly, nor can we imagine currently what a test for Goodium or Goodium receptors might look like.) Conversely, Hitler either lacked Goodium or effective receptors for it. Goodium came about in the universe at the same time as the Big Bang.

Anything wrong with that? What hesitations would you have in accepting my assertions? In what significant way do those hesitations differ from how you'd evaluate whether there must be a god to originate moral truths?