Coincidence and illusion

[QED]

OK, we're all humans here (apart from any visiting bots who are barred from this debate ). That means we all have pretty much the same basic issue of hardware, but each of us runs a different version of software. So when we experience things with our eyes, ears etc. we are quite likely to interpret them in different ways.

Harvey1 wrote a marvelous piece in the When God knows a soul goes to hell.. thread (a source of much interesting debate about everything but the original OP!):

Once I was pondering what God would say about a certain situation that I had encountered, and I was deep into that particular thought (parked in front of a store), a particular message on an LED display lit up with a sentence that perfectly answered the question. So, I don't think it is necessarily in contradiction that God can communicate to us. Incidentally, Richard Feynman had an interesting experience with a so-called supernatural clock:

Once we were talking about the supernatural and the following anecdote involving his first wife Arline came up. Arline had tuberculosis and was confined to a hospital while Feynman was at Los Alamos. Next to her bed was an old clock. Arline told Feynman that the clock was a symbol of the time that they had together and that he should always remember that. Always look at the clock to remember the time we have together, she said. The day that Arline died in the hospital, Feynman was given a note from the nurse that indicated the time of death. Feynman noted that the clock had stopped at exactly that time. It was as the clock, which had been a symbol of their time together, had stopped at the moment of her death. Did you make a connection? I asked NO! NOT FOR A SECOND! I immediately began to think how this could have happened. And I realized that the clock was old and was always breaking. That the clock probably stopped some time before and the nurse coming in to the room to record the time of death would have looked at the clock and jotted down the time from that. I never made any supernatural connection, not even for a second. I just wanted to figure out how it happened.

This raises an interesting question: Are some of us getting all worked-up (into a spiritual lather) over nothing more than coincidences and other illusions? I firmly believe this to be the case. I believe this mainly because of the nature of our minds and the the way they are known to operate. While it is often impossible to dismiss experiences such as those supplied by Harvey, we can do simple experiments to demonstrate to ourselves that we perceive things not as they are, but as we expect to find them. The classic Negative mask illusion shows that what we "see" is informed greatly by our expectations.

Now given the fallibility of our perceptions it seems obvious to me that, like us today, humans long ago would readily fall for such coincidences and illusion and develop a great deal of superstition where none was warranted. I suggest that the world is a regular place with no hocus-pocus going on anywhere except in our furtive imaginations. How, given the knowledge of our fallible nature, can we justify any belief in the supernatural at all?

[harvey1]

Harvey1 wrote a marvelous piece in...

I thought every post I write is a marvelous piece...

This raises an interesting question: Are some of us getting all worked-up (into a spiritual lather) over nothing more than coincidences and other illusions? I firmly believe this to be the case.

Perhaps everything is a coincidence. I can easily imagine that if there are an infinite number of universes having existed an infinite time ago, as you suggested, then surely there could be a 5-minute old world exactly like our own up to 5 minutes ago stocked with memories, etc.. Perhaps we are such a world and everything is a coincidence and illusion, even scientific laws.

...given the fallibility of our perceptions it seems obvious to me that, like us today, humans long ago would readily fall for such coincidences and illusion and develop a great deal of superstition where none was warranted. I suggest that the world is a regular place with no hocus-pocus going on anywhere except in our furtive imaginations. How, given the knowledge of our fallible nature, can we justify any belief in the supernatural at all?

As my 5-minute old universe illustrates, we can always attribute coincidence to any phenomena simply by expanding our state space large enough so that the coincidence or a large number of coincidences can be expected, or at least they cannot be entirely unexpected. In addition, there's a bit of fallacious thinking in your argument:

1. If the world is a regular place with no "hocus-pocus" going on, then people who believe in "hocus-pocus" are being deluded by their furtive imaginations
2. People who believe in "hocus-pocus" are being deluded by their furtive imaginations
3. Therefore, the world is a regular place with no hocus-pocus going on

Another form of this argument is called the Affirmation of the Consequence:

1. If p, then q
2. q
3. Therefore, p

In order to establish your argument, you have to show that "hocus-pocus" as you call it is entirely uncalled for given the significance of the event in question. Of course, it's impossible to discuss every possible event, so you need to establish that your metaphysical naturalism is the best approach to understanding the universe, and this is what all of our many debates have been about, so it is not an agreeable premise by which to base your reasoning. I disagree with your metaphysical naturalist position, so your argument is fallacious in my opinion.

[QED]

I'm reminded of one of your favorite acronyms Harvey: FAPP.

"For all practical purposes" suggests to me that there is a pragmatic standard that should be applied to our experiences and inferences to prevent us getting bogged-down in philosophy. Of course you can construct a philosophical framework upon which God could deliver you a message on your car instrumentation or stop a mechanical time-piece on the demise of a human being. But in the presence of alternative explanations we have to examine the degree of parsimony involved.

I think that it's eminently reasonable to point out a well-known facet of human nature that gives us all the propensity to "make something of nothing". This is more than just an empty expression, it reflects the pattern-matching shortcuts that we all employ in the perceptions we gain through our senses. If we take this properly into account, then I feel we have an overwhelming probability for ascribing what people take to be "the supernatural at work" to coincidence and illusion. In the case of Feynman's story, it is a question of inference based on prejudice.

I suggest that the world is a regular place with no hocus-pocus going on anywhere except in our furtive imaginations. How, given the knowledge of our fallible nature, can we justify any belief in the supernatural at all?

In addition, there's a bit of fallacious thinking in your argument:
If the world is a regular place with no "hocus-pocus" going on, then people who believe in "hocus-pocus" are being deluded by their furtive imaginations

People who believe in "hocus-pocus" are being deluded by their furtive imaginations

Therefore, the world is a regular place with no hocus-pocus going on

You are the one placing a "therefore" in the statement. I simply stated that "I suggest that the world is a regular place..." to demonstrate that with knowledge of the nature our fallabilities, we ought to come down very heavily on the side of the mundane alternative whenever it presents itself.

[harvey1]

I think that it's eminently reasonable to point out a well-known facet of human nature that gives us all the propensity to "make something of nothing". This is more than just an empty expression, it reflects the pattern-matching shortcuts that we all employ in the perceptions we gain through our senses. If we take this properly into account, then I feel we have an overwhelming probability for ascribing what people take to be "the supernatural at work" to coincidence and illusion. In the case of Feynman's story, it is a question of inference based on prejudice.

When you talk in terms of pattern-matching shortcuts as being more probable of an explanation, obviously we are dealing with the size of the state space. For example, I could point out the significance of the clock stopping at Arline's death and her emphasis to Richard that this was symbolic of their time left. We aren't told in the story how often the clock broke, but we are told that he was on the Manhatten Project at the time, and that Arline probably was neglected while in the hospital, etc.. She wouldn't have told him to look at the clock if he was readily available. If it was broke too often (e.g., every week) she probably wouldn't have used the clock anyway. Likewise, it couldn't have broke a few hours before her death since the nurse would have seen that she was dead and the clock couldn't be the right time. Therefore, it is an extreme coincidence I think that the clock stopped working givin the significance of her death and the significance that she placed on that clock (i.e., the time left between her and Richard). Given the significance, I don't think you should fluff it off as an inference based on prejudice toward believing that "hocus-pocus" stuff happens. Again, we don't have a lot of information to go on, but it seems much more probable that the nurse would have noticed within a few minutes that she had died and whatever time she recorded was within a few minutes of being correct. The clock then would have stopped within minutes of her death, right?

If so, then why is pattern-matching or inference based on prejudice more probable of an explanation than the "hocus-pocus" solution? If your reasoning is in anyway connected to being based on your philosophical position, metaphysical naturalism, then that is the issue that is disputed here and elsewhere.

You are the one placing a "therefore" in the statement. I simply stated that "I suggest that the world is a regular place..." to demonstrate that with knowledge of the nature our fallabilities, we ought to come down very heavily on the side of the mundane alternative whenever it presents itself.

But, this is based on your own metaphysical naturalism. I think that metaphysical naturalism is precluded by the fact that material causation is apparently an inconsistent position as I have argued. So, if I don't have metaphysical naturalism to base my conclusions, why should I rule out other kinds of relations that exist simply because they fall outside of a known scientific theory? We know very little about the world, and we (at least "I") experience a great deal of synchronicity, so I don't see why I should rule it out if I have common experience with this phenomena. In my view, there is scientific support for synchronicity in evolutionary processes going back to the beginning of the universe in which unique physical constants values were obtained so that there could be an expansion universe.

[QED]

If it was broke too often (e.g., every week) she probably wouldn't have used the clock anyway. Likewise, it couldn't have broke a few hours before her death since the nurse would have seen that she was dead and the clock couldn't be the right time. Therefore, it is an extreme coincidence I think that the clock stopped working givin the significance of her death and the significance that she placed on that clock (i.e., the time left between her and Richard).

Are you implying that the strong significance of the clock somehow imbues it with "special" properties? This reminds me of the favorite ghost story that has a spook forever attached to the scene of some gory event. Somehow the magnitude of the event (which you'd have to agree is an entirely arbitrary measurement in the 'eyes' of the cosmos) is supposed to continue to resonate in the surroundings.

Given the significance, I don't think you should fluff it off as an inference based on prejudice toward believing that "hocus-pocus" stuff happens.

Where is this significance registered? Don't get me wrong, tragic stories like these do resonate in my mind, but psychokinesis has its limits (i.e. zero effect) and I wouldn't hesitate in saying that not one atom of the clock would be in any different state on account of its significance to Arlene and Richard.

Again, we don't have a lot of information to go on, but it seems much more probable that the nurse would have noticed within a few minutes that she had died and whatever time she recorded was within a few minutes of being correct. The clock then would have stopped within minutes of her death, right?

You really do think there's more to it than the mere material. I'm surprised. You are trading a ratio of something like 12 Hours to, say 15 minutes (who knows how frequently she was visited by a nurse, but more than once every half hour would be surprising) against a colossal assumption about the way the world works. I can't see how we could ever get to the point of establishing Newtonian mechanics if synchronicity represents anything other than a quirk of our perception. Feynman has given other accounts along these lines and, in my opinion, has done an admirable job of dispelling any such notions. The most significant feature of our perceptions is our ability to ignore that which is unremarkable. This means we have a tendency to over-react to coincidence when it does happen. (what was that tale of his about the telephone in the corridor of the university dorms?)

If so, then why is pattern-matching or inference based on prejudice more probable of an explanation than the "hocus-pocus" solution? If your reasoning is in anyway connected to being based on your philosophical position, metaphysical naturalism, then that is the issue that is disputed here and elsewhere.

Because, as I said above, if your preferred brand of metaphysics is frequently reaching into our world to stall clockwork mechanisms and latch binary data into flip-flops in your instrument panel, we would not have the regularities of physical laws that we do.

But, this is based on your own metaphysical naturalism. I think that metaphysical naturalism is precluded by the fact that material causation is apparently an inconsistent position as I have argued.

Yes, well I'm afraid to say that I don't understand your argument and neither, by the looks of it, has anyone else here. Without your help in making your reasoning more accessible to analysis and debate among lay-persons and idiots like me (and I say this with sincerity) we are stuck with this impasse. But even so, I can look around for evidence of the predictions of your metaphysics. Do you not agree that a critical and impartial appraisal of all the so called "paranormal activities" reported from around the world will come back with something like a 95% positive confirmation that what people were perceiving was illusory?

I think this would be a reasonable figure given that sufficient investigative resources were made available. So what of the remaining 5%? My opinion is that this shows that nineteen out of twenty people experiencing a paranormal event are being misled by their intrinsic physiological and psychological make-up. All humans are much the same in terms of their composition so I feel highly confident in assuming that the one particular person was reacting in the same way as the nineteen others.

I keep hearing people talking like this about crop-circles. Yes, they say, sure we know that men can go out into fields with planks and string and make the same sort of patterns -- that might account for 95% of the circles but why can't the other 5% be aliens? Your logic would seem to suggest that they're right to see it this way.

[harvey1]

I wouldn't hesitate in saying that not one atom of the clock would be in any different state on account of its significance to Arlene and Richard (..)You are trading a ratio...against a colossal assumption about the way the world works. I can't see how we could ever get to the point of establishing Newtonian mechanics if synchronicity represents anything other than a quirk of our perception. (...) The most significant feature of our perceptions is our ability to ignore that which is unremarkable. This means we have a tendency to over-react to coincidence when it does happen.(...) if your preferred brand of metaphysics is frequently reaching into our world to stall clockwork mechanisms and latch binary data into flip-flops in your instrument panel, we would not have the regularities of physical laws that we do.

QED, I can't distinguish the above assumptions in your reasoning from the following fallacious argument:

1. If the world is a regular place with no "hocus-pocus" going on, then people who believe in "hocus-pocus" are being deluded by their furtive imaginations
2. People who believe in "hocus-pocus" are being deluded by their furtive imaginations
3. Therefore, the world is a regular place with no hocus-pocus going on

I understand that you deeply believe that the conclusion of this argument is correct, but that doesn't make the argument less fallacious. Let me restate my position, I don't agree with (2) as being universally true. Sure, there are large numbers of people who are deluded by their furtive imaginations, but this alone does not establish your point. You can't successfully argue your metaphysical naturalism by assuming your metaphysical naturalism.

Yes, well I'm afraid to say that I don't understand your argument and neither, by the looks of it, has anyone else here. Without your help in making your reasoning more accessible to analysis and debate among lay-persons and idiots like me (and I say this with sincerity) we are stuck with this impasse.

Open up the thread and reply to some point I made. Let me know what point you didn't understand. I can't reply to a blank counterargument or to such a wide-open question.

But even so, I can look around for evidence of the predictions of your metaphysics.

Well, you can, but you have an infinite number of universes to use as your excuse for not accepting my metaphysics (or some kind of theistic metaphysics). I've tried to address your arguments for an infinite number of universes, but you stopped replying to me. My last reply to you on that subject was here. I would love to continue that discussion with you because I see it as a very important discussion to get to the bottom of this metaphysically deep lake.

[Bugmaster]

As I see it, the argument goes something like this:

1). An event E is an emotionally significant event for us.
2). We have at least two explanations for E:
2g). E is evidence of God (or gods or any other spiritual entities)
2n). There's an explanation of E framed enitrely in natural terms (coincidence, lens flares, etc.)
3). We have a lot of evidence for the natural world, and very little evidence for the spiritual.
4). Thus, if (2g) and (2n) both adequately explain E, then we're justified in picking (2n), by Occam's Razor.
5). We would only be justified in picking (2g) if it explains E better than (2n).

I don't think QED is claiming that everything is a coincidence; however, I don't doubt that many things are. For example, what are the chances that two people at the same sporting event have the same birthday ? Pretty good, actually, since sporting events usually include thousands of people, and there are only 365 days in a year. Yes, that white blob on your photo could be a ghost, but it's most likely a lens flare. Etc. etc., you get the idea.

[QED]

QED, I can't distinguish the above assumptions in your reasoning from the following fallacious argument:

1. If the world is a regular place with no "hocus-pocus" going on, then people who believe in "hocus-pocus" are being deluded by their furtive imaginations
2. People who believe in "hocus-pocus" are being deluded by their furtive imaginations
3. Therefore, the world is a regular place with no hocus-pocus going on

I understand that you deeply believe that the conclusion of this argument is correct, but that doesn't make the argument less fallacious. Let me restate my position, I don't agree with (2) as being universally true. Sure, there are large numbers of people who are deluded by their furtive imaginations, but this alone does not establish your point.

FAPP it does. "Large numbers" of deluded people is an understatement. Large numbers is evidence of our intrinsic human nature. Horoscopes are published in virtually every newspaper -- superstition is rife. What you are effectively saying is that, although we know that hundreds of people do go out into fields with rope and planks to make elaborate crop circles it is still credible that a handful are the genuine article made by space aliens. I am drawing a distinction here between what "credible" and what is "possible".

Open up the thread and reply to some point I made. Let me know what point you didn't understand. I can't reply to a blank counterargument or to such a wide-open question.

But why am I not alone in not being able to get a firm grip on what you are arguing? It takes a certain amount of skill to engage in a purely philosophical debate (and that is all it would seem to be) -- a skill of yours which I don't think is quite matched by anyone else on these forums today (except perhaps for Bugmaster ).

But even so, I can look around for evidence of the predictions of your metaphysics.

Well, you can, but you have an infinite number of universes to use as your excuse for not accepting my metaphysics (or some kind of theistic metaphysics).

Never mind my excuses, where's the evidence for your metaphysics? All I see is coincidence and a vague public assumption that the supernatural exists. But apart from the horoscope column, I can't ever recall seeing a single banner headline proclaiming that the supernatural (that nearly everyone seems to assume permeates the world) has done something definite and remarkable.

[harvey1]

FAPP it does. "Large numbers" of deluded people is an understatement. Large numbers is evidence of our intrinsic human nature. Horoscopes are published in virtually every newspaper -- superstition is rife. What you are effectively saying is that, although we know that hundreds of people do go out into fields with rope and planks to make elaborate crop circles it is still credible that a handful are the genuine article made by space aliens. I am drawing a distinction here between what "credible" and what is "possible".

Yet, you continue to approach this discussion with the same metaphysical assumption: viz. there is no God. Even with FAPP, you have to demonstrate that some of the people being deluded about some obvious "hocus-pocus" things is equivalent to all the people being deluded by all the "hocus-pocus" things they believe. I could make a similar argument against atheism, but why waste each other's time? These arguments that one presupposes their position ahead of time are a bore, don't you think so?

But why am I not alone in not being able to get a firm grip on what you are arguing? It takes a certain amount of skill to engage in a purely philosophical debate (and that is all it would seem to be) -- a skill of yours which I don't think is quite matched by anyone else on these forums today (except perhaps for Bugmaster).

I don't get into any of that fluff stuff. All I want to know is what you believe and why you believe it. I ask the same of you when looking at my arguments. I need replies just like you need replies. I believe my replies are consistent, and I think I can show that they are consistent. I think your replies are inconsistent, and I think I can show they are inconsistent. But, in order to do so, we need to follow the course of these discussions to their natural end. If people stop in mid-stream, like Spetey, then what am I supposed to do? I understand people have more important priorities, but what's the purpose of engaging in a debate here unless you are prepared to finish them? It sometimes takes months to get to the point to where these inconsistenties show themselves, and it's frustrating that intelligent people pull away and then say that no one was convinced even though they have not dealt with the inconsistencies in their argument.

Why hasn't anyone agreed that material causation is not valid? I don't know. They should. The argument was dropped by all those who say they aren't convinced, so if they really think I'm wrong, then why not put forth an argument that shows why my argument is not consistent. Why just say that it is? Show it. Don't just recite it.

Never mind my excuses, where's the evidence for your metaphysics? All I see is coincidence and a vague public assumption that the supernatural exists.

As I said in the brute facts thread, the brute fact assumptions of atheism just don't make any sense. I think I showed this, and to date no one has shown otherwise. Even though Bugmaster has picked up this discussion, it's really not a discussion that has much to do with the OP of that thread. We should probably have that discussion on a more apt titled thread (e.g., "is mathematics/logic real?... etc.).

But apart from the horoscope column, I can't ever recall seeing a single banner headline proclaiming that the supernatural (that nearly everyone seems to assume permeates the world) has done something definite and remarkable.

QED, we both know that we live in a natural world. The difference in our views isn't that one of us thinks that supernatural stuff is happening all over, and the other isn't. The difference is that one of us thinks that causation is materially based, and the other doesn't. That's the difference. I think non-material causes bring about a different interpretation of naturalism. Now, you can call my form of naturalism as supernaturalism if you think that adds to the clarity of our discussions, but I don't think it does at all. My form of naturalism is a platonic law kind of naturalism, and there's surely a great many physicists who believe such platonic laws exist. Let me quote Paul Davies:

It seems that almost all physicists who work on fundamental problems accept that the laws of physics have some kind of independent reality. With that view, it is possible to argue that the laws of physics are logically prior to the universe they describe. That is, the laws of physics stand at the base of a rational explanatory chain, in the same way that the axioms of Euclid stand at the base of the logical scheme we call geometry. Of course one cannot prove that the laws of physics have to be the starting point of an explanatory scheme, but any attempt to explain the world rationally has to have some starting point, and for most scientists the laws of physics seem a very satisfactory one. In the same way, one need not accept Euclid's axioms as the starting point of geometry; a set of theorems like Pythagoras's would do equally well. But the purpose of science (and mathematics) is to explain the world in as simple and economical a fashion as possible, and Euclid's axioms and the laws of physics are attempts to do just that. (Paul Davies, "When Time Began", New Scientist, October 9, 2004)

So, when we talk about my version of naturalism, I think I'm in pretty good company.

[QED]

FAPP it does. "Large numbers" of deluded people is an understatement. Large numbers is evidence of our intrinsic human nature. Horoscopes are published in virtually every newspaper -- superstition is rife. What you are effectively saying is that, although we know that hundreds of people do go out into fields with rope and planks to make elaborate crop circles it is still credible that a handful are the genuine article made by space aliens. I am drawing a distinction here between what "credible" and what is "possible".

Yet, you continue to approach this discussion with the same metaphysical assumption: viz. there is no God. Even with FAPP, you have to demonstrate that some of the people being deluded about some obvious "hocus-pocus" things is equivalent to all the people being deluded by all the "hocus-pocus" things they believe. I could make a similar argument against atheism, but why waste each other's time? These arguments that one presupposes their position ahead of time are a bore, don't you think so?

Well I'm sorry to be a bore Harvey, but I'm going to continue to press you over this. I notice that you keep falling short of addressing the crop-circle example. I also notice that your argument relies on forcing the premise that "there is no God" upon me. For the sake of argument the existence or lack of existence of God is irrelevant to what I'm pointing out: that people are known to be prone to illusions, superstition and reading "supernatural goings-on" into mere coincidences. This is an observation. I've given some (what I feel are over-generous) "waving hands in the air" figures like 19 out of 20 cases of all paranormal reports being traceable to entirely natural phenomena. This being the case, it seems reasonable to make the assumption that the remaining 5% of unexplained cases are due to the same fallible human nature that we are so painfully aware of as leading to the other 95%.

As an analogy, if the power goes out in a city grid, the breakers can automatically reset themselves when the fault clears. 95% of the time the problem will be identifiable to the maintenance crew that follow-up the incident (i.e. lighting strike, cable damage or overload. But 5% of the interruptions might not provide the engineers with any clues to the cause of the outage. What I'm saying is that it is not reasonable to suggest causes outside of the regular events given that there are so many regular possibilities. Any engineer who seriously proposes that the pixies must have been involved would deserve what he gets from his workmates.

But if the power grid was so robust that it had been running for thousands of years without incident, then any sudden unexplained trip would indeed warrant a wider scope for speculation. What I'm trying to capture in my argument is the breadth of speculation that we are justified in applying to human reports given the known fallibilities of humans. For all I care God might be up there laughing at us jumping at the movement of our own shadows.