The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a “possible world� (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be false…or a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isn’t President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, it’s possible.

That being said; let’s turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, I’d like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)…an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying “It is possible for a necessary being to exist�.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because God’s existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, God’s existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, you’ve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting “The argument is not valid� or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I don’t think that you can, can you?

[marco]

When it comes to the MGB, you define it as existing in all possible worlds. However, there are possible worlds without beings.

As I see it, when one takes the statement:

" It is possible that a maximally great being exists " one ASSUMES the meaning of the important word "exists". The MGB can exist in theory. The statement's truth is contingent on the definition one attaches to "exists" and in any event "a necessary truth" is something different from " a necessary being" - the word "necessary" has quietly been attached to being from its previous attachment to truth. Because we concede that a MGB exists in a theoretical world, we don't thereby concede that it exists in all possible worlds, far less our own.

[For_The_Kingdom]

When it comes to the MGB, you define it as existing in all possible worlds. However, there are possible worlds without beings.

The being is defined as necessary. If the being is necessary, there cannot be a possible world without it, because if there was, then it wouldn't be necessary.

You are still, after 50 pages, conflating two terminologies; contingent, and necessity.

We know in the past there was such a world, before the first life-forms arose.

Um, before life arose, there was God. Is that a newsflash for you?

[For_The_Kingdom]

Or, reinforced the realization that Christianity must use ploys and spurious logic to trap folks.

You know, there aren't many times I put "LOL" and actually laugh out loud. But the "spurious logic to trap folks" made me literally LOL.

[Bust Nak]

The being is defined as necessary. If the being is necessary, there cannot be a possible world without it, because if there was, then it wouldn't be necessary.

The keywords are bolded for you. You are still, after 50 pages, trying to define God into existence.

A God is not necessary just because you define it as necessary. IF and ONLY IF a being is necessary, would there be no possible worlds without it. Pay particular attention to the fact that the second sentence is a conditional statement, it begins with an "if."

Recall if you will, who was it that admitted "One can define something anyway that he wants, whether or not the definition reflects reality...that is the question..." And yet there you are defining God as necessary, the way you want, never questioning whether or not the definition reflects reality: You cannot conclude there are no possible worlds where God doesn't exist simply because you have defined God to be necessary.

We have been telling you the same thing over and over again, in multiple different ways. You understands our examples when we gave it, you even came up with examples yourself re: Artie!!! Somehow you are not making the connection to the MOA.

[Artie]

Recall if you will, who was it that admitted "One can define something anyway that he wants, whether or not the definition reflects reality...that is the question..." And yet there you are defining God as necessary, the way you want, never questioning whether or not the definition reflects reality: You cannot conclude there are no possible worlds where God doesn't exist simply because you have defined God to be necessary.

Let's experiment. In the OP Kingdom defines his being as

"omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)"

but suppose he had simply left out omnipresent and only had omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent? What would happen to the MOA?

[Justin108]

Next, I’d like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)…an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The Flying Spaghetti Monster, at least as defined by Pastafarians, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that the Flying Spaghetti Monster is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)…an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

Therefore, the Flying Spaghetti Monster exists.

Amidoinitrite?

[Artie]

The Flying Spaghetti Monster, at least as defined by Pastafarians, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that the Flying Spaghetti Monster is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)…an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

Therefore, the Flying Spaghetti Monster exists.

Amidoinitrite?

Well, then we have two equally great beings. And since Kingdom has defined his being as omnipresent but not in such a way that it would have to occupy all of space then I can see no logical contradiction in having two equally great beings.

[jgh7]

When humans create possible worlds via conception (thought), all that is proven to exist in those worlds are concepts.

If we conceive a possible world where a strawberry exists at some location, then we are being misleading when we say that the strawberry exists in this possible world. We are being terminologically correct when we say that the concept or idea of the strawberry exists in this possible world.

Likewise, P2 cannot assert that a MGB exists in a conceived possible world. It can only assert that the concept or thought of a MGB exists in such a possible world.

The rest of the argument does not follow if this is taken into consideration.

[rikuoamero]

[Replying to post 487 by For_The_Kingdom]

Um, before life arose, there was God. Is that a newsflash for you?

I cannot accept this line of reasoning, because God is the very thing you are trying to prove with the MOA. This, again, is having your conclusion in the premise. You're trying to get us to agree to something BEFORE the argument to prove it has even been done.

[Bust Nak]

The following is meant for entertainment only:

When it comes to the term 'married bachelor', you cannot think of it, conceive of it, is that right? Yes or no?

Of course I can think of a 'married bachelor,' I can prove it too: I can think of it because I can conceive of it; and I can conceive of it because I can think of it.

If yes, the reason being that the words, the definition of 'married bachelor' is contradictory. If one is married, they are not a bachelor.

This is false. A married bachelor must be a bachelor... yet the statement is giving a scenario at which a bachelor is not a bachelor.

If one is a bachelor, they are not married. The terms cancel each other out.

Nonsense. A married bachelor by definition is married.

First, you define this married bachelor as someone who is married and a bachelor, then you proceed to say he cannot be married... which, by definition, would make this person NOT a married bachelor.

So you've changed the person's status from married, to not married, and then concluded the person cannot be a married bachelor?

Wow. And then you claim victory?

/sarcasm