The only two reasonable positions on the existence of God?

[ThePainefulTruth]

Atheism and Deism? From our standpoint, those two philosophies are indistinguishable. All others can be dismissed on the basis of reason/science since other theologies inevitably have to resort to faith (blind faith) to justify ignoring reason and logic.

[wiploc]

[Replying to post 75 by Cathar1950]

It is not known to be possible that a maximally great being (MGB) could exist, though many may consider it plausible. By plausible, I mean its possibility is conceivable, or that it may be a concept that many easily believe to be possible.
However, plausibility does not correspond to possibility. We cannot assert the possibility of an MGB.

Furthermore, and my main objections, MGB is defined in such a way that an MGB is defined as necessary.
You cannot define a noun in such a way that it is either necessary or having some property entailing necessity, because that defines a noun to be extant in reality.
The modal ontological argument would work for ANY OBJECT assigned necessary existence.
Not only that, but the modal ontological argument is pointless. The moment you say that an MGB is necessary is the moment you've shown its existence. If your definition of MGB entails necessity, then it exists by definition.



A simple objection to the modal ontological argument can be written as follows:

1. If it is possible that a MGB exists, then a MGB exists in some possible world.
2. If a MGB exists in any possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
3. If an MGB does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in any possible world.

(Premise) It is possible that an MGB does not exist

4. If it is possible that an MGB does not exist, then an MGB does not exist in some possible world
5. If an MGB does not exist in some possible world, it does not exist in every possible world
6. If an MGB does not exist in any possible world, an MGB is impossible and does not exist in the actual world
7. A maximally great being does not exist.


Now, either it's impossible that an MGB doesn't exist, or it's necessary that he doesn't.
So, in order to counter this argument and justify the ontological argument, you need to show that it is impossible for an MGB not to exist.

In other words, you need to prove an MGB exists necessarily so that you can use your argument to prove an MGB exists.

Some possible worlds are godless. We know this, because a possible world is any world without logical contradiction, and there is no logical contradiction in godlessness. Such worlds aren't impossible, therefore they are possible.

So, for an MGB to exist in any possible world, it would have to exist even in worlds where it did not exist. That's a contradiction. Thus, we know that MGBs do not exist in any possible world.

[Goat]

[Replying to post 75 by Cathar1950]

It is not known to be possible that a maximally great being (MGB) could exist, though many may consider it plausible. By plausible, I mean its possibility is conceivable, or that it may be a concept that many easily believe to be possible.
However, plausibility does not correspond to possibility. We cannot assert the possibility of an MGB.

Furthermore, and my main objections, MGB is defined in such a way that an MGB is defined as necessary.
You cannot define a noun in such a way that it is either necessary or having some property entailing necessity, because that defines a noun to be extant in reality.
The modal ontological argument would work for ANY OBJECT assigned necessary existence.
Not only that, but the modal ontological argument is pointless. The moment you say that an MGB is necessary is the moment you've shown its existence. If your definition of MGB entails necessity, then it exists by definition.



A simple objection to the modal ontological argument can be written as follows:

1. If it is possible that a MGB exists, then a MGB exists in some possible world.
2. If a MGB exists in any possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
3. If an MGB does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in any possible world.

(Premise) It is possible that an MGB does not exist

4. If it is possible that an MGB does not exist, then an MGB does not exist in some possible world
5. If an MGB does not exist in some possible world, it does not exist in every possible world
6. If an MGB does not exist in any possible world, an MGB is impossible and does not exist in the actual world
7. A maximally great being does not exist.


Now, either it's impossible that an MGB doesn't exist, or it's necessary that he doesn't.
So, in order to counter this argument and justify the ontological argument, you need to show that it is impossible for an MGB not to exist.

In other words, you need to prove an MGB exists necessarily so that you can use your argument to prove an MGB exists.

Some possible worlds are godless. We know this, because a possible world is any world without logical contradiction, and there is no logical contradiction in godlessness. Such worlds aren't impossible, therefore they are possible.

So, for an MGB to exist in any possible world, it would have to exist even in worlds where it did not exist. That's a contradiction. Thus, we know that MGBs do not exist in any possible world.

How can you show what is in any 'possible world' without real world data. It's all find to yak about 'possible word', but how can we tell if any world is actually possible?

[Jashwell]

[Replying to post 80 by Goat]

As I said, "possible" is unexpectedly quite a premise.

The whole point of my counter argument is that if we are to take "it is possible that an MGB exists" as a premise, we should surely entertain the idea that "it is possible that an MGB does not exist", in which case we get two directly conflicting conclusions.


In any case, if they dispute the first premise "it is possible an MGB does not exist" they are saying "it is impossible for an MGB to not exist" or "an MGB must exist" and begging the question. Hopefully this shows why you can't put necessity or existence into a definition (or a necessary-entailing property)

[wiploc]

How can you show what is in any 'possible world' without real world data.

That doesn't make any sense.

It's all find to yak about 'possible word', but how can we tell if any world is actually possible?

By definition, a possible world is any world without a logical contradiction.

[Goat]

How can you show what is in any 'possible world' without real world data.

That doesn't make any sense.

It's all find to yak about 'possible word', but how can we tell if any world is actually possible?

By definition, a possible world is any world without a logical contradiction.

That is a screwed up definition. Just because there are no 'logical contradictions' doesn't mean it is possible. Little things like.. reality get in the way.

Of course,this reinforces the concept to me that philosophy is not interested in reality, but rather fancy word games that quite often are meaningless.

[wiploc]

How can you show what is in any 'possible world' without real world data.

That doesn't make any sense.

It's all find to yak about 'possible word', but how can we tell if any world is actually possible?

By definition, a possible world is any world without a logical contradiction.

That is a screwed up definition.

Your beef isn't with me. I hadda learn that lingo in order to refute Plantinga. You don't have to use it at all. Just don't go there. But to use it and complain about it is like complaining to Parisians that their idea of the French language doesn't accord with how you would have designed it.

Just because there are no 'logical contradictions' doesn't mean it is possible.

Again, by definition, that is exactly what it means.

Little things like.. reality get in the way.

The only possible world that has to do with reality is Kronos, the actual world.

Of course,this reinforces the concept to me that philosophy is not interested in reality, but rather fancy word games that quite often are meaningless.

I don't understand why you're in this conversation. Would you complain to mathematicians that they call some numbers "irrational" but use them anyway?

[Goat]

How can you show what is in any 'possible world' without real world data.

That doesn't make any sense.

It's all find to yak about 'possible word', but how can we tell if any world is actually possible?

By definition, a possible world is any world without a logical contradiction.

That is a screwed up definition.

Your beef isn't with me. I hadda learn that lingo in order to refute Plantinga. You don't have to use it at all. Just don't go there. But to use it and complain about it is like complaining to Parisians that their idea of the French language doesn't accord with how you would have designed it.

Just because there are no 'logical contradictions' doesn't mean it is possible.

Again, by definition, that is exactly what it means.

Little things like.. reality get in the way.

The only possible world that has to do with reality is Kronos, the actual world.

Of course,this reinforces the concept to me that philosophy is not interested in reality, but rather fancy word games that quite often are meaningless.

I don't understand why you're in this conversation. Would you complain to mathematicians that they call some numbers "irrational" but use them anyway?

Because, the thread was specifically about 'Are there more than two reasonable positions about God', which was a false dichotomy. I pointed out several other reasonable positions, although I don't hold those positions. Those positions, and the initial two positions about God say nothing about the fluff and nonsense of 'possible worlds', and other pseudo intellectual pieces of nonsense.

[Cathar1950]

How can you show what is in any 'possible world' without real world data.

That doesn't make any sense.

It's all find to yak about 'possible word', but how can we tell if any world is actually possible?

By definition, a possible world is any world without a logical contradiction.

I find that an unacceptable definition as it should be the goal that any and all propositions should at least be without logical contradiction. Only in some theisms or theology have I found the acceptance of logical contradiction, renamed paradox or mystery.
A possible world is a way of talking about possibility and the modal relationship between necessary, possible and contingent or actual. To be a possibility it has to have the possibility of being actually actual, and closer to chance with overlapping meanings.
Your above proofs only seem to show that you can purposely argue in a circle and for the life of me I can't understand why anyone would start with the impossible as an a priori.
Goat is correct, it is only "real" world data or the actual that is the given, the rest is meaning and analysis.
Goat's charge against philosophy is something many philosophers would agree as many philosophies are not anything we could live with or be useful. Often we see analytic philosophers accepting the same rather contradictory ideas about "God" and metaphysics that have misled the classical theists.
Often what seems to be missing is a understanding of the history or philosophy, but it is also common to not understand the history of science.
One classical theist, after a round of sophism concerning science, even tries to make the unwarranted claim that between science and philosophy we could live without science better than without philosophy thus showing his lack of understanding either, facts come before theory and knowledge (science) proceeds philosophy or theory as experiences precedes reflection.

It took about 100 years or so for philosophy to catch up to the positive ideas in science such as evolution, chance and even the idea of randomness.

[wiploc]

How can you show what is in any 'possible world' without real world data.

That doesn't make any sense.

It's all find to yak about 'possible word', but how can we tell if any world is actually possible?

By definition, a possible world is any world without a logical contradiction.

I find that an unacceptable definition

Then make up your own language. In possible-world speak, that is the definition.

[Cathar1950]

How can you show what is in any 'possible world' without real world data.

That doesn't make any sense.

It's all find to yak about 'possible word', but how can we tell if any world is actually possible?

By definition, a possible world is any world without a logical contradiction.

I find that an unacceptable definition

Then make up your own language. In possible-world speak, that is the definition.

I am not making up my own definition, you seem to be confusing the definition as without contradiction is the goal of any definition or system. What is it that is suppose to be non-contradictory, the possible world? I am not a fan of Plantinga and it has been many years since I have read any of his work, like Craig I tend to see him as more apologist than philosopher, Craig being worse. I recall one poster that made the claim that Craig was one of the top 25 philosophers, I tend to think he might be one of the 25 worse as he is a sophist and where it counts falls back on faith as he knows his arguments fail and reassures his reader that even if all his arguments fail then they too can fall back on faith.
He is also not what anyone should call an authority on time unless what you mean by authority is someone that uses different ideas of time in a contradictory manner. He is confused at best. But even Plantinga would not define possible world as you have and I think you should show us where any one uses such non-descript meaning for possible worlds.
What is being stressed is that a necessary existence or Being would be true for all possible worlds, I also disagree with the idea of a greatest conceivable existence, it is the weakest form of Anselm's arguments where even Anselm had to fall back upon faith. I like the Christian NT "pistis" as faithfulness and trust being largely a response than the Christian idea of belief. But I hold a more Jewish understanding that was not philosophy even if I don't believe there was ever an original Covenant, it was a response to Assyrian ideology using their terms and ideas replacing the Assyrian lord, and god, with the Hebrew Yahweh eventually with Yahweh as king.
But that is another story.

possible world, Conception of a total way the universe might have been. It is often contrasted with the way things actually are. In his Theodicy (1710), G.W. Leibniz used the concept of a possible world in his proposed solution to the theological problem of the existence of evil, arguing that an all-perfect God would actualize the best of all possible worlds; this idea was later satirized by Voltaire in his comic novel Candide (1759). Philosophers have since constructed several different formalizations of the concept of a possible world.

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/top ... ible-world

Given the Medieval concept of deity Leibniz managed to show that it didn't allow for possibility making the world necessary and losing the contrasting ideas of necessary and contingent.

Of course Leibniz was not privileged with our positive understandings acquired through modern science or mathematics to deal with modal logic, the last 100 or 200 years of inquiry has shown many a philosopher to be mislead and it has only been the last 100 years or so that philosophy, at least some philosophers to catch up, Hartshorne tells us they were not psychologically ready to entertain such ideas as evolution, relativity, quantum mechanics or the positive ideas of chance where becoming is more appropriate than being as the way things are.